The Naked Communist (26 page)

In spite of these legal restrictions, however, the uninhibited generosity of the diplomats dominated Lend-Lease rather than Congress or the leaders of the Military.

General John R. Deane, for example, who was in Moscow as Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, turned down a Russian request for 25 large 200-horsepower Diesel marine engines because the engines already sent to Russia were rusting in open storage and from all appearances were simply being stockpiled for post-war use. Furthermore, the engines were badly needed by General MacArthur in the South Pacific. After hearing General Deane's decision, the Russians appealed to Harry Hopkins (head of the Lend-Lease program) who over-ruled General Deane. During the following two years a total of 1,305 of these engines were sent to Russia at a cost to the American people of $30,745,947.

After Pearl Harbor, when Navy officials were given the highest possible priority for copper wire to be used in the repair of U.S. battleships, they found the Russians had an even higher priority for an order of copper wire which was apparently to be used for post-war rehabilitation of Russian cities. The wire was turned over to the Russians in such quantities that it had to be stored on a 20-acre lot in Westchester County, New York, where it remained until the war was nearly over. A few months before the Armistice, it was shipped to Russia for the rehabilitation of their communications systems.

Since the close of World War II, the American people have gradually learned the details concerning the flood of goods and treasure which went to Russia under Lend-Lease. The lists which have been published are from Russian records. They were secured by an American officer, Major George Racey Jordan, who was the official U.S. expediter for Russian Lend-Lease at the Great Falls Air Base in Montana. An analysis of these lists showed that according to Russian records, the Communists received over eleven billion dollars worth of Lend-Lease and that in spite of the legal restrictions against it, the diplomatic strategists included $3,040,423,000 worth of American goods, paid for by American taxpayers, which definitely does not appear to be authorized by the Lend-Lease act. These lists show shipments of vast stockpiles of "non-munition" chemicals together with voluminous shipments of cigarette cases, phonograph records, ladies' compacts, sheet music, pianos, antique furniture, $388,844 worth of "notions and cheap novelties," women's jewelry, household furnishings, fishing tackle, lipstick, perfumes, dolls, bank vaults, playground equipment, and quantities of many other types of illegal, non-military merchandise.

Students of Russian wartime history point out that American Lend-Lease began feeding into Russia at a time when she was almost prostrate. She had lost most of her crops as a result of the scorched earth campaign designed to slow Nazi advances. Even with Lend-Lease food the troops had to be rationed at a bare subsistence level so it is likely that without

Lend-Lease the Russian resistance might well have collapsed. Furthermore, the Germany occupation cut the Russians off from many of their major industrial centers. In addition to U.S. planes, munitions, chemicals, tools, heavy machinery, and so forth, the amazing American "Arsenal of Democracy" provided Russia with 478,899 motor vehicles. This was nearly half of all the motor vehicles used on the Soviet front.

It is an interesting commentary on the Communist psychology to note that the United States never received an official "thank you" from Russia for the eleven billion dollars worth of Lend-Lease goods which were paid for and literally "donated" to the Communist Motherland by the American people. Stalin's excuse was that his government felt the United States made an error when it stopped Lend-Lease at the close of the war. He made it icy clear that under the circumstances his people did not feel an expression of gratitude would be either appropriate or justifiable.

Throughout World War II Russian espionage vigorously concentrated on the most important thing to come out of the War -- the harnessing of atomic energy. A two-pronged thrust was employed to get the information as it was developed: one by espionage and the other by diplomatic channels. For a time the diplomatic channels were particularly productive, not only for atomic energy secrets, but for all military and industrial information.

Major Jordan first became aware of this at the Great Falls Lend-Lease Air Base when the Russians began bringing large quantities of cheap, black suitcases along with them whenever they left the United States. They refused to let Jordan see the contents on the grounds that the suitcases were pieces of "diplomatic luggage" and therefore immune to inspection.

One night the Russian commander at the base almost demanded that Jordan go into Great Falls as his dinner guest. Jordan was suspicious but accepted. About midnight he received an excited call that a plane had just landed and the Soviets were going to take off for Russia without waiting for Jordan's clearance. Jordan raced back to the airfield. Sure enough, the plane was a joker. In it were fifty black suitcases protected by armed Russian guards. Jordan ordered a GI to hold the guards at bay and shoot to kill if they forcibly interfered with his inspection.

Jordan later testified under oath before a congressional committee that he found each suitcase to contain a file of information about U.S. industry, harbors, troops, railroads, communications, and so forth. In one suitcase Jordan said he found a letter on White House stationery signed by Harry Hopkins and addressed to the number three man in the Russian hierarchy. Attached to the letter was a map of the top-secret Manhattan (atomic energy) Project, together with descriptive data dealing with atomic energy experiments! One folder in this suitcase had written on it, "From Hiss." At the time Jordan did not know who Hiss was. Inside the folder were numerous military documents. Another folder contained Department of State documents. Some of them were letters from the U.S. embassy in Moscow giving confidential evaluations of the Russian situation and detailed analytical impressions of Russian officials. Now they were being secretly shipped back for the Russians to read.

When Major Jordan reported the facts to Washington he was
severely criticized for holding up the plane!

In April, 1943, the Russian liaison officer told Jordan that a very special shipment of experimental chemicals was coming through. The Russian officer called Harry Hopkins in Washington and then turned the phone over to Jordan. Major Jordan reports that Harry Hopkins told him: "I don't want you to discuss this with anyone, and it is not to go on the records. Don't make a big production of it, but just send it through quietly, in a hurry."

The Russian officer later told Jordan the shipment was "bomb powder" and Jordan saw an entry in the officer's folder which said "Uranium." The shipment came through June 10, 1943. It was the first of several. At least 1,465 pounds of uranium salts are said to have been sent through to the Soviet Union. Metallurgists estimate that this could be reduced to 6.25 pounds of fissionable U-235. This is two pounds more than would be necessary to produce an atomic explosion. On July 24, 1945, at Potsdam, President Truman announced to Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin that the United States had finally developed a highly secret bomb. He told them this bomb possessed almost unbelievable explosive power. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes was watching Stalin and noted that he did not seem particularly surprised, or even interested in the announcement. Four years later (September 23, 1949), President Truman announced to the world that Russia had successfully exploded an atomic bomb -- years ahead of U.S. expectations! Some officials wondered why, with all the help they received, the Russians had not exploded one long before.

Historically, Russia has always been stronger in defense than in attack. During World War II the Russian people displayed an incredible will to resist during the days when even Hitler thought they were completely beaten. They suffered astronomical losses: 7 million dead (including 2.5 million Russian Jews exterminated by the Nazis and 1.5 million other Soviet civilians killed by the Germans), while approximately 3 million died in combat. From 3 to 4 million were taken prisoners but the number of wounded and maimed is not given. As a result of the war there was a destruction of 1,700 Russian towns, 70,000 villages and hamlets, 31,000 factories, 84,000 schools, 40,000 miles of track, in addition to the destruction of 7 million horses, 17 million head of cattle, and 20 million hogs. This represented about one-fourth of all Soviet property.

There is no way of knowing whether or not Stalin ever forced himself to acknowledge it, but this almost incomprehensible toll of monstrous destruction might very well have been avoided if Stalin had not made the insidious mistake of deliberately signing the pact with Hitler in 1939 which triggered the opening campaign of World War II. There are leading political authorities who now state that if Hitler had been forced to delay his campaign into Poland because of a threat from Russia, it would have given the Western Nations sufficient time to build up their forces, and by restoring a balance power in Europe the entire saga of World War II might have occurred.

During World War II the President of the United States received two different interpretations of Communist policy and two different recommendations as how best to deal with the Communist leaders. One group of advisers took the historical approach, accepted the Communists as the world revolutionists which they described themselves to be, and assumed that their past conduct was the safest criterion of how they might be expected to act in the future. A second group of advisers presented a much more idealistic view of the Communist leaders. They wanted people to forget the past; to look upon Communist boorishness as nothing more than political immaturity, something which could be changed by patient endurance and expansive generosity.

To this second group, there rapidly gravitated not only theoretical idealists, but men and women who were later found to be deeply involved in outright subversion against the United States government.
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Historians now find it difficult to define just where idealism left off and subversion took over. In any event this was the group which dominated the Lend-Lease program and set the stage for policies which controlled U.S. relations with Russia for approximately fifteen years.

This was also the group of presidential advisers who acclaimed with the greatest enthusiasm the slightest suggestion that the Communists were "changing." For example, when the Communist International was disbanded May 22, 1943, this group hailed the announcement as incontrovertible evidence that the Communist leaders had renounced world conquest. Others suspected that this was merely a propaganda device. The latter proved to be the case, as Igor Gouzenko, the former Russian code clerk, testified: "The announcement of the dissolution of the Comintern (Communist International) was probably the greatest farce of the Communists in recent years. Only the name was liquidated, with the object of reassuring public opinion in the democratic countries. Actually the Comintern exists and continues its work, because the Soviet leaders have never relinquished the idea of establishing a Communist dictatorship."
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When many high officials of the President's own party saw the dangerous direction in which U.S. policy was moving, they hastened to warn him. One interesting conversation took place during the war between the President and his good friend, William C. Bullitt, whom the President had sent to Russia as the first U.S. ambassador in 1933. Mr. Bullitt had just finished outlining to the President many of his personal experiences with Joseph Stalin, and had warned the President to keep up his guard when dealing with the Communist leaders.

"Bill," replied the President, "I don't dispute your facts; they are accurate. I don't dispute the logic of your reasoning. I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of a man. Harry (Hopkins) says he's not, and that he doesn't want anything but security for his country. And I think that if I give him everything that I can, and ask nothing from him in return ... he won't try to annex anything, and will work with me for a world peace and democracy."
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The philosophy reflected in this statement is the keynote to an understanding of the conferences held by the "Big Three" toward the close of the war. By that time the diplomatic strategy of the United States (which began with simple co-existence in 1933) had passed into its fourth phase -- the complete acceptance of the Russian Communists as full partners the plans for preserving future world peace.

During August and September 1944, the representatives of Britain, China, Russia and the United States, met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C. At this conference the constitutional foundation for the United Nations was laid. In it Russia was not only made a full partner, but a dominant stockholder. A most significant development was the fact that, while other nations objected, Russia insisted on the right to exercise the veto power even if she were a party to the dispute. This violated the very foundation of international jurisprudence but the democracies consented. They were ready to pay almost any price to get Russia to participate.