The essential writings of Machiavelli (16 page)

CHAPTER FOUR
O
N HOW DISCORD BETWEEN THE PLEBEIANS AND THE
R
OMAN
S
ENATE MADE THE
R
OMAN
R
EPUBLIC FREE AND POWERFUL

I do not want to pass over the tumults that occasionally arose in Rome between the time the last Tarquin king died and the time the tribunes were created. I would also like to say a few things against the opinion of those who hold that Rome was an unruly republic beset by so much confusion that if good fortune and military skill had not made up for its defects, it would have been inferior to all other republics. I cannot deny that Fortune and the army were reasons for the power of Rome, but it seems clear to me that those who are of the opinion that Rome was unruly do not realize that where there is a good army there must also be good institutions, and this only rarely occurs where there is no good fortune. But let us proceed to the other aspects of Rome. I say that those who censure the discord between the nobles and the plebeians are blaming things that played a foremost part in keeping Rome free, and that they consider only the tumult and shouts engendered by such disorder rather than the good results they generate. Nor do they consider how in the body of every republic there are two different humors—that of the people and that of the nobles—and that all the laws that are passed in favor of liberty arise from their discord, as can easily be seen to have happened in Rome. From the era of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, a period of more than three hundred years, the clashes in Rome rarely resulted in exiles and even more rarely in bloodshed.
¹⁸
Nor can one judge these clashes as detrimental, or the republic divided. In all that time, in its periods of strife, it did not send more than nine or ten citizens into exile, executed very few, and did not force many to pay fines. Nor can one reasonably claim that Rome was a republic in disarray when there are so many examples of excellence: because good examples arise from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from those clashes which so many rashly condemn. If one examines the outcome of these clashes, one will find that they did not result in exile or violence against the common good, but in laws and institutions that benefited civic liberty. Some might say that the means were extreme and almost savage, seeing the populace gathered to shout against the Senate, the Senate against the people, everyone running riot through the streets, closing the shops, the plebeian masses leaving Rome—things that frighten even those who only read about them. I would like to propose that every city has to have methods that allow the populace to give vent to their ambitions, above all those cities that want to engage their populace in important matters. Rome had such a method. When the populace wanted to obtain a law, they either caused unrest as mentioned above, or refused to enlist to go to war, so that to placate them Rome had to satisfy them in some way. The desires of a free populace are rarely dangerous to liberty, because the danger arises either from a populace being oppressed or from the suspicion that they might be oppressed. Where these fears were false, there was the remedy of the public assemblies at which some good man could rise and make a speech demonstrating that they were mistaken. And as Cicero says, the populace, though ignorant, are capable of understanding the truth, and readily acquiesce when they are told the truth, by a man worthy of trust.
¹⁹

One should therefore criticize the Roman government more moderately, and realize that the many good results that came out of that republic could only have been brought about by the best causes. And if the discord was the reason for the creation of the tribunes, it deserves the highest praise, because, besides affording the populace a role in the government, the tribunes were formed to guard Roman liberty, as will be shown in the following chapter.

18.
Tarquin the Proud, the last king of Rome, was deposed in 510
BCE
. The Gracchi brothers were influential statesmen and reformers. The elder, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, was killed in 133
BCE
, his brother, Caius Sempronius Gracchus, in 121
BCE
.

19.
In
De amicitia (On Friendship)
XXV, Cicero writes: “A public assembly, though composed of inexperienced men, nevertheless will be able to judge the difference between a mere flatterer and untrustworthy citizen seeking popularity, and a man of principle, standing, and solidity.”

CHAPTER FIVE
O
N WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF LIBERTY IS MORE SECURE IN THE HANDS OF THE POPULACE OR OF THE NOBLES, AND WHETHER THOSE SEEKING TO ACQUIRE OR THOSE SEEKING TO MAINTAIN HAVE GREATER CAUSE TO SOW DISCORD

Among the most important institutions set up by the wise founder of a state is legislation to protect liberty. Living in freedom will last for a greater or lesser time depending on how well founded that freedom is. In every state there are nobles and populace, and so the question arises in whose hands it would be best to place the protection of liberty. In ancient Sparta, as in modern Venice, it was placed in the hands of the nobles, while in Rome it was placed in the hands of the plebeians. Therefore it will be useful to examine which of these states made the better choice. If we look at the reasons for these choices, there is something to be said for both sides. But if we examine the results, one would choose the side of the nobles, as Sparta’s and Venice’s liberty lasted longer than that of Rome.

As for the reasons for these choices, let me first argue the case of the Romans, and say that the protection of liberty ought to be given to those who have less desire to usurp it. For without doubt, if one considers the respective aims of the nobles and the populace, one sees in the former a strong desire to dominate, and in the latter merely a desire not to be dominated.
²⁰
Consequently, the populace have a stronger will to live free, having less hope to usurp freedom than the nobles. Thus if the populace are setup as the protector of liberty, it is reasonable to conclude that they will take better care of it. Not being able to seize power themselves, they will not permit others to seize it.

On the other hand, the defenders of the Spartan and Venetian model will counter that he who places the protection of liberty in the hands of the nobles does two good things. First, it satisfies the nobles’ aspiration to rule, and with that power in their hands they consequently play a larger part in the state and have more reason to be satisfied. Second, it removes authority from the plebeians with their restless spirits, which are the cause of infinite discord and upheaval in a state and certain to reduce the nobility to despair, which over time brings bad results. The defenders of the Spartan and Venetian model cite Rome itself as an example: The tribunes of the plebeians acquired so much authority that they were no longer content with one consul being a plebeian, but wanted both to be. Achieving that, the tribunes then demanded the office of censor, the office of praetor, and all the other positions of power in the city, and it was this same passion that before long drove them to venerate any man capable of assaulting the nobility. This gave rise to the power of Marius and the ruin of Rome.
²¹

But in fact, whoever weighs both sides might be in doubt as to which side he would choose to be the protector of such liberty, not knowing which humor would be more injurious in a state: the humor that seeks to preserve the rank and offices it already holds, or the humor that seeks to gain that which it does not have. Yet examining everything carefully, one will come to the following conclusion: One is considering either a state that is striving toward an empire, like Rome, or a state content to maintain itself as it is. In the first case, the state has to do exactly as Rome did, and in the second it can follow the example of Venice and Sparta, for reasons I shall explain in the following chapter.

But let us discuss which men are most injurious to a state: those who desire to acquire, or those afraid of losing what they have acquired. I propose that once Marcus Menenius was made dictator, and Marcus Fulvius his Master of the Horse (both were plebeians), in order to investigate conspiracies against Rome that had arisen in Capua, they were also given authority by the people to seek out those men in Rome who, through ambition and illegal means, strove to gain the consulship or other high positions in the city
²²
In the nobility’s eyes such authority had been given to the dictator against them, and they began spreading the rumor throughout Rome that it was not the nobles who were seeking these high positions out of ambition and illegal means, but men from the plebeian ranks, who, unable to rely upon their birth and skill, were seeking to acquire the highest ranks through illegal means.
²³
They particularly accused the dictator. Their accusation was brought with such force that the dictator, Menenius, gave an oration in which he complained about the calumnies which the nobles had launched against him and laid down his office, submitting himself to the judgment of the populace. His case was deliberated and he was absolved: at which point the question arose, who was more ambitious, he who wants to maintain what he has or he who wants to acquire what he does not have, as it is easy enough for either aspiration to be the reason for the greatest discord. Nevertheless, in most cases the discord is caused by those who possess, because the fear of losing generates in them the same desires as those who wish to acquire. Men do not feel their possessions secure if they do not also acquire the possessions of others. And the more they possess, the more power and capacity they have to cause turmoil. Furthermore, their improper and covetous behavior ignites in the hearts of those who do not possess the urge to avenge themselves and rob those who do, gaining the wealth and honors that they see so badly misused by others.

20.
This idea is echoed in
The Prince
, chapter 9: “One acquires this principality through the favor of either the people or the nobles, because in every city there are two opposing humors. This arises from the fact that the nobles want to command and oppress the people, but the people do not want to be commanded or oppressed by the nobles.”

21.
Gaius Marius was a Roman general of plebeian background who was first elected consul in 107
BCE
. Many of his reforms led to the fall of the republic.

22.
The dictator was a chief magistrate with absolute authority, elected for six months during great emergencies. The Master of the Horse assisted the dictator in managing the state. Gaius Maenius (not Marcus Menenius) became dictator, with Marcus Folius (not Fulvius) as his Master of the Horse. Livy describes these incidents in Book IX, chapter 26.

23.
Livy (Book IX, chapter 26) writes: “The nobility, not only those who were being accused, but all the nobles, protested that the charge should not be brought against the patricians to whom the path to honors was always open, unless it was obstructed by intrigue, but against plebeian upstarts.”

CHAPTER SIX
O
N WHETHER A FORM OF GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE BEEN SET UP IN
R
OME THAT COULD HAVE REMOVED THE ENMITY BETWEEN THE POPULACE AND THE
S
ENATE

We have discussed the effects of the clashes and conflicts between the populace and the Senate. Since these continued until the time of the Gracchi,
²⁴
leading to the end of liberty in Rome, one might have wished that Rome had attained its greatness without such enmities. But it seems relevant to consider whether a government that was able to remove such clashes could have been instituted in Rome. To examine this, one must look at the states that managed to remain free for a long time without enmities and clashes, and see what form of government they had, and whether one could have set up such a government in Rome. There are ancient Sparta and modern Venice, both of which I have already touched on. Sparta set up a king and a small senate to govern it,
²⁵
while Venice did not organize its government by ranks, but rather under a single appellation: All those with the right to enter the administration were called gentlemen. This system was given to the Venetians more by chance than by the wisdom of their legislator. They were confined to those little islands on which the city now stands, for the reasons I have already mentioned, and as the Venetians had grown to such a number, they needed laws if they wanted to live together, and so they set up a form of government. They often convened in councils to deliberate on matters concerning the city and when it seemed that they had enough members in their councils to form a vital civic system, they closed the doors to all further newcomers to Venice, preventing them from participating in their government.
²⁶
Then, once enough inhabitants were excluded from government, the men of the government acquired a standing and were called gentlemen, while the others were called commoners. This system could arise and maintain itself without discord because when it originally came into being, everyone living in Venice was made part of the government, and so nobody could complain. Those who arrived later found the government established and closed, and so did not have cause or opportunity to spark turmoil. There was no cause because nothing had been taken from them, and there was no opportunity because whoever was ruling held them in check and did not call upon them in matters in which they could end up gaining power. Furthermore, those who later came to settle in Venice were not many, not enough in number to cause an imbalance between those who governed and those who were governed. The proportion of gentlemen to commoners was either equal or greater, so Venice could set up this kind of state and keep it united.

Sparta, as I have already mentioned, was governed by a king and a small senate. It managed to maintain itself for such a long time because it had few citizens, and did not accept immigrants. Sparta had also adopted and observed the laws of Lycurgus, which took away all cause for discord, and the Spartans managed to live united for a long time. The laws of Lycurgus brought more equality in wealth and less equality in rank. Hence there was equality in poverty, and the populace were not as politically ambitious, since the positions of power in the city were open to so few citizens and were kept from the populace, nor did the nobles ever give them reason to desire these positions by treating them badly. This stability arose from the kings of the Spartans, who, being called into office and placed in the midst of that nobility, had no better way to hold on to their office than by keeping the populace secure from harm. The result was that the populace neither feared nor desired power; and since they neither had power nor feared that of the nobles, the struggle they would have had with the nobility and the causes for clashes did not arise, and they could live in harmony for a long time. But two principal matters brought about this harmony: first, Sparta had few inhabitants and so could be governed by a few, and second, by not accepting foreigners into their state, they did not have occasion either to adulterate themselves or to grow to such an extent that the state would become unrulable by the few who governed it.

Considering all these matters, it is clear that the Roman legislators, if they wanted Rome to remain as peaceful as the states I have mentioned, had to do one of two things: either not use the plebeians in war, like the Venetians, or not open their doors to foreigners, like the Spartans. The Romans, however, did both, which gave the plebeians power, helped them grow in number, and gave them infinite occasion to cause turmoil. But had the state of Rome become more peaceful it would have become weaker, as this would have blocked the path to the greatness it achieved. In other words, had Rome removed the causes of turmoil, it would have also removed the causes for its growth. If one looks carefully this pattern can be observed in all human affairs: One can never remove one problem without another one’s arising.
²⁷
If you strive to make a populace numerous and armed in order to build a large empire, you end up unable to control it as you wish; if you keep it small or disarmed you can control it, but if you acquire new dominions you will be unable to keep them, or they will become so weak that you will fall prey to whoever attacks you. So in all our deliberations we should consider where the fewest drawbacks lie and choose the best solution, because there is no choice that is entirely clear and certain. Rome, therefore, like Sparta, could have created a prince for life and a small senate; but unlike Sparta, Rome could not have avoided expanding the number of its citizens, as it wanted to create a large empire. This would have meant that the king for life and the small senate would have been of little benefit to Rome as far as its harmony was concerned.

Therefore, anyone wishing to set up a republic from the start should first consider whether his aim is to expand his dominion and power, like Rome, or to remain within strict limits. In the first case, he has to follow the model of Rome and allow the tumult and popular discord to the extent that he can; because without a great number of men, and well-armed ones, a state can never grow, or if it does, it will be unable to maintain itself. In the second case, the founder of a republic can set it up following the model of Sparta or Venice; but because expansion is poison to such states, he who sets them up has to do his utmost to hinder them from acquiring territory. Such territorial acquisitions, when a state is weak, will be its utter ruin. This is what happened in Sparta and Venice. The former, having subjugated almost all of Greece, showed its weak foundation in a minor incident: When Pelopidas
²⁸
sparked a rebellion in Thebes, other cities followed suit, and the Spartan state was destroyed. Similarly, Venice had occupied a large part of Italy—most of it not through war but through money and ingenuity—and yet the moment it had to prove its strength, it lost all its territories in a single day
²⁹

Therefore I propose that the way to create a republic that will last a long time is to set it up like Sparta or Venice, and to found it in a strong location and with such power that nobody would consider it easily subjugated, but on the other hand not allow it to become so large that it would instill fear in its neighbors. This way, a state can prevail for a long time, since one makes war on a state for two reasons: in order to subjugate it, or out of fear that one might be subjugated by it. The model I have proposed above will almost entirely remove these reasons, because if it is difficult to conquer a state (since I presuppose its defense would be skillfully devised), it would be rare or out of the question for someone to set his sights on acquiring it. If the state remains within its own borders, and experience demonstrates that it does not harbor ambitions of expansion, nobody will declare war on it out of fear, and even less so if it has a constitution or laws that prohibit expansion. I have no doubt that if such a balance could be kept it would lead to a proper living according to law and the true tranquillity of a city. But as all affairs of this world are in motion and will not remain fixed, they must either rise or fall, and many endeavors to which reason will not induce you, necessity will. If one has set up a republic that is able to maintain itself without expanding, but necessity leads it to expand, one will see its foundations crumble under it, and it will quickly come to ruin. And yet, if the heavens smile upon it and it never has to wage war, idleness might make this republic effeminate or divided. These two problems together, or each by itself, can be enough reason for the republic’s ruin. Therefore, since it is not possible, in my opinion, to find a balance or to maintain a middle way, in setting up a republic one must think of the most honorable choices, and set it up in such a way that even if necessity induces it to expand, it will be able to conserve what it has acquired.

But to return to my first argument: I believe that it is necessary to follow the institutions of Rome and not those of other states, because I do not believe it is possible to find a middle way. One must tolerate the kinds of clashes that arose in Rome between the populace and the Senate, regarding them as a necessary ill on Rome’s road to greatness. Beyond the other reasons I have submitted, which demonstrate that the authority of the tribunes was necessary for the protection of liberty, one can easily see the benefit that states derive from the power of public indictment, which was granted, among other things, to the tribunes, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

24.
The reforms of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus acted as a catalyst to end the Roman Republic, opening the way to imperial Rome.

25.
In fact, Sparta had
two
kings, who were elected as lifetime co-rulers. The Spartan senate, or
gerousia
, was made up of twenty-eight elders.

26.
In 1297, Venice’s Maggior Consiglio (Greater Council) excluded all non-aristocrats from political power.

27.
See also
The Prince
, chapter 21: “It is in the nature of things that you can never escape one setback without running into another. Wisdom consists of knowing how to recognize the respective qualities of the setbacks and choosing the lesser evil.”

28.
Pelopidas freed Thebes from Spartan occupation in 379
BCE
, which Plutarch describes in
Parallel Lives
in his chapter on Pelopidas.

29.
In the Battle of Agnadello in 1509, Venice suffered a total defeat by the French king Louis XII and lost all its cities on the Italian mainland.