The King's Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (Pimlico) (45 page)

Wolsey arrived at Calais on 2 August, and almost immediately he was involved in some hard bargaining with the Imperial delegation;
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indeed, at one point he threatened to call off any meeting with Charles, and thus in effect all plans for an Anglo-Imperial alliance, because the Imperialists were proving too intractable.
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As it was, on 14 August he set off for Bruges – for the benefit of the French his excuse for this visit being the need to persuade the emperor not to withdraw his delegation from the Calais conference
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– and there the bargaining continued. The two matters most in dispute concerned the Imperial acceptance of the responsibility for the annual French pension – what in the negotiations was referred to as the indemnity – and the details of the marriage terms. On both of these Wolsey seems to have got his way. He certainly secured the indemnity and appears to have obtained slightly more than the going rate for Mary’s dowry.
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This left the most important matter, and one that Wolsey had stipulated could be discussed only with the emperor himself: when would England actually have to declare war?
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As has already been mentioned, Wolsey won this argument as well. Under the terms of the Treaty of Bruges, signed on 25 August, England was not expected to do this until March 1523, unless, that is, the present war between the French and the Imperialists had not ended by the beginning of November, when England was supposed to come in on the Imperial side immediately. It was therefore embarrassing that, when the deadline arrived, the war was still in progress. However, Wolsey was able to secure an extension until the end of the the month,
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and in the end was able to delay England’s declaration of war against France until 29 May 1522.
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But the price for all these concessions by the Imperialists – including the various extensions that Wolsey had won – was that
England had to provide money, ships and men for Charles’s return to Spain.
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The postponement of the declaration of war was a major victory for Wolsey,
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but its purpose must not be misunderstood. It did give him more room for manoeuvre, and one such manoeuvre might just possibly have been a break with the emperor. But its main purpose was quite different. Wolsey genuinely wanted time for English military preparations to be made, for only then could the ‘Great Enterprise’ against France become a reality. This was also why he was willing to help Charles return to Spain. Only then, once the rebellions were settled, could Charles raise sufficient money and troops to make a joint invasion of France effective. After Bruges, the ‘Great Enterprise’ was the major aim of English foreign policy, and this represents a change of emphasis. As has been shown, initially the Imperial alliance was partly a means of getting England out of a difficult situation, almost a defensive measure. On the other hand, if the emperor really could be tied down, and detailed plans for a joint invasion of France in strength be worked out, then there was a golden opportunity to win honour and glory. At Bruges, this began to happen.

No wonder Henry got excited. So did Wolsey – but with this very important proviso: he was all too aware of the difficulties yet to come, and therefore determined to move cautiously. This explains the differences between him and Henry that occurred while Wolsey was at Calais. The first concerned who should command a force of six thousand archers to be sent to the immediate aid of the emperor,
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the second whether the English merchants should make their usual autumn trip to Bordeaux to buy wine.
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The point about both is that Henry was anxious to get things moving, while Wolsey wanted business as usual. In Wolsey’s view there was no point in antagonizing the French until England was ready to declare war, and in the summer and autumn of 1521 she was not.
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Both Wolsey and Henry were delighted with the new Imperial alliance.
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That being the case, why did Wolsey spend over three months at Calais pretending that he was interested in peace? In fact the explanations have already been given. To have suddenly blown his cover, and to have changed overnight his role of peacemaker to that of warmonger, as well as losing him room for manoeuvre, would have resulted in a damaging loss of credibility. As it was, when England did declare war, she did so as the defender of the Treaty of London, having apparently attempted every diplomatic means at her disposal to reconcile the warring parties. England had right on her side, and that always has its uses.
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There was also the question of how to secure time to make the necessary
preparations for war. It all boils down to a simple point that has never been sufficiently emphasized: the difference between a truce and a peace. It was the former that Wolsey was working for when he returned to Calais at the end of August, and he wanted it the better to prepare for war. So did Charles.
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It is true that Charles would have preferred an immediate English declaration, but that was because he was involved in the war already and was naturally anxious to come out of it with as much credit as possible. But he knew that he was short of money, he knew that he ought to return to Spain, and he knew that he was not ready for a major showdown with Francis. Thus, at Bruges, he came to see some advantages from a peace conference orchestrated by Wolsey and his own delegation, the purpose of which was to secure a truce at the moment of maximum advantage to himself.

This was the plan, and throughout most of September it worked very well.
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By the beginning of October this was no longer the case, and by the beginning of November relations between Wolsey and the emperor were definitely bad. The rift was caused by the difficulties in deciding when the moment of maximum advantage had arrived. For Wolsey, the present war was so much men and money down the drain, thus hindering the ‘Great Enterprise’. Unless there were immediate and decisive successes to be gained, the sooner a truce was made the better.
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Charles’s desire for a truce fluctuated, depending entirely on how the war on France’s northeastern border was going. By early October the Imperialists were on the retreat, having already abandoned the siege of Mézières. Francis was now crossing the River Scheldt, poised either to raise the siege of Tournai or to do battle with the emperor outside Valenciennes. Charles was quite anxious for a truce, despite disliking many of its conditions. However, with things moving in their direction, the French were dragging their feet.
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To overcome this, Wolsey decided to impose the greatest possible pressure by sending delegations from Calais to negotiate directly with the two princes. But it was now the turn of the Imperialists to prove obstructive. By early November, the situation had changed. It was clear that Francis’s attempt to relieve Tournai had failed and that it was only a matter of time before the city would fall to the Imperialists. In Italy, also, the war was going well, with the French on the verge of losing Milan. On the other hand, the news of the French capture of Fuenterrabia, on Spain’s north-west border with France, close to the disputed kingdom of Navarre, on 19 October was very unwelcome, and for the emperor any truce that involved the acceptance of this unpleasant fact was out of the question, unless there was absolutely no alternative.
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There is no doubt that Wolsey was angry with the emperor’s refusal to respond favourably to his diplomatic initiatives – and with reason.
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They had been made, as he thought, in order to rescue Charles from a difficult situation.
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No wonder he
wrote to the delegation sent to Francis
I
that he was for his part

sore tempested in mind by the untowardness of the chancellors and orators on every side putting so many difficulties and obstacles to condescend to any reasonable condiction of truce and abstinence of war, that night nor day I could have no quietness nor rest, so that almost my appetite and sleep … are sequesterate from me
.

Here, so it has been suggested, speaks a man worn out in the service of universal peace.
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That this is not so is shown by a letter Wolsey wrote to Henry a little later, on about 14 November. He had just received an explanation from the emperor of why this was the wrong moment to make a truce. In effect, the reasons have already been given: the war was going too well, except in and around Navarre where it was going too badly. Wolsey, as the apostle of peace, should have been distressed to hear this news. In fact, he wrote as follows:

And, Sir, if the enterprise of Tournai succeed, and the expedition against Milan take effect, and the Spaniards determine themselves to revenge these outrages of the French king done against Naverre, Biscay, Fuenterrabia and other countries under the obeisance of the crown of Spain, his [the French king’s] dominions, power and substance shall be so well shaken, diminished, and extenuated, before you set forth your enterprises against him, that, God willing, he shall be easy enough to meddle with. And thus, Sir, the affairs standing in such train, as it is before expressed, better it is to suffer these princes to ruffle with the said French king, and invest him on all parts, for the consumption of his treasure, which is almost clearly extenuated, than suddenly to take this truce now, when he can do no more harm than he hath done. And to the intent your grace may understand in what state the matters of Italy stand, I send unto the same, at this time, certain copies of such news as lately came from thence; whereby there is some good hope and appearance that the affairs of the French king be like to decay there, and proceed from evil to worse
.
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The quarrel with the emperor was very quickly over because it had only ever been a quarrel over immediate tactics, not long-term aims. The truce could well be delayed until after Wolsey’s return to England. Meanwhile at Calais, there was a meeting with the Imperial delegation and the papal nuncio Ghinucci in order to discuss the terms of the alliance in the light of developments since the meeting at Bruges, and the inclusion of the papacy. On 24 November a new treaty was signed, and on the 27th Wolsey sailed for Dover.
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Thus ended the conferences of Calais and Bruges. For Wolsey they had been a
tour de force
.
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It was true that all was not yet settled. The search for a truce, with Charles’s connivance, continued. So also did the bargaining; that was not settled until Charles’s visit to England the following summer, if indeed then. There was also a lot of work to be done if England was going to be ready for war, and to that end a commission was set up in March to look into the whole question of England’s
military potential.
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Still, if his return to England was to bring him no rest, Wolsey must have derived some satisfaction from what had so far been achieved. For four months he had hoodwinked the French into believing that he was concerned with peace, while all the time he had been negotiating with the emperor on how best to bring them to their destruction. In doing this, he had engineered a situation in which even greater honour and fame might accrue to his master than that which had resulted from the Treaty of London.

Mention of Henry’s honour may serve to introduce some final thoughts about Wolsey’s intentions at Calais and Bruges. The picture of him that has emerged from this account is that of the skilful political operator: opportunist, pragmatist, tough negotiator – these are the words that seem best to describe him. What they leave out is the whole question of motivation. Many motives have been ascribed to him, most of them unfavourable. Self-glorification – already touched on in another context – comes obviously to mind, and this could include an excessive desire for material things. It was an aspect of his character that contemporaries were well aware of:
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the Imperialists were always bribing him with a bishopric, the French with a pension.
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However, as an explanation for what he did it does not help very much: as everybody was offering him rewards, it was easy for him to retain his freedom of action. However, one thing that not everybody could offer him was the papacy. The one person who might be able to do so was Charles v, and at Bruges he did offer to support Wolsey’s candidature at the next election. This has led some historians to see this as the key to Wolsey’s action in 1521: Wolsey wanted an Imperial alliance because he wanted to be pope. It now seems clear that this is not the case because he never genuinely wanted to become pope. Even so, the view still persists that the papal connection, very much nurtured by the cardinal protector of England and the pope’s cousin and chief confidant, Giulio de’ Medici (later Clement vii, provides the best explanation for Wolsey’s foreign policy. Without becoming too involved in the intricacies of papal politics, we must offer some comment on this view.
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It may have been noticed that up until now there has been no reference to any papal connection. This has not been deliberate, but merely reflects the fact that it was during this time very little discussed.
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What evidence there is suggests that in responding to the Imperial proposals for an alliance Wolsey had no knowledge of the papal alliance with the emperor of 28 May.
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It is true that from mid-July onwards the new English ambassador at Rome, John Clerk, was reporting back the pope’s very strong anti-French feelings; but it is clear from these same reports that Clerk’s instructions were to defend Wolsey’s ostensible policy of trying to maintain
the peace of Europe. Certainly there is no hint that he was to begin negotiations for an anti-French league.
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Just before he left for Calais, Wolsey did hint to the papal nuncio that he might be able to help Leo
X
against the French,
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but it was not until 25 August, the day the Treaty of Bruges was signed, that he wrote to Clerk informing him of the plot to deceive the French,
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and not until 13 September that Clerk told the pope.
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In other words, Wolsey told the pope of what he was doing only after the moves had been decided. At no time was there any consultation or negotiating with the pope because the pope was not in Wolsey’s confidence.