The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (34 page)

There are times when heads of states stumble into the theater of the absurd, and when gestures intended to be acts of higher diplomacy turn into riotous burlesque worthy of the Marx Brothers. This was the case with that telephone call:

President Ford:
Hello. President Sadat?

President Sadat:
Hello. This is President Sadat.

President Ford:
How are you this morning? I wanted to call you and congratulate you on the great role that you played in the negotiations that have culminated in this agreement.

President Sadat:
Hello? [Inaudible]

President Ford:
Unfortunately, I don’t hear you too well, Mr. President. I hope that my conversation is coming through more clearly. Let me express most emphatically on behalf of my Government the appreciation for your statesmanship, despite adversity and some criticism, the spirit in which you have approached the need for an agreement. I am most grateful for the leadership that you have given, and look forward to continuing the work with you…

President Sadat:
Hello?

President Ford:
Hello. Can you hear me, Mr. President?

President Sadat:
Hello?

President Ford:
I am asking, can you hear me, Mr. President?

President Sadat:
This is President Sadat.

President Ford:
I am asking, can you hear me, Mr. President?

President Sadat:
Not very well.

President Ford:
I know that you and I recognize that stagnation and stalemate in the Middle East would have been potentially disastrous, and your leadership in working with Secretary Kissinger and with the Israelis
–
all of us are most grateful for. And as we continue to work together, personally, as well as government-to-government…

President Sadat:
Hello? This is President Sadat speaking.

President Ford:
Yes, I can hear you, Mr. President. I hope you can hear me, Mr. President.

President Sadat:
President Ford? Hello.

President Ford:
I don’t hear you too well, Mr. President.

President Sadat:
Is that President Ford speaking?

President Ford:
Yes, this is President Ford.

President Sadat:
Go ahead, please.

President Ford:
The connection, unfortunately, is not too good for me to hear your comments, Mr. President. Let me say, if I might, despite the difficulties, that Mrs. Ford and I hope that Mrs. Sadat and you and your children will visit the United States sometime this fall. Secretary Kissinger has told me of the very warm hospitality that you have extended to him and Mrs. Kissinger, and we look forward to reciprocating when you come to the United States in the fall of 1975.

President Sadat:
Hello?

President Ford:
I regret that I can’t hear you. The connection is very bad. I hope you can hear me and my comments from the United States. Mr. President, I understand that Secretary Kissinger is coming to Alexandria to personally deliver the documents for your initialing, and I have asked Henry to extend to you on that occasion the gratitude…

President Sadat:
Hello?

President Ford:
Hello, Mr. President.

President Sadat:
Hello, Mr. President.

President Ford:
I can hear you better now.

President Sadat:
Mr. President, I hope you and your family are well.

President Ford:
I am feeling very well, Mr. President, and I hope you are, too.

President Sadat:
I want to thank you for your personal message [Inaudible].

President Ford:
I, unfortunately, could not hear as well as I would like the last comments you made. The connection from here is not, apparently, as good as I hope you have there, but…

President Sadat:
I hear you quite well.

President Ford:
The efforts of Secretary Kissinger and myself, we feel, were completely worth what we have done, but our efforts could not have been successful without your leadership and statesmanship.

President Sadat:
Thank you, Mr. President, very much.

President Ford:
We will see you soon, I hope.

President Sadat:
We are looking forward to coming, with pleasure, and convey my good wishes to your family.

President Ford:
And my best to yours, sir.

President Sadat:
Thank you very much.

President Ford:
I would just wish to add…

President Sadat:
Hello?

President Ford:
Hello? [Inaudible].

President Sadat:
Hello! Hello!

With that the line went dead.
43

The prime minister’s room in the Knesset had two seating areas, one around a large desk and the other around a couch, both of which were a rather drab brown but toned well, nevertheless, with the chestnut-colored curtains and carpet. As was his practice when wanting to engage a visitor in personal conversation, it was toward the couch that the prime minister guided the leader of the opposition in the early afternoon of 2 September 1975. Rabin wished to explain to Begin what had transpired between February and March of that year, when he had withstood American pressure to conclude an interim agreement with Egypt, and the previous day, when he had signed one.

In contrast to Begin’s immaculate self, Rabin looked awful. Lighting a cigarette, he dragged on it as though sucking in oxygen, his whole body bearing the signs of the strain and the anxieties of the past months. His eyes were puffy and his shoulders stooped; he was exhausted from the late-night negotiation sessions that had culminated in his initialing the agreement in the presence of an elated Kissinger.

“I wanted this meeting so that I could explain to you, as leader of the opposition, the essence of what we’ve just signed,” Rabin began.

“Mr. Prime Minister,” responded Begin in formal fashion, “I fully appreciate your gesture. However, I have already been shown the contents of the document, so I don’t think there is much to explain. What I do know is that in February you categorically told us that you would not hand over any of the Sinai assets
–
the oilfields, the passes, the early
warning
stations
–
let alone commit yourself to a deep withdrawal, unless the Egyptians responded with a commitment to end the state of war. In March you told us that an Egyptian commitment to ‘the non-use of force’ was meaningless verbiage. Now, here we are, a few months later, and you have turned the whole thing on its head, as if our public is mindless.”

Wearily, Rabin said. “I have not turned the whole thing on its head. Events have moved on since March. We have now negotiated a new and improved situation, enabling us to reach an understanding.”

“But with all respect, Mr. Prime Minister, you cannot expect our people to believe that what you signed yesterday changes the fabric of our relations with Egypt today. From March onward, when you refused to bow to the Egyptian dictates and to American pressure
–
and you won our total support for that…”

“Indeed I did.”

“…Kissinger constantly stepped up the heat through his so-called ‘reassessment’ policy and his grim prophecies, not one of which materialized, until you finally capitulated, and you signed.”

Genuinely upset, Rabin sat up, and in a firm and tight voice, snapped, “Mr. Begin, that is preposterous. I did not capitulate. My government entered into this improved interim accord of its own volition because it holds out the promise of a new strategic situation in our relations with Egypt, and a new threshold of support from America. The alternative”
–
this with derision
–
“is the renewal of the Geneva peace conference.”

The Geneva peace conference was the official negotiation framework established by the United Nations after the Yom Kippur War, headed jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union. It met only once in the immediate aftermath of the war, and had since become defunct.

“Let them convene Geneva,” huffed Begin. “We have nothing to fear from Geneva. The Arab representatives will make their case and we shall make ours. It will be an excellent international platform to broadcast to the whole world the justice of our cause.”

“On the contrary, we will be totally isolated,” retorted Rabin. “The whole world will line up to pressure us to return to the old sixty-seven lines. This partial settlement with Egypt gives us a chance to tempt Sadat away from the military option and adopt a political one, backed by the United States. He will do so if he concludes it’s worth his while.”

Begin sneered, “That’s an illusion.”

“I don’t think so,” said Rabin, and he began to navigate his way into the underlying concept which he wanted to put across to his visitor:

“Egypt is the largest and most powerful of all the Arab states. In population it is almost half of the Arab world. It is the leader of the Arab world. No war has ever been launched against us which has not been initiated by Egypt, and then the other Arab states followed. And no war has ever ended without Egypt being the first to pull out and then the others followed. This Sinai interim arrangement is a first step in the effort toward taking Egypt out of the alliance of violence against us.”

Begin threw Rabin a skeptical look: “Many of us don’t see it that way, Mr. Prime Minister. We see it as an unacceptable gamble.”

Continuing his conceptualization, Rabin postulated: “Security is not merely a matter of territory, as you know full well. Given our willingness to withdraw to a new defensive line deep inside Sinai, Sadat is now being given, for the first time, genuine motivation to reopen the Suez Canal [closed since the 1967 Six-Day War], and to rebuild his cities along its banks [destroyed in the 1969–1970 War of Attrition]. That, in itself, grants us substantial added security. Also, the return of the Sinai oilfields gives Sadat yet another good reason to maintain his side of the bargain. In other words, the agreement is largely self-policing. And on a broader strategic level it gives Egypt an added impetus to totally move out of the Soviet orbit and into the Western one. Moreover, it widens the rift between Egypt and Syria, putting an end to the most dangerous regional alliance against us
–
the Cairo-Damascus axis.”

Begin, his face hard and somber, remained unconvinced. “Speak to the man in the street,” he said brusquely. “He’s no fool. He feels he’s being led down the garden path. You promise him a step toward peace and all he sees are the fruits of victory being frittered away under his very nose. He senses an inherent contradiction between your orders to the
IDF
to carry out a most significant withdrawal in Sinai, and Sadat’s orders to maintain the state of war. He feels that not an inch of territory should be returned to Egypt except in return for a full contractual peace.”

Rabin took his time responding, as if weighing the merits of what his visitor had just said. Eventually, he demurred, “We have to put this agreement to the test of time. Time will tell, Mr. Begin.”

Begin bridled: “Time to enable the Egyptians to repeat what they did after our last withdrawal in August nineteen seventy, when they brazenly violated the ceasefire by rushing their
SAM
missiles into the area we had just evacuated, and for which we soon paid a terrible price in the Yom Kippur War, just as I had predicted. And now here we are again making the same mistake. By your abandoning the Mitla and the Gidi Passes, in a total reversal of your original stance, you are practically inviting the Egyptians to duplicate their deceptions.”

“We are not abandoning the passes,” retorted Rabin, irked to the core.

“You decidedly are, Mr. Prime Minister. According to the map attached to the documents shown to me, you are certainly moving out of the passes.”

“Yes, but we are retaining total control of them,” countered Rabin, with unyielding earnestness. “We shall continue to encircle them and dominate them from the eastern ridges. Any Egyptian tank which tries to enter those passes from the western side will be a sitting duck. Besides, there will be American monitors in the passes. Study the map again, please.”

Begin grunted a “bah,” and shifted his line of argument:

“Few things are more important in diplomacy than credibility, and your government has lost its credibility. Your government has caved in on some of the most vital issues on which you initially refused to budge. So now everybody knows that when Israel says no to a specific demand, all one has to do is to exert pressure and we shall change our minds. In these last few months the Arabs have learned a lesson or two about how to negotiate with Israel.”

Rabin knew Begin enough to know he was not simply playing party politics. He knew he was genuinely troubled. So he said to him in a placatory fashion, “Let me share with you my strategic philosophy. It might help you to understand why I see hope in this agreement. I see hope in this agreement because it contains the three fundamental elements essential for peacemaking. One: it deepens the disengagement between our opposing forces. Two: it strengthens the element of diffusion. And three: it holds out the prospect of fortifying trust. If we are ever going to move toward peace with any of our neighbors it will be by these three steps: disengagement, diffusion, and trust. Only when we have trust can we conduct a genuine face-to-face negotiation. This is what I believe. And I believe in one thing more besides.”

He took a letter from his pocket, and said, “I believe, wherever possible, we have to synchronize our best interests with those of America. And I believe that to advance peace, America must keep us militarily strong. This new agreement cements our ties with Washington in both senses. It places the U.S.-Israel relationship on an entirely new footing. Please read this letter. It is from President Ford. It was delivered to me last night after the initialing.”

Mr. Begin took the letter, adjusted his glasses, and read:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister
–
The Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement entailing withdrawal from vital areas in the Sinai constitutes an act of great significance on Israel’s part in the pursuit of final peace and imposes additional heavy military and economic burdens on Israel.

It is my resolve to continue to maintain Israel’s defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the
F
-16 aircraft…enter into a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing Ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response…submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel’s economic and military needs…Should the U.S. desire in the future to put forward proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.

Asked for the precise meaning of these last words, Rabin explained that they were meant to remove once and for all the ever-hovering fear of a Great Power–imposed settlement on Israel.

And then Begin read the final paragraph:

The U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will give great weight to Israel’s position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights.
44

“Well, that
is
interesting,” he said. “It’s hardly a binding commitment to support our retention of the Golan Heights, but it’s important nevertheless. And what, pray, was Kissinger’s role in the composition of this letter?”

“We negotiated every word through him. Without these new presidential commitments I would never have signed the agreement.”

Menachem Begin sank deeper into the sofa, clasped his hands around one knee, and in a collegial fashion, asked, “I’ve never asked you this before, but what do you make of Kissinger? You’ve known him a long time. That last paragraph on final borders and the Golan Heights for example
–
has he ever spoken to you about what he thinks our final borders should be?”

Rabin could not contain a wry smile as he answered, “One day on my last visit to Washington I asked him about that point blank. I said, ‘Henry, we’ve known each other for years and have had hundreds of conversations on every subject under the sun. Yet I have never heard you express your opinion on what Israel’s final borders ought to be. Now that we’re here alone, all by ourselves, tell me, what is your view?’”

“And his answer?”

“He raised both arms as if to say, ‘Please don’t shoot me,’ and said, ‘Yitzhak, you’ve never heard me talk about your final borders and you never will. Moreover, I pray that when the time comes to decide on those final borders I shall no longer be secretary of state.’”

“Very witty,” said Begin, not at all amused. “What conclusions have you drawn about the man after all he’s said and done over these past months?”

“Oh, he’s a complicated Jew all right. He’s full of contradictions when it comes to us. Need I tell you, he’s a virtuoso at negotiations. Not only can he be tough, he can also be dangerous, as we saw when the negotiations collapsed.”

“Is he duplicitous?”

“I would say he has a Metternich system of telling only half the truth when it suits him. He doesn’t lie. He would lose all credibility if he lied. He simply emphasizes different shadings to different listeners. It’s a negotiation technique.”

“A chameleon, eh?”

“That’s one way of putting it. Although I have to say I believe that underneath it all he cares deeply about us. And you should know”
–
this with a sudden bite that sharpened to anger
–
“he was devastated by the vicious attacks on his Jewishness at the demonstrations mounted against him by
Gush Emunim
.”

Rabin was referring to a series of mass anti-Kissinger demonstrations organized by the religious nationalist settlement group called
Gush Emunim
–
the Bloc of the Faithful
–
that had taken place in front of the King David Hotel and outside the Knesset when Kissinger was in Israel. Placards had read
JEW BOY GO HOME
,
JEW TRAITOR
, and
HITLER SPARED YOU SO YOU COULD FINISH OFF THE JOB
.

“I call that unadulterated Jewish anti-Semitism in the heart of the Jewish State,” seethed Rabin. “These self-styled religious chauvinists are ruining the chances of peace. Countless times I have argued that we Jews should not assert our right to settle in the West Bank, with the exception of areas vital to our security.”
45

“The whole of what you call the West Bank and what I call by its original biblical names, Yehuda and Shomron,” said Begin indignantly, “is vital to our security.”

“I beg to differ,” answered Rabin icily. “The planting of Jewish settlements in regions densely populated by Arabs is a prescription for violence. We Jews have to make a choice between remaining a Jewish and democratic state or retaining control of the whole of Eretz Yisrael. We can’t have both. The two are a contradiction in terms.”