The Descent of Air India (4 page)

These two initiatives in my first year and a half made it clear to me that if one wanted to bring about change, the organisation would not come in the way. It was also not difficult, if one was so inclined, to make a difference in areas that were even not directly under one’s purview.

Before the reader misconstrues these examples as an exercise in self-gratification, let me clarify that my objective, instead, is to show that if only the employees of Air India had not given up on their responsibilities towards the airline way back in the 1980s and the 1990s, Air India would have had a fate very different from that from which it suffers today.

SEEDS OF DECLINE

It lacked leadership; training and mentorship were alien to its culture; and there was no structured succession plan. It was soon clear that Air India was not ready for the open skies policy that was soon to become a reality. But I was a minority in the organisation. Most continued to believe, and many still do, that Air India would never crumble, and that worries such as mine were imaginary. As a governmental undertaking, it was mandated to survive. The fact that Air India has been gradually losing market share and respect among its passengers was of little significance to most employees.

However, the writing on the wall was clear. It was obvious that with Air India’s work culture of chairman/managing director-centric functioning, its lack of desire to set product weaknesses right and an HR policy that ignored merit and did nothing to hone skills, its future looked bleak.

My observations spurred me to advise a few commercial department officers with management degrees who met me in 1992–93 to look for greener pastures. One of them, Debashis Golder, still with the airline, reminded me of this advice in 2008 when I visited him at Air India’s Bangalore office. With a sense of regret he said, ‘Sir, I wish I had heeded your advice.’

CHAPTER TWO

clipped wings

IN THE MID-1980s, the only bright spot—even as Air India found itself buffeted by a host of pressures on several fronts—was its in-flight experience. While the airline resembled a crumbling edifice on almost every front, its in-flight service appeared to hold on to the exemplary standards of the past. Passengers rarely, if ever, found fault with the food, champagnes or the wines on offer on board the flight, or the service of the cabin crew. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the overall in-flight experience made up for the other shortcomings of the airline.

THE LAST BASTION

The reason the in-flight service had managed to retain some of its glory was that earlier managements had placed great emphasis on aligning the product features and services with passenger expectations and benchmarking the airline with the best in the business. Whether it was sacrificing premium seats in its B747-200 jumbo aircraft to create an exclusive lounge for its first class passengers or paying attention to the menu for its passengers, the airline’s management had done everything to make passengers feel special and at home. The cabin crew had been deeply committed to the task—especially the air hostesses, who had been concerned about passenger comfort and the image of the airline. The crew had contributed in a large measure to the character of the airline, thanks to their high adherence to ethics in the workplace. It helped that the airline industry had been a profession much sought after and that Air India was an employer of choice for many during those years.

Air India had also had a rigorous and exacting training programme that had been drawn up by a team of dedicated air hostesses and pursers under J. R. D. Tata’s discerning tutelage. Moreover, it had been meticulous in the manner in which it had conducted its recruitment for these posts. The airline had thus worked with a double advantage: not only had it attracted the best talent, it had also groomed them in accordance with the best traditions of Indian hospitality. The cabin crew of Air India had thus come to be known as the best in the business. The reputation of Air India’s in-flight service had been such that the airline had helped Singapore Airlines train its cabin crew in the late 1960s. Current celebrities such as Parmeshwar Godrej and Maureen Wadia, among others, had been a part of the Air India crew and had added to the glamorous image of the airline.

Air India’s standards of service, although in decline, were still considered to be one of the best during the 1980s. Film stars, industrialists and the top brass of the corporate world preferred to fly Air India because of the care that distinguished its in-flight experience, especially in the first and business classes. Such was the prestige the airline enjoyed that some passengers even changed their travel schedules to suit those of Air India. Even a single air hostess who had been exposed to the training and grooming of the previous era was enough to ensure that the experience offered on board a flight was exemplary. As a result, by the late 1980s, even as the signs of decay were increasingly evident, the In-flight Services Department was still earning encomiums, though not on the same scale that it had done a decade ago. And a comment commonly aired by its passengers was, ‘Once in the air, Air India is the best.’

FALLING STANDARDS

Once Air India’s top management changed in the late 1970s, the organisational work culture underwent a sea change. The new leaders adopted an indifferent attitude towards in-flight services, treating it on par with other functions. The eligibility criteria for aspirants to a job as a crew member were not imposed rigorously, and new recruits were not given adequate and rigorous training.

The recruitment process, which had been framed along a set of stringent guidelines, was given the go-by and any employee—be it from the clerical cadre of a department—was considered eligible for the post of air hostess or purser. Aptitude became immaterial and so did merit. The airline failed to institutionalise and continue with the strict recruitment norms and training procedures that once gave its service the edge, and thereby lost its advantage over the rest. And as, one by one, the old guard of the In-flight Services Department retired, their absence was reflected in the deteriorating service on-board the flights.

In the past, a member of the cabin crew had to have a pleasing personality and meet the minimum requirement with respect to height and a maximum limit on weight. Aspirants holding a degree or a diploma in hotel management had been preferred. Moreover, the superannuation age for air hostesses had been low, unlike the present limit of 58 years. The problem of poor selection criteria, lack of training and indifference towards excellence intensified over the years and by the late 1980s, Air India began reeling under their impact.

Political backing and union pressure—and not merit and aptitude— began to play a greater role in recruitment. This had a dual impact. First, there was a flood of applications from within the airline during every recruitment drive. The job was seen as glamorous, better paying and a ticket to exotic destinations. Clerical, secretarial and security staff, irrespective of their age and aptitude, began to find passage as cabin crew. Second, the quality of service began to decline since most of them had no prior exposure to the world of hospitality and service, and the organisation did not offer a rigorous training programme. Thus, while the number of cabin crew, including air hostesses, grew from a few hundred to nearly 2,000 as the airline’s fleet expanded, the charm and grace of the earlier era disappeared. Passengers soon began complaining about the impersonal service and the overall unpleasant ambience on flights. Even as airlines across the world raised their standards of in-flight experience to sublime levels—first, the Asian, then the European and later, the Gulf airlines—Air India steadily slipped down the scale.

Naturally, this had disastrous consequences. The brand suffered and the quality of the product declined. There was yet another damaging outcome: Many of the new appointees who had joined as cabin crew from the clerical cadre only to benefit from the perks of the job had strong political and union links. Some among them began to stir up trouble on almost every front. Negotiations for enhanced allowances, issues of productivity and day-to-day operations became acrimonious affairs resulting in delay or cancellation of flights. The intransigent stand of the unions on the changes that were imperative for the upgradation of the services on board the flights affected passenger comfort and the timely departure of flights. As a result, foreign airlines cashed in to attract the once-loyal Air India clientele. It was as if the seeds of decline of Air India’s in-flight services sown in the late 1970s had begun to sprout shoots.

Was it neglect or complacency that hurt the airline? Or was it an inability to stand up to the growing belligerence of the airline’s unions? Or was it all of these? While the real answer is known only to those who helmed the airline during those years, the truth is that by the late 1980s, the Air India Cabin Crew Association (AICCA) had grown all-powerful, and the duo of Sagar Katrekar and P. Murlidhar, backed by boisterous executive committee members, had led several agitations. In fact, to many of us, it seemed that the two were always calling for some strike or registering some protest or the other. The department had worked with the union without too much acrimony in the past, but what had changed was that the predecessors of the current union leaders, led by Mohan Bir Singh, had affiliated the AICCA to a political party and that lent them significant clout. Both Mr Katrekar and Mr Murlidhar had joined as cabin crew after serving in the airline’s clerical cadre. Soon after assuming leadership, they made a string of demands on the airline with respect to concessions in work norms, enhanced allowances and a host of other issues. They, however, refused to discuss employee productivity or cooperate in the introduction of new services. It was clear to everyone that their priorities were not aligned with those of the airline.

Most departmental heads and chairmen wanted to keep the union leaders in good humour and gave in to all their demands. But when the bickering between the management and the union began turning into a regular slugfest, and the department became more a management– union fighting arena than a customer-oriented wing of the airline, the management realised that it was important to find a way to focus on the in-flight issues. A person from the HR department was appointed to head In-flight Services. Even this did not yield the desired result as he spent most of his time settling disputes and appeasing the union. He was never really able to focus on the service and the product. Moreover, given the frequency with which the union was clashing with members of the management, the job of the departmental head began to resemble that of a fire fighter—dousing the flames but never really able to prevent them in the first place. And in the battle between the management and the unions, the airline suffered, as neither of the two objectives of ensuring industrial peace and service enhancement was achieved.

OLD CHALLENGES IN A NEW ROLE

In November 1991, Y. C. Deveshwar was appointed the chairman of Air India by the late Madhavrao Scindia, the then minister for civil aviation. Mr Deveshwar came from the diversified tobacco-and-hospitality conglomerate, ITC. He was brought in over the candidature of Subhash Gupte, Director of Finance, who had officiated as the managing director after Mr Jetley’s sudden exit in 1990. Mr Gupte had conducted himself ably during the interim period, but he was sidelined, and he quit Air India after Mr Deveshwar joined the company.

Mr Deveshwar lacked core airline experience but was conversant with the hospitality business, as ITC ran a successful chain of luxury hotels. He was conscious of passengers’ needs and what was required to be done to stem the rot that had set in. He brought in a host of good management practices that infused new life into Air India. For instance, he instituted the practice of succession planning within the airline. He would track positions and make sure that six months before a position fell vacant, a person was identified and trained to occupy it. He sought to ensure a smooth transfer of functions when an incumbent departmental head was due for retirement and understood that not every one, howsoever competent, could be considered as good for all positions. Aptitude mattered and so did attitude. This was a major departure from the past.

A few months after he took over, one day, in May 1992, Mr Deveshwar summoned me to his office. He started off the meeting by talking about the impending vacancy in the airline’s In-flight Services Department and the need for an able manager to succeed him. K. A. Sapat, the departmental head, was due to retire in eight months in January 1993. I was frank and said, ‘I don’t think there is anyone within the organisation who can meet the requirement; please get a person from outside.’

‘Why?’ asked Mr Deveshwar. I said, ‘In-flight has been Air India’s mainstay for years; even passengers who were severely critical of ground services appreciated the experience on flight. We shouldn’t dilute our strength. And we need someone who is innovative, customer-focused, articulate and can be tough with a hostile union. I don’t think we have anyone within the company at the senior management level with the qualities to achieve that.’ He heard me out and responded, ‘ Tell me which of the qualities you have outlined you don’t possess. I have you in mind for the post.’

I had joined Air India as its chief public relations manager and had not expected that my assignment would change and that too, so soon. I asked for some time to think and consulted with a few colleagues. However, most of my peers said that I should refuse, as it was a thankless job. They were comfortable maintaining the status quo and loathe to taking up any challenge or increasing the scope of their responsibilities and wanted me to do the same. After a month, prodded by Mr Deveshwar, I disregarded their warnings and took up the offer. I saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate that if one had the will, one could not only arrest the decline in service standards but, in fact, improve them.

From July 1992, I spent six months as an ‘understudy’ to the head of the In-flight Services Department. This was a first in the history of Air India. The general practice was to move people to other departments without any training or guidance on the day the previous head of the department was due to retire. I moved to the department’s office at Sahar, Mumbai, to familiarise myself with its strengths and weaknesses, while concurrently holding my position as the head of the Public Relations Department. My first few months were spent listening to the experiences recounted by the management team and members of the cabin crew. I wanted to get to know the strengths and weaknesses of the department, and spoke to people who had served for close to 30 years with the airline, as well as those who were relatively new. Time and again, my talks with various people in the organisation threw up the same refrain: ‘We were known for immaculate in-flight service and this has been destroyed.’ ‘What was the problem?’ I asked. They replied that everyone was at fault. The management team said the unions were responsible for the state of affairs. Crew members blamed the management. And the more I spoke to people, the clearer it became: a combination of factors had led to the dilution of the airline’s in-flight service standards.