Suleiman The Magnificent 1520 1566 (35 page)

So disheartened were the Ottoman leaders by the losses they had sustained that they made a vain effort to induce La Valette to surrender his two chief remaining fortresses —St. Angelo and II Burgo, on the other side of the Great Harbor—without a fight; after its failure they started to besiege them both. At this juncture Hassan Barbarossa arrived from Algiers with twenty-seven more ships and 2,500 men. As he was not only the son of his father but also the son-in-law of Dragut, he demanded, in deference to the names of these distinguished sailors, that he be given some voice in the conduct of the siege, and the differences between the Ottoman commanders were thus perpetuated. 23 Open conflict between them was avoided by giving each one of them an independent operation to

21 The point opposite St. Elmo on the west, across the Marsa Muscetto, appropriately bears the old corsair's name today.

22 R. B. M., IV, 116-117. 28 Hammer, VI, 203.

carry out, but meantime the Turks were getting more and more discouraged. The defenders of St. Angelo and II Burgo fought as furiously as had their comrades at St. Elmo, and the assailants lost four times as many men as the besieged. In the end of August, the first detachment of the long awaited Christian reenforcements was at last despatched from Sicily. The story of the reason for their long delay Is very interesting, but It can only be briefly summarized here. Don Garcia de Toledo in Sicily did his utmost to hurry their departure. His recent experiences in North Africa had filled him with the ardor of the true crusader, and he longed to rescue the Knights. He got ready all the ships and men at his disposal; he perfected all his plans. One thing alone was lacking, namely, the approval of his master Philip II. But the "Prudent King" held back. In the first place Malta was too remote to appeal to one whose horizons were as narrow as his. He had been enthusiastic for the defence of Oran, and for the capture of the Penon de Velez, because they were close to Spain, but he had not forgotten Gerba. Moreover La Valette was a Frenchman, and most of the Order were French, and though the Franco-Spanish wars were over, the memory of them was still vivid. Not till August 20 did Philip give his reluctant consent to the landing of troops at Malta. Storms delayed their departure; not till September 7 was the viceroy able to report to his master that 9,600 Christian soldiers had been put ashore, without loss, on the western end of the island. Their arrival was the signal for the retreat of the Turks. For almost four months they had been stood off by a force of only a quarter the size of their own, and they dreaded combat with the Spanish infantry which was the terror of Europe. They had lost at least 20,000 men, and the differences between their leaders must have added to their despondency. One last attack was tried and failed. On September n

they broke camp and began to retire. The next day the last of their sails disappeared over the horizon, Hassan toward Algiers, Piali Pasha and the rest to the eastward. 24 It was significant that the Sultan gave orders that his fleet should not enter the harbor of Constantinople till nightfall 25

Such was the sorry ending of the great Mediterranean adventure which the Sultan had so gloriously begun at Rhodes, and which he had had such high hopes of continuing and expanding when in March, 1534, he had made Khaireddin Barbarossa admiral in chief of the Ottoman navy. Worse was yet to come, for six years after their failure at Malta the Turks were routed at Lepanto. Yet, curiously enough, these events had but little effect on the actual situation in the Mediterranean. Aluch Ali's recapture of Tunis in 1574 was a telling answer to the Christian victory of three years before, and Philip II was as reluctant to force the fighting as was Suleiman's unworthy successor, Selim the Sot. The result was that the Turks and the Christians made a truce in 1580, which soon after lapsed into a permanent peace. 26 The Turks kept all the North African coast, east of Oran, and also Tlemcen, for over a hundred years; the Christians have held Malta until this day. All this, however, the old Sultan could not foresee. All that he knew was that his last great maritime venture had failed. It roused the lion in his heart, and strengthened his resolve in the final year of his life to revenge himself on the land.

Ever since the death of Roxelana Suleiman had become more and "more scrupulous in religious matters, or in other words," so Busbecq tells us, "more superstitious.

24 R. B. M., IV, 117-121.

25 Hammer, VI, 211.

26 R. B. M., IV, p. 154.

He used to enjoy hearing a choir of boys, who sang to the accompaniment of stringed instruments. But all this has been done away with by the interposition of some old hag, renowned for her profession of sanctity, who threatened him with heavy punishments hereafter if he did not give up this amusement. Alarmed by her denunciations, he broke up all his musical instruments and threw them into the fire, though they were of excellent workmanship, and adorned with gold and jewels. Some one found such fault with him for eating off silver plate, that he has used nothing but earthenware ever since. 5 ' 2T But the Sultan found little real happiness in renunciations. The one thing that could satisfy him was a final victory on the field of battle. The Turks had attained their greatness by their military achievements. Their empire was personified by their army. Everything demanded, after the failure at Malta, that Suleiman should himself lead his forces on one last grand campaign. There could be no doubt about its objective. Maximilian II, the successor of Ferdinand, had not paid the tribute prescribed by the treaty of 1561; he had attacked Turkish towns, and had demanded the cession of others; the local Ottoman commanders called loudly for support. The repulse of the Sultan's forces before Erlau, and still more before Sziget, could not be suffered to remain unavenged. Clearly Suleiman must launch a new attack on Hungary.

On May i, 1566, Suleiman left Constantinople for the last time at the head of one of the largest armies he had ever commanded—probably not less than 200,000 men. It was the thirteenth campaign which he had conducted in person, and the seventh which he had led into Hungary. 28 But there were many tragic contrasts to the earlier days. The old Sultan could no longer sit a horse, save on special

^Busbecq, I, 331.

28 Hammer, VI, 216, note 2.

state occasions. 29 He rode in a carriage, for which the way was smoothed by troops sent on in advance; when he wished to confer with his vizirs, they were summoned to meet him there. On June 29, at Semlhi, he received John Sigismund Zapolya with splendid ceremony. The occasion was marked by the utmost friendliness. Magnificent presents were exchanged. Young Zapolya realized that Suleiman was still his master, and thrice bent his knee before the great Padishah, but the Sultan graciously raised him, and renewed the solemn promise which he had made twenty-five years before at Buda, that he would ultimately place him on the Hungarian throne. John Sigis-mund's territorial demands were so modest that Suleiman unhesitatingly accepted them. It was evident that the enemies whom he had gone forth to seek were the representatives of the House of Hapsburg. 30

From Semlin the Sultan was about to move northward to avenge his repulse at Erlau in 1552, but he had scarcely started when word came that at Siklos, Mohammed of Trikala, one of his greatest favorites and a prominent sanjak bey, had been attacked, robbed, and murdered by Count Nicholas Zrinyi. The latter had been the constant enemy of the Turks ever since the siege of Vienna in 1529; he believed that at all costs the Ottomans must be driven back, and was willing to adopt any means to that end. Croatian by origin, he had been of such service to Hungary that he had been accepted by the Magyar nobles as one of themselves, and he strengthened his position by successive marriages with two rich heiresses who put their vast estates at his disposal. 31 He was at present at Sziget,

29 Hammer, VI, 219.

^Hammer, VI, 219-222.

31 See biographical sketch in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, XTV (1900), 441-443, with references. A letter of Zrinyi of Aj>ril 19, 1566, in regard to his preparations against the Turk, is printed in Gyorgy Fray's Epistolae Procentm Regni Hungariae (Posonii, 1806), HI, 177-180.

where Suleiman had another memory of a defeat to erase, and this, together with his fury at the killing of his favorite, determined the Sultan to turn all his forces against Zrinyi. He was out for blood, and was as ready to sacrifice that of the incompetents among his own officers as he was eager to shed that of his foes. On his way to Sziget he ordered the execution of his representative at Buda, Mohammed a the Lion," for slackness and inefficiency in his warfare with the Christians round about him. 32

The fortress of Sziget was then almost wholly surrounded by marshes and lakes. The only access to it was over a causeway, which was defended at both ends by advanced outworks which were known, respectively, as "the old and the new towns." Zrinyi had plenty of provisions and supplies and fifty-four cannon, but no more than 2500 soldiers. The disparity between the forces of the besieged and the besiegers was even greater than at Malta, and Zrinyi's name deserves to be coupled with that of La Valette. The Sultan did his utmost to inspire his men with the idea that they were fighting a holy war. Appropriate passages of the Koran were read to them, and chants of victory and conquest were sung as" they passed along. On July 31 their advance guards reached the city, and Suleiman arrived on Aug]iist 5. When he showed himself on the top of a hill above the marshes, Zrinyi bade him a formal welcome by discharging a heavy cannon. 33

Fierce fighting ensued during the next two weeks. Dry weather favored the besiegers and facilitated their approach across the marshes. By the nineteenth of August both "the old and the new towns" were in their hands. Batteries, protected by bags of sand, were set up, and the bombardment of the citadel began. Suleiman had been so much impressed by the heroism of the defence, that he offered

82 Hammer, VI, 225-227.

83 Hammer, VI, 228-229.

generous terms to Zrinyi if he would surrender, and when they were refused he tried to sow sedition among the garrison by shooting blunted arrows into the town, bearing letters in Hungarian and German. 84 The failure of these efforts made him more furious than ever. Three successive assaults were launched against the wails, in which the Sultan urged on his men to conquer or die. The first was easily repulsed, but Suleiman was confident that the second would be victorious, for it was delivered on August 29, the anniversary of his triumphs at Belgrade, at Mohacs, and at Buda. Nevertheless it was beaten back, and the third, on September i, was so half-heartedly conducted that it effected nothing at all. What the old Sultan was doing and thinking during these last dreadful days we can only surmise. He had given orders for the laying of a tremendous mine under the principal bastion of Sziget. His sappers had been at work at it for two weeks past, and he had high hopes of the results of its explosion. On September 5 it was fired with terrible effect. The walls were shattered, and a fierce wind carried the flames into the citadel From that moment the fall of Sziget was inevitable. But it is doubtful if Suleiman was on hand to witness the ensuing conflagration; in a very true sense it was his funeral pyre. On the night of September 5-6 he died in his tent, at the age of about seventy-two, probably of a heart attack brought on by his superhuman exertions. The satisfaction of being present at the culmination of the last of his triumphs was denied him. He did not live to see the bloody repulse of the desperate sortie of Zrinyi and the gallant six hundred who accompanied him, the slaughter of its heroic leader and all save a few of his companions-in-arms.* 5 But Suleiman himself had also died

84 Zrinyi, it is said, had refused to accept any German soldiers among his garrison; Vambery, Hungary, p. 313.

85 Hammer, VI, 228-234.

standing, as Vespasian had declared that an Emperor should. 36

Mohammed Sokolli, the Grand Vizir, kept the death of the great Sultan a secret for no less than three weeks; it is said that he had Suleiman's doctor strangled to make assurance doubly sure. The interval was none too long, for the heir apparent was at Kutahia in Asia Minor, and it was essential that he should have time to reach Constantinople, 125 miles away, before the news was generally known. But Mohammed Sokolli did far more than that. For thirteen long years, down to his death in 1579, that is, throughout the whole of the miserable reign of Selim the Sot and the first five years of that of his successor Murad III, he kept the reins of government firmly in his own hands, and did his utmost to conceal from the eyes of Western Europe the tragic fact that the long and glorious rise of the Turks, from a petty principality to one of the foremost powers of the world, was now to be succeeded by an appallingly rapid decline.

For the tide had turned with a vengeance and with dramatic suddenness—far more suddenly than was the case with the contemporaneous Spanish Empire of the West. Suleiman's reign marked the culmination of a national advance of nearly three centuries, to which there are few parallels in human history. With the possible exception of his ancestor Mohammed II, he was the greatest of the long line of illustrious rulers who had brought it about. The vicious Selim who followed him was a nonentity as a soldier and a statesman, and few of his successors were much better. Such triumphs as the Ottomans were to win in the next three hundred and fifty years were chiefly due to the energy of their Grand Vizirs—notably to the Kiuprilis in the second half of the seventeenth cen-

38 Suetonius, Vespasian, 24.

tury. The Turks, in fact, did not come into their own again till the days of the republic and Mustafa Kemal. When we seek to estimate the causes of this great reversal, we are confronted with one of those mysteries which are the truest fascination of the study of history. There can be no definite answer; the subject is too complex. 37 Many writers have laid the fault at the door of Suleiman himself. Some have blamed him for his failure regularly to preside at the Divan, thus setting a bad precedent for his successors. Others, with more justice, have pointed out the disastrous consequences of his occasionally delegating to others the supreme command of the army; for the heart of the Ottoman Empire was its army, and all men expected the Sultan to lead it in person. 38 Suleiman himself fully appreciated the danger here: witness his personal conduct of the campaign against Sziget. But what could ultimately be done about it? So rapidly had the Turks expanded that they had constantly to be fighting on two or more fronts at the same time, and the Sultan could not be everywhere at once. Had not Suleiman's dominions become so vast that, under the existing regime, it was impossible to defend them?