The Great Train Robbery (29 page)

This information confirmed the somewhat vague earlier intelligence that came to the attention of C11 back in September, to the effect that a raid on the Weymouth-Waterloo line was being planned. Senior IB investigator William Thomas wrote a memo that day following receipt of the information:

Threatened attack on SW TPO

1.  Information has reached New Scotland Yard (C11) which suggests that the threat of attack on high value mails carried on the SW TPO Up (Weymouth-Waterloo) has been renewed.
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The information, which is somewhat nebulous, is to the effect that a raid is again being planned with mention of Weybridge as the possible target. This information was passed to PD/IB (Mr Yates) by C11 officers late on Thursday 5 September 1963.

2.  PSD/PMB(S) and D/LPR (TPO Section) were advised of the above development early on Friday 6 September. At the same time I confirmed by direct enquiry of BTC Police (Supt Ward) that the SW TPO Down and Up are included in the special precautions currently being taken by BTC Police for the protection of certain TPOs – ie that 2 BTC Police officers travel as escorts on both down and up journeys of the SW TPO from Monday to Friday nights inclusive.

3.  Follow up action has been taken by PSD/PMB(S) to alert LPR, HCR and SWR as to the renewed threat so that security arrangement connected with the TPO, station and feeder services security may be checked and local Police forces advised of the possibility of attack.

4.  At the request of PD/IB (Thomas-Supt, Ward), BTC Police have undertaken to provide two additional Police officer escorts who will travel on the TPO Up from Southampton to Waterloo on Tuesday and Thursday nights commencing Tuesday night 10/11 September, 1963. This arrangement will continue until further notice subject to review after four weeks.

W Thomas

6 September 1963
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As Thomas’s memo stressed, the information at hand in September was somewhat non-specific. With new and more detailed information now coming forward, security was to be significantly ramped up in the new year. Commander Hatherill took the initiative in calling a round-table conference at Scotland Yard immediately after the Christmas/New Year holiday on 8 January 1964, to put the wheels in motion. The same day that invitations to the conference were sent out by Scotland Yard, IB assistant controller R.F. Yates summarised the progress of the investigation, so far as the hunt for those who were still at large was concerned:

On 4 December, 1963, it became known that Bruce Reynolds and his wife had been residing in West Croydon but had left hurriedly on the night of 3 December. He has not been seen since but finger prints found at the West Croydon house established that both Daly and James had visited there.

To summarise the situation up to that stage, offenders who have so far been arrested:

12 were charged with robbery

8 were charged with receiving stolen money

1 (Mr Wheater) was charged with conspiracy

The total sum recovered amounted to a little less than £350,000 which is about 14% of the total stolen. It is important to note that these recoveries were effected despite the fact the identifiable notes recorded by the Banks amounted to about .05% of the notes despatched.

Detective inquiries continue concerning three groups of criminals:-

Commander Hatherill’s sources seem to be the same ones that provided much of his inside knowledge about the planning of the robbery and those who had taken part in it.
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As a memorandum on this highly secretive meeting shows, Hatherill’s informants were clear that those behind this second potential train robbery included some of those connected with the Great Train Robbery the previous August:

1.  A meeting took place this morning at Scotland Yard of Metropolitan Police and the Chief Constable on the route of the SWTPO. Mr Morgan Philips, Chief of Police in the British Railways Police, was present and from the Post Office Messrs Wesil, Osmond, Yates (IB) and Shires (LPR) were present. The meeting was called by Commander Hatherill but in fact it was chaired by Mr Bacon Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.

2.  The object of the meeting was to discuss a threatened attack on the SWTPO. Commander Hatherill explained that information had been received which suggests very strongly that an attack on this TPO was being planned by criminals some of whom were connected with the gang concerned in the Up Special TPO robbery. The timing of the attack was not known but was likely to be in the early part of the year extending into spring and early summer.

3.  For the Post Office we explained what the arrangements were on this train, what amounts were carried and when the peak periods of values carried were likely to be and we stressed that in the present season the greatest amount carried was likely to be tonight. We said that although we had taken certain measures to improve the protection of the sorting coaches on this train, it was impracticable for us to make it impregnable and that in any event some of the measures which we wanted to take could inevitably be carried out only in the longer term. We were bound to rely on the Railway Police and the Police Force through whose territory the train passed for proper protection and on this I stressed the supreme importance of everyone concerned of avoiding another successful attack.

9 January 1964
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It was only after the Scotland Yard conference had taken place that Postmaster General Reginald Bevins was told about the new information and how Hatherill intended to combat the threat:

Postmaster General

You will wish to know that the Police have received information which suggests that an attack may take place on the South Western TPO which runs from Weymouth to London. The information is not precise about the date when the attack can be expected, but the early part of 1964 has been mentioned and the threat may hang over us until the spring or even early summer. The attack would be carried out by a large gang at least on the scale of the one that carried out the Up Special robbery on the 8 August.

Yesterday a meeting took place at Scotland Yard of Chief Constables of the police forces along the route of the TPO and adjacent forces. It was chaired by an assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and was attended by the Head of the Crime Department of the British Railway Police. We were represented by members of the administration, the Investigation Branch and the London Postal Region.

The meeting decided to form a working Party of the police forces directly concerned, under the chairmanship of the Chief Constable of Hampshire, to deal with the threat. The first meeting of the Working Party is taking place today at Winchester. We are attending and will, of course, give the Police every assistance. At the same time we have done what we could to strengthen the physical defences of the train, which is not wholly a Post Office train but carries passengers. For the time being Railway Police and Investigation Branch Officers are travelling on the train each night.

We will keep you informed of developments.

9 January 1964
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The whole exercise now took on a distinctly melodramatic air by naming it ‘Operation Primrose’. The day after the Scotland Yard conference, another meeting was held in Winchester, the first of the ‘Primrose’ taskforce meetings,
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which pulled in representatives from a wide range of organisations in the areas seen as possible locations for the hold-up.

‘PRIMROSE’

Meeting of Planning Group held on Thursday 9 January 1964 at West Hill, Winchester

Purpose of Group:

Reliable information of intended robbery of travelling post office Weymouth/Waterloo, one night during the coming 3-4 months.

Agreed:

Object of the exercise would be to ensure that if such an attempt is made those responsible would be apprehended. It follows that all arrangements should be secret and no disclosure to the press of plans in hand. Post Office and Railway Police would take steps to ensure maximum physical security of train and persons travelling thereon. Railway Police travelling on the train might well be employed in plain clothes.

Survey of Railway Line:

In view of the considerable mileage involved, it was pointed out that it was essential to eliminate unlikely areas of attack as far as possible. Mr Duck (Assistant to Traffic Superintendent, SW Line) agreed to supply aerial photographs of route on basis of one master copy of whole route to the Chief Constable, Hampshire, with additional copies to Chief Constables Dorset and Surrey, covering their own areas.

Agreed:

Survey of railway line in each Force area should be carried out forthwith by Police in conjunction with Railway Police and Railway Authorities. In addition to unlikely areas of attack, particularly vulnerable points should be noted. The Chief Constable Hampshire, agreed to set up a special Control Room equipped with communications which would operate each night throughout the period of the running of the train. Other County Forces would, of course, have to make local arrangements for receiving signals and acknowledging but Dorset and Surrey frequencies would be monitored from the Central Control Room. The Chief Constable, Hampshire, would also provide two officers to act as intelligence officers. One of these would be the officer on duty at the appropriate time in the Central Control Room. These officers would also co-ordinate and disseminate all intelligence received regarding the exercise. They would work in close co-operation with Mr Walker, C11. GPO intelligence at London end would be passed through Mr Walker.

Detective Chief Superintendent Jones would produce a circular for distribution to officers directly concerned showing particulars of two principal suspects, this circular to be distributed to detective officers on vicinity of the railway line. Officers receiving this circular would be strictly instructed as to secrecy.

If suspects seen, not to be interrogated but information passed with code word ‘PRIMROSE’ to Central Operations Room, Hampshire Constabulary. (Note: The two officers appointed are Inspector Childs and Sergeant Head, with direct telephone line at Winchester 61627 in operation from noon on Friday, 10 January. Alternatively, intelligence to be passed to Detective Chief Superintendent Jones or Detective Chief Inspector Stuchfield at Winchester 3333. Preference to be given to the first telephone number.)

(a)  Run-In: The probability was that the criminals would seek to find a run-in within 20 miles of the railway line. Accordingly checks should be made forthwith of all vacant and suitable premises in this area and where agents-reliable arrangements made for the Police to be notified of enquiries regarding purchase or tenancy of such premises.

(b)  Attention to be given to the possibility of use of caravans for this purpose, particularly in New Forest area. Caravans not permitted in New Forest area until after the 1 April, so particular attention to be paid to any such vehicles in the meantime.

(c)  Possible that no run-in would be acquired and attempt made to transfer proceeds to other vehicles such as agricultural vehicles, oil tankers, etc. Added importance of check points.

(d)  Manning of check points in the light of commitment revealed by survey of check points. Arrangements for manning will be discussed at next meeting. It must be accepted that this operation will entail a considerable drain on manpower in the coming months but first priority must be given to provision of adequate men and vehicles to deal with the emergency for the whole length of line. Emphasised that check points should be capable of providing physical barrier to traffic.

DATE OF NEXT MEETING

Thursday, 16 January 1964, at 11.00 am at West Hill Winchester

If this attack took place and succeeded through lack of the physical security referred to I need hardly say what trouble we should be in.

10 January 1964

Brigadier K S Holmes, CB, CBE
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The new security measures to be taken were quickly set out in a memo:

Measures adopted or accelerated to meet the threat against SWTPO:-

  1.  Windows on all coaches barred

  2.  Steel mesh covers to windows of HVP coach

  3.  HVP cupboards strengthened

  4.  Mechanical bell alarms installed in all coaches

  5.  Loud hailers temporarily installed in HVP coach

  6.  VHP radio temporarily installed

  7.  2 IB escorts on up train.

  8.  7 BT police escorts on up train.

  9.  Train included in signalman reporting procedure

10.  TPO staff augmented

11.  Police supervision at stations during loading

12.  Telephone communication between stations and police

13.  Mechanical bell alarm at stations

14.  High standard of security between stations and offices

15.  Loading of HVPs into ordinary coaches at TPO stopping points (to avoid opening of HVP coach)

9/1/64
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Four days later, the chief constable of the Hampshire & Isle of Wight Constabulary introduced a degree of dissention into the equation by questioning the length of time the new security measures could be kept up for:

   
HAMPSHIRE & ISLE OF WIGHT CONSTABULARY

13 April 1964

Dear Sir

Exercise ‘PRIMROSE’

The question must now arise as to the length of time over which the arrangements for this exercise should be kept in being. I know that all concerned have been prepared to keep the arrangements in hand as long as there seemed to be any likelihood of an attack being made. In the considerable time since the information was first received, however, no intelligence of any significance whatsoever has been collected which would tend to confirm the original information, and it is difficult to believe that if an attack was intended some further indication would not have been forthcoming.