The Kennedy Brothers: The Rise and Fall of Jack and Bobby (63 page)

130
  Burke Marshall, Professor of Law at Yale Law School, commented on the Kennedy negotiation style in interview with the author. “Process theory” is explicated in Roger Fisher and William Ury,
Getting to Yes
(New York: Penguin, 1988).

131
  Transcript of conversation between RFK and Barnett, 25 September 1962. Burke Marshall Papers, JFKL.

132
  Lord,
The Past That Would Not Die
, p. 122.

133
  Transcript of conversation between RFK and Barnett, 25 September 1962. Burke Marshall Papers, JFKL.

134
  William A. Geoghegan, memorandum to the attorney general, 28 September 1962. RFKP, JFKL.

135
  Quoted in Lord,
The Past That Would Not Die,
p. 175.

136
  Guthman and Shulman, eds.,
In His Own Words
, p. 160.

137
  Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy and His Times
, p. 344.

138
  Lord,
The Past That Would Not Die
, p. 189.

139
  Guthman,
We Band of Brothers,
pp. 200—1.

140
  Quoted in Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy and His Times,
p. 346.

141
  Guthman,
We Band of Brothers
, p. 204.

142
  Guthman and Shulman, eds.,
In His Own Words,
p. 166.

143
  The president’s communication is quoted in Lord,
The Past That Would Not Die,
pp. 3—4.

144
  Transcribed conversation between RFK and Congressman Bruce Alger (R-Tex), 4 October 1962.

145
  Interview, Marshall.

146
  Guthman and Shulman, eds.,
In His Own Words,
p. 164.

147
  Quoted in Wofford,
Of Kennedys and Kings,
p. 170.

148
  The three drafts of this speech can be found in the Burke Marshall Papers, JFKL.

149
  
New York Times,
12 April 1964;
Life,
15 May 1964.

150
  Dan E. Moldea,
The Hoffa Wars,
p. 149. HSCA, Final Report (HR-951828), p. 88.

151
  Walter Sheridan,
The Fall and Rise of Jimmy Hoffa
(New York: Saturday Review Press. 1972), p. 217.

152
  Interviews, Novello and French.

153
  Bradlee,
A Good Life,
pp. 243—44.
Newsweek
printed neither story.

154
  The dispositive account of the war against Hoffa is Sheridan,
The Fall and Rise of Jimmy Hoffa.

155
  Time, 16 February 1962.

156
  A member of the Justice legal team, William French, was helpful in reminiscence with the author.

157
  Summers,
Official and Confidential,
p. 296.

158
  Navasky,
Kennedy Justice
, pp. 418—19. Also Sheridan,
The Fall and Rise of Jimmy Hoffa
, p. 283.

159
  Organized Crime files 1962 and 1963, RFKP, JFKL.

160
  The attorney general initially did not want publicity over Valachi’s revelations. When Hoover tried to give the story to the press, with all credit going to the FBI, Kennedy and his press aide Ed Guthman blocked it. Later, when congressional testimony by Valachi was unavoidable, the story was released to Peter Maas.

161
  Roemer,
Man Against the Mob
, pp. 105—13, 203—8.

162
  Statement by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary H.R 4616. Also Remarks of the Hon. Robert F. Kennedy before the Conference of Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, Los Angeles, 21 March 1962.

163
  Interview, Mortimer Caplin. IRS oral history interview with Mortimer M. Caplin (provided to the author by Professor Caplin).

164
  Navasky,
Kennedy Justice
, p. 61.

165
  In an interview, Louis Oberdorfer, the head of the tax division under Kennedy, insisted that the decisional procedure regarding prosecution followed a separate and disinterested process. With regard to “cross-fertilization of case development” between the Organized Crime division and IRS leadership, this was clearly not the case.

166
  See SAC, LA 92—113 to Director, 28 March 1962, NA.

167
  Ibid.

168
  C. A. Evans to Mr. Belmont, Subject: John Roselli (
sic
), 22 August 1962. Indication that the director himself was monitoring the surveillance is found in 92—3267 Director to SAC LA, 11 May 1962. “FURNISH BUREAU ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING NECESSITY OF RENTING APARTMENT EIGHT FOUR ONE, FOUNTAIN AVENUE, LOS ANGELES, TO INSURE THIS MATTER MAY BE PROPERLY EVALUATED.”

169
  Michael Hellerman (with Thomas C. Renner),
Wall Street Swindler
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), p. 86.

170
  
Washington Post
, 2 May 1976. Interviewed by HSCA investigator Gaeton Fonzi in 1977, Aleman reiterated his story as well as the fact that he had reported Trafficante’s statement to the FBI. Trafficante, in testimony before the HSCA in 1978, conceded that he had met Aleman but denied that he had ever said Kennedy was going to get hit: “I might have told him he wasn’t going to get reelected.” Fonzi later observed that one factor weighing against the veracity of Aleman’s allegation was his known association with the FBI during the period and Trafficante’s customary discretion in terms of incriminating statements. Fonzi,
The Last Investigation
, pp. 256—57.

171
  Davis,
Mafia Kingfish
, pp. 106—12, 209—15.

172
  Interview, Powers.

173
  Fletcher Knebel, “154 Hours on the Brink of War,”
Look
, 12 November 1962.

174
  Ibid.

175
  Robert F. Kennedy,
Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 23.

176
  Interviews: Rusk, Nitze, Ball, O’Donnell.

177
  Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 24.

178
  McGeorge Bundy Memorandum to the President, 31 August 1962, National Security Files, JFKL.

179
  RFK Memorandum (for the record), 11 September 1962, RFKP, JFKL.

180
  Knebel, “154 Hours on the Brink of War.”

181
  Reference to Kennedy’s exchange with Ambassador Dobrynin is contained on pp. 25—26 of
Thirteen Days
. The RFK-Georgi Bolshakov exchange can be found in Blight and Welch,
On The Brink
, p. 231.

182
  Blight and Welch,
On The Brink
, pp. 236—48.

183
  Richard Rovere in
The New Yorker
commented that the “war party in Washington” was as active as the jingoists of 1898. Cited in Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy and His Times
, p. 545.

184
  The invasion plan is set forth in Knebel, “154 Hours on the Brink of War.”

185
  Blight and Welch,
On the Brink
, p. 63.

186
  Ibid., p. 49.

187
  Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, 16 October 1962, Presidential Recordings, JFKL.

188
  Interview, O’Donnell.

189
  Interview, Rusk.

190
  Interview, Ball.

191
  Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 33.

192
  Blight and Welch,
On The Brink
, p. 201.

193
  At the Hawk’s Cay Conference, Ball, McNamara, and others discussed these conclusions. Blight and Welch,
On The Brink
, pp. 21—25.

194
  Knebel, “154 Hours on the Brink of War.”

195
  At the Cambridge Conference, Khrushchev’s former speech-writer Fyodor Burlatsky posed the question of why JFK did not confront Gromyko directly. The answer that McGeorge Bundy gave was: “We couldn’t believe that Gromyko could be trusted to handle a private negotiation without going public on us because he had been assuring us in no uncertain terms for a long time that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. Theodore Sorensen doubted that such a confrontation would have caused the missiles to be withdrawn.” Blight and Welch,
On the Brink
, p. 246.

196
  Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, 17 October 1962, Presidential Recordings, JFKL.

197
  Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, pp. 38—39.

198
  Dean Acheson, “Dean Acheson’s Version of Robert Kennedy’s Version of the Cuban Missile Crisis,”
Esquire
, February 1969. Also Douglas Brinkley,
Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years
, 1953—71 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 160—61.

199
  Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy and His Times
, pp. 548—49, quoting Leonard C. Meeker’s memorandum of discussion.

200
  Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 44.

201
  Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy and His Times
, pp. 546—47. Ed Guthman’s
We Band of Brothers
contains an interesting account of his highly confidential exchanges with RFK, pp. 118—28.

202
  O’Donnell and Powers, “
Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye
,” p. 361.

203
  Theodore C. Sorensen,
Kennedy
, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 705.

204
  Blight and Welch,
On the Brink
, pp. 406—7.

205
  Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, 22 October 1962, Presidential Recordings, JFKL.

206
  Blight and Welch,
On the Brink
, p. 246.

207
  Ibid., p. 247. Shaknazarov, a former aide to Mikhail Gorbachev, spoke to several of the Soviet principals in the crisis, including Ambassador Dobrynin.

208
  Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 62.

209
  Interview, Harlech.

210
  Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,”
American Political Science Review
63 (September 1969).

211
  Quoted in Blight and Welch,
On the Brink
, p. 64.

212
  Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 70.

213
  Ibid., pp. 89—90.

214
  Ball quoted in Blight and Welch,
On the Brink
, p. 49. Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 97.

215
  Blight and Welch,
On the Brink
, p. 72.

216
  Ibid., pp. 360—63.

217
  The so-called Trollope Ploy is best discussed in Graham Allison,
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). Also Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy and His Times
.

218
  Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 106.

219
  The delicate balance RFK tried to strike was to confront Dobrynin with: 1) a deadline (9 A.M. Washington time, 3 P.M. Moscow time) along with a recitation of military contingencies that were possible if a commitment to withdraw the missiles was not made by Khrushchev; and 2) no categoric commitment that the United States would attack. The Soviet leadership may well have taken this as an ultimatum, although RFK later characterized it as “a statement of fact.” See Blight and Welch,
On the Brink
, p. 264, and Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 108.

220
  Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, p. 130.

221
  Guthman and Shulman, eds.,
In His Own Words
, pp. 378—79.

222
  Mario Lazo,
Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba
(New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p. 378.

223
  For a contemporaneous account filed by the FBI field office in Miami, see FBI Memorandum 105—1198, 20 January 1963, NA. Also Hinckle and Turner,
The Fish Is Red
, pp. 154—57.

224
  Veciana’s testimony, HSCA Report, 18 September 1978, NA.

225
  Ibid., p. 132.

226
  Hinckle and Turner,
The Fish Is Red
, pp. 15—52.

227
  Interview, John Nolan. See also “Cuban Prisoner Release” oral histories of Joseph Dolan, John Nolan, Mitchell Rogovin, John Jones, Louis F. Oberdorfer, JFKL.

228
  Interview, Nolan. Also oral history of John E. Nolan Jr., JFKL.

229
  Interview, O’Donnell. O’Donnell and Powers, “
Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye
,” pp. 312—13.

230
  Ibid., p. 313. Guthman,
We Band of Brothers
, p. 136.

231
  Confidential interview 11. In the course of the interview, the respondent (currently a Miami attorney) placed a call at the author’s request for verification of his assertion that there had been an assassin in the Orange Bowl that day to a fellow veteran of the Bay of Pigs invasion. This individual, serving a twenty-year-sentence for narcotics trafficking, agreed to be interviewed the following day by phone. In the interview, he stated that it was “well-known that there was a hitter in the stadium.” When asked if he knew the identity of the man, he said he did not. Confidential interview 19 with a Brigade 2506 veteran, wounded during the invasion and released in May 1962.

232
  Miami Police Department, Intelligence Unit, initialed by Mary L. Gilbert, 3 January 1963. “Capt. Napier called this date, and stated that John Marshall of the U.S. Secret Service was anxious to find out some information concerning the following individual: A Cuban male, 25 yrs., 5’4”, 135—155 lbs., strong muscular build, known only as CHINO.” NA.