Suleiman The Magnificent 1520 1566 (17 page)

You have sent to my Porte, refuge of sovereigns, a letter by your faithful agent Frangipani, and you have furthermore intrusted to him sundry verbal communications; you have informed me that the enemy has overrun your country and that you are at present in prison and a captive, and you have here asked aid and succors for your deliverance. All that you have said having been set forth at the foot of my throne, refuge of the world, my imperial knowledge has comprehended in detail, and I have taken complete cognizance of it.

There is nothing wonderful in emperors being defeated and made prisoners. Take courage then, and be not dismayed. Our glorious predecessors and our illustrious ancestors (may God light up their tombs!) have never ceased to make war to repel the foe and conquer his lands. We ourselves have followed in their footsteps, and have at all times conquered provinces and citadels of great strength and difficult of approach. Night and day our horse is saddled and our sabre is girt.

May God on High promote righteousness! May whatsoever He will be accomplished! For the rest, question your ambassa-

dor and be informed. Know It to be thus. Written in the first decade of the moon of Rebiul-akir, in the year 932 [February, 1526] from the residence of the capital of the Empire, Constantinople, the well supplied and the well guarded. 4

Though the tone of this letter, if lofty, was highly favorable, it will be observed that the Sultan was careful to avoid any specific statement as to what he was willing to do. Such was the established custom of the Porte, which, averse to binding itself in writing, preferred to communicate the essential things by word of mouth. 5 Moreover the situation in Western Europe had greatly altered in the weeks between Frangipani's arrival at Constantinople sometime before December 6, 1525,* and his departure In the following February. On January 14, 1526, the Emperor had laid down the terms on which Francis was to be liberated in the famous treaty of Madrid, 7 and though the French king did not return to his own territories till the following March, it must have been evident at the Porte before Frangipani left which way the wind was blowing. Europe was now thoroughly 'alarmed at the overwhelming preponderance of the House of Haps-burg, and was determined to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of France as the outward and visible symbol of her escape from it The League of Cognac, formed to serve just that purpose, was not officially concluded till May 22, but the forces which went to compose it were in operation months before. 8 When Frangipani first reached Constantinople, the state of affairs had been much more desperate. There had been talk of the Sultan's launching a great attack around the

4 Charriere, I, 116-118; Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, vol. HI* i, no. 489, p. 801. fi Ursu, p. 34.

6 Sanuto, Dairiiy vol. XL, col. 700.

7 R.B.M, IH, 241-242. *R. B. M., HI, 243-249.

head of the Adriatic against the imperial dominions In Milan, 9 and It had also been proposed to deliver a vast naval assault on the coasts of Apulia. 10 But now, two months later, conditions were very different. The king of France, with the promise of the support of most of the rest of non-Hapsburg Europe, was no longer a negligible quantity. It appeared that after all he might be able to maintain himself in the West. The Sultan would not be obliged to interfere In those remoter regions to save him. He could accomplish what he had been asked to do equally well by a diversion; in other words, by the very attack' on Hungary to which Suleiman's own ambitions were driving him. "The bey of France," as Kemal Pasha Zadeh puts It, "and the Sultan's promise to deliver him from the supremacy of the bey of Spain, were among the principal causes which determined Suleiman to undertake the expedition." u In other words, the real answer to Pavia was to be Mohacs.—Moreover the Sultan was shrewd enough to perceive that though Francis had come to him as a suppliant—the letter quoted above is proof that he proposed to make the most of the fact—there might ultimately be great advantages which he could hope to obtain from the French king's alliance. Over and above the fact that they had a common enemy In the House of Austria, It would give added prestige to the Ottomans'—comparatively recent arrivals on European soil—to enter into official relations with a power as ancient and respected as France. They would thus gain a patent of legitimacy for their conquests In the Balkan peninsula. The friendship between the two powers, which lasted, with some intermissions, for nearly three centuries, was based, much like its

Gevay, vol. I, pt. 3, p. 44 (report of Lamberg and Juxisic, February 23,

)-

10 Ursn, p. 34. 11 Kemal Pasha Zadeh, Histoire de la Campagne de Mohacz, p. 24. See

also Ursu, pp. 37-38.

successor the Franco-Russian alliance of fifty years ago, on a community of interests as opposed to certain other powers—a bond which insured its continuance in spite of every difference of religion, civilization, traditions, and ideals. It was denounced as "the impious alliance," "the sacrilegious union of the Lily and the Crescent," but despite its ill odor it was destined to survive, because it was so obviously useful to both the high contracting parties.

Certainly Frangipani had no reason for dissatisfaction with his reception at Constantinople. Though he had brought no gifts, he was amply rewarded and was treated with marked honor. When he ventured to complain of the murder of his predecessor, the Pasha of Bosnia was at once summoned to the Porte to justify himself. This he succeeded in doing, though probably the support of Ibrahim was all that availed to save him; it is at least significant that it was at this juncture that the famous ruby ring of King Francis passed into the possession of the Grand Vizir, who declared that he had bought it! 12 We may also note, in passing, that wide publicity was given at the time to a curious but generally accepted Turkish legend to the effect that a very lovely daughter of a certain king of France had been captured by corsairs and presented by them to Murad II, that she had subsequently become the mother of Mohammed II, and had been converted to Islam. 13 If this were true, the reigning houses of France and Turkey were now connected by ties of blood!

On his way home Frangipani had the ill luck to permit knowledge of the contents of the Sultan's encouraging letter which he bore to reach the ears of Lope de Soria, the imperial representative at Genoa, who sent his master

12 Q£vay, vol. II, pt. i, p. 27.

13 KemaL Pasha Zadeh, pp. 164-165.

the whole story on July i514 Of course Charles was prompt to make all possible capital out of the fact that the Eldest Son of the Church and the Commander of the Faithful were now united against him; and he continued to do so till the end of his days. But Europe was In no mood to be easily shocked. Franglpani got safely back to Ms master, who at once (July, 1526) despatched him again to the Sultan, with a cordial letter of thanks for his proffered aid. 13 It is not certain that the envoy ever reached Suleiman; If he did, It must have been in Hungary, at the close of the Alohacs campaign. In any case, we know that two years later the Sultan sent back a formal confirmation of the ancient privileges of the French merchants In Egypt. 16 At the same time, however, he politely but firmly declined to permit an ancient Christian church in Jerusalem, which had been converted into a mosque, to be restored to the use of those who had first worshipped there. 17

The Alohacs campaign proved a grievous disappointment to the king of France. He had regarded it at the outset as an expedition which must needs ultimately curb the power of the House of Hapsburg, but its actual result had been precisely the reverse. The death of King Louis had made Ferdinand of Austria undisputed lord of Bohemia, and gave him at least a chance at the throne of Hungary. The territories of the House of Hapsburg had already been greatly enlarged, and promised to be so still more. So confident, in fact, was Ferdinand, after the Sultan had retired, that he despatched George Frunds-berg and his German mercenaries across the Alps to help the Imperialists to sack Rome. 18 Moreover, by the summer

14 Ursa, p. 35.

15 Urso, |>. 36.

16 Charriere, I, 121-129.

17 Charriere, I, 129-131. "R-B-M^IH, 145.

of 1527 the French king was beginning to be doubtful whether after all he really needed the alliance of the disreputable Ottoman whom he had addressed as a humble suppliant two years before. The League of Cognac was doing even better than had been expected of it. Everywhere, save in Italy, the Imperialists were checked. Henry VIII was beginning to contemplate the possibility of divorcing Catharine of Aragon, and consequently showed signs of drawing near to France. 19 The inference was obvious. The Eldest Son of the Church must loosen the ties that bound him to the Commander of the Faithful, and attain his anti-Hapsburg aims through the help of Christian allies. The years 1527 and 1528 are filled with the stories of his efforts to win the friendship of John Zapolya and the long of Poland; but as these only indirectly concern the life of Suleiman, it will profit nothing to enlarge upon them here. 20 Hieronymus Laski, whom we have already encountered, and Antonio Rin$on, a Spanish traitor who had gone over into French service, were the principal go-betweens. In general it may be said that they succeeded well: particularly with the voivode, who in return for an annual subsidy of 20,000 ducats promised to adopt as his heir the second son of the French king. None of these negotiations was destined to bring Francis any permanently important advantage; but it is worth noting that in the course of them neither Zapolya nor King Sigismund showed himself anywhere nearly as squeamish about direct relations with the Porte as did he. The voivode, in fact, who was the protege of the Sultan and was courted by the French monarch, inevitably found himself acting for some years as an intermediary between them. 21

. .,, 247. *> Charriere, I, 158-169. 21 Ursu, pp. 40-50.

Francis, In fact, had got himself into a thoroughly false position, and his conduct of Eastern affairs was marked by a duplicity seldom equalled even in that unscrupulous age. He had no real fondness for the Turk, whom he had only approached as a last resort when he was in desperate straits, and with every effort to keep his doings secret. Now that things were looking a little brighter he was anxious to disavow him—at least until they should grow dark again. His political interests and his religious duty as Eldest Son of the Church pulled him in opposite directions. No sooner had he resolved to devote himself to the one than he was obliged by the current of events to pay heed to the other. He was like the man who borrows money from a shady banker and cuts him in the street. The attitude of the Sultan was totally different. In his case political and religious Interests did not conflict; they coincided. In waging war on the Hapsburgs he w^as attacking at once the enemy of his empire and the foe of his faith; he had no scruples or doubts. He punctiliously fulfilled all his promises to Francis, though there can be no doubt that he had taken the measure of the man; he was proud, frank, honorable, from first to last; he never played the suppliant. While the French king was perpetually short of funds, Suleiman always seemed to have unlimited treasures at his disposal. On one occasion, when things were looking bright for Francis In the West, and he had consequently concluded a truce with Charles and had urged the Turk to follow his example, Suleiman loftily replied, "I will certainly do so, when the Emperor has restored to my ally, the French king, the lands of which he has unjustly deprived him." ^

The nature of the relations between the two was admirably illustrated by the events of 1529-32. The advance of the Sultan on Vienna was one element, at least, in in-

22 R. B. M., ffl, 267; Uiso, pp. iii-iiz.

ducing Francis to sign the Peace of Cambray, in which he bound himself, among other things, to unite his forces with those of Charles against the Moslem. He had been practically sure for sk months before of a reasonable settlement with the Hapsburg; why proclaim to the world his shameful treaty with the Ottoman? And yet, on the other^hand, he was really more than ever in need of Turkish aid at the moment, for in July, 1528, the Genoese Admiral Andrea Doria had deserted him and gone over to the Imperialists; Francis could no longer claim to control the western basin of the Mediterranean. But for the time being he felt safe in the West and consequently continued openly to disavow the Sultan; in 1530 a French fleet of thirteen galleys actually took part with the Imperialists under Andrea Doria in an attack on the Algerian port of Cherchell. 23 Yet, on the other hand, Francis was careful all the time to keep in touch with Suleiman. Their dealings were doubtless secret and indirect; but there is contemporaneous evidence of all sorts to prove that the French remained in good odor at the Porte. The Sultan had given them his word, and he would not go back on it.

After the Emperor's return into Germany in 1530 another phase began. The French king had not been unfriendly to Protestantism in his early years, feeling, probably, that it would be safer to play with the heretic than with the Moslem. He had now begun to pin his faith on the League of Schmalkalden and the hopes that it offered of weakening Charles's power in the Empire. The one thing that would be certain to compose the religious differences there would be another Turkish invasion. So in early 1532 Antonio Ringon was once more despatched to Constantinople to try to dissuade the Sultan from embarking on the expedition which was to be

28 R. B.M^m,p. 297,

checked at Guns. 2 * If Suleiman must needs attack the Hapsburg, let him do so in Italy, so that the French king could reconquer Genoa and Milan. Illness, and the intrigues of the Imperialists, prevented the envoy from finding the Sultan until the latter had reached Belgrade. There Ringon was received with marked honor and was given precedence over the envoys of Ferdinand, whom he met on the same errand. 25 The Turkish historian declares that "his Highness the commanding Pasha [i.e., Ibrahim] spoke to the ambassador of France like a friend, to the others like a lion/' The Sultan himself notes two audiences in his diary, 26 and in his letters of reply he addressed Francis as a Padishah and an equal. On the other hand, he could not be expected to listen to the suggestion of the king of France that he should abandon an expedition on which he had got so far. He politely excused himself for his refusal to do so on the ground that, if he halted, his people would say that he had done so out of dread of Charles of Spain. In the end the fears of Francis were justified by the event. The most tangible result of Suleiman's great expedition was the Religious Peace of Nuremberg, 27 which postponed the outbreak of religious war in Germany till 1546.