Queen Anne: The Politics of Passion (56 page)

For all that, it was a major advance to have formulated terms for a treaty of Union, and the fact that the war went extremely well in 1706 provided additional cause for celebration. At the outset of that year’s campaign in the Low Countries, Marlborough had been convinced he had ‘no prospect of doing anything considerable’, for he had assumed the French would have the sense to avoid aggressive action. Fortunately his enemy underestimated him: the French Minister of War, Chamillart, pronounced he had ‘only a mediocre opinion of the capacity of the Duke of Marlborough’ and Louis XIV evidently agreed that the allies’ victory at Blenheim was attributable ‘to luck alone’, for he ordered his commanders in Flanders to seek out and engage the enemy. The resulting Battle of Ramillies, which took place on 12/23 May, ended in ‘a victory signal and glorious beyond all expectation’ for the allies, and was arguably Marlborough’s greatest triumph. Approximately 18,000 French soldiers were killed, wounded or captured, whereas losses of troops under Marlborough’s command were estimated at 3,600. As one of Anne’s subjects exulted, ‘It seems the Queen was born to have the honour of humbling France’.
³⁰

Marlborough, who had ‘exposed his person as the meanest soldier’ on the battlefield, had been in considerable danger during the action. He had only narrowly escaped capture after falling off his horse and then, as he was climbing on a fresh mount, a cannonball had decapitated the officer holding his stirrup. When the Queen wrote to congratulate the Duke on his triumph she noted that concern at his undergoing such perils had somewhat allayed her delight, but she unreservedly thanked the Almighty for not only aiding her general to secure this ‘great glorious success’, but also for preserving his life.
³¹

Because the victory came so early in the campaign, Marlborough was able to capitalise upon it in the following weeks by making notable
further gains. Several strategically important towns such as Ghent, Bruges, and Antwerp surrendered to the allies without a fight; other places of significance fell after successful sieges. By the end of the campaign the allies held most of the southern Netherlands.

In Spain too the allies initially appeared to make some progress. They had thwarted an enemy attempt to retake Barcelona when Admiral Leake had relieved the town by sea on 27 April/8 May 1706. Unfortunately the allied performance then began to suffer as a result of personal animosities among their commanders. In particular the Austrian Archduke Charles – or King Charles III as he was styled by the allies – loathed the English general, the Earl of Peterborough, and their mutual hatred prevented them agreeing on a sensible course of action. Although an army of English and Portuguese troops had recently set out from Lisbon under the Earl of Galway, heading towards Madrid, Charles and Peterborough delayed advancing towards the capital from their bases in southern Spain. As a result, when Galway entered Madrid on 16/27 June, neither Charles nor Peterborough was on hand to support him. Galway’s position, maintained by a long supply line from Lisbon, soon became untenable. By the time that forces were despatched to aid him, he had been forced to evacuate Madrid, which was reoccupied by a French army under the Duke of Berwick in August. Galway ended up in Valencia with his men, having ‘made the tour of Spain’ as Berwick mockingly observed.
³²

Despite the disappointing end to the Spanish campaign, the allies could take heart from events in Italy. For much of the year Turin – capital of the Duke of Savoy – had been in grave danger of falling to the French, but loans underwritten by England paid for an Imperial army, commanded by Prince Eugene, to go to the town’s relief. The situation in Italy was transformed when Turin was saved in September 1706, a ‘signal victory’ that the Queen hailed with ‘inexpressible joy’.
³³

In terms of military success 1706 was, for the allies, ‘the year of wonders’, but their many gains could not bring the war to an end. In the euphoria after Ramillies, both Marlborough and the Queen seem to have believed that peace was in sight, and a leading British statesman would later declare that ‘all the ends of the Grand Alliance might have been obtained’ that year if peace had been energetically pursued. In the summer the French put out feelers to the Dutch, offering the allies improved terms that envisaged that Archduke Charles would have most of the Spanish monarchy, with only Naples and Sicily going to the Bourbon claimant, Philip Duke of Anjou. But the allies were not yet
prepared to accept any diminution of Spain’s assets to benefit a French prince.
³⁴

It was also clear that peace negotiations would be complicated by the need to allocate the Dutch a line of fortresses that would act as a buffer, preventing France from invading their country in future. Being keen for his family to regain full control of the Spanish Netherlands, the Emperor expected this barrier to be formed principally from towns within the frontiers of France, whereas others in the alliance envisaged that the Dutch would be allowed to garrison strongholds on the other side of the border, in territory traditionally regarded as Spanish. If peace talks were embarked upon, it was to be feared that France would exploit these differences ‘to distract the allies with jealousy’.
³⁵

By the autumn of 1706 Marlborough had concluded that because France was ‘not yet reduced to her just bounds … nothing can be more hurtful than seeming over forward to clap up a hasty peace’. It would later be alleged that this brought him into conflict with Secretary Harley, who reportedly favoured embarking on negotiations. An early biography of Queen Anne, published in 1722, stated that in the autumn of 1706 the duumvirs began to fear that Harley was beguiling the Queen with ‘pacific counsels’. In 1708 Harley himself wrote a letter lamenting that two years earlier, Godolphin and Marlborough’s ‘pride, ambition and covetousness would not permit them … to accept the offers of [peace] when they might have had a very great bargain of it’. There is, however, no contemporary evidence to prove that Harley was currently pressing for peace, and still less are there any grounds to believe that the Queen had become disillusioned with the war.
³⁶

Marlborough was confident that by waiting a short time, the allies would find themselves in a better negotiating position, and that ‘in all probability one year’s war would give ease to all Christendom for many years’.
³⁷
It was a refrain he would repeat on many subsequent occasions. For the next five years he would reiterate at the end of every campaign that another season’s fighting would enable the allies to dictate the terms they wanted. Unfortunately, despite his extraordinary military achievements, his predictions were always confounded.

The Tories had been so troublesome in the session of Parliament that had ended on 19 March 1706 that Godolphin resolved to prepare for the next one by rewarding the Whigs who had enabled him to deflect these attacks. The best way of doing this, he believed, was to offer a Cabinet post to a member of the Junto, on the understanding that the Whig
leaders would then command their followers in the Commons to support ministerial policy. Marlborough was happy with the plan, and had spoken to the Queen about it before he embarked for the Continent in spring 1706. Robert Harley, however, was against it, for he still clung to the belief that the government could secure the support it needed by detaching moderate Tories from extremist elements in the party. Godolphin considered this completely unrealistic, telling the Secretary the Tories had displayed such ‘inveteracy and … little sense’ that he despaired of them. ‘Is it not more reasonable … to preserve those who have served and helped us, than to seek those who have basely and ungratefully done all that was in their poor power to ruin us?’ he demanded.
³⁸

The Triumvirate’s working relationship was showing signs of strain, but for the moment Godolphin was more worried about winning over the Queen. Although the Whigs had commended themselves to her by opposing the Hanover invitation, she was alarmed by the prospect of granting office to a prominent party figure. On 22 April 1706 Godolphin informed Marlborough that he had discussed the idea ‘with Mrs Morley … but all that matter goes so much uphill with her, that she will hate one for endeavouring to persuade her to half of what is really necessary for her own good’. He was dejected to find in her in such an unaccommodating frame of mind, which he foresaw ‘must have ill consequences of many kinds’.
³⁹

It was particularly awkward that the Junto had indicated that they would only uphold the government if the Earl of Sunderland was made Secretary of State in place of Sir Charles Hedges. Since they were unaware that Sarah was no longer on such close terms with the Queen, they assumed that Sunderland would be more acceptable to Anne on account of being the Duchess of Marlborough’s son-in-law, but this was a grave miscalculation. An affinity with Sarah was no longer much of a recommendation in Anne’s eyes, and in other ways Sunderland was utterly abhorrent to her. He himself remarked cheerfully that the Queen thought he had ‘cloven feet’, and certainly the prospect of having to work with a Whig ideologue, notorious for his irritability and republican sympathies, filled her with dread. However, although Lord Halifax would later acknowledge that he and his Junto colleagues ‘could [have] chosen better’, at the time ‘they imagined it was driving the nail that would go’.
⁴⁰

Marlborough privately doubted the wisdom of imposing Sunderland on the Queen, but Sarah dismissed these concerns. She and Godolphin
drafted a letter for Marlborough to copy out and send to Anne, urging her to appoint Sunderland. Despite his reservations, Marlborough did as instructed, only to be turned down by the Queen. She had already objected that it would be unfair to dismiss Sir Charles Hedges, and although this was a somewhat weak excuse (for Hedges could be put in another post in which he had earlier expressed interest), she held tenaciously to this argument. On 9 July she informed Marlborough that although in principle she was ‘willing to grant any request you make … especially for one who is so near to you … it is not in my power at this time to comply with your desire’.
⁴¹

Marlborough was not unduly disturbed, believing that Anne would give in before too long. He argued that the Whigs ‘ought not to take it unkindly’ that she had put up this initial resistance, but Sarah felt differently. She was indeed so angry that Marlborough felt obliged to remind her that the Queen was ‘very sincere and [has] a great many other good qualities in which we ought to think ourselves happy’. He also disagreed when Sarah suggested that Anne was only being so obstinate because some unknown person was influencing her. ‘You know that I often have disputes with you concerning [the Queen]’, he wrote in late July, ‘and by what I have always observed, when she thinks herself in the right, she needs no advice to help her to be very firm and positive’.
⁴²

Although Marlborough felt confident that all would ultimately be well, Godolphin was becoming increasingly disheartened. The Whigs were not in the least grateful for his exertions on their behalf, unfairly suspecting that he was not making much effort to secure Sunderland his place. They left him in no doubt that if they remained unsatisfied when Parliament met, they would see to it he did not command a majority. ‘The animosity and inveteracy one has to struggle with is unimaginable’ the poor man groaned to Marlborough. To make matters worse, his relationship with the Queen was suffering, for all their encounters were marred by disagreements over Sunderland. At Godolphin’s behest Marlborough wrote twice more that summer to press Anne about the Secretary’s place, but Godolphin reported wearily, ‘There still continues a reluctancy in the matter which is extremely unaccountable after all that has been done and, I might add, all that has been said upon that occasion’.
⁴³

On 20 August Godolphin informed the Queen that if she went on denying his request, he would have to resign. Three days later Anne wrote to him, saying she was appalled he was contemplating ‘such a cruel action’, which would ‘expose me to the violent humour of all parties and
disturb the affairs of all Europe, as well as your humble servant’s’. To try and resolve the crisis, she proposed an ‘expedient’, suggesting that Sunderland could attend Cabinet meetings in an unofficial, though salaried, capacity. When another major government post became available, she would gladly appoint him to it. She told the Lord Treasurer that ‘there can certainly be no good objection against this, and this will make me easy’, whereas, if she was forced to employ Sunderland as her Secretary, she would consider it an infringement of her liberty.
⁴⁴

Godolphin replied the next day, indicating that he did not believe her solution would be acceptable. On 30 August the Queen sent him another passionate letter, putting her case in writing because she feared that if she tried to talk to him, she would ‘begin to speak, and not be able to go on’. Anne explained that not only was she still reluctant to deprive Hedges of his post, but she was convinced that ‘making a party man Secretary of State’ would amount to ‘throwing myself into the hands of a party’. She stressed that she had no desire to employ those violent Tories who had ‘behaved themselves so ill to me’; she merely wanted to give office to men who could be relied upon to support the government, and ‘whether they are called Whigs or Tories, not to be tied to one or the other; for if I should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of either, I shall look upon myself, though I have the name of Queen, to be in reality but their slave’.

The Queen acknowledged that she was particularly apprehensive about Sunderland being foisted upon her because the Earl had a notoriously fiery temper. Anne thought it unlikely they could ever work together harmoniously, ‘finding by experience my humour and those that are of a warmer’ (clearly she was thinking of Sarah) ‘will often have misunderstandings’. The Queen deplored the current situation: ‘Why, for God’s sake, must I, who have no interest, no end, no thought but for the good of my country, be made so miserable as to be brought into the power of one set of men, and why may I not be trusted since I mean nothing but what is equally for the good of all my subjects?’ she cried in anguish.
⁴⁵