The Naked Communist (34 page)

Gradually Povl Bang-Jensen felt himself going down under the avalanche of opposition. When the U.N. officials could not force him to disclose the secret list of Hungarian witnesses, he was ordered to burn them in the presence of a U.N. representative. This he did. Then they fired him. Povl Bang-Jensen was discharged by Dag Hammarskjold on December 4, 1957. Nevertheless the U.N. pressure against Bang-Jensen as a mentally-ill person continued. Derogatory reports from the U.N. prevented him from securing several highly important positions.

For some time Bang-Jensen had also feared the possibility of physical harm. He had been a Danish underground fighter against the Nazis and Communists in World War II and was familiar with the technique of doing away with an enemy by making it look like a suicide. Therefore he wrote the following note to his wife on November 30, 1957:

"Under no circumstances whatsoever would I ever commit suicide. This would be contrary to my whole nature and to my religious convictions. If any note was found to the opposite effect in my handwriting, it would be a fake."

It was Thanksgiving Day, 1959, that the body of Povl Bang-Jensen was found in a secluded area two miles from his home with a bullet hole in his head. A pistol and scribbled note were by his side.

He had left home 72 hours earlier to catch a bus. The coroner found he had been dead only a few hours. What had happened during that tragic interval of two days or more while Bang-Jensen was still alive?

Professional investigators suspected murder. If so, it was carefully executed to look like suicide. And suicide was the final, official verdict. Many remained unconvinced.

But by this time the U.N. investigation of the Hungarian Revolution had long since been completed. The expurgated, distorted and watered down report had been turned over to the U.N. and officially accepted by the General Assembly.

Communism has only one fragile excuse for all the unparalleled brutality, cruelty and crimes against humanity which it commits. This is the Marx-Engels-Lenin promise that it is the historical shortcut to a better life for all mankind. But even Communists are men with minds that seek tangible evidence for the faith they live by. The most bitter reality in the Communist hierarchy is the fact that after 40 years of all-out effort, numerous five-year plans, the purging, executing, torturing and liquidation of millions of human beings, the Communist Motherland has still produced little more than a dull and monotonous existence.

A five-year analysis of Russian economics revealed the humiliating fact that less economic progress had been made under 40 years of Communism than under the last 40 years of the Tsars!
⁶

Although stealing technical knowledge from the West and kidnaping the scientists of vanquished foes has made it possible for the Communist leaders to make several spectacular crash exhibitions in the technical field, nevertheless the plain irrefutable fact remains that Russia just cannot compete with capitalism in massive production. This continues to be a nest of cockleburs in the craw of Communist leadership.

After 1955, when Americans were finally allowed to visit the Soviet Union, it was observed that the whole socialist production system sloppily squandered vast quantities of manpower. Often, for each man working, another stood idly looking on. Capitalistic work incentives had been introduced to create work motivation, but even so, monolithic socialized planning continued to hold back production schedules and production speed.

American tourists with eyes alert to such problems observed that Khrushchev was resorting to child labor to try to make up the difference. In fact, the Russian government admitted it was recruiting students from the schools to work for the farms and factories. Khrushchev announced his plan to limit most Russian youth to seven or eight years of schooling and said much of this would be at night. Only very select students would be allowed to go to college.
⁷

As for the collectivized farms, even with half of the entire Russian population working on socialized farms the USSR had not been able to do more than feed the people at a bare-subsistence level. The fact that the American system permits a mere 12% of the people to produce more than Americans can either eat or sell stuns the comprehension of Red farm experts like Khrushchev. And he has made no secret of his resentment. Every so often he lashes out at the sluggish Russian farm program. These are direct quotes from his 1955 speech denouncing Russian agriculture:

"Lag in production."

"Intolerable mismanagement."

"State farms fail to fulfill their plan for an increase."

"Hay fields remain unharvested."

"No silo buildings are being erected."

"Unfortunate situation has arisen with regard to seed."

"For six years work has been in progress on the design of a tractor ... and the tractor has not been designed."

"Machinery is not being used on many collectivized farms."

"There is considerable disorder on our state farms."

"Cases of damage (labor sabotage) to trucks and tractors."

"Absenteeism."

"Undernourished cattle delivered to the State."

"Serious shortcomings in pig breeding."

"Production of milk decreased 10 percent."

"Cows bearing calves amount to only 34 percent."

"Weight of fattened pigs and wool clippings decreased."

"Americans succeeded in achieving a high level of stock breeding."

"In the United States this crop (corn) gives the highest harvest yield."
⁸

This was the reason Khrushchev abandoned the last Five-Year-Plan and substituted a Seven-Year-Plan. The latest plan is supposed to equal U.S. production by 1965, but in 1961 Khrushchev roared out his anger at the Russian farmers. There had been a continuous slump in farm production for five years!
⁹

By 1958 Nikita Khrushchev had officially declared himself head of the Communist Party and the supreme dictator of all Russia. Nevertheless he had some cold, hard facts to face.

By that time the Red timetable of conquest was at a virtual standstill; the Iron Curtain was surrounded by NATO and SEATO defense bases with atomic warheads zeroed in to discourage Communist aggression.

Mao and Chou, the Red Chinese leaders, were becoming increasingly defiant, critical and independent.

It was taking more than six million soldiers and secret police to maintain the "state of siege" behind the Iron Curtain so as to give the appearance of "domestic tranquility."

Russia had worn out her good offices in the U.N. and was beginning to feel the united pressure of the Western Bloc.

There was continued unrest in the satellites and large Red Army garrisons had to be stationed in each of them since the local armies were likely to join any uprising just as they did in Hungary.

There was also serious unrest in the Red Army where deep resentment against Khrushchev's ruthless political decapitation of Marshal Zhukov still existed.

Khrushchev had been only partially successful in opening up the world market so that the Sino-Soviet Bloc could buy the things which its collectivized economy could not produce. He also faced the unpleasant fact that the Red economy was not in a position to pay for foreign trade because it was continually operating on the brink of bankruptcy.

Finally, and most important of all, Khrushchev lived under the constant threat of possible "regrouping" by disgruntled Red leaders to oust him from power the same way he had ousted Malenkov and Bulganin. Khrushchev felt a desperate need to boost his personal political status. He determined to achieve this by forcing the United States to honor him with an invitation to visit America.

Ever since 1955 Khrushchev had tried to get the United States to invite him to America, but failed. Finally he decided to accomplish it by creating a crisis over Berlin. In 1958 he issued an ultimatum that America and her allies must get out of West Berlin by a certain date or he would turn the Communist East Germans loose on them.

This demand was a flagrant violation of all existing treaties. When President Eisenhower announced that any efforts to force us out of Berlin would be met with military resistance, Khrushchev immediately said he didn't really want war and that he thought the whole thing could be worked out amicably if he just came to the United States and talked it over with the President. He also mentioned on several occasions that President Eisenhower would be welcome to visit Russia.

At first President Eisenhower demurred. Bringing the Communist dictator to the United States was precisely what Secretary Dulles had warned against right up to the time of his death. However, President Eisenhower felt that such a visit might impress Khrushchev with the power of the United States and deter him from hasty military action. Furthermore, the President felt much good might arise from a visit to Russia by the President of the United States. It would be in furtherance of his own program of "people to people" relations. Therefore an official invitation was extended to the Communist dictator -- making him the first Russian ruler ever to visit the United States.

American strategists on Communist problems immediately warned that a serious tactical error was being made. Several of them testified before Congressional Committees. Eugene Lyons, a senior editor of The Readers Digest, a biographer of Khrushchev and a former press correspondent in Russia, called the invitation to Khrushchev "a terrific victory for Communism." Then he continued:

"It amounts to a body blow to the morale of the resistance in the Communist world. It's a betrayal of the hopes of the enemies of Communism within that world, and their numbers can be counted by the hundred million.

"The announcement of the invitation was a day of gloom and despair for nearly the whole population of every satellite country and for tens of millions inside Russia itself."
¹⁰

When asked if Khrushchev's visit to the United States might cause him to slow down or abandon his plans for world conquest, Mr. Lyons replied:

"It's a childish fairy tale. The Communists in high places are perfectly well informed about our material prosperity and political freedom. Khrushchev is not coming here to confirm his knowledge of our strengths, but to feel out our weaknesses. The notion that he will be impressed by our wealth and liberty to the point of curbing Communist ambitions is political innocence carried to extremes....

"In the first place, the new Soviet boss, despite his homespun exterior, is one of the bloodiest tyrants extant. He has come to power over mountains of corpses. Those of us who roll out red carpets for him will soon have red faces."
¹¹

Even while Khrushchev was on his tour of the United States, Americans felt the icy thrust of numerous snarling threats which crept out between his propaganda boasts, his quaint platitudes and his offering to swear on the Bible. The press observed that he was supersensitive and hot tempered about questions on any of the following matters:

The ruthless and illegal suppression of the Hungarian revolt after all of Khrushchev's recent preachments about "self determination."

Questions about his role as the "Hangman of the Ukraine."

Questions about Soviet jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.

Questions about the continuous flight of thousands of refugees from satellite states.

The whole world-wide program of Communist aggression was swiftly accelerated as a result of Khrushchev's visit. The Communist Party in the United States came boldly out into the open. It began a new recruiting program. It openly attacked the House Committee on Un-American activities and marked the FBI for early dismantling if it succeeded in destroying the Congressional Committees. Convicted Communists from the Hollywood cells moved back into the cinema capital and boldly began writing, producing and propagandizing through multi-million dollar productions. The president of the Communist Party announced the launching of a nationwide Communist youth movement.

The same thrust became apparent all over the world -- in Japan, Southeast Asia, India, Africa, Cuba, Central and South America. Everywhere the Red tide ran stronger. The dire prediction of strategists like John Foster Dulles and Eugene Lyons had been literally fulfilled.

Nevertheless, the visit of the Russian Dictator to the United States also carried a certain penalty for Khrushchev. This was the devastating effect which could result from President Eisenhower's reciprocal visit to Russia. Khrushchev was deeply impressed with the acclaim which Vice President Nixon received when he visited Russia and the satellites. He knew that if President Eisenhower were granted the same freedom of expression on radio, TV, in public meetings and in press interviews that Khrushchev had enjoyed in the United States, the pro-Communist tide could be reversed, Desperately, Khrushchev looked around for some semblance of an excuse to cancel the Eisenhower visit. Almost as though the Communists had planned it, a monumental excuse dropped into Khrushchev's lap right out of the sky.