The Michael Eric Dyson Reader (15 page)

For many whites, racial clarification and racial justification are the same. This is especially true when talking about race goes against white beliefs about the disappearance or absence of racism. The question, of course, is whether race made a difference in Simpson’s case. For Cochran and millions of blacks, the reasonable answer was yes. The reasonableness of that answer is partially determined by an undeniable fact: the bad treatment of blacks by the police. Mark Fuhrman’s bigoted behavior only reinforced the belief among millions of blacks that he might have framed O.J.

If we look closely, it will become clear that the race card (racial justification) was played in the Simpson trial from the beginning. The question of which jurors to select was racially motivated. Both the defense and the prosecution took race into account. The decision to bring Christopher Darden onto the prosecution team was driven by race. The prosecution’s decision to stick with Fuhrman, even when it was apparent that he was a racist, carried racial overtones. The race card had been drawn and dealt long before Cochran even came on the scene. It should be evident that the “race card” metaphor is a limited way to understand how race operates. As an instance of racial justification, the race card metaphor leaves aside the context and the subtext of race. The race card metaphor fails to account for the complexity of race. It fails to show how racism poisons civic life and denies the worth of human beings because of their color. Race is not a card. It is a condition. It is a set of beliefs and behaviors shaped by culture, rooted in history, and fueled by passions that transcend reason.

Understanding the complexity of race can throw light on the actions of the black jurors in the Simpson case. The jurors’ verdicts were widely viewed as a failure to transcend race. They were also viewed, in the words of a ’70s James Brown hit, as the “big payback” to whites for all the wrong they’ve done. Furthermore, the jurors were accused of failing to critically weigh the evidence in the case. Racial clarification helps to identify a historical paradox of race for blacks relating to claims of this sort: when dealing with their peers, blacks are seen as fair—that is, neutral, just, and transcending race—only when they oppose perceived black interests. For many whites, the black jurors could only transcend race, and satisfy the demands of justice and good citizenship, by finding Simpson guilty of murder. Because the jury found Simpson not guilty, many whites believed their decision was an instance of racial justification, that the verdicts were a biased judgment, a pretext for racial solidarity.

But blacks routinely convict black defendants. (I should know. I saw my brother sentenced to life in prison by an all black jury.) Neither are whites viewed as unfair when they fail to send a white defendant to jail. Whites are not viewed in such cases
as expressing white solidarity. Unless, of course, the defendant is accused of a crime against a black person. Even then, whites defend their decisions as just. They often claim their decisions are made without regard to color. Whites are rarely asked to consider the role race plays in the decisions they make. This is especially the case when their decisions involve unconscious expressions of group loyalty.

Racial mystification may help to explain veiled, and not-so-veiled, references to the black jurors’ intelligence. The subtext of criticisms aimed at the black jurors was drenched in race: they were uneducated, hence, intellectually inferior. It’s interesting to note how dismissed white juror Francine Florio-Bunten’s story casts light on racial mystification in the trial. Florio-Bunten claims she would have voted to convict Simpson. She has been celebrated, in coded terms, as a white heroine who would have saved the day by representing the “truth”—that is, “white” interests. Florio-Bunten was lauded for being the only juror who knew what “DNA” stood for at the beginning of the trial. (The subtext is that the black jurors, by contrast, were dumb.) Florio-Bunten also claims that she had decided Simpson’s guilt long before the trial had ended. Yet, unlike the black jurors, who were viciously attacked for arriving at a hasty decision (after four hours of deliberation), Florio-Bunten has been exempt from harsh criticism. Florio-Bunten is even more ingratiating to whites when she claims that no amount of deliberation by her cohorts would have swayed her opinion. (Subtext: she would have resisted “black interests” and stood firm for “white interests.”) The stigma black jurors wear—dumb, race loyalists, un-American—is the stigma attached to many blacks who risk white rage by reaching decisions that upset white interests and beliefs.

In the final analysis, what race as context, race as subtext, and race as pretext cannot help us gain is certainty about the motives that lurk in the hearts of human beings. We don’t know what intentions or motivations people have apart from the behavior we can observe. (That is the frustration for blacks confronting subtle forms of racism that are not manifest in overt action.) Despite every effort to explain the jury’s actions, it may be that race, of whatever sort, was the motivation for their decision in the Simpson trial. No amount of knowledge or insight can protect against that possibility. Black folk already know this because they have been on the losing end of that proposition too many times before. As this case proves, it’s a bitter lesson few whites are familiar with. It may be that the jurors’ decision confirmed the worst fears of whites and blacks: Despite what many whites think about blacks—that they are morally inferior—or what many blacks think about themselves—that they are morally superior to whites—blacks and whites may be very much the same.

Oddly enough, that might be a basis for moving beyond the prism of race. Not by denying race, but by taking it into account. That is the lesson we learn from clarifying our understanding of race. Those whites who claim it is unfair, even absurd, for blacks to enjoy racial preferences deny that whites have always enjoyed such preferences on a much larger scale. Now that many whites seek to use the absurdity of racial preferences as a justification for axing programs like affirmative
action, they fail to make use of history. True enough, they highlight the absurdity of the idea of race. But they remove it from a context—racial clarification—that explains its historical function—to justify white privilege. The bitter history of black struggle, the facts, are what make the idea that race is absurd valid and compelling. To take that idea out of context and to turn it against blacks without regard for history is crass and dishonest.

Then too blacks must be honest about the manner in which we have been vulnerable to race exploiters who deny the importance of race. If racial justice is our dominant concern, then the cases of prisoners Geronimo Pratt and Mumia AbuJamal should have goaded us to action long before the superrich Simpson captured our attention. And our large disinterest in the trials of rappers Snoop Doggy Dogg, Tupac Shakur, and Dr. Dre reveals a huge class and generational bias in black America. In fact, millions of blacks believed the hostile portrayals of these young blacks in the media. (I’m not suggesting that each didn’t deserve criticism for his actions. I’m simply referring to hostile black reaction to the category of “young, black male” or “rapper.”) Millions of blacks believed in these rappers’ probable guilt simply because they were rappers. Millions of blacks didn’t rally around these rappers, who probably had more cash than Simpson. Many blacks wrote them off. Why? They weren’t the right kind of blacks. They weren’t “our” kind of role models. Yet such figures, given the wide public hostility aimed at them, are more likely to be targets of white fear and police misconduct than a rich, well-loved black sports icon like O.J. Class divisions in black life are huge and growing.

In the end, we can only have racial progress if we take the lessons of this case seriously. Despite the undeniable advances we have made, despite the enormous strides taken, we remain a deeply divided society. (Although this case framed our racial problems in black and white, we must certainly realize that there are all sorts of racial and ethnic tensions brewing that involve Asian, Native American, and Latino communities.) We cannot wish our differences away. We must work to increase our understanding of the contexts, pretexts, and subtexts of race. Then we must do something concrete about racial suffering and racial injustice. We have the negative examples of O.J. Simpson and Mark Fuhrman, the two men at the center of this trial, to spur us on past their, and our, tragic limitations and failures. Simpson, in particular, is a man without a country. The white folk who once adored him, and whose acceptance Simpson still seeks, now despise him. The blacks Simpson has never shown much interest in, and who have welcomed him, do not inspire his allegiance.

In perhaps one of the most tragic ironies this case has served up, a black man who lived his life avoiding black culture was ultimately set free because of a white bigot who hated blacks and worked at the core of urban black life. The cruel symmetry of their fates at the hands of a black culture that each, in his own way, found troubling is nearly biblical. If we are not careful, their fates will be the nation’s as well.

There is little doubt that affirmative action is a controversial public policy
that has been bitterly debated in the nation’s long and chaotic battle
for racial justice. I think it is best to tell the truth about affirmative action:
that it is not a cure-all for our racial miasma; that it is not fair for
whites who have enjoyed centuries of unchallenged social advantage to
carp about the relatively small benefits distributed to minorities; and that
too often the discussion of racial justice is yanked out of a truthful political
context and smothered by amnesia. If we ever ginned up the courage
to speak honestly about race, we might also open up unexpected avenues
of racial healing.

Moderator:
From the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, I’m Margot Adler. Welcome to
Justice Talking
. Do we still need affirmative action? The United States Supreme Court will rule this term on whether the University of Michigan can consider race when evaluating applicants to its undergraduate and law schools. Like many prestigious colleges and universities, Michigan takes the position that diversity itself has an important educational value, and that the school must maintain its academic freedom to create a student body with the widest range of people, ideas, and experiences. U of M gives African American applicants additional points just for being black, and whites who didn’t get in have sued, claiming reverse discrimination . . . Affirmative action—will it prevent the resegregation of our country’s institutions of higher learning? Is diversity a value so important in the twentyfirst century that colleges may discriminate against whites?

I’m joined by Carl Cohen, who has taught philosophy at the University of Michigan since 1955. Professor Cohen’s request for these policies
under the Freedom of Information Act is credited with sparking the movement to end race-based admissions at the university. He is the author of a book called
Naked Racial Preference
. Michael Eric Dyson is also with us. He’s the Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania. Known as a hip-hop intellectual, Professor Dyson is also a Baptist minister and the author of
Race Rules: Navigating
the Color Line
. We’re thrilled to have both of you here on
Justice Talking
.

Moderator:
So Carl, how do the University of Michigan’s affirmative action policies work? And how does race figure into the equation?

Cohen:
Race figures into the equation heavily, both on the undergraduate level and in the law school. There are two different systems, and that’s why there are two different cases. In the undergraduate case, additional points are actually given on a scale, which one hundred points eventually assures admission. Twenty points are given for color of skin. I find that, of course, deeply wrong. In the law school, a point system is not used, but a critical mass of minority students is sought.

Moderator:
Michael, President Bush criticized this policy as a quota system. Is it? Is it discrimination?

Dyson:
Absolutely not. Twenty points granted, as Professor Cohen has indicated, is part of a number of points granted for a number of categories and considerations other than color, or even academic achievement. So that if we give twenty points for race, we give points for legacy; we give points for being an athlete; we give points for being from a diverse part of the country. So race is
a
consideration,
a
factor, not the exclusive factor, and certainly not the dominant factor.

Cohen:
Of course it’s not the exclusive factor. No one thinks that. But it is wrong to consider race, morally wrong and legally wrong, to give preference in our country on the basis of skin color or national origin.

Dyson:
I agree, and Carl, as a white man, you would understand that more than anyone else in this room, because racial preferences have been predicated upon pigment. We live in, as some scholars call it, a pigmentocracy [where] the distribution of goods, like employment and education, [is] based upon white skin privilege. So I certainly agree [we’ve got to attack] racial preferences. However, speaking to affirmative action, that’s different than racial preference.

Cohen:
Oh no, we’re talking about racial preference. That’s the issue before the courts right now.

Dyson:
Let me finish my point. Affirmative action is about conceding the fact that the historical practices of white supremacy have excluded people,
unfairly
, based upon race, and we cannot now pretend that race shouldn’t be a consideration in trying to redistribute those goods.

Moderator:
Carl, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Powell, in the majority opinion in the
Bakke
case, wrote that “achieving diversity on campus is an
important and legitimate part of the university’s educational mission.” Was he wrong?

Cohen:
I think diversity is a very genuine value, and I think the university is right to seek diversity of all kinds, not just racial and ethnic diversity, but intellectual diversity. I think that’s a genuine merit. But I don’t think that it justifies discriminating by race.

Moderator:
Michael, isn’t there something a little elitist and even patronizing in the university’s argument? They seem to be implying that the presence of minorities enhances the educational experience offered to the white majority, and that blacks will get a better education in the presence of whites. You’re an African-American professor on a majority
white
campus. What do you think?

Dyson:
Well, I think that in the abstract these arguments may appear to be patronizing, condescending, and altogether typical of the liberal attempt to engineer social diversity. But in the concrete context in which we find ourselves, given the diminution of any intense interest in racial justice for many students of color on predominantly white campuses, I think it’s a salient point that needs to be reinforced. And diversity in this case, racially speaking, is a compelling interest, because A, it allows majority students to interact with, yes, minority students; B, it does allow minority students to engage with those students with whom they will be working in the future; but [C], and most important, it provides an intellectual context to demystify some of these prejudices and biases that feed racial injustice. So I think that there are a variety of ways in which diversity is a compelling interest, both to the college and the university, and to the society at large.

Cohen:
You don’t want to suppose that absent these preferential programs there would be no minorities on campus? There are a very substantial number of very able minority students and faculty members who would be, and who are, on our campus, quite without preference. What’s at issue is the increment in the degree of diversity which is provided, by a degree of deliberate racial preference. And that increment, it is supposed, is sufficient to justify deliberate discrimination by race.

Dyson:
No, I’m not suggesting that absent these so-called, what you termed preferences, what I call racial modifications, black students will not thrive. What it suggests is that there are other considerations than intelligence and test scores that play into the acceptance or rejection of students of color. For instance, a recent study just showed that the
name
of an African-American person is sufficient grounds for excluding them from even being brought in to
compete
for the job. So don’t tell me, Professor Cohen, you’ve been living in a cocoon, somehow, in the United States of Amnesia, where you have rejected the legitimacy of the fact that racial preferences have historically accorded white men, first of all, and
white people secondly, extraordinary access to the goods and resources that are available.

Cohen:
With respect, I am not being ahistorical. I am keenly aware of the long history of racial discrimination in our country, and I think we cannot approach this question without attending to it. I share with you, Professor Dyson, a concern for the way in which race, as you put it in your book, has poisoned the atmosphere in our country in many respects. But the way to bring that to an end is not to take another dose of the same medicine.

Moderator:
Let me butt in here a second. Carl, you’ve been at the University of Michigan for nearly fifty years. Over the five decades that you’ve been teaching, hasn’t the growing presence of African-American students in your courses made a qualitative difference to the kinds of discussions your students had in class?

Cohen:
I don’t know that one could say a very substantial difference. There’s been a growing number of minority students over the years. That’s a good thing. There was a growing number of minority students in the ’60s before preferential programs began. One of my colleagues at the University of Michigan Law School, Terrance Sandalow, remarked after many years of teaching at the law school, that he never found that any one of his minority students contributed in the discussion an idea or a point of view that wasn’t contributed by others.

Dyson:
If you’ve been, for instance, subject to police brutality, and you’re discussing police brutality in your classroom, it makes a heck of a difference if you’re a white man who has had the ability to teach at the University of Michigan for 50 years without the compunction of the law, as opposed to a person of color who has been subject to police brutality, like myself, where the marks are borne in the body. That makes a
heck
of a difference epistemologically, as well as existentially.

Cohen:
We are not going to be without that representation when preference is done away with. It’s not as though we were choosing between the presence of minorities and the absence of minorities. We’re choosing between the presence of minorities in a substantial degree, and the presence of minorities in a somewhat greater degree. And that increment is the only thing that can justify this system. Now I want to say, the way to transcend our tradition, our unhappy tradition, of racial prejudice and discrimination, is to cease to do it, to resolve never again to use race and national origin as the criterion for judgment. That is what I think it is time for us to resolve.

Dyson:
I would agree with [the latter part of your statement], except to say
racism
is a key distinction. Not race.

Moderator:
Carl, some studies show that
without
affirmative action, enrollment of African-Americans at highly selective schools like the U of M,
would drop from 9 percent to 2 percent. The state of Michigan is 14 percent black, has three of the ten most segregated cities in the country. Are you saying that the university would be a better place with only a token presence of black students?

Cohen:
I don’t believe that the result of the elimination of preference would yield a token presence of minority students. The numbers will drop because they have been artificially inflated. I think they will drop, but there will be a substantial number of minority students, as there
were
a substantial number of minority students before the introduction of preference. But I do think the university will be a better place when the hostilities and the tensions that are created by preference are no longer there, and when all the minority students who are on campus are recognized as being there on their own merits. I think we do the minorities a great service when we eliminate preference in their behalf.

Dyson:
Well, let me respond to that by saying, first of all, thank you so much for your concern about the psychological state of African-American students who, in the embrace of so-called racial preferences, are thought to be somehow inferior. Surely Professor Cohen, as a teacher of philosophy, is aware of the long legacy of the disbelief in the essential humanity and intelligence of black people—long before affirmative action, I might remind you. So when I went to Carson-Newman College, a historically Southern Baptist school, [a] white school, I got a Ph.D. fellowship to go to Princeton University. I made straight A’s in philosophy, [and] graduated at the top of my class in philosophy. A white man—whose son was graduating with me—at an awards banquet came up to me and said, “Son, you know, you’re not just going to Princeton because you’re black.” Now he excluded all of the evidence and the data that suggested that my superior academic standing was the basis, was indeed the engine that drove my acceptance into Princeton. I’m suggesting to you that if we ever stoop to perceptions of minority students as the basis from which to include or exclude them, we will reproduce the very pathology you’re seeking to avoid. I think that affirmative action has been a credible tool and a critical tool to implement real diversity, and therefore real racial justice.

Moderator:
Carl, Derek Bok, the former president of Harvard, wrote that “no applicant has a right to a certain college. Instead the school has an obligation to choose students carefully so as to advance the purposes it seeks to serve.” Aren’t the white students suing the University of Michigan, essentially asserting a right to go there?