The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (22 page)

Before moving to its new and smarter premises at 3514 International Drive in the late 1970s, the Israeli Embassy in Washington,
DC
was located in a rather decrepit building on a ramshackle street of terraced houses at 22nd and R Street. There, in December 1969, Menachem Begin called on Ambassador Rabin to pay his respects and be briefed on the latest goings on in the American capital. Begin was visiting the United States on behalf of one of his pet causes: the Israel Bonds Organization, an operation headquartered in New York that was
–
and still is
–
dedicated to the sale of securities issued by the Israeli Government for the development of national infrastructure projects. It remains a hugely successful venture, boasting a multi-billion dollar portfolio of nationwide development programs.

Menachem Begin was still serving as a minister without portfolio in the national unity government, now headed by Golda Meir, and his visit to Washington coincided with media reports of a growing rift between the White House and the State Department. Indeed, the
Washington Post
asserted that very morning that President Nixon was worried that the squabbling between his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, and his secretary of state, William Rogers, was so impeding United States diplomacy that its consequences had serious repercussions for America’s relations with the Soviet Union, the still-raging war in Vietnam, and the deadlocked conflict in the Middle East. Begin wanted to learn what the ambassador thought about it.

“Extraordinary times,” said Rabin. “Yesterday, Bill Safire [who was then a presidential speechwriter before later rising to prominence as a
New York Times
columnist] told me off the record that Nixon had told him that he regretted the two men were not getting along. He quoted Nixon as saying, ‘Their quarrel is really deep-seated. Henry thinks William isn’t very deep and William thinks Henry is power-crazy.’ That’s what the president said.”

“And what did Safire have to say about that?” asked Begin lightly.

Rabin, in a communicative mood that afternoon, smiled. “Safire said they are both egomaniacs!”

Begin laughed, and said a tad teasingly, “It sounds a bit like what’s going on between you and the Foreign Ministry back home.”

Rabin’s face went amber. “Meaning?”

“Meaning, it is said in Jerusalem that you and Foreign Minister Abba Eban are hardly on speaking terms these days. Please don’t take offense. I simply report what I hear.”

“And I’m glad you have,” said Rabin earnestly. “As a cabinet minister you have to know the facts. The fact is that Nixon prefers that national leaders maintain maximum direct contact with one another without going through their foreign ministers
–
in other words a back channel. So, when Golda was here a short while back, he proposed to her that she pass her messages directly to him through Kissinger via me, and vice versa. Golda approved. So, if that suggests a lack of confidence in Rogers by Nixon and in Eban by Golda that’s hardly my fault, is it? The trouble is, I’m caught in the middle, and have to take the brunt of Eban’s umbrage.”

Begin was not surprised. Foreign Minister Eban had aired his complaints about Rabin to various cabinet members, Begin among them. He’d asserted that Rabin’s wayward diplomatic behavior showed that he had no real comprehension of his ambassadorial tasks. Rabin was under the misapprehension, so Eban carped, that the hierarchy which applied to the
idf
did not apply to the relations between his embassy and his ministry. This was evident in Rabin’s cables. Some were thoughtful and moderate, others intemperate and aggressive. They invariably targeted members of the Foreign Ministry staff, or Eban himself, or other ambassadors and, on occasion, even the Israel Government as a whole, not to speak of the Army Command which Rabin had so recently led. In short, he was acting more like a minister of government than an official of the Foreign Ministry.

But Begin had no intention of getting involved in that spat. He wanted to get to the core of things, so he asked about Rabin’s relations with President Nixon. “Rumor has it his door is open to you,” he said.

“That’s an exaggeration,” answered Rabin dryly. “The truth is that in the presidential elections last year I did indicate my preference for him, and he seems to have appreciated that.”

“Really? You, our ambassador, spoke out in support of Richard Nixon against [Democratic candidate] Hubert Humphrey?”

By the manner Begin posed the question it was clear he was being more inquisitive than disparaging, and the way Rabin answered suggested he was being more bold than discreet, for he replied scathingly: “Our sensitive souls at our Foreign Ministry may find distasteful the notion of an Israeli ambassador trying to set one presidential candidate against another on matters of vital importance to us. If that is what they think they understand nothing of the ways and means of American politics. It is not enough for an Israeli ambassador here to simply say ‘I’m pursuing my country’s best interests according to the book.’ It doesn’t work that way here in Washington. To promote our interests an Israeli ambassador has to take advantage of the rivalries between the Democrats and the Republicans. If he doesn’t do that he’s not doing his job. An Israeli ambassador who is either unwilling or unable to maneuver his way through the complex American political landscape to promote Israel’s strategic interests would do well to pack his bags and go home.”18

Begin let Rabin’s forceful remarks sink in, but made no comment. He respected Rabin, first and foremost because he was a veteran general, and the old Irgun commander had high esteem and a soft spot for veteran Israeli generals, whatever their politics. Indeed, there was no resentment in Begin’s mind when speaking to this old Palmachnik, who had once taken aim at the
Altalena
, with him on board
.
In fact, he greatly admired Rabin for being the soldier that he was, possessed of unbending intellectual honesty and forthrightness, so that when he spoke he conveyed authority and incisiveness. This was why Begin had no compunction now in saying to him rather cheekily, “People tell me Nixon’s an anti-Semite. Is that true?”

Rabin smiled, but the smile didn’t reach the eyes. “Confidentially,” he said, “I reckon he is. He doesn’t like the way Jews overwhelmingly vote Democrat, and he certainly doesn’t like the way liberal Jews are leading the anti-Vietnam War campaign against him. Moreover, he probably believes Jews control the press, and he suspects many of them are more loyal to Israel than to America. However, this hasn’t stopped him from appointing individual Jews to high places, like Henry Kissinger, based on their exceptional competence. I think he has high regard for our leaders, and admires our guts in defense of our national interests. Like now, for instance”
–
a grin was spreading across Rabin’s usually acerbic features
–
“he seems to have no objection to my clipping the wings of Secretary of State William Rogers.”

“And I hope you make a thorough job of it,” agreed Begin, his face showing his contempt for Rogers, whom he did not like one bit.

Prime Minister Golda Meir also had a huge bone to pick with Bill Rogers, as did the whole of the Israeli cabinet. Without a by-your-leave the man had announced a comprehensive peace initiative of his own which, at rock bottom, required Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 boundaries, with no binding Arab peace and security commitments in return. Instead, the Four Powers – the United States, Russia, Britain, and France – were to guarantee what Rogers called the establishment of a ‘state of peace.’ Note: not ‘peace’ plain and simple, but a nebulous something called a ‘state of peace.’

“Preposterous!” Golda had fumed upon learning of the idea. “A disaster for Israel,” she bristled. “Any Israeli government that would adopt such a plan would be betraying its country.” And Yitzhak Rabin in Washington and Menachem Begin in Jerusalem had, at Golda’s request, helped craft the cabinet statement of sharp protest, making plain Israel’s utter rejection of the Rogers Plan. It smacked of an imposed settlement
–
an American-Soviet connivance to be forced on Israel. In those days Jerusalem lived in constant fear of precisely that
–
that Israel would be the victim of a Big Power policy that would lead to an imposed settlement favorable to the Arabs.

Sitting now with Ambassador Rabin mulling over this matter, Begin said, “Did not Mrs. Meir send a sharp personal letter to President Nixon for you to deliver?”

“She certainly did.”

“And were you not authorized to launch an intensive public relations campaign against the Rogers Plan here in America?”

Leaning back in his chair, thumbs hitched in his belt, Yitzhak Rabin drew his lips into a tight smile, and said foxily. “Yes, I was. That’s what I’m talking about. And Yehuda here”
–
he meant me
–
“can show you the kind of material we’re distributing to a very select list of newsmen, congressmen, Jewish leaders, and other major opinion makers. We call it the Pink Sheet.”

I handed a pack of pink stenciled pages to Mr. Begin.

“Why pink?” asked Begin, flipping through the sheets.

“Because when we hit on the idea it was very late at night
–
no secretaries,” I explained. “And since I had to get it out very quickly, hand delivered, and since the only paper I could find in the stenciling room was pink, I used that.”

“And we’ve used it ever since,” added Rabin. “It gives it a distinctive look. A Pink Sheet is, in essence”
–
he was pointing to the pack in Begin’s hands
–
“an expanded version of my talking papers with senior administration officials. We’ve made sure the media and the other people who get it know that. They know these are my actual arguments, often my actual words
–
from the horse’s mouth, so to speak.”

Begin loved to read memos and reports, loved getting briefed, speed-reading voluminous paper work, so he glanced at the Pink Sheets with the air of a man who requires only to look at a paper to grasp its contents, and said, “Forthright language indeed!” He was particularly struck by a paragraph which, by coincidence, had been quoted word for word the day before in a New York Times editorial:

U.S. policy as it is now unfolding comes close to the advocacy and development of an imposed settlement. While this may not be deliberate, the mechanics and dynamics are moving in that direction. Israel will resist this. By addressing itself in detail to matters of substance, the U.S. proposals do more than undermine the principle of negotiation; they preempt its very prospect. If the United States has already determined what the “secure and recognized boundaries” are there is no point in Israel taking part in any negotiations with anybody at all. Why should the Arabs consent to give Israel more than what America is recommending publicly?

“That’s saying it exactly as it is,” commented Begin with approval. “But how is the State Department taking it, attacking them on their own turf?”

Rabin answered sardonically, “Oh, it’s touched off a firestorm of controversy all right. Rogers is raging. He says such public attacks in the host capital are unacceptable. Abba Eban has complained to Golda about my embassy issuing such high-powered stuff without his approval. And Joe Sisco, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, has whispered in my ear that Yehuda here might have to be declared persona non grata for writing such stuff.”

While there was more tease than truth in Rabin’s tone, I hardly found it amusing.

“And yet, with it all, you seem to be so relaxed about the furor,” said Begin. “Why so?”

The ambassador’s reply was preempted by a gentle knock on the door, and a secretary quietly entered with a tray of two steaming cups of coffee and a glass of lemon tea. The tea she handed to Begin, who took it with a grateful “Thank you.” He placed a cube of sugar under his tongue, and repeated his question, “Why so?”

Rabin lit a cigarette and said, “Because Rogers presides over a State Department which Nixon and Kissinger have come to thoroughly distrust. You are a member of the cabinet, Mr. Begin, and you have a reputation of trustworthiness and discretion.”

“I try. I try,” said Begin demurely.

“Then I shall share with you in confidence how thorough the breakdown is.” He unlocked a desk drawer and, rifling through some papers, extracted a brown envelope from which he took out a single sheet.

“This is a snippet of an exchange between Kissinger and Rogers a few days ago,” he said. “It took place the day after a meeting I had with Kissinger. It speaks for itself. Please don’t ask me how I got hold of it.”

Peering over Begin’s shoulder I read what he was reading:

Rogers:
The meeting you had last night with Rabin screwed it up badly.

Kissinger:
Don’t be ridiculous.

Rogers:
I’m not being ridiculous.

Kissinger (shouting):
You are being absurd. If you have any complaint, talk to the president. I’m sick and tired of this.

Rogers:
You and I don’t see eye-to-eye on these things. The Israelis have the impression that they have two channels to the president, and they exploit them differently.

Kissinger:
There is no separate channel.

Rogers:
Why do you think they go to you?

Kissinger:
To try to end-run you and to get the president to overrule you.

Rogers:
That’s right!

Kissinger:
But that has never happened.

Rogers:
But why give them the impression that it might? I don’t think you should see those people.
19

Begin handed back the page, and with a twinkle in the eye, said, “How enlightening! I take it that Dr. Kissinger is here telling a
–
how did Churchill define a lie in Parliament?
–
a ‘terminological inexactitude.’ Tell me, how big a terminological inexactitude is Kissinger’s assertion that there is no separate channel to the president?”

“This big,” answered Rabin with a smile as wide as his outstretched arms. And then, “If I seem relaxed about our public relations campaign against Rogers it’s because I have the blessings of the highest echelons.”

“And how high are the highest echelons?”

“Nixon and Kissinger in person!”