The Fall of the Asante Empire (42 page)

It is quite obvious that as the nineteenth century progressed, the Asante inferiority in weaponry put them at a decisive disadvantage, but of equal if not greater significance in the outcome of most battles against the British was the astonishing inability of the Asante to shoot straight.
In most battles the Asante soldiers were armed only with Dane guns, whose limited range gave the British a tremendous advantage, but even so, in battles like the crucial ones in Wolseley’s march to Kumase, Asante fire was so heavy that it stripped the bark from the trees above head height, and leaves from overhead showered down on British troops who were for the most part unscathed.
In 1900 almost all Asante fire, except for that at short range, went over the heads of the British troops, and in this war the Asante had enough captured British rifles that even reasonably accurate fire would have inflicted heavy losses.
Sometimes, as
in the war’s last great battle, the sheer volume of Asante rifle fire was so heavy that the British troops refused to advance even though almost all of the bullets were passing well over their heads.
The Asante were hardly unique in their inability to aim Western firearms accurately.
Loaded as heavily as they were and fired from the hip, Dane guns were wildly inaccurate, and men unfamiliar with sights on modern rifles or with their tendency to fire high due to recoil were likely to fire over their enemy’s heads unless carefully drilled to fire low, as British troops were.
This pattern of firing high allowed European armies to defeat many African armies, including the Zulus, whose rifle fire in 1879 was, if anything, even more inaccurate than that of the Asante.

The wars between the Asante and the British were not chivalrous, but neither were they as brutal as might have been expected.
British officers were often kind to Asante civilians and military prisoners, and their troops were under orders not to loot, rape, or brutalize in Asante villages.
With a few exceptions they behaved well.
However, Kumase was burned, the palace was destroyed, royal tombs were desecrated, and in 1900—by which time civilization might have been expected to set higher standards of military conduct—a campaign of terror against civilians was carried out that included the enslavement of Asante women and children.
Even so, British officers often attempted, sometimes successfully, to save Asante wounded or prisoners from torture and death at the hands of their merciless African allies, who also regularly slashed and mutilated Asante corpses so savagely that British officers were sickened.

For their part the Asante beheaded wounded supply carriers and Hausas but did not generally mutilate dead bodies or torture prisoners, although there is no reason to believe that they would never have done so had there more often been victories in battle.
When they did win, as against Sir Charles MacCarthy in 1824, they exercised remarkable restraint.
They took two officers and two British soldiers captive.
One officer was killed because he could not keep up with his captors, but the other was treated reasonably well and later released in good health.
The two soldiers were both well treated, as were the European prisoners held in Kumase by King Kofi Kakari.

The Asante fought with undeniable valor, discipline, and skill, and on the whole they followed their rules of war without excessive
cruelty.
Colonel Willcocks wrote that he felt he had been in a fair fight against them.
He added that they were such fine soldiers the British army in West Africa should attempt to recruit them.
Until 1917 the loyalty of the Asante was so much in doubt that they were not permitted to join the British-led Gold Coast Regiment, which was, not coincidentally, headquartered in Kumase and seen by most Asante as the enemy.
The pressing need for more manpower eventually led the British to attempt to recruit Asante, but few volunteered and most of those soon deserted.
⁹
Even greater efforts to recruit Asante into the British army were made in World War II, but the Asante did not flock to the colors of Britain this time either.
They remained loyal, but they were not interested in soldiering.
Though the Asante were much the largest ethnic group in the region, they provided fewer than 10 percent of the entire Gold Coast military establishment during the war, and by the time of independence, only 5 percent of Ghana’s army was Asante.
¹⁰
Asante militarism did not revive during the struggle for independence that led to the birth of Ghana in 1967 or during the turbulent years that followed.
Although the Asante formed their own national liberation movement in 1954 to demand self-rule in what would soon become the independent state of Ghana, their leaders and their king prevented armed Asante from using military means to alter the electoral process.
¹¹

If it is true, as it appears to be, that the Asante would have taken up arms to defend the Golden Stool in 1921, it seems equally true that once the stool’s safety and sanctity were ensured, they saw no further need for war.
In earlier times they had figuratively fought “for the ashes of their fathers and the temples of their gods,” as Victorian poet Thomas Macaulay once wrote of British warriors.
With impressive finality the Asante put aside their great warrior tradition to become prosperous farmers, traders, businessmen, artists, engineers, lawyers, educators, and doctors—not soldiers.
Abruptly, without declarations or fanfare, they were through with war.

1
Davidson (1966:42-43).

2
Fynn (1971a).

3
Rattray (1929).

4
Bowdich (1819; rev.
ed.
1966:122).

5
Posnansky (1987).

6
T.
70/31.
Governor John Hippisley, Cape Coast castle, 13 July 1766.

7
Wilks (1975:20).

8
Reindorf (1966:130-31); Wilks (1975).

9
Bender (1978:137).

10
Muffett (1978:280).

11
Peires (1989).

12
Muriuki (1975:155).

13
Ibid.

14
Iliffe (1979:93).

15
Bridgeman (1981).

16
Edgerton (1989).

17
Stratton (1964).

18
Hubert (1938).

19
Wilks (1975); Hagen (1971).

1
Ramseyer and Kühne (1975); Morris (1970).

2
Fynn (1971b:135).

3
Yarak (1990).

4
Davidson (1966:19).

5
Anquandah (1982).

6
Davidson (1966).

7
Wilks (1975:692-693).
Estimates like these are necessarily imprecise because the exact weight and purity of the gold was not known.

8
Gros (1884:197).

9
Bowdich (1866; original 1819).
For a discussion of his accuracy, see Busia (1951).

10
James indiscreetly revealed to Dr.
Tedlie that he was jealous of Governor Smith and intended to divert Asante trade to his own fort of Accra.
James was also unable to cope with Asante negotiators.
When James was confronted by King Osei Bonsu about British interests, he was so taken off guard and unable to explain the purpose of his mission that young Bowdich had to step in to save the day.
Thereafter, Bowdich was the de facto head of the mission, and James returned to Accra in disgrace.

11
Bowdich (1966:23-24).

12
Ibid., 31.

13
Ibid., 34.

14
Hutton (1821).

15
Ibid., 216.

16
Schildkrout (1987:86).

17
Bowdich (1966:115).

18
Freeman (1843).

19
Huydecoper (1962:26).

20
Bowdich (1966:76).

21
Hutton (1821:208).

22
Ellis (1893:292).

23
Freeman (1843:147).

24
Huydecoper (1962:25).

25
Tufuo and Donkor (1969:47-48).

26
Rattray (1929).

27
Freeman (1843:132).

28
Wilks (1975).

29
Freeman (1898:135).

30
Freeman (1843:132).

31
Bowdich (1966).

32
Bowdich (1966:32).

33
Lewin (1978).

34
Schildkrout (1987:107).

35
Wilks (1975:130).

36
Tufuo and Donkor (1969:70).

37
Bowdich (1966:278).

38
Hutton (1821).

39
Aidoo (1975:142).

40
Huydecoper (1962:24).

41
Freeman (1843:128).

42
Ramseyer and Kühne (1875:164).

43
Bowdich (1966:421).

44
Claridge (1915).

45
Bowdich (1966:123-124).

46
Robertson (1819).

47
Dupuis (1966:140).

48
Lewin (1978).

49
Bowdich (1966:421).

50
Rattray (1929:91).

51
Aidoo (1975:106).

52
Rattray (1916:118).

53
Tufuo and Donkor (1969:26).

54
Bowdich (1966:295).

55
Wilks (1975:695).

56
Ibid.

57
Bowdich (1966).

58
McLeod (1981); Wilks (1975).

59
Tufuo and Donkor (1969:77-84).

60
Adjaye (1984).

61
Ibid., 68.

62
McLeod (1981); Lewin (1974:I, 186).

63
Bowdich (1966:320).

64
Arhin (1987:56).

65
Fynn (1971a:7); Arhin (1987).

66
Wilks (1975).

67
McLeod (1981:72).

68
Dummett (1987).

69
Anquandah (1982).

70
Fynn (1971a:78); Dummett (1987:223); Herskovits (1962:173-174).

71
Yarak (1990)

72
McLeod (1981:15).

73
Fortes (1950).

74
Bowdich (1966:302).

75
Busia (1951:7).

76
Busia (1951:27).

77
McLeod (1981).

78
Ramseyer and Kühne (1875:167).

79
Rattray (1929:360).

1
T.
70/26.
Committee of Merchants, London, to John Hippisley, Cape Coast castle, 3 September 1766.

2
Claridge (1915:I, 245).

3
Ibid., 248.

4
T.
70/35; H.D.
431 Accounts and Papers [1817] vi, 401.

5
Cruikshank (1853:I, 79-80).

6
Dupuis (1966:263).

7
Claridge (1915:I, 254).

8
C.O.
267/144.

9
Claridge (1915).

10
Bowdich (1966:317); Wilks (1975:676).

11
Hagen (1971).

12
Aidoo (1975:I, 73).

13
Rattray (1929:123); for an outline of Asante army organization, see Miles (1968) and Arhin (1980).

14
Fuller (1921:14).

15
Rattray (1929:122).

16
Kea (1971:213).

17
Bowdich (1966:36).

18
Ibid., 37.

19
Ibid., 298.

20
Rattray (1929:103).

21
Bowdich (1966:300-301).

22
Wilks (1975:226).

23
Rattray (1929:126).

24
Bowdich (1966:300).

25
Wilks (1975:222).

26
Huydecoper (1962:47).

27
Hutchinson (1966:419).

28
Dupuis (1966:213).

29
Wilks (1975).

30
Arhin (1983).

31
Ramseyer and Kühne (1875:52); Jones (1993).

32
Reade (1874:50).

33
Ramseyer and Kühne (1875).

34
Rattray (1929:124).

35
Ibid., 157.

36
Wilks (1975:38).

37
Ramseyer and Kühne (1875:33).

38
Ricketts (1831:85).

39
Tufuo and Donkor (1969:94).

40
Ibid.

41
Huydecoper (1962).

42
Ibid., 4.

43
Ibid., 8.

44
Bowdich (1966:289).

45
Ramseyer and Kühne (1875:136).

46
Ffoulkes (1945).

47
Kea (1971:200).

48
Yarak (1990:220).

49
Kwamena-Poh (1973:28-29).

50
Lewis and Foy (1971).

51
Ffoulkes (1945:78).

1
Bowdich (1966:124).

2
Ibid., 146-147.

3
Claridge (1915:I, 302).

4
Dupuis (1966:xxxvii).

5
Claridge (1915:I, 305).

6
Dupuis (1966:xxxv).

7
Wilks (1975:485).

8
Claridge (1915:I, 338).

9
Ricketts (1831:54).

10
Ibid., 105.

11
Ibid., 84.

12
Ibid., 150-152.

13
Wilks (1975).

14
Claridge (1915:I, 362).

15
Ibid., 362.

16
Wilks (1975:486).

17
Ibid., 373.

18
Cruikshank (1853:1).

19
Ibid., 160.

20
Ellis (1893:178).

21
Ricketts (1831:120).

22
Wilks (1975:439).

23
Ricketts (1831:121).

24
Claridge (1915:I, 389).

25
Ricketts (1831:123).

26
C.O.
267/74: Campbell to Bannerman, 12 November 1826.

27
Owusu-Ansah (1987).

28
Wilks (1975:185).

29
Ricketts (1831:146).

30
Ibid.

31
Metcalfe (1962:vi).

32
Cruikshank (1853:I,196).

33
Cruikshank (1853:I).

34
Buckley (1979).

35
Yarak (1990:132).

36
Van Dantzig (1965).

37
McLeod (1987:187).

38
Freeman (1843:139).

39
Curtin (1969:336-337).

40
Wilks (1975:222).

41
Ibid.

42
Claridge (1915:I, 529).