Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (44 page)

14. The Board of Punishments had recommended that the runners be sentenced to strangulation for falsely implicating an innocent party. This
would be in keeping with the punishments recently meted out to Ts'ai
Jui, the county constable who had victimized the Hsiao-shan monks, and
Chang Erh, who had attempted to frame his creditor. Funihan objected
that these two cases had involved malicious intent, whereas the two
runners had nothing against 'I"ung-kao. They should receive lesser penalties of beating and banishment. CPTC 856.12, CL 33.1 1. 16 (Funihan).
I have not recovered the document that resolved this question.

15. KCTC CL 33.7.18; CPTC 852.5, CL 33.8.5 (Liu T'ung-hsun et al.);
LFTC/FLCT CL 33.9-11 (Liu Lun et al.).

16. Chiian 43 of the Ch'in-ting li-pu tse-li (Peking, 1749) specifies the penalties
for officials who wrongfully use torture. They are almost wholly in the
administrative channel (dismissal, demotion, or fines). The only offense
punishable by criminal sanctions is use of a certain kind of "casket bed"
(hsia-ch'uang) for pressing a prisoner.

17. "Instructed confessions" (chiao-kung) were sternly forbidden in imperial
instructions to provincial officials; for instance, CSL 815.38b, CL 33.7.24
(to Sacai).

18. CSL818.7b,CL33.9.4.

19. KCTC 815.6b, CL 33.7.21; CPTC 852.3, CL 33.7.23 (Liu T'ung-hsun).

20. CPTC 854.4, CL 33.7.30 (G'aojin).

21. CPTC 852.5, CL 33.8.5 (Liu T'ung-hsun et al.).

22. CSL 816.25, CL 33.8. 1 t (to Wu T'an).

23. CSL 817.24, CL 33.8.25-

24. LFTC/FLCT CL 33.9.2 (Liu T'ung-hsun et al.); LFTC/FLCT CL 33.9.8
(Liu Lun et al.).

25. CSL 818.15, CL 33.9.7 (October 17, 1768). Emphasis added.

26. CSL818.i6b,CL33.9.7•

27. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, 533.

28. On Liu's customary journeys to Ch'eng-te, see, for example, SYT CL
3o.9.5 and CL 33.8.28.

29. The movements of grand councillors during this period can be traced
by examining the signatories of court letters copied into the SYT.

30. KCTC CL 33.9.24 (the court letter) and CSL 819.15b (the open edict).

31. KCTC 270, Cl, 33.9.24•

32. CPTC 860.12, CL 33.10.5. Here was more than a little hypocrisy, considering that Hungli's earlier doubts about "seeking-by-torture" stemmed
from the unreliable information it produced. Vermilion on CPTC 854.2,
CL 33.7.15 (G'aojin).

33. CSL 819.15b, CL 33.9.24. Those punished included Magistrate Tu, who
had released the beggars of Soochow for lack of evidence. Li-k'o t'i-pen
(civil government, impeachment, packet 72), CL 33-11-15.

34. CSK 477-13023-

35. The statement appears twice in Funihan's memorial of September i.
CPTC 860.2, CL 33.7.21.

36. SYT CL 33.11.23 (December 31, 1768). Funihan was not called to
account until two months after the interrogations were over. For clarity
of presentation, I am treating these events in conjunction with the
October investigations.

37. CPTC 852.9, CL 33-11.27 (December 19, 17 68) (Funihan).

38. The analogy is the Bogus Memorial case, in which the then Shantung
governor, Juntai had also committed what might be called an "information crime" by failing to report material evidence. KCTC CL 33.12.5•
The emperor's injunction to "do your utmost" is in CSL 813.15b, CL
33.6.23. Another governor, Ch'eng T'ao of Hunan, was also demoted to
the rank of provincial treasurer for a similar case involving a cover-up
of torture in securing a confession. KCTC CL 33-12-5-

39. LFTC/FLCT CL 33.9.17 (Fuheng).

40. LFTC/FLCT CL 33.9.17 (Fuheng).

41. SYT CL 33.9.28 (Fuheng et al.).

42. The "Temple of Mercy" case was originally unearthed by Yungde; it was
later confirmed by Jangboo's agents who were following up leads in
Chekiang. CPTC 853.24, CL 33.9.4 (Yungde); CPTC 862.19, CL
33.9.8 (Jangboo); LFTC/FLCT CL 33.9.17; SYT CL 33.9.17; CPTC
SLHK 181, CL 33.10.25 (Jangboo).

43. Some "business" aspects of temples and monasteries are discussed in
Welch, The Practice of Chinese Buddhism, 191--2o5.

44. The local terms were mai-sang (bury funerary magic) or mai-sha (bury
baleful magic). Sha meant the baleful spiritual emanations from corpses.
Both expressions meant magic that spread death pollution.

45. SYT CL 33.9.17 (Fuheng).

9. Political Crime and Bureaucratic Monarchy

1. Parts of this chapter were published in my "Political Crime and Bureaucratic Monarchy: A Chinese Case of 1768," Late Imperial China 8.1 (June
1987): 80-104; used by permission of the Society for Ch'ing Studies.

2. See the works by Li Kuo-ch'i, Metzger, Ocko, and Watt in the
bibliography.

3. See the works by Bartlett, Chuang, Spence, and Silas H. L. Wu in the
bibliography.

4. In describing such an integrated "system," if one existed, we would have
to avoid the temptation of reasoning away the arbitrary component of
autocracy by asserting any of the following: (1) that what seems to be
"arbitrary" is actually the conventionalized activity of a monarch who is
himself a mere instrument of the rules, or of conventional values; (2)
that monarchs were largely manipulated by their advisory staffs, who
presented them with few real options for independent action; or (3) that
monarch and bureaucrat were products of a single social system, so that
any apparent contradiction between their roles is illusory.

5. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed.
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978), 1048-

6. Ibid., 993.

7. Ibid., II.

8. Weber, The Religion of China (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), 59•

9. Weber, Economy and Society, 8 18.

10. Ibid., chaps. 3, 8, 12.

11. Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 16oo-18r5 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958),
38-41-

12. Ibid., chap. 2.

13. Ibid. 175-

14. Michel Crozier's classic description of power relationships in bureaucracies illuminates the Chinese case: "To achieve his aims, the manager has
two sets of conflicting weapons: rationalization and rule-making on one
side; and the power to make exceptions and to ignore the rules on the
other. His own strategy will be to find the best combination of both
weapons . . . Proliferation of the rules curtails his own power. Too many
exceptions to the rules reduce his ability to check other people's power " (emphasis
added). The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1964), 163-164-

15. As Crozier puts it, the bureaucrats' "struggle against centralization is not
directed toward helping the organization to adapt better to the challenge
of the environment, but rather toward safeguarding and developing the
kind of rigidity that is protecting them" (emphasis added). Ibid., 193-

16. Ch'in-ting li-pu tse-li (Peking, 1749), 16.11b, 23.1, 38.24b.

17. Charles O. Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1966), 57•

18. On the organization of the Ch'ing Censorate see H. S. Brunnert and
V. V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organization of China (Shanghai:
Kelly and Walsh, 19"), 75-79; and Kao I-han, Chung-kuo yii-shih chih-tu
tiyen-ko (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1926), 77-96. Both these works
are entirely normative and are based on the Collected Statutes. We still
lack an archival study of how the Ch'ing Censorate actually functioned.

19. Ma Ch'i-hua, Ch'ing Kao-tsung ch'ao chih l'an-ho an (Taipei: Hua-kang
ch'u-pan-pu, 1974), 78-84-

20. Under general terms such as k'ao-k'o, k'ao-thi, and san-nien to-pi, periodic
evaluation of officials appears in works as old as the Rites of Chou (Chouli), a text of the third century B.C. that purports to describe the institutions of China's ancient feudal monarchy, and in the dynastic histories
of the Former and Later Han.

21. The early history of the system under the Ch'ing is in TCHTSL 78-80.
The system underwent a number of minor changes during the first
century of Ch'ing rule, but I am limiting my discussion here to the
Ch'ien-lung reign. My own thinking about official evaluation has been
stimulated by Thomas A. Metzger's fundamental study, The Internal
Organization of Ch'ing Bureaucracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1973), especially chapter 4.

22. A parallel system (called chun-cheng) was used for military officials.

23. This system is to be seen in the numerous surviving yellow registers of
routine examinations in the First Historical Archives, Peking. See, for
example, the rosters of the ching-ch'a for 1753, Huang-ts'e, vols. 3861-35•

24. Ta-chi-ts'e for 1751/52, CL i6, vol. 3860; these are county-level officials.

25. Li-k'o shih-shu CL 25-12 (1761), vol. 1076; these are prefectural- or
county-level officials.

26. TCSCSH 91.4 (1742). The young emperor was still formally under the
tutelage of the four regents appointed by his dying father. This edict,
like many others of this early period, was "heard" (that is, probably
drafted) by the regents. Yet its tone is quite consistent with Hungli's later
edicts on the same subject, and there is no reason to assume that it does
not reflect his views. For a similar complaint by Hungli's grandfather,
see TCHTSL 8o.lob (1697).

27. TCSCSH 93.1 (1750).

28. CSI. 295.1 b (1747)•

29. TCSCSH 92.3b (1748).

30. TCSCSH 92.6 (1749)•

31. Save in quotations, I shall use the term "governors" to cover both governors-general (tsung-tu) and governors (hsun-fu) in this discussion; the
problems we are concerned with here affected them identically.

32. That is, those positions that bore all four of the "post designations" for
difficulty; see G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local
Systems" in Skinner and Elvin, eds., The City in Late Imperial China, 314321, on the post-designation system.

33. The Ch'ien-lung edition of the TCHT does not categorize posts according to their method of appointment, but that of the succeeding
Chia-ch'ing reign does. One category listed in TCHT mixes some posts
that were within governors' reach with others that were not, so I have
not included that category in the 30 percent figure. TCHT, Chia-ch'ing,
chiian 4-6, sections on Board of Civil Office. On the categories of posts,
see Fu, Ch'ing-tai tofu chih-tu chih yen-chiu, 91-94. Early in his reign,
Hungli had to issue a special prohibition against provincial patronage
networks based upon regional or classmate ties-a conventional theme,
but no doubt heartfelt: "How can Our Dynasty's official posts be
[reserved for] the peaches and pears [that is, the clients] of private
patrons?" Wang Hsien-ch'ien, Tung-hua hsu-1u, in Shih-erh-ch'ao tung-hualu (reprint; Tainan: Ta-tung shu-chii, 1968), 2.8, CL 2.2.13-

34. TCSCSH 94.4 (1757).

35. TCSCSH 94-3(1755)-

36. TCSCSH 91.4b 0744)•

37. CSL 153.21b (1741).

38. CSL 816.7b (1768).

39. The nominal salary was but a small fraction of an official's total salary,
which consisted mostly of the "incorruptibility allowance" (yang-lien). The
ratio of yang-lien to nominal salary in the case of a circuit-intendant could
be more than forty to one, depending on the jurisdiction. See Chang
Chung-li, The Income of the Chinese Gentry (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), 12-14.

40. Ch'in-ting li-pu tse-li, 1749 ed., 3.15•

41. KCSY Cl, 31.1.13.

42. CPTC nei-cheng, chih-kuan, file 2, no. 118, Cl. 31.2.9 (G'aojin and
Mingde); CSLC 21-37-

43. TCSCSH 93.1b (1750).

44. TCSCSH 92.3b (1749), 97.3b (1769).

45. The special character of the Ch'ing regime, as Hungli saw it, was its
superiority to the faction-riven government of its Ming predecessors. He
was outraged when one governor suggested in 1769 that a special minimum-security prison be built for "official criminals" (to afford greater
comfort to those imprisoned for crimes in office). Far from deserving
favors, these men were actually worse than commoner-criminals. "Yet
you do not scruple to follow the defunct Ming regime's hateful practice
of officials' protecting each other." KCSY CL 33-12-15-

46. CSL 15.30 (1736).

47. "I'CSCSH 90.4 (1738).

48. TCSCSH 95.1 (1759)•

49. CSL 628.6b (1761).

50. KCSY CL 31.6.17. 1 have not recovered the censor's original memorial.
51. Hungli was disgusted when an elderly brigade-general from a Yunnan
garrison, evidently struck dumb by the awesome moment, "uttered not
a word from beginning to end." The man's superior, Governor-general
Aibida, shortly memorialized that the general was "old and sick" and
should be retired. Hungli was furious at Aibida for disclosing such information only when he knew that the imperial eye would have spied
out the man's infirmity. TCSCSH 95.2b (176o).

52. Injen's audience comments have recently been published: Ku-kung powu-yuan, comp., Ch'ing-tai tang-an tzu-liao ts'ung-pien (Peking: Chunghua shu-chii, 1983), vol. 9, 44-157.

53. TCSCSH 92.2b (1747). The official in question was, by the way, not some
rough Manchurian trooper reeking of the saddle but a Han bureaucrat
in mid-career, whom Hungli had certainly interviewed before.

54. I have seen what are probably all the surviving examples of Hungli's
audience comments, jotted in vermilion on the official vitae prepared for
him by the Board of Civil Office. These are in Kung-chung tang-an, lu-litan, two boxes; First Historical Archives, Peking. The imperial comments
are not dated, but as a matter of convenience I have indicated the latest
date that appears on the candidate's vita. Evidence for imperial personnel
evaluation is not limited to audience notes. In addition, Hungli jotted
evaluations on "gratitude" (hsieh-en) memorials from officials who had
just received appointments. I noted a few dozen of these in the Peking
palace memorial collection under the category "Civil government, officials in service" (nei-cheng, chih-kuan), but there are probably hundreds
of them, if not thousands. An example shows that the tone and content
are not markedly different from the audience notes. On the "gratitude"
memorial of a recently appointed prefect, Hungli noted in vermilion,
"He really does know a lot about river conservancy. He should still be
used in that specialty. Sacai says he is not as good as Han Huang. His
field of appointment (chu-mien) should be river conservancy." CPTC, nei-
cheng, chih-kuan CL 45.2.5, T'ang Shih-pi. Besides specifying areas for
future specialization, these comments sometimes indicated the top level
that Hungli expected the man to attain: "An average talent. Will do only
for an easy posting (chien-chih)"; "seems all right for prefect, but rather
a minor posting (chu-mien hsiao-hsieh)." CPTC, nei-cheng, chih-kuan CL 45,
boxes 63-65-