Read The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy Into Action Online
Authors: Robert S. Kaplan,David P. Norton
Tags: #Non-Fiction, #Business
Considering that each of the four perspectives in the Balanced Scorecard can require between four and seven separate measures, businesses often have scorecards with up to 25 measures. Are 25 measures too many? Is it possible for any organization to focus on 25 separate things? The answer to both questions is NO! If a scorecard is viewed as 25 (or even 10) independent measures, it will be too complicated for an organization to absorb.
The Balanced Scorecard should be viewed as the instrumentation for a
single
strategy. When the scorecard is viewed as the manifestation of one strategy, the number of measures on the scorecard becomes irrelevant, for the multiple measures on the Balanced Scorecard are linked together in a cause-and-effect network that describes the business unit’s strategy. While this is easier said than done, the examples of Metro Bank and National Insurance, as well as our experience with other companies, indicate that companies can indeed formulate and communicate their strategy with an integrated system of approximately two dozen measurements.
But today most organizations already have many more than 16 to 25 measures to keep themselves functioning. They are incredulous that a
Balanced Scorecard of no more than two dozen measures can be sufficient for measuring their operations. They are, of course, correct in a narrow sense, but they fail to distinguish between
diagnostic measures
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—those measures that monitor whether the business remains in control and can signal when unusual events are occurring that require immediate attention—and
strategic measures
—those that define a strategy designed for competitive excellence.
A simple example clarifies this point. Many aspects of our bodily functions must perform within fairly narrow operating parameters if we are to survive. If our body temperature departs from a normal 1–2° window (away from 98.6°F or 37°C), or our blood pressure drops too low or escalates too high, we have a serious problem. In such circumstances, all our energies (and those of skilled professionals) are mobilized to restore these parameters to their normal levels. But we don’t devote enormous energy to optimizing our body temperature and blood pressure. Being able to control our body temperature to within 0.01 of the optimum will not be one of the strategic success factors that will determine whether we become a chief executive of a company, a senior partner in an international consulting firm, or a tenured full professor at a major university. Other factors are more decisive in determining whether we achieve our unique personal and professional objectives. Are body temperature and blood pressure important? Absolutely. Should these measurements fall outside certain control limits, we have a signal about a major problem that we must attend to and solve immediately. But while such measurements are necessary, they are not sufficient for the achievement of our long-run goals.
Similarly, corporations should have hundreds, perhaps thousands, of measures that they can monitor to ensure that they are functioning as expected, and to signal when corrective action must be taken. But these are not the drivers of competitive success. Such measures capture the necessary “hygiene factors” that enable the company to operate. These measures should be monitored diagnostically, with deviations from expectations noted rapidly; in effect, management by exception.
The outcome and performance driver measures on the Balanced Scorecard, in contrast, should be the subjects of intensive and extensive interactions among senior and mid-level managers as they evaluate strategies based on new information about competitors, customers, markets, technologies, and suppliers.
2
After he had implemented his first Balanced Scorecard one executive remarked: “Our division had always measured hundreds
of operating variables. In building a Balanced Scorecard, we chose 12 measures as the key to implementing our strategy. Of these 12 measures, 7 were entirely new measurements for the division.”
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The Balanced Scorecard is not a replacement for an organization’s day-to-day measurement system. The scorecard measures are chosen to direct the attention of managers and employees to those factors expected to lead to competitive breakthroughs for an organization.
Even the best objectives and measures can be achieved in bad ways. The Balanced Scorecard guards against some of the myopic suboptimization that occurs when only a single measure, especially a financial one, is used to motivate and evaluate business unit performance. But suboptimization is not unique to financial measures. For example, many companies use, in their customer perspective, the on-time delivery performance for targeted customers. On-time delivery has become an especially valued attribute by companies, especially manufacturers operating under a just-in-time discipline, where little inventory is held to buffer unreliable deliveries. Yet if too much pressure is placed on a single customer metric like OTD, managers could soon develop dysfunctional methods to achieve excellent OTD. For example, manufacturers can build a substantial inventory of all likely requested items so that almost any request could be filled by shipments from finished-goods inventory. For such companies, the OTD measure might be excellent but large amounts of capital would be tied up in inventory, storage, and handling facilities, and the company would run a high risk of obsolescence and spoilage. This is a very expensive way to achieve high OTD levels.
Alternatively, companies could achieve high OTD simply by quoting and committing to long lead times. For example, a customer might request delivery within 18 days. The company, because of backlogs, delays, and general confusion within its operations, may realize that it cannot deliver within 18 days, and offers the customer delivery only by day 30. The customer may not be happy with the extension, but in the short run may not have an alternative supplier for the good or service, and therefore accepts the 30-day delivery commitment. If the company does, in fact,
deliver on day 30, it has satisfied its OTD objective, but it has not satisfied the customer that requested delivery on day 18.
Consider, as another example, an excellent performance measure for the innovation cycle of the internal-business-process perspective: the time-to-market measure for new products and services. Business units hope to improve their time-to-market by improving the management of their new-product introduction process, and by learning to produce the finished product with fewer design cycles, for example. But, lacking fundamental improvement in new-product introduction processes, and under the discipline of adhering to a demanding time-to-market performance measure, managers can release new products that are only incrementally different from existing products. They have achieved their performance target, but at the expense of fundamental innovation that has placed a competitive strength at risk.
A company’s total measurement system should not encourage suboptimization along any single measure or perspective. Designers should attempt to anticipate the suboptimization that might occur for a given metric on the Balanced Scorecard, and provide supplemental metrics that discourage achieving the primary scorecard objective in undesirable ways. Rather than clutter up the scorecard with additional, nonstrategic measures, companies can use diagnostic measures to balance the strategic measures on the scorecard. As a specific example, Analog Devices, a prototype company for the Balanced Scorecard,
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wanted to offset the temptation to achieve high OTD through long-lead-time quotes. Therefore, in addition to OTD, Analog measured the difference between the promised delivery date and the customer’s requested delivery date. It also measured the percentage of time it could not commit to the customer’s requested delivery date. It could also have used a diagnostic measure like inventory turns ratio to offset the temptation to achieve excellent OTD performance by carrying lots of inventory. The off-scorecard diagnostic measures like inventory turns and the difference between customer requested delivery dates and quoted delivery dates enable managers to detect when improved on-time delivery performance has been achieved by undesirable actions.
Balanced Scorecards need to be more than a mixture of 15 to 25 financial and nonfinancial measures, grouped into four perspectives. The scorecard
should tell the story of the business unit’s strategy. This story is told by linking outcome and performance driver measures together via a series of cause-and-effect relationships. The outcome measures tend to be lagging indicators. They signal the ultimate objectives of the strategy and whether near-term efforts have led to desirable outcomes. The performance driver measures are leading indicators, which signal to all organizational participants what they should be doing today to create value in the future. Outcome measures without performance drivers create ambiguity about how the outcomes are to be achieved, and may lead to suboptimal short-term actions. Performance driver measures that are not linked to outcomes will encourage local improvement programs that may deliver neither short-nor long-term value to the business unit. The best Balanced Scorecards will tell the story of the strategy so well that the strategy can be inferred by the collection of objectives and measures and the linkages among them.
1
. For a description of diagnostic measures, see Chap. 4 in Robert Simons,
Levers of Control: How Managers Use Innovative Control Systems to Drive Strategic Renewal
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1995).
2
. The important distinction between the measures monitored in an organization’s diagnostic control systems and those that are part of the continual interactions among managers as they scan and debate key strategic uncertainties has been articulated by Simons,
Levers of Control.
3
. Experience reported in “Implementing the Balanced Scorecard at FMC Corporation: An Interview with Larry D. Brady,”
Harvard Business Review
(September–October 1993): 143–147.
4
. Robert S. Kaplan, “Analog Devices, Inc.: The Half-Life System,” 9-190-061 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1990) and A. Schneiderman, “Metrics for the Order Fulfillment Process: Parts I and II,”
Journal of Cost Management
(Summer 1996, Fall 1996).
Structure and Strategy
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HE
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ALANCED
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CORECARD
must reflect the structure of the organization for which the strategy has been formulated. The examples provided so far have illustrated Balanced Scorecards for autonomous business units. But Balanced Scorecards are useful for other organizational units as well. In this chapter we illustrate the development of scorecards for: