Tecumseh and Brock (16 page)

On May 27, General Prevost wrote again to Brock, this time to express his support for the precautions that Brock had taken “to prevent any act occurring within your control that should afford the Government of the United States a legitimate pretext to add to the clamour artfully raised by it against England.”
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Brock had done invaluable service preparing the available forces to defend the Canadas. With only a few months left for him to live, the greatest days of Brock's career still lay in the future.

Chapter 8

The United States Declares
War on Great Britain

O
N JUNE 1,
1812,
PRESIDENT
James Madison crossed his personal and political Rubicon and sent his war message to both houses of Congress. In sharp contrast to more recent U.S. declarations of war, memorably Franklin Roosevelt's against Japan in December 1941, a clerk read the document, with no emotion.

In his three-page message, the president made the case that for a
number of years the British government had been guilty of “a series of acts hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation .
. .
British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it; not in the exercise of a belligerent right founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects,” Madison charged. “We behold our vessels, freighted with the products of our soil and industry, or returning with the honest proceeds of them, wrested from their lawful destinations, confiscated by prize-courts, no longer the organs of public law, but the instrument of arbitrary edicts,” the president continued, widening his case from impressment to the effects of the British blockade on American shippers.

Although most of Madison's message dealt with Britain's alleged wrongdoings on the sea, one paragraph charged that the British were instigating native hostility toward the United States on America's inland frontier: “Our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers: a warfare which is known to spare neither sex nor age, and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and combinations which have for some time been developing themselves among tribes in the constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons, without connecting their hostility with that influence . . . We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United States; on the side of the United States, a state of peace towards Great Britain,” concluded Madison.

Having made his case for war, the president passed the matter to Congress to decide whether the U.S. would “continue passive under these progressive usurpations, and these accumulating wrongs; or, opposing force to force in defence of their natural rights, shall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of events . . .”
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Significantly, Madison closed his message to Congress with a warning to France. “I proceed to remark,” noted the president, “that the communications last made to Congress on the subject of our relations with France, will have shown, that since the revocation of her decrees as they violated the neutral rights of the United States, her government has authorized illegal captures, by its privateers and public ships, and that other outrages have been practiced on our vessels and our citizens. . . . I abstain at this time from recommending to the consideration of Congress definitive measures with respect to that nation, in the expectation, that the result of unclosed discussions between our minister plenipotentiary at Paris and the French government, will speedily enable Congress to decide, with greater advantage, on the course due to the rights, the interests and the honour of our country.”
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Madison delivered his war message to an “executive session” of Congress that was closed to the public and, therefore, to the feedback of public opinion.

The response to the message in the House of Representatives exposed deep divisions between Madison's Republicans (the ancestors of today's Democrats) and the Federalists (the ancestors of today's Republicans via the Whigs). The more liberal Republicans, in the Jeffersonian tradition, were broadly inclined to identify with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and even Napoleon, the heir of the Revolution, rather than monarchical Britain. The more conservative Federalists were more sympathetic to Britain than to revolutionary France. At least as important as these ideological inclinations were the major sectional rifts that divided the United States. Federalists who opposed war with Britain tried three times without success to open the session to the public, in the hope that negative popular sentiment would halt the passage of the declaration of war.

On June 4, 1812, the House passed the motion by a vote of 79 to 49. West of the Appalachian Mountains, where the issue was the desire to settle on native land and the conflict was with Tecumseh's confederacy, Congressmen voted solidly for war. The rest of the country was split. The majority of the delegations from Virginia and Pennsylvania assented to the declaration. The large majority of New York's congressmen voted against the motion, as did all of Delaware's members. In New England, where opposition to the war was so strong that it threatened the unity of the nation, the votes in the House were split. Delegations from Connecticut and Rhode Island unanimously voted in opposition to war. Majorities from Vermont and New Hampshire voted yes, as did six Massachusetts congressmen.

The Senate was so deadlocked that it appeared for a time that the declaration would fail. Following a week of deliberations, Senator Alexander Gregg of Pennsylvania moved that the war bill be sent back to a select committee to be amended so that in place of a full declaration of war, the United States would issue letters of marque and reprisal, licensing privateers to attack and seize British vessels.
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The Senate passed Gregg's motion by a vote of 17 to 13. But three days later, when the limited-conflict proposal emerged out of committee to go before the full Senate, the upper chamber cast a tied vote on the measure, 16 to 16, and thus it went down to defeat.

With the compromise off the table, Madison's motion again went before the Senate. On June 17, 1812, senators voted 19 to 13 in support of the declaration. It was by far the narrowest vote for war in the history of the United States. The following day, Madison signed the declaration.

On June 27, Brock received the news at Fort George that the United States had declared war against Britain nine days earlier. He immediately dispatched missives to his key subordinates along the Niagara Frontier. By June 30, the news had reached Colonel Thomas Bligh St. George, an experienced British officer who had served in Europe before being transferred to Canada as commander of Fort Malden. And by July 8, Captain Charles Roberts, in command at Fort St. Joseph, had been alerted, which gave him a clear edge against the Americans at Fort Michilimackinac.

Although Brock was urged by Prevost to remain cautious and defensive-minded, he did send two letters to Roberts on June 26 and 27, ordering him to assault Fort Michilimackinac if he felt he could take it. Roberts commanded an outpost on the St. Mary's River just off the northern shore of Lake Huron, manned by a small contingent of Royal Artillerymen and a single company of the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion. His fort was located eighty kilometres northeast of Michilimackinac, a strategically important island that dominated the strait connecting Lakes Huron and Michigan and sat astride a major fur trade route. The very day that Roberts received his missives from Brock, he also received a letter from Prevost with orders to act with caution, offer aid to the North West Company, and ready himself to retreat “in case of necessity.” Even Brock was not entirely committed to the offensive in the Northwest. On July 15, Roberts received another letter from his commanding officer with orders “to adopt the most prudent methods of offence or defence which circumstances might point out.” But this was not an order to prepare to retreat.
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With these ambiguous instructions from two distant commanders, Roberts was left to decide on his own what course to follow. On July 17, with a force of about 700 native warriors (including Sioux, Winnebagoes, Tallesawains, Chippewas, and Ottawas), 260 Canadian militia, and just under 50 British regulars, Roberts swooped down on Michilimackinac and seized the island from the surprised American garrison. U.S. Lieutenant Porter Hanks, in charge there, only learned
on the day he surrendered his post that war had been declared — Roberts
informed him. The swift capture of the post, which was held by the British until the end of the conflict, helped open the way for Brock's attack on Detroit and had long-term consequences for the course of the war in the Northwest.
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Michilimackinac was also strategically crucial to the Canadian fur trade and to winning over native peoples of the region to the British side.

In his roles as the head of the government of Upper Canada and the commander of armed forces in the province, Brock issued a proclamation to steady the nerves of the populace: “Whereas on the seventeenth day of June last the congress of the United States of America declared that war then existed between those States and their territories, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof: And whereas, in pursuance of such declaration the subjects of the United States have actually committed hostilities against the possessions of his Majesty and the persons and property of his subjects in this province: now therefore by and with the advice of his Majesty's executive Council for the affairs of the Province, I do hereby strictly enjoin and require all his Majesty's liege Subjects to be obedient to the lawful authorities, to forbear all Communication with the Enemy or persons residing within the Territory of the United States, and to manifest their Loyalty by a zealous Co-operation with his Majesty's land Force in Defence of the Province & repulse of the Enemy. And I do further require and command all officers civil and military to be vigilant in the discharge of their Duty, especially to prevent all Communication with the Enemy; and to cause all Persons suspected of traitorous Intercourse to be apprehended & and treated according to Law.”
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On July 3, Brock wrote to Prevost that he had “been anxiously expecting for some days, to receive the honor of Your Excellency's Commands” to deal with “the present emergency.” He told the commander-in-chief that while he believed the declaration of war against Britain by the Americans “would have justified in my opinion, offensive operations,” he calculated that attacks could later be mounted against a number of American positions, including Fort Niagara, which was across the river from Fort George. Therefore, he “relinquished” any such immediate intentions and “attended only” to defensive measures such as “calling out the flank companies” of the local militia. He informed General Prevost that he believed the Americans had about twelve hundred regulars and militia at Fort Niagara, and added, “I consider myself at this moment perfectly safe against any attempt they can make.”
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A few days later, Prevost replied to Brock in characteristic fashion, telling him, “I am convinced you have acted wisely in abstaining from offensive operations . . .” Still in a cautionary frame of mind, he wrote, “It is highly proper you should secure the services of the Indians but restrain and control them as much as you can.”
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On July 10, again counselling restraint, Prevost advised Brock, “I consider it prudent and politic to avoid any measure which can in its effect have a tendency to unite the People in the American States.”
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While Brock and Prevost attempted to calculate the correct balance between offence and defence, the Americans were acting on a plan of attack that they had conceived months earlier. The Madison administration had one big idea about how to prosecute the war. The idea was to conquer Canada.

Shortly after war was declared, Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York was confident that “one half of the Militia of both provinces [Upper and Lower Canada] would join our standard.”
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And in Washington, Henry Clay told the House of Representatives in the summer of 1812, “We have the Canadas as much under our command as she (Great Britain) has the ocean; and the way to conquer her on the ocean is to drive her from the land. I am not for stopping at Quebec, or anywhere else; but I would take the whole continent from them, and ask no favors. Her fleets cannot then rendezvous at Halifax as now; and, having no place of resort in the north, cannot infest our coast as they have lately done. It is as easy to conquer them on the land, as their whole navy would conquer ours on the ocean. We must take the continent from them. I wish never to see a peace till we do.”
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A week after the U.S. declared war, Secretary of State James Monroe gave himself over to the rising belligerence where Canada was concerned when he said that public opinion could make it “difficult to relinquish Territory which had been conquered.”
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Also at the beginning of the war, former president Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter that the conquest of Canada must be a goal of the United States. He referred to his hope for “the successful course of our war, and the addition of Canada to our confederacy. The infamous intrigues of Great Britain to destroy our government . . . and with the Indians to tomahawk our women and children, prove that the cession of Canada, their fulcrum for these Machiavellian levers, must be a
sine qua non
at a treaty of peace.”
13
In a further letter he wrote in late 1812, Jefferson said that he believed that “the acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighbourhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and will give us the experience for the attack on Halifax, the next and final expulsion of England from the American continent.”

For the Americans, a successful invasion of Canada would achieve three goals simultaneously: by denying British war aid to the native enemies of the United States, it would ensure U.S. control of the lands the Americans were contesting with Tecumseh's confederacy; it would lead to the annexation of Canada, which was much desired by the land-hungry War Hawks; and it was the one way the United States could get at the British. Potentially, Canadian soil could be held as a bargaining chip to force the British to end the practice of impressment and interference with U.S. commerce across the seas.