The Fall of Carthage (41 page)
Like so many of the other strongholds to fall during the Punic Wars, Arpi was captured by treachery and stealth. Hannibal had some successes elsewhere during these years, usually by the same means, but his repeated attempts to capture Nola, which lies on the edge of the Campanian plain, failed. The Romans were ruthless in their attacks on allies who had rebelled, but their commanders paid careful attention to winning back the loyalty of the disaffected Italian noblemen before they committed themselves to the enemy. At Nola Marcellus rewarded and lavished praise on the bravery of Lucius Bantius who had been captured at Cannae and released as part of Hannibal's plan to win over the Italians. Fabius also took care to foster the loyalty of his allied soldiers, for instance rewarding a Marsian soldier, who was believed to be planning to desert, and publicly stating that the man's achievements had been unfairly overlooked in the past.
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The Fall of Tarentum
Hannibal was especially eager to capture a port. The Roman refusal to concede defeat after Cannae and the continued loyalty of most of her allies had made it clear that the war would not be won quickly. In the struggle to control the walled towns and cities of southern Italy, Hannibal was at an increasing disadvantage as the Romans mobilized more and more soldiers. His main army remained undefeated in any serious engagement and he repeatedly led it against the strongholds loyal to Rome, hoping to force their defection or discover a means of capturing them. The Roman armies kept to the higher ground on the fringes of the Apennines as far as possible and avoided the plains where the superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry was unchallenged. Roman commanders offered battle only from strong defensive positions, which the Carthaginian was rarely willing to attack. In the hilly country around places such as Beneventum and Nola it was hard to fight a decisive battle. Rarely were the open plains wide enough to deploy large armies and there was always higher ground for a beaten side to retire to and recover. Even a general of Hannibal's genius could not force a reluctant enemy to fight pitched battles in this country. His army needed to remain concentrated if it was to threaten the Romans. Wherever it appeared, the Romans' movements had to become cautious, but the army could only be in one place at a time and the Roman forces elsewhere inevitably became very aggressive. Unprotected, his allies were attacked and their fields raided. Hannibal's rapid and unexpected marches during these years displayed all his familiar genius and the continued efficiency of his army, but even this could not entirely overcome the enemy's vastly superior numbers.
Late in 216 Hannibal had sent his brother Mago to report to the Carthaginian Senate. There, perhaps in the same hall where Fabius Buteo had let slip war from the fold of his toga, Mago ordered his attendants to pour onto the floor heaps of the gold rings taken from the bodies of slain Roman senators and equestrians as evidence of the slaughter Hannibal had wrought on the state's enemies. He ended with an appeal for immediate reinforcement and supplies of grain to feed the army. Livy claims that Hanno, the old opponent of the Barcid family, mocked the catalogue of Hannibal's achievements, complaining that the general was asking for aid as if he was losing rather than winning the war. In spite of this criticism, the majority voted to send support to the army in Italy as well as reinforcing the position in Spain. The problem was how to get reinforcements and supplies to Italy. Without a port, and some degree of control over the waters off Sicily, no sizeable reinforcement could reach Hannibal without following the land route he had taken himself.
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Hannibal had failed at Cumae and Naples. In 214 five noblemen from the great maritime city of Tarentum came to the Punic camp. All had been captured at Trasimene or Cannae and released. They claimed that they had the support of most of their city and that it would immediately defect if the Carthaginian army approached in force. Hannibal was currently on the west coast outside Cumae and made another attempt at Naples, before marching once more on Nola. From there he set out at night, reaching Tarentum whilst the Roman armies were all occupied elsewhere. The Roman garrison were on their guard and had recently been reinforced by the fleet from Brundisium. No rising occurred in the city and none of the noblemen appeared to fulfil their promises, so after a few days Hannibal withdrew.
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In 212 hostages from Tarentum and Thurii attempted to escape from Rome and were arrested and executed, enraging opinion in these and many other Greek cities. Another conspiracy was formed at Tarentum by a group of young aristocrats led by Philemenus and Nico (Nikon in Greek). Hannibal had placed his winter camp three days' march from the city and before the spring he was approached by the conspirators, who were ostensibly on a hunting expedition. Hannibal accepted their offer and sent them back, driving cattle from his baggage train which they claimed to have found grazing and captured. In the next weeks the ruse was repeated on several occasions as the noblemen negotiated the conditions of their betrayal. Tarentum was granted much the same terms as Capua, being guaranteed freedom to be ruled by its own laws and magistrates, that the city would not pay tribute to Carthage nor accept a Punic garrison against its will. Only the property of Roman citizens living in the city was to be seized by Hannibal and these, as well as the Roman garrison, would be taken prisoner by the Carthaginians who could then ransom or sell them as they wished.
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The detailed accounts of the capture of Tarentum provide a good example of the type of operations which occurred when other cities were betrayed and are worth recounting in detail. Philemenus took to hunting at night, allegedly to avoid Punic patrols, and regularly returned with prizes which he liberally shared with the sentries and commander at the side gate he used. So familiar did the guards become with this routine that they happily opened the gate whenever they recognized his whisde. Hannibal picked 10,000 mixed horse and foot for their speed and agility to form his attack column, issued four days' rations, and led them out in the middle of the night. Interestingly they included three bands of Gauls, a total of 2,000 men, which shows how effectively these warriors had been absorbed into the army, when compared with the criticisms of the Gauls' lack of speed and stamina in marching during the 217 campaign. The column was screened by 80 Numidian horsemen, who had orders to capture or kill anyone they met but otherwise give the impression that they were no more than a normal foraging party. Hannibal's force marched them to within 14 or 15 miles of the city, keeping the men tightly under control and not permitting any straggling. He rested them for the remainder of the day in a gorge where they were hidden from view, holding a briefing for his officers in which he stressed that they must keep their men tightly under control and obey his orders to the letter.
The commander of Tarentum's Roman garrison, one Marcus or Caius Livius, was attending a feast when he received a report of the marauding Numidian cavalry. He saw no serious threat in their actions and merely ordered a cavalry patrol to be sent out the next day. The conspirators had deliberately chosen this day in the belief that Livius would be distracted and some of them kept him drinking after the celebration and escorted him home in no state to command. That night Hannibal was guided towards the city by Philemenus and made the prearranged signal by lighting a bonfire. When the conspirators answered with a fire-signal of their own, Hannibal extinguished the beacon and divided his force into three. The 2,000 cavalry were to remain outside, ready as a reserve to cover their retreat or exploit their success. Philemenus led 1,000 Libyans towards the gate he habitually used for his hunting expeditions, whilst Hannibal led the remainder cautiously up the main road towards the Temenid Gate. The conspirators surprised the guards there and massacred them, killing the majority in their sleep, and admitted the Carthaginians when they arrived. In the meantime Philemenus and three others approached the other gate carrying a boar as if returning from the hunt. Hearing Philemenus' whistle, the sentry admitted them through the postern door next to the main gate. As the man leaned over to view their prize, Philemenus killed him with a hunting spear. Thirty Libyans had followed close behind the four men and swiftly entered, dealing with the guards and opening the main gate for the rest of the force. Pushing into the city, the whole body joined Hannibal, who had by this time reached the Forum. From there he dispatched the three bands of Gauls guided by some of the conspirators to take control of all the routes into the marketplace. All Romans encoun tered were killed, most without managing much resistance. Further confusion was added when the conspirators brought out some Roman military trumpets and began to sound contradictory orders. Livius escaped in a rowing skiff to the citadel which lay on a narrow promontory and was the only part of the town to remain in Roman hands. The Tarentines, faced with an enemy already controlling their streets, were assembled and soon accepted the terms presented to them by the conspirators.
Hannibal took immediate steps to reduce the citadel, which commanded the entrance to Tarentum's harbour. A wall and ditch were constructed cutting the promontory off from the main city, and a Roman sally to hinder the work was heavily defeated. However, the Roman garrison remained confident and was able to draw supplies and reinforcements from the sea. The entire garrison of Metapontum was shipped into the citadel, although their withdrawal prompted the defection of that city. A direct assault failed and Hannibal left the blockade largely in the hands of the Tarentines. He once again demonstrated his ingenuity by showing the citizens how to drag their galleys from the harbour and down one of the main streets to float them again in the open sea, allowing them to close the blockade by sea.
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Rome Resurgent
The capture of Tarentum was a heavy blow to Rome and a great, if incomplete, victory for Hannibal. Yet in the same year the Romans advanced to begin a full-scale siege of the other major city to join him, Capua. As early as 215 Fabius Maximus had mounted a series of heavy raids to ravage Campanian territory. Grain can most easily be burned for only a short period before harvest and the Romans took care to mount their attacks each year at this time. With cities such as Arpi and Casilinum back under their control both consuls were able to move against Capua itself in 212 and begin its blockade. In answer to the Capuans' appeal, Hannibal sent only 2,000 cavalry and several officers to their aid, but made vague promises of more substantial assistance. The Campanian cavalry were very good and had always been highly thought of by the Romans. Reinforced by the detachment from Hannibal's main army they won several small actions. However, the Romans' morale was restored when one of their own horsemen accepted the challenge to single combat issued by a Campanian with whom he was linked by ties of hospitality. This is the second such duel between Roman and Campanian described by Livy, in both of which he patriotically avers that the Roman proved successful.
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Soon afterwards Hannibal did march his army to the relief of Capua. Three days after his arrival he offered battle in front of the Roman camps. Livy's account of the action is confused, although not necessarily impossible, since he claims that battle was ended when both sides saw a distant column approaching and, assuming them to be enemies, broke off the action. Whatever the actual details of the fighting, it seems to have been indecisive, but at the very least discouraged the Roman consuls. Their two armies decided to part company and march in opposite directions to lure Hannibal away from Capua, knowing that he could only pursue one of them, so that the other could return. Livy tells the strange story of a former senior centurion named Marcus Centenius, who had requested a command from the Senate, claiming that his intimate knowledge of the area would allow him to raid it with great effect. With 8,000 men under his command he ran into Hannibal who had just given up his pursuit of one of the retreating consular armies. Centenius died heroically, but his men were massacred in the brief action or the ensuing pursuit so that barely 1,000 escaped.
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In the meantime both consular armies had returned to Capua to renew the blockade. Supplies were massed in a depot at Casilinum and strongholds established to control the River Volturnus so that bulky material such as grain could be carried in safety along it to feed the armies. Great care was taken to organize an effective system of supply, for large numbers of Roman troops would have to remain in one position if the blockade were to be successful. The two consular armies were joined by another commanded by a praetor, Claudius Nero, and the six legions set to work building a wall and ditch to encircle the city and another facing outwards. A last plea for assistance was sent to Hannibal by the city before the line of circumvallation was closed, but the Carthaginian was interested in other projects, hoping to capture Brundisium by treachery. The Romans offered free pardon to any Campanians who surrendered to them before the lines had been closed. None responded, although 112 equestrians had deserted to the Romans the year before.
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In 211 the siege of Capua remained the main priority of the Senate in Italy and both the consuls and Nero had their commands extended as pro-magistrates. The Campanian horse continued to enjoy frequent successes, until a Roman centurion, one Quintus Naevius, came up with the idea of forming a picked body of
velites
who would ride behind the Roman horsemen. In action they dismounted and fought in close support of the cavalry, acting as a solid bulwark in the shelter of which the horsemen could rally and reform to charge again. The new tactic gave the advantage to the Romans in all subsequent encounters. This incident has sometimes been depicted as a major reform of the cavalry and light infantry of the legions, but in fact it was simply a local expedient to deal with a particular situation. It reflected the growing experience of the Roman armies, rather than any fundamental change in their composition.
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velites
who would ride behind the Roman horsemen. In action they dismounted and fought in close support of the cavalry, acting as a solid bulwark in the shelter of which the horsemen could rally and reform to charge again. The new tactic gave the advantage to the Romans in all subsequent encounters. This incident has sometimes been depicted as a major reform of the cavalry and light infantry of the legions, but in fact it was simply a local expedient to deal with a particular situation. It reflected the growing experience of the Roman armies, rather than any fundamental change in their composition.
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Capua would inevitably fall if the blockade were not broken, so Hannibal decided that he must act. Leaving the heavier part of his baggage train with the Bruttians he hastened to Campania. The Roman armies were now in the open country around Capua where his more numerous and effective cavalry could normally be expected to have given Hannibal the advantage, but the Romans refused to leave their fortifications and fight a pitched battle. The proconsul Appius Claudius was not to be drawn out when Hannibal sent skirmishers up to the pickets outside the Roman camp in the way that he had lured other Roman commanders into unfavourable battles. Desperately Hannibal launched a direct assault on the Roman camps, whilst the Capuans sallied out to attack the defences from the other side. At one point a unit of Spanish infantry led by three elephants broke through the fortifications and threatened Fulvius Flaccus' camp, only to be repulsed as the Romans counter-attacked inspired by the heroic example set by several officers including Naevius. Hannibal's attack failed and his army quickly began to run short of food. They had carried only a small supply with them and the Romans had picked the land around clean of anything that could be foraged. It was then that Hannibal decided to march on Rome in the effort to lure the legions away from Capua described in the last chapter. When this failed, he abandoned Capua to its fate and returned via Samnium and Apulia to Bruttium in the south-east.
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Even the Carthaginian officers left in the city felt betrayed and abandoned by their commander, but the angry letters they dispatched to him were all intercepted by the Romans, who cut off the hands of the couriers (who had pretended to desert) and returned the men to the city. Capua's population was now facing starvation. A few of the more anti-Roman senators committed suicide, but the remainder surrendered the city, opening the gates to admit the Romans. Soon afterwards the outlying communities of Atella and Calatia also capitulated. Fifty-three Capuan senators who were held principally responsible for the rebellion against Rome were arrested. They were subsequently executed by the proconsul Fulvius, seemingly on his own authority and against the wishes of his colleague, although there were apparently several traditions concerning this incident. Later the Roman Senate decided to dissolve Capua as a city state with institutions, magistrates and laws of its own. In future it was to be governed by an official appointed by Rome.
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