Terror in the Balkans (63 page)

9. Ibid., 541–542.

10. In 1944 units under Artur Phleps, commander of the Prinz Eugen Division,

employed hunter group–type tactics on a larger scale, in the form of rapid pursuit

operations rather than encirclement operations. However, the source base is too small to enable the drawing of fi rm conclusions as to how successful these operations were. Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 553.

11. Ben Shepherd,
War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 163.

12. On German anti-Partisan operations in 1943, see Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in

Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, ch. 5; Gaj Trifkovic, “A Case of Failed Counter-Insurgency: Antipartisan Operations in Yugoslavia 1943,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies
24

(2011): 314–336.

13. On Operation Black see Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944,
261–

288, 543; Trifkovic, “A Case of Failed Counter-Insurgency: Antipartisan Opera-

tions in Yugoslavia 1943.”

14. Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 282–283; Trifkovic, “A Case of Failed Counter-Insurgency: Antipartisan Operations in Yugoslavia 1943,” 334–336.

15. Ruth Bettina Birn,
Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer: Himmlers Vertreter im Reich
und den besetzten Gebieten
(Düsseldorf: Droste, 1986), 260–274.

16. Klaus Schmider, “Der jugoslawische Kriegsschauplatz,” in
Das Deutsche Reich und der
Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 8. Die Ostfront, 1943/44: Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten
, Karl-Heinz Frieser et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007), 1021.

17. Ibid., 1028–1030; Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 545–547.

18. Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 52–53; Schmider, “Der jugoslawische Kriegsschauplatz,” 1028. On relations between the Germans and the NDH

during late 1943 and 1944, see Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 362–378, 397–413.

19. On the Partisans’ increasingly impressive military performance during 1943 and

increasing Allied support for them, see, for example, F. W. D. Deakin,
The Embattled
Mountain
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Milovan Djilas,
Wartime: With
Tito and the Partisans
(London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1977), 215–363; Michael McConville,
A Small War in the Balkans: British Military Involvement in Wartime

Notes to Pages 241–253
329

Yugoslavia 1941–1945
(London: Macmillan, 1986); Richard West,
Tito and the Rise and
Fall of Yugoslavia
(London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1996), chaps. 8, 9; Marko Attila Hoare,
Genocide and Resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 329–349. On Chetnik–Axis collaboration, see Jozo Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in

Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), chaps. 7, 9; on the eventual Chetnik–Allied break, see ibid., 359–372. For a detailed

treatment of British–Chetnik relations, see Simon Trew,
Britain, Mihailovic´, and the
Chetniks, 1941–42
(London: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

20. Schmider, “Der jugoslawische Kriegsschauplatz,” 1024–1025. For more detail on the

Italian capitulation’s impact upon German efforts in Yugoslavia, see Schmider,
Par-

tisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 288–316.

21. On anti-Partisan operations in 1944 and the campaign’s fi nal phase, see Schmider,

Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 378–397, 413–417.

22. Jürgen Förster, “The Relation between Operation Barbarossa as an Ideological war

of Extermination and the Final Solution,” in
The Final Solution: Origins and Imple-

mentation
, ed. David Cesarani (London: Routledge 1994), 90–97; Jürgen Förster,

“Wehrmacht, Krieg und Holocaust,” in
Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität
, ed.

Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 953.

23. See the example of Security Battalion 242.Shepherd,
War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans
, 203–207, 211.

24. Theo J. Schulte,
The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia
(Oxford: Berg, 1989); Shepherd,
War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans.

25. Shepherd,
War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans
, 147–149.

26. Ibid., chap. 6.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 66–70.

29. Ibid., chap. 2.

30. Ibid., 155–157, 227–228.

31. Ibid., 81–82.

32. Three additional motivational factors to which previous secondary literature

ascribes importance are omitted:

1.
Direct experience of armed confrontation during the Time of Struggle (1918–

1920)
, omitted because available sources rarely indicate whether or not a par-

ticular offi cer was engaged so actively.

2.
Pursuit of civilian career during the interwar years.
This may have been a radicalizing factor, given that there was, from 1935 onward, a predominance within

the German army offi cer corps of men who came from the middle-class civilian

circles from whom the Nazis drew their most extensive electoral support. How-

ever, any impact this factor may have had is obscured by the fact that most of

the sample served as continuing offi cers during the interwar years in any case.

3.
Prior service in the East (Poland or the Soviet Union) during World War II.

This may have been a brutalizing factor for reasons similar to service on the

eastern front during the Great War. It is omitted because the sample offi cers

330
Notes to Pages 253–254

who served in Yugoslavia from 1941 onward—a large portion of the entire sam-

ple—would have been unable to serve in the Soviet Union beforehand, because

their occupation of Yugoslavia preceded the invasion of the Soviet Union.

33. See Appendix A.

34. On the 221st Security Division, see Shepherd,
War in the Wild East: The German

Army and Soviet Partisans
, 129–218. On comparison between the 221st and the more hard-line 203d Security Division during the second half of 1942, see ibid., 155–157.

35. See Appendix A.

36. On continuities and discontinuities between the eastern front experience of the

Great War and the Third Reich’s prosecution of World War II, see Rüdiger Bergien,

“Vorspiel des ‘Vernichtunsgkrieges’? Die Ostfront des Ersten Weltkrieges und das

Kontinuitätsproblem,” in
Die vergessene Front: Der Osten 1914/15
, ed. Gerhard P.

Groß (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 393–408.

Acknowledgments

Grateful thanks are due to:

The School of Law and Social Sciences, Glasgow Caledonian University, for providing

me with such a supportive environment in which to carry out this study.

Kathleen McDermott at Harvard University Press, and HUP’s external reviewers, for

helpful advice on writing the book.

Andrew Kinney at HUP, and Marianna Verturro and her colleagues at IBT Global, for

helping put the book together in its later stages;

The British Academy and the Carnegie Foundation for providing extra research funding.

The following individuals, who freely provided either valuable advice, practical help,

excellent company during my archival visits, or a combination: Alex Bangert, Sonja Bern-

hard, Heiko Brendel, John Breuilly, Peter Broucek, Caro Buchheim, Philip Cooke, Tomislav Dulic´, Yvonne Ewen, Alex Flucker, Jürgen Förster, Richard Germann, Jonathan Gumz, Chris Haag, Christian Hartmann, Mike Hierholzer, Marko Hoare, Lothar Höbelt, Patrick

Hoolahan, Ke-chin Hsia, Johannes Hürter, Maria Knight, Alexander Korb, Bernd Lemke,

Peter Lieb, Walter Manoschek, Alex Marshall, Evan Mawdsley, Mark Mazower, Charles D.

Melson, Timm C. Richter, Felix Römer, Klaus Schmider, Peter Steinkamp, Geoffrey

Swain, Wolfram Wette, and Martina Winkelhofer.

The staff of the following institutions: Bavarian State Archive, Munich; Federal

Archive, Berlin-Lichterfelde; Federal Archive, Koblenz (images department); Federal

Archive, Ludwigsburg; German Historical Institute, London; Imperial War Museum,

London; Library of Contemporary History, Stuttgart; Military History Research Institute, Potsdam; Süddeutscher Verlag, Munich (images department). Special thanks are due to

the staff at the Federal Military Archive, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, and at the Austrian State Archive, Vienna, for their unfailing patience and help.

331

332
Acknowledgments

A note on the maps: the maps provided in the book are based extensively on copies of

original German Army maps, which varied widely in cartographical consistency. They are

intended to convey only a general idea of the scale and location of the events discussed.

Ultimately, the responsibility for the fi nal work is, of course, my own.

Index

Agricultural workers (Yugoslavia), 96–97,

Anti-Serbism, and counterinsurgency in

110, 136–137, 149–150

Yugoslavia, 1–3, 121–122, 255–256; pre-

Albania, 35, 72, 75–76

1914, 21–22, 255; in Great War, 29–30,

Alexander I, King, 73–75

34–37, 55, 255; anti-Serbism of Hitler, 75,

Ambrosio, Vittorio, 77, 154, 172.
See also

77, 238; in Ustasha policy, 79–80, 92–94,

Italy, Second Army

156, 180, 193, 200, 237–238, 241; in 342d

Anti-Bolshevism, in Third Reich, 2, 5, 32,

Infantry Division, 135, 141, 232, 255.
See

253, 284; in Great War, 46–49, 233–234;

also
anti-Slavism

link with anti-Slavism, 48; and Time

Anti-Slavism, in Third Reich, 2, 6, 69;

of Struggle, 54–55, 138–139; in Reich-

pre-1914, 20–21, 232, 243; in Great War,

swehr, 57, 59; link with anti-Semitism,

36, 43–45, 48, 56; link with anti-Bolshe-

63, 69–70, 117, 122, 244; in Kingdom of

vism, 48; in Wehrmacht, 67–68; and

the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 73; and

counter-insurgency in Yugoslavia, 185,

counterinsurgency in Yugoslavia, 98,

232, 253–255.
See also
anti-Serbism

138–139, 230–231.
See also
Bolsheviks;

Armed Forces High Command.
See
OKW

Communists, Yugoslavia

Army High Command.
See
OKH

Anti-Communism.
See
Anti-Bolshevism

Austria, Republic of, 60–61, 64–65

Anti-Semitism, in Third Reich, 2, 5, 32, 85,

AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of the

251; pre-1914, 18–19, 21, 243; in Great

People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia), 199

War, 49–51, 53–54, 253; and Time of

Struggle, 54–55; in Bundesheer, 61; in

Reichswehr, 62–63; link with anti-

Bader, Paul, appointed commander of

Bolshevism, 63, 69–70, 117, 122, 244; in

LXV Corps, 80–81; appointed Com-

Wehr macht, 67–69, 251; and Ustasha

mander in Serbia, 147, 308; advocates

policy, 78–79, 92; and counterinsurgency

ruthless counterinsurgency measures,

in Yugoslavia, 85–87, 98–103, 117–118,

158, 162–163, 170, 201–202; attempts

122–124, 127, 142, 165, 186, 245, 317

to engage DangicĆhetniks, 158–159;

333

334
Index

attempts to deescalate counterinsur-

relations with Partisans, 150; relations

gency brutality, 170, 175–176, 178; and

with Italians, 150, 155, 173, 193–194, 196,

Trio operations, 173–175, 177; and

217–219, 235, 237–238; ethnic cleans-

militias in eastern Bosnia, 194–195, 196.

ing campaigns of, 150–151, 155, 185, 187,

See also
German army (1939–1945),

193–198, 213; and “Great Serbia”, 151;

corps: LXV; German army (1939–1945),

organizational weaknesses, 152–153,

regional commands: Serbia Command

238, 241; in combat against Axis, 153,

Balkan Wars 1912–1913, 21, 30

163, 165, 170, 188, 204; under Dangic´,

Baltic States, 54, 138

158, 164, 170; poor military performance

Barton, Gottfried, 251, 254

against Partisans, 158, 218, 235, 238,

Belgium, German invasion of 1914, 29,

241; relations with Germans, 158–159,

German atrocities in 1914, 31–32, 55, 68;

170, 184, 196–197, 218–219, 241; confl ict

German occupation of during Great

with Partisans, 158, 179, 182, 184, 191,

War, 45

198; propaganda of, 179, 192; relations

Boehme, Franz, radicalizes counterinsur-

with NDH, 182, 196, 199; 718th Infantry

gency campaign in Serbia, 1–3, 120–127,

Division’s view of, 184, 194–197, 205, 213;

143, 232, 255; engages with Nedicín 1943 counterinsurgency operations,

regime, 120–121, 123; manoeuvres against

218–219, 240, 325.
See also
Chetniks

Danckelmann, 120; outdone for ruthless

(Mihailovic´ movement, Serbia)

by 342d Infantry Division, 128, 131–133,

Chetniks (Mihailovic´ movement, Serbia),

140, 250, 306–307; attempts to deesca-

formation and early support, 89, 95–96,

late counterinsurgency brutality, 135;

98; initial weakness of, 96–97; alli-

biographical details, 141; and Operation

ance with Partisans, 110; and Serbian