Tank Tracks to Rangoon (10 page)

By 1100 it was considered that sufficient preparation had been made, and the West Yorkshire company, supported by half of B Squadron, attacked from the north. The Yorkshiremen seem to have been in a fine vindictive mood, and indeed they had many grudges to settle, for they swarmed onto the Japanese position and closed with bayonet and butt, boot and fist, hunting the enemy along the ridge until, for all their medieval belief in the nobility of combat, they fled.

The trapped vehicles now began to move northwards, preceded by a troop of tanks, and for a while all went well. However, the Japanese from the ridge, rallied and reinforced, now began to engage the column from the east with heavy and accurate artillery and machine-gun fire. The drivers of the remaining lorries at once abandoned their vehicles, and since there was little the tanks could achieve without them, they moved off over the ridge and formed a close leaguer with Brigade HQ.

During the afternoon the Essex Yeomanry engaged the enemy on the south bank of the Pin Chaung, and the Chinese began to arrive in large numbers, taking up a position on the ridge. It was agreed that 38th Division, with C Squadron, would attack across the chaung the following morning, to try and relieve pressure on the still trapped 1st Burma Division.

Accordingly, at 0615 hours on 18th April, Major Rudkin reported to 38th Division HQ.

‘There was little activity except for the cooking of breakfast and it seemed most unlikely that the attack could start on time. I asked the British liaison officer with the Chinese what was happening and he informed me that as the Chinese realized that they would not be ready to attack at 0630 hours, they had put their
watches back one hour, so that officially they were still attacking at 0630 though the time would in reality be 0730. They had, therefore, not lost “face ” by being late.

‘The plan was that a troop of tanks would follow the leading troops of the leading Chinese battalion and give what support it could. Another troop was to follow the leading infantry battalion and assist the leading troop if required. The tanks would be almost entirely road-bound owing to the going off the road.

‘At 0730 the assaulting Chinese moved forward off the ridge on a front of about four hundred yards, the leading troop keeping very close behind on the road. On foot near the tanks was a Chinese interpreter who carried out liaison between the tanks and infantry.

‘After advancing about half a mile the leading tank was hit by a Japanese 75-mm gun situated on the road just north of the Pin Chaung which was firing straight up 300 yards of road. The tank was disabled but there were no casualties.

‘The Chinese advance continued and by afternoon had almost reached the line of the ford on the Pin Chaung which was still held by the enemy. The Chinese had had heavy casualties, especially amongst officers, as it was the custom for Chinese officers to lead, whatever their rank. It was finally decided to hold positions about half a mile north of the crossing and continue the attack next day.’

Throughout the day it had been possible to hear A Squadron on the forward regimental frequency. Major Bourne’s tank troops had given support to both 1st and 13th Brigades, but now 1st Burma Division’s advance northwards to Yenaungyaung was stalled by a road block in the village of Myaunghla. The divisional commander, Major-General Bruce Scott, had put forward a plan to General Slim that the division should abandon its transport and break out on foot during the night, but it was decided to await the result of 38th Division’s attack the following day.

On the 19th April it was the turn of B Squadron to support the Chinese, but 38th Division HQ informed Major Bonham-Carter that the attack would not be made until noon, and this was later postponed until 1300.

It was therefore decided that B Squadron would carry out a preliminary attack across the ford in company with the West Yorkshire’s D Company. This went in at 1150, the infantry riding on the tanks, with the support of the Essex Yeomanry, who
fired concentrations on likely areas. Halfway up the slope on the south side of the chaung the Japanese infantry counter-attacked, but were shot flat by the combined fire of the Stuarts and D Company. At this point, with all going well, D Company was withdrawn and sent hurriedly northwards with C Squadron to deal with a reported attack on Kyaukpadaung. This left B Squadron stranded south of the chaung, which was particularly annoying since the report turned out to be false.

However, at 1500 the Chinese began their own attack, which made good progress and soon cleared the southern slopes of the chaung. The advance continued for the remainder of the day, reaching Thwingon, a village on the northern outskirts of Yenaungyaung, early in the evening. This was attacked and taken with the help of B Squadron, numerous Japanese being killed and two hundred British and Indian prisoners being released.

During the day, 1st Burma Division had received a much needed piece of luck. A friendly Burmese had given A Squadron an obscure route round the enemy’s eastern flank, and the tanks had found it clear and just passable for wheeled vehicles. In the event, when the division’s transport was sent along it, the leading vehicles became bogged in, and because the others were unable to pass, all the lorries were burned. The division itself came through on foot, with its animal transport, and although it had also lost its field artillery, considered itself fortunate to have escaped. It had suffered very severely during the past three days, and at one time had almost been forced to surrender for lack of water. Throughout the afternoon and evening it continued to pass through the Chinese and across the Pin Chaung northwards.

Tired but happy, A Squadron rejoined the regiment. In three days fighting they had supported most units in 1st Burma Division, and if they had not been present at least some of these would have been overrun, with inevitably harsh consequences for the remainder. At one stage the Japanese had pressed their attacks so hard that they had got within yards of the tanks, and had only been beaten off with the greatest difficulty, the tank commanders having to resort to their revolvers to protect themselves. With A Squadron came three members of Sgt Gibbs’s crew who had been captured on the first night of the battle, and subsequently escaped. For his part in the escape of 1st Burma Division Major Bourne was awarded the DSO.

During 20th April the 38th Division was involved in further fighting south of the Pin Chaung, but by evening a state of stalemate
had been reached, and the Battle of Yenaungyaung was clearly at an end.

The following day the Chinese began to withdraw to the Kyaukpadaung area, as they were anxious not to overreach themselves. The withdrawal was covered by 2 RTR, A and B Squadrons then moving to Meiktila to turn tracks, which had become very worn by this time. C Squadron remained with 38th Division until the 26th, carrying out patrols and acting as divisional rearguard.

On their last day with 38th Division, Major Rudkin was asked by the second-in-command how many men there were in the squadron. Rudkin told him approximately eighty-five, and a little later was handed eighty-five rupees, one for each man. A collection had been made, and the gesture was very touching, especially as the Chinese were paid next to nothing. So ended the only occasion in history when British troops were directly under Chinese command.

7th Hussars, it will be recalled, were already operating around Meiktila, and on 25th April Captain Ray Nickel’s troop, patrolling south on the Toungoo road, bumped a column of enemy lorries head on. Nickel’s guns opened up at once, and he travelled the length of the column twice, lashing it from end to end with machine-gun fire. Not surprisingly, the tank crews enjoyed giving the Japanese a taste of the medicine they had themselves handed out so often to British transport columns, and the engagement ended with a large number of the enemy sprawled dead and wounded in and around their wrecked and blazing vehicles.

On the same day Major Bonham-Carter had set off for Pyawbwe with two scout cars to liaise with the Chinese, who reported that they were under pressure. Rounding a bend about a mile north of the town he suddenly found himself staring down the muzzles of three Japanese tanks, only seventy-five yards away. Both cars at once swung round to make good their escape, and whilst they were turning the tanks opened fire. Incredibly, they all missed, and Bonham-Carter did not give them a second chance.

By now, the strategic situation in Burma was extremely grave. Whilst Burma Corps and the Chinese were conducting a fighting withdrawal up the river valleys, a third Japanese force was proceeding unopposed northwards through the hills of eastern Burma, and had captured Lashio, effectively severing the vital
link with China, the Burma Road. This force was now swinging westwards, and the implications were that very shortly all Allied forces to the south of Mandalay would be surrounded and forced to surrender. For obvious military and political reasons, Alexander could not allow another debacle like Singapore, and the decision was made that the Army should cross the Irrawaddy and retire westwards towards the Indian frontier.

It was, in any case, time to go. For two months the Army had been living and fighting on stores back-loaded from Rangoon, and now these were beginning to run out. Replenishment from India was out of the question, since the physical means of delivery did not exist.

In this light, the events of 25th April, whilst small in themselves, were symptomatic. The reappearance of the Japanese armour, and the presence so far forward of a motorized column, indicated not merely another local offensive, but the beginnings of a major effort to finish the business once and for all.

During 26th April, the Hussars’ A Squadron, patrolling south from Meiktila, encountered the enemy in considerable numbers near a village called Kandang. Troops from B and C Squadrons were sent down to assist, together with D Troop Essex Yeomanry and a company of West Yorkshires. In spite of heavy losses, the Japanese held onto the village throughout the day, and fought back hard, knocking out two of the Stuarts. At last light, the tanks withdrew into leaguer north of Wundwin, close to 2 RTR, 7th Armoured Brigade being concentrated for the first time for several weeks.

After the checks imposed on the enemy by 7th Hussars during the past two days, Brigadier Anstice did not feel that the Japanese would press their advance the next day, and his orders were that 2 RTR were to patrol southwards in an attempt to contact the enemy, but not to get heavily involved.

B Squadron thus found themselves advancing southwards through Ngathet next morning, and the point troop had actually passed through the village, when two tanks in the next troop were knocked out in quick succession by anti-tank fire. The leading troop returned to the squadron across country, and the tanks remained in a position of observation whilst the Essex Yeomanry shelled the village.

The enemy replied from Ngathet with four guns but his fire was inaccurate, and it was felt that he was not in position to observe his shooting. Observation of any kind was, in fact, extremely
difficult, as the country was covered with tall thick scrub.

At about 1030, Captain Chaplin, the Essex Yeomanry FOO, observed through his binoculars four enemy tanks moving north out of Ngathet. B Squadron at once engaged and a short but sharp exchange of fire took place, in which at least one Japanese vehicle was hit without either casualties or damage being sustained by the Stuarts. The remaining enemy tanks retired.

The Japanese now changed their tactics, and were clearly under pressure to get on. Throughout the morning they had been stealthily pushing their guns forward, manhandling them through the thick scrub. The only indication of this movement was that after a few rounds of gunfire there would be a period of silence, and then the guns would open up again, a little nearer the tanks. Back at RHQ it sounded as though the guns were actually firing from B Squadron’s position. Occasionally, infantry could be seen, but never for very long, whilst away to the west dust and blue smoke were visible, accompanied by engine noises.

It seemed, therefore, that the Japanese armour was, for once, trying to work round the flank whilst B Squadron’s attention was held by the artillery. Lt-Colonel Yule appreciated that the squadron was too far forward, and deployed A Squadron on a wide front south of Wundwin, in a lay-back position. In the meantime, B Squadron 7th Hussars was covering the eastern flank, whilst the same regiment’s C Squadron patrolled the main road north of Wundwin to prevent the formation of the sort of road blocks which had given so much trouble in the past.

At 1430 B Squadron began to withdraw. As the tanks approached the village of Shawbin, enemy guns, which must have been manhandled through or round the squadron’s position, opened up, firing on the main British position at Wundwin to the north. Simultaneously, the Japanese tanks put in an appearance to the west of the road, which they began to shoot up with a mixture of AP and HE, and their infantry and mortar teams also engaged the Stuarts.

In spite of this unexpected reception, Captain Dumas, commanding B Squadron whilst Major Bonham-Carter was recovering from a severe snake bite, fought his way through, and the squadron took up a position of observation north of the village. One tank, attempting to skirt the village on the blind side, had
overturned in a nullah, and the crew, evacuating under small, arms fire, later found their way back.

The Essex Yeomanry at once engaged Shawbin, but the steady infiltration continued, and Colonel Yule advised Brigade HQ that the position, as far as 2 RTR were concerned, would become untenable very shortly. Brigadier Anstice sent up another company of West Yorkshires to plug the gaps between the tanks, but told Yule that he must stay where he was and cover 63 Brigade’s position at Wundwin until they withdrew during the evening.

Whilst Anstice arranged for 7th Hussars and the Tanks’ newly returned C Squadron to lift 63 Brigade out of the position, there now being very little wheeled transport left to Burma Corps, A and B Squadrons, the Yeomanry and the West Yorkshires held on. By 1800 the enemy had closed up on the position, and an assault seemed a distinct possibility. The situation was further complicated by damaging shellfire from the north, which caused casualties amongst the infantry, and B Squadron was despatched to the rear to deal with this problem. To their disgust they found that the guns belonged to 17th Indian Division, and were firing very much at random, without an OP.