The Israel-Arab Reader (24 page)

. . . To my mind there is one chief method which cannot be ignored or avoided in tipping the balance of fear and assurance in the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of the Arabs. This course, which meets all the requirements and necessities and is in harmony with logic and nature—this main course to tip the balance in our favour, or merely precisely to adjust it, is: to inflict a clear defeat on the Israeli Army in battle, in one military battle.

I should like to be more specific because there is no room under present conditions for irresponsible talk. I would make the following points: (1) I am not speaking about the enemy's defeat in the war, but his defeat in a battle. There is still a long way to go before the enemy can be defeated in the war. The possibilities for this are still not within sight. But the enemy's defeat in one battle presupposes capabilities which could be available at an early stage in the long period before the end of the war. (2) I am not speaking of a battle on the scale of that of 5th June 1967—a 5th June in reverse, with the Arabs taking the initiative and Israel taken by surprise. Most likely 5th June will not be repeated either in form or in effect. In the coming battle neither we nor the enemy will be taken by surprise . . . I am speaking about a limited battle which would result in a clear victory for the Arabs and a clear defeat for Israel—naturally within the limits of that battle. (3) The requirements and necessities I am speaking about, and which will impose the military battle, do not include any marked consideration for the so-called revenge for injured Arab dignity. . . .

To these three reservations regarding the battle, which I consider necessary and vital, I should like to add more, in the hope that they will give a clearer picture of what I am saying. (1) The current artillery exchanges along the Egyptian front are not the battle I am thinking of—the battle that I feel the requirements and necessities are imposing. What I am envisaging is far greater and broader. The artillery exchanges are important, indeed very important, but they are not the battle which can achieve the aim of inflicting a clear defeat on the Israeli Army. (2) Neither are the activities of the resistance organisations at their present level the battle I am thinking of or the battle imposed by the requirements and possibilities. . . . (3) In simple and general terms the battle I am speaking about . . . is one in which the Arab forces might, for example, destroy two or three Israeli Army divisions, annihilate between 10,000 and 20,000 Israeli soldiers, and force the Israeli Army to retreat from the positions it occupies to other positions, even if only a few kilometres back.

I am speaking, then, about a battle and not the war; about a battle that is limited as battles naturally are; about a real battle, however, resulting in a clear defeat for the Israeli Army. Such a limited battle would have unlimited effects on the war. . . .

There are two clear features of U.S. policy. One which concerns the Middle East crisis, is that the U.S.A. is not in a hurry to help in finding a solution to the crisis. No matter how serious or complicated the situation may become, the U.S.A. will continue to move slowly as long as Israel is militarily in a stronger position. This situation would surely change once the Israel position of strength was shaken.

The other phenomenon concerns the Middle East after its present crisis. It is that the U.S.A. sees in Israel an instrument for attaining its aims in the area. No matter how far the Arabs go in their revolt against the U.S. influence and how much they defy this influence, the U.S. aims are guaranteed as long as Israel remains capable of intimidating the Arabs. If Israel's ability to intimidate becomes doubtful, U.S. policy will have to seek another course. Israel has proved to the U.S.A. that for the time being it is more useful to it than the Arabs. Although all the U.S. interests in the Middle East lie with the Arabs, the U.S.A. continues to support Israel. The strange contradiction in the Middle East at present is that the U.S.A. is protecting its interests in the Arab world by supporting Israel. Israel is thus the gun pointed at the Arabs, the gun which the U.S.A. is brandishing to attain its aims and protect its interests. . . .

After all this, the question remains: is such a battle possible?

The answer is: I do not claim military experience, yet I say that there is no doubt or suspicion as to the possibilities of such a battle which could inflict defeat on the Israeli Army. My belief is based on the following considerations:

At the beginning of my article I said that a battle ending in a clear defeat for the Israeli Army should be the chief method of tipping the balance of fear and assurance. . . . I did not say it is the only method because there are other secondary methods. . . . I will give the following examples in this respect:

Q.— Fatah
has offered an alternative to the Jews in Palestine—that is the creation of a progressive, democratic State for all. How do you reconcile this with the slogan “Long Live Palestine Arab and Free?”

Abu Ammar.
—A democratic, progressive State in Palestine is not in contradiction to that State being Arab. The social, geographical and historical factors play a major role in determining the nature and identity of any State. Anyone who has tried to look at the Palestinian problem in its historic perspective would realise that the Zionist State has failed to make itself acceptable because it is an artificially created alien state in the midst of an Arab world.

Palestine has acquired its identity through the historical development of the area. It is impossible for any Palestinian State to isolate itself from its geographical surroundings. It has been proved historically that any State, created on the land of Palestine which had been alien to the area, was unable to survive.

It is claimed that the main reason for the establishment of the State of Israel was to find a solution to the Jewish problem, but the experience of the past twenty years has proved that the absorbing capacity of the State has been insufficient to solve the problem of the sixteen million Jews in the world.

The Zionist Movement has, as a result, to face one of two alternatives: either to carry on an expansionist policy which will enable it to absorb all the Jews of the world or to admit the failure of its experience and try and find a solution for those Jews who have been up-rooted from their countries of origin to be settled on the land of Palestine.

We have offered our solution: that is the creation of a democratic Palestinian State for all those who wish to live in peace on the land of peace. Such a State can only acquire stability and viability by forming a part of the surrounding area, which is the Arab area. Otherwise this State with its Jewish, Christian and Moslem citizens would be another alien and temporary phenomenon in the area, which will arouse the antagonism of its neighbours, exactly as did the first Jewish State and the Crusaders' State. Neither of these States lasted for more than seventy years.

The word Arab implies a common culture, a common language and a common background. The majority of the inhabitants of any future State of Palestine will be Arab, if we consider that there are at present 2,500,000 Palestinian Arabs of the Moslem and Christian faiths and another 1,250,000 Arabs of the Jewish faith who live in what is now the State of Israel.

Q.
—The immediate objective of your Movement is the liberation of your occupied homeland. What are your long-term objectives after achieving liberation? How do you envisage the future State of Palestine?

Abu Ammar.
—As you have rightly mentioned, the immediate objective of Fatah is the total liberation of Palestine from Zionism and the destruction of any racial or sectarian notion which might exist among the Arabs.

Accordingly, we believe the only way to realise our objective is by overcoming our differences and achieving national unity. Our struggle in its present stage is a struggle for survival and for recovering our national identity. We aim ultimately at the establishment of an independent, progressive, democratic State in Palestine, which will guarantee equal rights to all its citizens, regardless of race or religion.

We wish to liberate the Jews from Zionism, and to make them realise that the purpose behind the creation of the State of Israel, namely to provide a haven for the persecuted Jews, has instead thrown them into a ghetto of their own making.