Tank Tracks to Rangoon (29 page)

However formidable an obstacle the Irrawaddy might be, Kimura, even with his divisions concentrated, found himself guarding a line some 200 miles long, and as he could not be strong everywhere, could only guard the likely crossing places in force, and keep a vigilant watch elsewhere.

In the event, he was forced to fight on two fronts, for whilst 19th Indian Division crossed some sixty miles north of Mandalay, two further divisions, 20th Indian and 2nd British, established bridgeheads west of the city, where the Irrawaddy swings towards its junction with the Chindwin. Coming on top of the Meiktila débâcle, this broke the back of his resistance, and as a cohesive force the Burma Area Army was finished.

Unlike 255 Tank Brigade, which fought as a concentrated unit during 4 Corps’ battles for Meiktila, 33 Corps’ 254 Tank Brigade, now consisting of 3rd Carabiniers and 150 Regiment RAC, both still equipped with Lees, 7th Light Cavalry’s Stuarts, and two squadrons of PAVO armoured cars, was dispersed amongst the various bridgeheads, where they provided local superiority until the break-out phase, and then formed fast-moving, hard-hitting columns which prevented the enemy regaining his balance.

First across the river was 19th Division, which pushed two battalions over at Thabeikyin on 9th January, and established a bridgehead. Three days later the division landed its 62 Brigade across the river some miles to the south, at Kyaukmyaung, and again secured a foothold.

To the Japanese, completely unaware as yet as to the true location of 4 Corps, this looked like the beginning of the major Allied offensive, and they spared no pains in their efforts to pinch out these two dents in their line, concentrating their efforts on Kyaukmyaung, against which they threw 15th and 53rd Divisions, to which was added artillery drawn from divisions guarding the Irrawaddy bend, and some tanks. They put down their heaviest artillery concentrations so far encountered, and for a month, day and night, they launched suicidal attacks, piling bodies round the perimeter, but losing ground instead of gaining it. Throughout this period, 19th Division’s commander, a diminutive and fiery Welshman called Rees, nicknamed the Pocket Napoleon, could usually be found up with the forward infantry
sections
, easily recognizable in his bush hat and red scarf, joining in the fighting and apparently enjoying himself immensely, to the distress of his staff, who saw the role of a Major-General in a slightly different light.
*

11 The battle of the Irrawaddy Bend: 33 Corps Divisional bridgeheads

By early February Rees considered his position to be so secure that he planned to break out and begin his drive south to Mandalay. Using the only available raft, the 18 tanks of C Squadron 150 RAC, under Major Newman, spent two nights crossing the river, the sound of the tank engines being drowned by aircraft and bulldozers, which had been practising the deception for several nights. C Squadron 7th Light Cavalry, under Major Campbell, followed shortly after.

The first phase of the break-out was the extension of the bridgehead southwards to Singu, as reconnaissance had shown that the jungle to the east was too dense for the tanks to be used to their best advantage. On 10th February, 7th Light Cavalry assisted 1/6th Gurkha Rifles in the capture of Thila, and the following day continued the advance to Steamer Point, fighting a smart little action against the 37-mm anti-tank guns of the Japanese covering force. During this five tanks were damaged, one being hit by 37-mm fire no less than thirteen times, but all were repairable. Jemadar Lall Singh, petrol pouring from a ruptured tank, refused to reverse out of action in spite of the terrible fire risk, and was awarded the MC.

On 17th February 7th Light Cavalry supported an attack on the village of Khanpa. One troop had been sent round into a cut-off position, and caught most of the garrison formed up and marching along a track, and killed fifty, putting the rest to flight. Khanpa was occupied without difficulty, the success being exploited as far as Kulbintha. The Japanese reaction was to detail several artillery batteries to shell the tanks’ dust as they retired into leaguer and the following morning they carried out a preparatory shoot on the squadron’s leaguer, prior to putting in a spirited but unsuccessful bayonet charge. One officer was shot down only ten yards from Dafadar Pritam Singh’s tank, the NCO jumping out smartly to claim his sword.

A week later the 7th’s Stuarts were deployed in cut-off positions on the flanks and rear of the Japanese position at Thankobin, catching enemy reinforcements trying to reach the village, and then shooting up the escaping garrison as 64
Brigade, supported by the heavier Lees of 150 Regiment, fought their way through in a frontal attack.

This continuous pressure by 19th Division’s tanks was obviously causing the enemy considerable worry, for, as the 7th Light Cavalry’s narrative tells, he went to some trouble to find a tank-proof stop line.

‘The following day (26th February) we carried on past the 2nd Worcester box with 5th Baluch. We were now in a defile with a marsh on our right and a hill on our left. After advancing a mile the leading tanks and infantry came under heavy fire from artillery, mortars and medium tanks in prepared positions. Len Dormer’s tank was hit and burned but he managed to evacuate it without casualties. Dafadar Balwant Singh’s was also hit and brewed up—this crew were badly burned and Dafadar Kirpal Singh subsequently died: the driver being killed immediately. Later in the day Alister (Campbell) was hit in the elbow by a sniper while going forward on foot to reconnoitre. The defile was obviously ideal for defence, and we were not used on that axis again.’

So far, General Rees had been using the main road as his principal axis of advance on Mandalay, but this check indicated that until the defile could either be captured or turned, there would be little further progress, so he turned his attention to the possibility of an advance along the river bank. However, the full implications of the Meiktila operation had now burst upon Kimura, who concentrated his efforts north of Mandalay to getting as much of his army away as possible.

Rees decided to make an all-out dash on Mandalay along the river route, using an armoured column, and following up along the original axis with the remainder of his division, once the enemy’s stop line was turned. The armoured force, known as Stilettocol, since that was the nature of its narrow thrust, consisted of C Squadron 7th Light Cavalry, with under command, the Lees of No 1 Troop of C Squadron 150 RAC, a section of Valentine bridgelayers, a 25-pounder battery, 15th Punjabis, engineers and signals.

Stilettocol, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Gardiner assembled on the north bank of the Magyi Chaung on 5th March, crossed the obstacle during the night, and then laid up to await zero hour, which was 0930 on 6th March.

Needless to say, Rees was well up with the forward troops, which covered about eight miles on the first day against light
opposition, the chaung crossings causing more delay than the Japanese. On one occasion, this energetic general personally directed the manhandling of several three-ton trucks into a chaung bed, where they acted as a causeway for the tanks to cross; having completed the job he flayed the nearest sapper officer for not thinking of the solution himself.

The second day’s progress was spectacular. The tanks’ general brief was to keep heading south, and to establish themselves in the area of Mandalay Hill. Even the most optimistic could not have forecast the speed with which the advance would be made. Village after village was taken, the inhabitants running out to greet the tanks with flowers, fruit and chickens, and to tell them that the Japanese had just left. The country opened out, leaving the chaungs behind, and the tanks rolled along ‘two-up’ at high speed. By early afternoon the great rock of Mandalay Hill, crowned with pagodas, had risen into view. By 1600 the tanks had reached Powa Taung, five miles north of the city, having covered twenty-six miles since starting that morning and, as some had run out of petrol, they went into leaguer to await the arrival of the petrol lorry.

Next day, having been told by villagers that the enemy was holding the hill with nothing heavier than machine guns, Stilettocol tried to take it. As the tanks shook out to deploy for the attack, they came under heavy artillery fire, and it was obvious that the job was too big for the forces available. Two tanks of the Lee troop, deployed to give supporting fire to the attack, were hit and immobilized, but not before they had accounted for a 75-mm gun. Elsewhere, 15th Punjabis captured, with tank support, several pagodas and an outlying pimple that the enemy was using as an observation post, but little more could be done until the main body of 19th Division arrived, with the remainder of 150 Regiment’s Lee Squadron.

During the afternoon, pressure from Rees’s main column became evident, for Stilettocol could observe in the distance bodies of men approaching Mandalay from the north, but as it was impossible to tell whether they were friend or foe, two troops under Lts Dormer and Jemmett were sent to find out. Running into marshy ground, Jemmett lost two tanks which were engaged by a 47-mm gun, and the remainder returned to the squadron.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had intensified their shelling of the area held by Stilettocol, and one of the immobilized Lees was
hit again and caught fire. At 1600 Rees advised the column commander that some of the enemy were infiltrating back into their old positions, and ordered him to send a troop back to deal with the situation. This, however, proved to be a false alarm, and at last light the fighting spluttered out.

During the next few days Mandalay Hill was stormed by Gurkha and Berkshire infantry. The hill was a complex of temples, pagodas, halls, covered ways and underground chambers which Japanese military engineering skill had succeeded in turning into a veritable fortress, but the men of 19th Division were not to be denied. In a battle of sten and grenade, bayonet and kukri, they routed their opponents from room to room, from gallery to gallery, until the survivors were confined to a few subterranean chambers. They would not surrender, so drums of petrol were rolled in on top of them, and ignited with tracer ammunition.

Now the Lees of 150 Regiment began to come into their own, as 7th Cavalry’s Stuarts were unsuitable for the heavy street fighting within the town of Mandalay. Pivot of the Japanese defence was Fort Dufferin, surrounded by an 80-foot moat, with 30-foot high walls, backed by an earthen bank 15-foot thick. Try as they might, the forces of mechanized war could not breach this medieval structure. Firing over open sights, 5.5-inch howitzers succeeded in bringing down a little masonry; Lees, recoiling continuously, with prodigious expenditure of ammunition hammered out a few more stones; forlorn hopes, with demolition charges, scarcely reached the moat before being shot down. At length, a solution occurred in the form of skip-bombing into the earthen bank, from behind, and after a few dangerous early attempts, in which the bombs bounced over the wall and landed amongst friendly troops, the planes altered their angle of approach, and down came a section of curtain wall. The Japanese, however, did not await the arrival of a storming party, having escaped through the Fort’s sewers during the hours of darkness.

On 20th March, the Union Flag rose again for the first time in three years over the former palace of the Burmese Kings, and with it rose 19th Division’s own flag—a yellow dagger on a scarlet ground. General Rees had won the race, by a whisker, thanks largely to Stilettocol, for even now a brigade of 2nd British Division was operating in the southern environs of the town.

To the west of Mandalay, 20th Indian Division had begun to cross the Irrawaddy at Allagappa on 12th February, and after two days fighting had established a bridgehead six miles wide by two deep. To this the Japanese reacted as sharply as they had done to 19th Division’s crossing, and made desperate efforts to throw the British and Indian troops back into the river. But although the enemy pressed home his attacks, these were not co-ordinated, and, in spite of heavy casualties sustained by both sides, 20th Division’s bridgehead continued to expand and to capture important villages.

On 24th February, the Japanese received a further shock when 2nd British Division, after some initial difficulty, established a further bridgehead between 20th Division and Mandalay. This they left relatively undisturbed, concentrating their efforts on containing the landing whilst they tried to deal with 20th Division.

It was on 20th Division’s front that most of 254 Tank Brigade’s armour was concentrated, the bridgehead eventually containing A and B Squadrons 7th Light Cavalry, with B Squadron 150 Regiment RAC for heavy support, and the armoured cars of A and C Squadron PAVO.

To many who took part, this phase of the fighting was the nastiest of the war, and the following account, written by an officer of A Squadron 7th Light Cavalry, mentions some aspects of this in describing his regiment’s operations in support of 4/10th Gurkha Rifles at Talingon.

As we bumped across paddy fields in two-up formation, neither ourselves nor the Japs realized what a slaughter-house Talingon was going to prove for them, or what hard nerve-wracking days and nights it could give us.

The Gurkhas were a bit late as they got lost in the elephant grass to our right, but they finally arrived. Harry Barnard and Bernard Lemon were just moving forward on the flanks when they suddenly disappeared from view amidst great spurts of earth as our own 5.5’s landed amongst them. They both miraculously survived this. Nos 3 and 4 Troops drew up to the village and went in with all guns firing, only to be bombed by our own planes. In the village they had an ordeal by fire; Harry and Desmond were like a couple of scorpions in a fire ring as they twisted and turned and backed and gave each other advice as to how to get out of it whilst the smell from burning tracks assailed their nostrils. Paddy Cudden with a B Squadron troop charged into the midst of all this and found his way right through the village.

Heavy fire from the elephant grass prevented the Gurkhas from consolidating outside the village, and we spent the night with them
at the southern end of the village. We were attacked from 2130 hours onwards by ‘Banzai!’ yelling Japs and this, combined with the unforgettable stench of rotting carcasses inside their positions, made a very grim night of it. The morning light welcome, as always, after a bad night, rose on the bodies of over fifty Japs on the wire and not very short of some of our positions …

The 24th and 25th saw two more days of even tougher fighting in Talingon, Harry Barnard’s and Harpy’s troops being heavily engaged.

The 4/10th did not remain in Talingon but evacuated it every night, and the Japs, following rigidly their order to hold it at all costs, reoccupied it each night. Very soon everyone knew the position of each bunker and trench by heart. Nos 2 and 4 Troops directed by Tony and Harry Barnard drove through the Jap positions time and time again. Reoccupied old positions and newly built ones alike were crushed and blasted and their occupants killed. An MMG in one bunker smashed the periscope of Jemadar Deep Chand’s tank, so he dismounted and covered by Desmond attacked the bunker single handed with a handful of grenades. For this he was awarded an immediate Military Cross.

B Squadron took part in the fighting for Talingon and by 26th the number of Jap dead was over 500. Sixteen officers’ swords, two 75s and a dozen machine guns were captured, and amongst the dead were two Jap battalion commanders. A Jap captured later, stated that he was the only survivor and that it had been hell.