The Imjin War (25 page)

News of the stupendous success of his armies in Korea filtered back to Toyotomi Hideyoshi at his Nagoya headquarters just days after the start of the invasion. First came word of the fall of Pusan and Tongnae and the rapid advance north. Next to arrive were reports of the taking of Taegu and Kyongju and of the rout of the Koreans at Sangju. Then came the heartening news of the decisive battle at Chungju, where Konishi’s first contingent wiped out the only sizable force the Koreans had been able to muster. The campaign was progressing more favorably than even Hideyoshi had hoped. If he had embarked on the enterprise with any secret doubts, they must have fallen away now. It no longer seemed a question of if he would succeed in conquering Korea and then China, but only a matter of when.

“By now we have taken various castles in
Korea,” Hideyoshi wrote to his mother in the middle of June, “and I have sent my men to besiege the capital there. I shall take even China around the 9th month [October 1592], so I shall receive [from you] the costumes for the [next] festival of the 9th month in the capital of China.... When I capture China, I’ll send someone to you in order to welcome you there.”
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And to his wife, “We have already captured a great number of castles in
Korea. I have heard that it takes about twenty days to reach the capital of Korea from the harbor that we have taken, and I have sent my men toward that capital. I expect to besiege the capital in a short time. When I have assembled the ships, I shall have my men cross over. As I expect to take China, too, I look forward to sending men [from there] to welcome you.”
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On June 25 came the greatest news so far:
Seoul had fallen, and without a fight. This must have left even the taiko himself astonished. During the wars of unification it had taken his armies months to subdue the island of Shikoku. It had taken months to conquer Kyushu. It had taken months to crush the recalcitrant Hojo at Odawara. But now it appeared that the entire kingdom of Korea, a land nearly as large as the whole of Japan, would be his in a matter of days. His generals were rolling up that country just as fast as they could march. Claiming China would take longer, of course, but only because it was so vast. Hideyoshi did not expect to encounter any more resistance there than he was meeting in Korea, for the Chinese in his opinion were effeminate “long sleeves” who did not know how to fight. To his military mind history clearly demonstrated this. From the fourteenth century right up into Hideyoshi’s own lifetime, wako pirates had raided China at will from their bases in southern Japan, pillaging all along the coast and at times far inland despite their often remarkably small numbers. The lesson to be learned here was obvious. If China’s supposedly great armies could not stop even small bands of audacious raiders, how could it possibly stand up to Hideyoshi’s incomparably more powerful expeditionary force? 

The victory of his armies was therefore assured, at least in Hideyoshi’s own mind. As he wrote triumphantly to Kato Kiyomasa and Nabeshima Naoshige in July of 1592, the subjugation of Korea was being “carried out as easily as dust is swept up with a broom,” and would very shortly be complete. “There is no reason why Tai-Min [
China] should not meet the same fate.... [Y]ou and your men of tested military experience and courage will be able to overcome the army of Tai-Min as easily as great mountain rocks roll upon and crush eggs.” After that “India, the Philippines, and many islands in the South Sea will share a like fate. We are now occupying the most conspicuous and enviable position in the world.”
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On June 27, two days after learning of the fall of Seoul, Hideyoshi dictated a letter to his wife O-Ne, formally known as Lady Kita-no-Mandokoro, stating that he would be leaving for Korea shortly to take personal command of his forces there and that he would take with him all remaining reserve units currently encamped at Nagoya. To prepare for this sea crossing “[a]ll the transports and other vessels that are now in Korean waters have been called back to
Japan.” Assuming that the weather would not delay him—typhoon season was just beginning—Hideyoshi hoped to be in Seoul by the middle of July and in Beijing before the end of the year. After that “Her Excellency Kita-no-Mandokoro will be requested by our Lord to join him in due time. Further detail concerning this matter will be entered into at the time when our Lord sails for Korea.”
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In a second letter written the same day to his nephew and adopted son and heir Hidetsugu, the kampaku of
Japan then residing in Kyoto, Hideyoshi outlined in twenty-four articles how he planned to organize the overseas empire that he now saw taking shape:

1.  Your Lordship [Hidetsugu] must not relax preparations for the campaign. The departure should be made by the First or Second Month of the coming year [1593].

2.
  The Capital of Korea fell on the second day of this month. Thus, the time has come to make the sea crossing and to bring the length and breadth of the Great Ming under our control. My desire is that Your Lordship make the crossing to become the Civil Dictator [i.e., kampaku] of Great China.

3.
  Thirty thousand men should accompany you. The departure should be by boat from Hyogo. Horses should be sent by land.

4.
  Although no hostility is expected in the Three Kingdoms [Korea], armed preparedness is of the utmost importance, not only for the maintenance of our reputation but also in the event of an emergency. All subordinates shall be so instructed....

[In articles 5 through 15 Hideyoshi gives Hidetsugu detailed instructions for how he should organize his crossing to
Korea, including what provisions, arms, and armor to take, the amount of silver he should withdraw from the treasury, and how many porters he should employ on his march.
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16.  After our military campaign in China is begun, we shall request Miyabe Keijun to take entire charge of the national capital of Korea. He will be summoned to Korea in due time. Your Excellency is hereby instructed to advise Miyabe to prepare for this important post.

17.
  Since His Majesty [Emperor Go-Yozei] is to be transferred to the Chinese capital, due preparation is necessary. The imperial visit will take place the year after next [1594]. On that occasion, ten provinces adjacent to the Capital shall be presented to him. In time instructions will be issued for the enfeoffment of all courtiers. Subordinates will receive ten times as much (as their present holdings)....

18.
  The post of Civil Dictator [kampaku] of China shall be assigned as aforementioned to Hidetsugu, who will be given 100 provinces adjacent to the Capital. The post of Civil Dictator of Japan will go either to the Middle Counsellor Yamato [Hideyoshi’s half-brother, Hidenaga], or to the Bizen Minister [Hideyoshi’s adopted son, Ukita Hideie], upon declaration of his readiness.

19.
  As for the position of the Sovereign of Japan, the young Prince or Prince Hachijo shall be the choice.

20.
  As for Korea, the Gifu Minister [Hashiba Hidekatsu, allied to Hideyoshi by marriage] or Bizen Minister [Ukita Hideie] shall be assigned. In that event the Middle Counselor Tamba [Kobayakawa Hideaki] shall be assigned to Kyushu.

21.
  As for His Majesty’s [Emperor Go-Yozei’s] visit to China, arrangements shall be made according to established practices for Imperial tours of inspection. His Majesty’s itinerary shall follow the route of the present campaign. Men and horses necessary for the occasion shall be requisitioned from each country involved.

22.
Korea and China are within easy reach, and no inconvenience is anticipated for any concerned, high or low. It is not expected that anyone in those countries will attempt to flee. Therefore, recall all commissioners in the provinces to assist in preparations for the expedition....

23. As for the persons who are to take charge of Heian-Jo [
Kyoto] and of the Juraku palace in our absence, their names will be announced later.

24. Miyabe Keijun, Ishikawa Sadamasa, and other persons should begin immediately to prepare for the work to be assigned them. I hereby request Your Excellency to advise them to present them
selves at our military headquarters [at Nagoya] as soon as they can.
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In sum, then, Hideyoshi foresaw the Korean campaign soon drawing to a close. In the coming weeks he hoped to cross over to that country to take personal command of his armies for the big push on to Beijing. Then would begin the task of organizing his nascent empire and putting a new administration in place. Korea would become in effect a fourth island in the Japanese archipelago, with either Hashiba Hidekatsu or Ukita Hideie at the helm in Seoul. (Hashiba was currently leading the ninth contingent in Korea and Ukita the eighth.) Hidetsugu, presently kampaku of Japan and thus second only to Hideyoshi, would assume the loftier position of kampaku of China, with a new kampaku being appointed to take command solely of Japan. Emperor Go-Yozei would be installed in Beijing’s Forbidden City as emperor of China, and his son and heir would assume the now-subsidiary role of emperor of Japan. Finally, with Japan, Korea, and China all firmly in his grasp, Hideyoshi envisioned extending his reach even further, into India, presumably sometime after 1594. He did not intend doing this himself, but rather would leave it to those worthy daimyo who rendered him good service in the coming China campaign. They “will be liberally rewarded with grants of extensive states near India, with the privilege of conquering India and extending their domains in that vast empire.”
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So there it was. Hideyoshi’s empire would extend from the northern tip of Honshu to the southern tip of India. It would stretch north into Manchuria and Mongolia, and eastwards through China to the Tibetan plateau. It would branch south into Vietnam, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia. It would reach offshore to the Philippine Islands, Taiwan, and Hainan. It would, in short, embrace what Hideyoshi would have regarded as virtually the entire known world.

And what of Hideyoshi himself? What would his role be in this huge empire, the largest the world had ever seen? First he would remain for a time in
Beijing. Then he would appoint a deputy to stay there in his place, while he himself would settle in a permanent residence at the southern port city of Ningpo, where the Chinese mainland comes closest to Japan.
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In these comfortable semitropical surroundings he would simply exist as the taiko, the kingmaker and puppet master, the omnipotent being who sat quietly to the side, controlling everything, missing nothing, governing the governors with a firm but generally benign hand.

Not everyone agreed with Hideyoshi’s plans. Some felt he was reaching too far in trying to conquer China, and that he should satisfy himself with just a piece of southern Korea. By far the biggest worry in that summer of 1592, however, was not that Hideyoshi wanted to rule the world, but rather that he planned to leave Japan and sail to Korea to take personal command of his armies. A number of his inner coterie of daimyo, members of the imperial court, his wife, even his eighty-year-old mother, all expressed grave reservations about this. To them the idea seemed uncharacteristically reckless, particularly for a man who had during the course of his career displayed such patience, astuteness, and plain common sense.

One of their concerns was the taiko’s health. Indeed, it is evident in his private correspondence that Hideyoshi himself was worried about this; it was probably a main reason why he was not already in
Korea, commanding his armies in person. He was no longer the youthful “Bald Rat” who had caught Oda Nobunaga’s eye, nor the steely-eyed warrior who had emerged victorious at Tennozan. Hideyoshi was now an old man. Although only in his mid fifties, he looked and apparently felt much older, a small, wizened wraith, worn out and used up after thirty years of war. Loss of appetite, first reported in 1585, had become a serious problem, leaving him thin and weak, his face gaunt, his cheekbones sharp. His eyesight was troubling him as well, to the point where he was having difficulty writing letters.
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Hideyoshi had high hopes of returning to health, and during the summer of 1592 sent a glowing report to his mother of the progress he was making. But even by his own reckoning he was scarcely fit for war. “Do not worry,” he wrote on June 15, “as I find myself more and more in good health and have a good appetite.... I am feeling better and better, and I am happy to say that yesterday, after a tea ceremony in Rikyu’s style, I enjoyed eating a meal. How is your appetite?... It is not necessary to worry about me. I am so well that I can go outside for a walk and have meals more and more often.”
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Eating a meal. Going for a walk outside. These are prerequisites for a happy retirement, not for leading armies in the field and enduring the hardships that that entails. If Hideyoshi was serious about going to
Korea, it was thus imperative that the trip be postponed until he had at least recovered a greater portion of his strength. Otherwise he would only succeed in destroying his health for good.

An even greater worry than Hideyoshi’s health was the prospect of Hideyoshi’s absence. He had completed the unification of
Japan barely two years before. He had done so by co-opting a number of powerful rivals, allowing them to retain sizable land holdings, large armies, and positions of power in exchange for oaths of loyalty to him. Japan was at peace now, domestic affairs were in order, and every peg was in its hole. But would all this remain so if Hideyoshi withdrew his commanding presence? If he were now to leave Japan and set off on some distant adventure, what were the chances that conflict would break out anew? If that happened and Hideyoshi was many weeks away in Korea or worse yet China, might not Japan slip back into anarchy before the news reached him and drew him home?