The Lost Band of Brothers (21 page)

Specht was very drunk and very quarrelsome. He was told to get out. In reply he struck me in the face which gave W51 (Godden) and myself the excuse we wanted. Between us we knocked the stuffing out of him. My steward boy then handed the dilapidated Specht over to the Police.
16

On 16 January Godden cabled London:

(1)  No official reaction yet … As far as we can ascertain nothing tangible revealed.

(2)  General impression seems satisfaction departure these vessels and recognition of efficient operation which was complete surprise.

(3)  Many now say W25 [Lippet] and J [sic] am fully aware of operations but I do not regard too seriously as many wild rumours current.

(4)  Captain German launch entered consulate 0130 hours 15th lubricated started fight was ejected then arrested. We have Police protection day and night. Behaviour Chief Police friendly helpful.
17

Word of the successful cutting-out operation in Santa Isabel harbour spread like wildfire. By 17 January Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador in Madrid charged specifically with keeping Spain out of the war, was reporting back to London his receipt of an inaccurate account of Operation
Postmaster
which the Spanish would later refer to as ‘an incident of exceptional gravity’:
18

Arriba publishes today a leading article voicing a violent protest alleging action of a Free French destroyer in entering the harbour of Santa Isabel Fernando Po and seizing three ‘enemy’ merchant vessels which they ‘towed out of harbour’ after ‘dropping depth charges in order to break moorings and killing crew’. 2. Use is being made of this alleged incident in order to stir up feeling against Great Britain as ultimately responsible. I should be glad to know if there is any truth in it.
19

The Foreign Office replied to their man in Madrid on 20 January:

For your own information, although no British or allied warship was concerned, operation was carried out by SOE with our approval. Every precaution has been taken and it seems reasonably certain that no evidence can be traced to our participation in the affair. One of the ships concerned carries an extremely valuable cargo and is herself a valuable modern liner … Please burn this telegram after perusal.
20

That same afternoon HMS
Violet
finally closed with
Duchessa d’Aosta.
She had been ordered to sea with a prize crew, ostensibly to bring back another vessel. Once at sea her captain had opened sealed orders which detailed the true reason for their mission.
21
At 1500
Vulcan
spotted HMS
Violet
steaming up towards their starboard beam. Her Captain, Tom Coker, remembered: ‘A shot was fired across our bow at the same time a string of bunting was hauled aloft. Identified as “STOP. HEAVE TO. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO ABANDON OR SCUTTLE YOUR SHIP.” This caused quite a laugh between us.’
22
HMS
Violet
came alongside
Duchessa d’Aosta
and sent aboard a young sub lieutenant and a boarding party of four ratings armed with rifles. Security on board HMS
Violet
, evidently, had been watertight. After a ludicrous exchange between the autocratic Capt. March-Phillipps and the junior naval officer who had not the slightest idea with whom he was dealing, the young sub lieutenant signalled back to his Captain aboard HMS
Violet
: ‘Captain of the Italian ship wishes to speak to the Captain of Violet. Italian Captain speaks good English.’
23
Quite so: March-Phillipps had actually written books on the subject. He crossed to
Violet
’s bridge and presently the situation was made clear.

All resolved, the vessels got under way once more and presently
Duchessa d’Aosta
made her triumphant way into Lagos harbour, surrounded by a swirl of immaculate Royal Navy motor launches sent out to escort her in. She arrived at 1800 on Wednesday, 21 January.
Nuneaton
and
Likomba
had made the safety of Lagos port two hours earlier. Plagued by continued troubles with her engines,
Nuneaton
had been hailed by a passing vessel the day before. It transpired the captain of
Nuneaton
knew the master of SS
Ajassa
, who promptly offered a tow to the tug and her charges. Once approaching the harbour:

We had a tremendous reception. The old General himself [Giffard], who was against us, came down and looked upon us as his chaps having pulled off a successful operation and we got all sorts of telegrams from the Cabinet and from the Foreign Office and so forth, congratulatory, and then, of course, the jitters set in on the part of the authority. They thought ‘My God, what have we done in a neutral harbour?’ and we were all dispersed to the far corners of the earth.
24

The safe arrival of all three prize vessels in Lagos was topped off in fitting style by His Excellency, the ever-supportive Governor Sir Bernard Bourdillon, who stood at the end of his private landing stage with many of the SOE home team, cheering loudly, whisky and soda in hand.
25
It was a stylish finale to a skilfully executed and audacious piece of piracy. Major Victor Laversuch’s signalled London:

LAGOS.

FROM W4 [Laversuch] FOR C.D. [Gubbins]: 22.1.42

MOST SECRET DECYPHER YOURSELF.

1.  ALL POST MASTERS ARRIVED HERE 2000 TODAY.

2.  CASUALTIES OUR PARTY ABSOLUTELY NIL.

3.  CASUALTIES ENEMY NIL WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW SORE HEADS.

4.  PRISONERS GERMANS NIL. ITALIANS MEN 27, WOMAN 1, NATIVES 1. ALL LEAVING TOMORROW NIGHT FOR INTERNMENT CAMP 150 MILES IN INTERIOR AND WILL BE KEPT ENTIRELY SEPARATED FROM OTHER INTERNEES.

5.  OUR PARTY ALL WELL AND COLONIAL GOVERNMENT VOLUNTEERS BEING DISPERSED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE POSTS TOMORROW UNDER COMPLETE SEAL OF SECRECY.
26

This triggered a fusillade of congratulatory responses including one from Brigadier Colin Gubbins himself:

To W4 FROM CD:

SO [Hugh Dalton] AND ALL RANKS HERE SEND BEST CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL CONCERNED ON COMPLETE SUCCESS OF A WELL THOUGHT-OUT CAREFULLY PLANNED AND NEATLY EXECUTED OPERATION.

‘Caesar’ followed up his telegram of congratulations with this letter from London dated 21 January:

The extent of our satisfaction and pleasure at the success of this jolly little venture will have been clear to you from the telegram which was sent to you by me and W Section yesterday, and I should just like to add that everybody at London HQ from the Chief right down to the messenger is frightfully pleased and proud of this marked SOE success.
27

From Lagos, Major Laversuch forwarded to Brigadier Gubbins one particular telegram which must have touched a particularly pleasant chord with the triumphant raiders. It was from that old obstructionist, General George Giffard:

DEAR W4.

FOR REASONS WHICH I WAS UNABLE TO EXPLAIN TO YOU I FELT I HAD TO OPPOSE YOUR PROJECT. IT DOES NOT LESSEN MY ADMIRATION FOR SKILLED?
28
DARING AND SUCCESS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE SUCCEEDED. I SEND YOU ALL MY HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS AND HOPE IN THE EVENT OF SIMILAR PROJECTS IN FUTURE, CIRCUMSTANCES MAY PERMIT ME TO ASSIST AND NOT OPPOSE.

YOURS SINCERELY

GIFFARD
29

Not all telegrams to do with Britain’s flagrant breach of Spanish neutrality on Fernando Po were quite so warm or conciliatory. The British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, the former War Cabinet’s Lord Privy Seal and the man sent to Madrid by Churchill expressly to keep Spain out of the war, was still busy fielding irate diplomatic communiqués. Earlier the Admiralty had eased matters a little – but not by much – when they issued a communiqué of their own, stating that one of their patrols had simply happened to intercept
Duchessa d’Aosta
and the tug
Likomba
off the west coast of Africa and that ‘it appears that these ships were endeavouring to reach the Vichy port of Contonu to take on sufficient fuel to enable them to continue their voyage to a port in German-occupied France.’
30

By the middle of February, Sir Samuel Hoare was able to send the Spanish authorities his government’s measured response to the very
suggestion
that Britain might have been in any way involved in the seizure of Axis shipping from within a neutral Spanish port. After the usual hollow pleasantries, during which Sir Samuel emphasised that he was writing on the instructions of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, he continued:

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have had under consideration the Spanish Government’s communication regarding certain events which are alleged to have taken place in the harbour of Santa Isabel in the island of Fernando Po on the 14th January, before the interception of the Italian vessel
Duchessa d’Aosta
by His Majesty’s Ships.

His Majesty’s Government’s action in connection with this vessel was confined to operations of British Naval and Air Forces reported in two communiqués issued by the Admiralty … These communiqués, copies of which for convenience are enclosed herein, clearly show that it was owing to the information obtained from the German broadcasts that the British Commander-in-Chief in the area concerned despatched five patrols to cover the area in question. As a result the Italian vessel
Duchessa d’Aosta
was intercepted, captured, and sent into a British port together with the two minor enemy vessels.

In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government cannot accept any protest of the Spanish Government in regard to this incident. They feel indeed compelled to express their surprise that the Spanish Government should so readily have assumed that His Majesty’s Government were concerned with any events which may have taken place in Santa Isabel or on the
Duchessa d’Aosta
prior to the vessel’s departure from the harbour …

His Majesty’s Government,
being in no way responsible for what happened prior to the capture of the enemy vessels on the high seas
[author’s italics], are not in a position to provide an explanation of the events that have occurred in the harbour of Santa Isabel …

In all the circumstances His Majesty’s Government do not perceive any grounds on which they could be called upon to take steps to restore an enemy vessel which was captured on the high seas in accordance with the accepted rights of belligerents.
31

The Rt Hon. Anthony Eden, His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was lying through his teeth.

  
1
.  Guise report in HS 3/91.

  
2
.  
Anders Lassen
, 85.

  
3
.  Guise HS 3/91.

  
4
.  March-Phillipps report in HS 3/91.

  
5
.  
Maid Honor
Log entry.

  
6
.  BBC Henrietta.

  
7
.  Detailed account by unknown author in the March-Phillipps Papers, 06/103, Documents and Sound Section, Imperial War Museum.

  
8
.  Guise HS 3/91.

  
9
.  BBC Henrietta.

10
.  HMS
Violet
survived the war. She was broken up in Bilbao, Spain, in October 1970.

11
.  HS 3/91.

12
.  Michie Report in HS 3/91.

13
.  
Anders Lassen
, 86–7.

14
.  Michie Report in HS 3/91.

15
.  
Anders Lassen
, 87.

16
.  Specht then allegedly spent three weeks in jail.

17
.  HS 3/87.

18
.  PREM 3/405/3.

19
.  Ibid.

20
.  Ibid.

21
.  HS 7/225.

22
.  Report of Tom Coker, Master S/T
Vulcan
. In ADM 116/5736.

23
.  Guise HS 3/91.

24
.  Longe in BBC Henrietta.

25
.  Guise HS 3/91.

26
.  HS 3/87.

27
.  Ibid.

28
.  As marked on original. Presumably refers to distorted grouping.

29
.  HS 3/87.

30
.  Ibid.

31
.  ADM 116/5736.

Yet
still
word could get out, the story leak. With the Italian prisoners moved to a remote inland internment camp and colonial government volunteers scattered back to their different stations, it was only the original Maid Honor Force that now remained to be dispersed far away from Lagos and the scene of their illegal triumph of violated neutrality. March-Phillipps and Appleyard were ordered back to England: both were needed urgently for the debriefing and caught the first available passenger liner back to England. The others were permitted to take a more leisurely route home. Lassen and a handful of others stayed in Nigeria, others headed south to Cape Town for a fortnight’s leave before – eventually – returning home to England.
Maid Honor
herself, Blake Glanville’s pride and joy that had carried them all safely from Poole to Africa but not onto the raid itself, was abandoned with regret in West Africa. Stripped of her ‘Q’ ship armament and surprises,
Maid Honor
was sold on in Lagos and ended her days as a simple fishing smack working out of Freetown, Sierra Leone, her un-sheathed bottom-planking riddled with teredo worm. Her bones lie there still.
1

Before
Duchessa d’Aosta
set out for England she was thoroughly examined, her cargo meticulously inventoried. One of the justifications for her seizure had been the possibility that she too was a ‘Q’ ship and that her radio was being used to pass information which might harm British interests. The fear proved groundless. A Most Secret signal sent to the Admiralty flatly stated: ‘No evidence yet found of vessel having given assistance to the enemy. No W/T message sent since Italy entered the war transmitter sealed. This is confirmed by W/T Operator and feel confident is the truth.’
2
Now, with Maid Honor Force dispersed and on the way home, it hardly mattered. What
did
matter, however, was the fact that, at a time when SOE in London was under great pressure to produce results to reassure Churchill and its many critics that SOE was, indeed, a force of real worth manned by competent, courageous officers, March-Phillipps and his men had stepped up to the mark. The success of Operation
Postmaster
, as SOE’s first historian recorded after the war, was simply ‘manna in the desert to SOE in its early lean years’.
3