These, then, are the principles upon which American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict will be based. I have made a personal commitment to see that they endure and, God willing, that they will come to be seen by all reasonable, compassionate people as fair, achievable, and in the interests of all who wish to see peace in the Middle East.
Tonight, on the eve of what can be a dawning of new hope for the people of the troubled Middle Eastâand for all the world's people who dream of a just and peaceful futureâI ask you, my fellow Americans, for your support, and your prayers in this great undertaking.
Twelfth Arab Summit Conference: Final Statement (September 9, 1982)
28
. . . In view of the grave conditions through which the Arab nation is passing and out of a sense of historical and pan-Arab responsibility, their majesties and excellencies and highnesses the kings, presidents and emirs of the Arab nation discussed the important issues submitted to their conference and adopted the following resolution in regard to them.
I. The Arab-Israeli Conflict
The conference greeted the steadfastness of the Palestine revolutionary forces, the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and declared its support for the Palestinian people in their struggle for the retrieval of their established national rights.
Out of the conference's belief in the ability of the Arab nation to achieve its legitimate objectives and eliminate the aggression, and out of the principles and basis laid down by the Arab summit conferences, and out of the Arab countries' determination to continue to work by all means for the establishment of peace based on justice in the Middle East and using the plan of President Habib Bourguiba, which is based on international legitimacy, as the foundation for solving the Palestinian question and the plan of His Majesty King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz which deals with peace in the Middle East, and in the light of the discussions and notes made by their majesties, excellencies and highnesses the kings, presidents and emirs, the conference has decided to adopt the following principles:
1. Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.
2. The removal of settlements set up by Israel in the Arab territories after 1967.
3. Guarantees of the freedom of worship and the performance of religious rites for all religions at the holy places.
4. Confirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to exercise their firm and inalienable national rights, under the leadership of the PLO, its sole legitimate representative, and compensation for those who do not wish to return.
5. The placing of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under UN supervision for a transitional period, not longer than several months.
6. The creation of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Security Council guarantees for the implementation of those principles.
8. The drawing up by the Security Council of guarantees for peace for all the states of the region, including the independent Palestinian state.
9. Security Council guarantees for the implementation of these principles.
II. The Israeli Aggression Against Lebanon
The conference declares its strong condemnation of the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people, and draws the attention of international public opinion to the gravity of this aggression and its consequences on stability and security in the region.
The conference has decided to back Lebanon in everything that will lead to the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 508 and 509 calling for the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese territory up to the recognized international borders.
The conference affirms the solidarity of the Arab states with Lebanon in its tragedy, and its readiness to render any assistance it demands to remedy and put an end to this tragedy. The conference has been notified of the decision of the Lebanese Government to end the task of the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon provided that negotiations be conducted between the Lebanese and Syrian Governments to make the arrangements in the light of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
Jordanian Crown Prince Al-Hasan Bin Talal: Jordan's Quest for Peace (Fall 1982)
29
. . . Because Jordan is a small country, we are often discounted as a major factor in what is clearly the greatest threat to international security. We do not have a large population like Egypt or Syria. We do not have a position of military superiority like Israel. We do not have oil like Saudi Arabia or Iraq. So, then, why is Jordan important? Do we assert its centrality because we are Jordanian?
No, Jordan's views are important. Apart from the Sinai, which is in the process of being returned to Egypt, most of the territory Israel occupied in 1967, and therefore which is referred to in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, was Jordanian. East Jerusalem was Jordanian. There are more Palestinians in Jordan than in any other state, most of them refugees from the wars of 1948 and 1967. Jordan and Israel have outstanding territorial conflicts dating from 1948. Although it is our position and belief that the Palestine Liberation Organization is and can only be the sole representative of the Palestinian people, still it is incontestable that large numbers of Arabs in the West Bank continue to attend closely to Jordan's actions and policies.
It is clear today that the sine qua non of any general and effective settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict must address and resolve the Palestinian issue. It is not our purpose here to posit the requirements for such a resolution; indeed, the requirements are part of the dispute. What is clear, however, is that all parties today recognize that, to use the words of former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, “The Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors.” Even a cursory review of Israeli statements demonstrates conclusively that there too is a recognition of the crucial nature of the Palestinian problem. Whether in terms of “autonomy” proposals or hints that the Palestinians already have their state in Jordan, it is evident that Israeli leaders, too, have come to accept, implicitly or explicitly,the unavoidable fact that no settlement is possible without dealing with the Palestinian problem.
We Jordanians must add that, practically speaking, a settlement must also take into account our perceptions. Small as Jordan is, our country is politically, socially, economically, militarily and historically inseparable from the Palestinian issue. Not that we can speak in place of the Palestinians; we cannot. As His Majesty King Hussein has said recently, “Palestinians alone have the right to determine their future. There are no other options acceptable to Jordan nor is there any substitute for the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine. . . .” We cannot speak in place of the Palestinians. At the same time, however, as a leading Jordanian social scientist has written, “The Jordanians and Palestinians are now one people, and no political loyalty, however strong, will separate them permanently.”
Consider for a moment the following:
⢠Half Jordan's population is Palestinian.
⢠The West Bank and East Jerusalem, both captured by Israel in 1967, were part of Jordan.
⢠If there is large-scale Palestinian migration as a result of any regional settlement, Jordan will necessarily be greatly affected.
⢠Virtually all Palestinians currently resident in Jordan are Jordanian nationals.
⢠Israel and Jordan have vital interests in development of regional water resources in the Jordan River. Israel has already illegally diverted much of the Jordan River, but the importance of cooperation in the future cannot be overestimated. In other areas such as tourism, there is also substantial need for cooperation.
⢠After any settlement as before it, Jordan will share a long border with Israel. For us, development is not just an abstract goal, but a pressing need. We do not wish to continue to divert so much of Jordan's small resource base to a costly armaments program to defend our overexposed position or in order to reduce the risks along this extended border.
⢠Pending the creation of a Palestinian state, it is still Jordan which pays the salaries and pensions of West Bank officials; it is Jordan that bears some development costs of the territory and whose approval is necessary for such projects; it is in the Jordanian parliament that the inhabitants of the West Bank are represented; it is Jordanian law that has effect in the West Bank. This is not to deny that Israel is also involved in these activities, for that is true, albeit a clear violation of international law. Rather, we intend only to show how concrete and contemporary are Jordan's interests. . . .
⢠. . . Yet lately we in Jordan have begun to hear and read that “Jordan opposes an Arab-Israeli settlement.” Let us be clear on this point: no one, no country, no people wants a settlement more than we do. Certainly, no one pays a heavier price for the continuation of the conflict than do we here in Jordan.
After the 1967 War, other Arab governments learnedâand what a costly lessonâwhat we had known for almost two decades: Israel was to be an enduring reality of the Middle East, and the issue was not to undo the 1947 injustice to Palestinians and all Arabs but rather to constrain an Israel hungry for territorial expansion and powerful enough to obtain it.
Perhaps it is germane to say at this point that we Jordanians do not have a precise blueprint of a settlement in mind. Indeed, I believe I can speak for all the Arab countries, and probably for Israel too, in saying that the range of ideas or alternatives or minimums or maximums that is advanced in any of our countries is appallingly varied. For us Jordanians, there are a few clear-cut requirements. Certainly, the same can be said for Egyptians, Israelis, Iraqis, Palestinians, Saudis and Syrians. We have learned through successive tragedies to keep our requirements few, to question them, to be sure they are truly vital. This is true also of other Arab parties. Sadly, it is not true for Israel, whose list of requirements has grown with each passing year. . . .
In spite of Israel's intransigence, which is growing apace with her appetite, the Arab governments including Jordan still seek a settlement. We have to, for let us be candid: Israel has designs on the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanonâwhose territories are these? Arab territories. We do not want to provide a pretext for further Israeli expansion. So, yes Jordan, and, yes, the other Arab states near Israel favor a settlement.
Yet it is true that we do not favor
any
settlement. Neither Jordan, nor Syria nor Lebanon nor Saudi Arabia nor Egypt nor Israelânone of the Middle East countriesâis prepared to accept, or should be prepared to accept, “peace at any price.” Again, let us all be honest. A “settlement” that did not resolve the Palestinian problem, or the question of the Golan, or Israel's or Jordan's or Lebanon's or Syria's rights to exist with reasonable security within a recognized territoryâsuch an outcome would be no settlement at all, for natural forces would be at work to overturn it before it was signed. We understand Israel's needs, and believe Israel's truly vital requirements can be met, but we too have a few vital requirements. Each nation must enjoy some security as a result of a settlement, and none of us can have perfect security, for as has often been shown, one nation's perfect security is another's perfect insecurity.
It is true that agreement on what a settlement should look like is lacking both within and among Arab states, as it is lacking in fact within Israel and between Israel and other states. But a resolution to the conflict is much less likely to be found
⢠if Israel continues to expand what are clearly illegal settlements in the occupied territories;
⢠if Israel continues to decide unilaterally to annex Arab land;
⢠if private land is confiscated to be handed out to Israeli settlers;
⢠if peace agreements are made in the name of rather than with other parties;
⢠if Israel continues to play with internal vulnerabilities of Arab states, increasing instability and distrust;
⢠if Israel continues to play with internal vulnerabilities of seeing her role as a regional policeman.
Let there be no mistake. I am not holding the Arabs blameless for the depth and duration of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For too long Arab states thought the monumental injustice perpetrated against the Palestinian people in 1948 was the only reality. For too long many Arabs held that justice would be served in the end, that justice would triumph, and could see only a return to their lands by the refugees as just. After all, we knew the Palestinian Arabs, native to the land, as our Arab brothers. We did not know the Jews who had suddenly seized it. What was to happen to them? Arabs didn't care; they cared deeply, though, about the Palestinians. This was unrealistic. Today, we understand that the Palestinian problem must be dealt with
in the context
of the existence of Israel. Nevertheless, that problem
must
be resolved. We Arabs too have some requirements, but there is no question that we seek, favor, and deeply desire a resolution to this disastrous conflict.
It must be noted that the Israeli annexation of Arab Jerusalem and the Golan have both taken place in the aftermath of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Even Israelis never claimed historic rights to the Golan. Now that they have purported to annex the Golan Heights, can anyone doubt that the next step will be the West Bank? Never mind the concept of autonomy. Never mind the ideas of Palestinian self-rule. It is clear that Israel is intent upon adding this Arab territory to Greater Israel.