The Riverman: Ted Bundy and I Hunt for the Green River Killer (20 page)

On the other side of the child-killer’s mask was evidence of his need for total possession of his victims by engaging in postmortem activities with them. He had a sex drive that embraced necrophilic tendencies and a willingness to spend considerable time with victims after death. Even though direct evidence of sexual assault was not confirmed for most victims, it was expressed through the killer’s signature: leaving the nude or partially clad males in a sexually degrading manner. He also partially redressed previously nude victims and disposed of their bodies in obviously posed positions at preselected locations, as if he’d rehearsed this before the killing.

The killer’s arranging of various victims in contorted or sexually degrading positions or leaving them in open places so they would certainly be discovered was a form of death ritual as well as a message. He revealed that he was treating the police as enemies and demonstrated with his victims’ bodies that he not only exercised absolute control over the corpses, but over the police as well. The police were completely unable to catch him even though he was leaving the bodies in plain view and in posed positions that said to investigators, “I am a murder victim.” The police looked more and more inept to the public as the search intensified, reinforcing the killer’s mentality with feelings of extreme superiority even as the hunted fugitive that he knew he was. He wanted the police to feel, psychologically, as he really did, helpless and controlled.

We also knew the killer was very aware of his environment, sensitive to the nature of the police pursuit, and clever enough to modify his patterns the moment he knew people were on to him. His changing of victim dump sites from mainly land surfaces to rivers, for example, was a response to the publicity his crimes had received. In so changing these styles, he revealed his media awareness and his ability to monitor the progress of the investigation through public sources. How the police tracked him, mainly with the remains examined for similar fibers and hairs, was very important to him. Leaving partially nude or nude bodies in a river diminished the chances for finding that crucial microscopic trace of physical evidence that could be linked back to him. There was no question that the Atlanta Child Killer was well-versed in police procedures. Having police-science knowledge was part of his survival
technique of acting only when there was least possibility of detection. He didn’t want to get caught—ever.

The killer’s predilection for postmortem engagement with his victims should have led investigators to check out those individuals who had been employed at—no matter how briefly—or were applicants for positions at funeral homes or medical examiners’ offices. Previously convicted multiple murderers had expressed their interest in morbidity by applying for jobs in police departments and in the death services area. Killers like Ted Bundy and Kenneth Bianchi worked at crisis clinics and applied for sheriff’s officer positions, respectively. Bundy, at one point in our interviews, reflected on his fascination with decomposing bodies.

The distance from where victims were last seen to the location of their body recovery ranged from a few blocks to over 15 miles. That feature could mean only that the killer had access to reliable private transportation. Each of the respective multiple murderers whom we had investigated had had several vehicles that were available to transport their victims to secluded areas. Also, each had driven hundreds of miles pursuing potential victims and checking out prospective dump sites.

The profile of the killer as a black male in his mid-twenties, with a record of intermittent employment around elementary schools, interest in medical examiner functions, obsession with necrophilia, traffic with boy prostitutes, a role model for young boys, and constantly driving around Atlanta in pursuit of potential victims was a characterization that the task force brass must have wanted to believe. The pressure was so intense to link the murders to some white racist conspiracy or to the occult that the black lust-killer theory was not emphasized publicly.

The white racist conspiracy and occult responsibility were poor theories to promote. For one thing, there were none of the typical indicators or paraphernalia, such written messages claiming responsibility or symbolic references such as “666” or “KKK” carved in a tree or discovered at any crime scene. In addition, only one of the victims had been shot, but more gunshot-type murders, which were characteristic of previous murders by members of extremist groups, would have been expected.

It was proposed by the Atlanta task force command that supporting the white racist theory through the media would make the killer think that the police were far from his tracks. We didn’t think that was a good idea because the killer already knew that they had linked cases through fiber identification. Besides that, previous attempts made by law enforcement to play games with a serial killer through the news media had failed miserably. The main reason that those strategies were not effective was that the killer was the only person who knew all the facts of the murders. Any attempt to deceive the killer by portraying distorted facts or attempting to lure the killer to a particular location through a remorseful appeal served only to alert the killer to how close the investigation really was to catching him—about as close as the planet Pluto is to Earth.

The second strategy suggested by the Atlanta staff was already in place, and they were hoping that this effort would be endorsed by the consultants and would ultimately be productive. Several days prior to our consultation, they had set out to conduct surveillance of bridges that crossed the South and Chattahoochee rivers. This rationale was sound because at least six of the last seven victims had been dumped in one of the two rivers and there was no reason to believe that the next or a subsequent murder victim would not be dumped into one of those two rivers. For the last two days, nagging doubts surfaced among our group of consultants about whether the task force had given us any meaningful criteria upon which to base our suggestions for apprehending the killer. At the very least, I doubted the Atlanta staff’s ability to relate the features of their series of murders that were important for our assessment. But their idea to stake out bridges was outstanding and a stroke of brilliance. We wholeheartedly endorsed their proactive effort to catch the killer, even though it meant using manpower in an area that took away from other parts of the investigation, such as following up leads, checking sources, and interviewing potential witnesses.

The task force had planned to watch 11 bridges that crossed the two rivers. It was a very labor-intensive proposition, taking at least five officers
to watch one bridge—two on each end and one near the water where he could hear the splash. That meant the equivalent of at least 55 full-time officers had to be on duty 24 hours a day. At the rate of re-lieving them every eight hours, it required 165 surveillance officers, a crew larger than 95 percent of the police departments in Washington State. What an expensive proposition to continue through the summer months while there were still routine traffic patrols and anticrime details that had to be staffed. But we all thought it would be worth it.

Some of the bridges were very long, so it was necessary to station someone underneath, near the water, to detect the splash of a body. If a vehicle stopped in the middle of a bridge, the surveillance crews on either side might not see it, so they had to be alerted by the splash detectors below. There was an elaborate notification procedure set up so that when a splash was heard, responding officers would quickly place large nets across the river in an effort to snag the body that would presumably come floating by. The officer under the bridge would notify the crews on top and the bridge would be barricaded and catch the Atlanta “riverman” in the act. The Atlanta task force staff members really appreciated our assistance and advice. We were confident the bridge stakeout would work.

At about 10:30
A.M.
on our last day in Atlanta, May 22, 1981, we were putting the finishing touches on our Child Killer profile when a messenger entered the room. It was a time that the entire city of Atlanta would never forget. Lee Brown and the others politely excused themselves for about an hour. When they returned, nothing was said about their abbreviated absence. Looks of frustration, nervousness, and stress lined their faces. Brown was especially apprehensive and remarked only that something critical to the murder series had occurred and he would inform each one of us, personally, what it was at a later date. He never did. He presented us with Atlanta City Police Department commemorative coins and paperweights, and thanked us by saying that the serial murder consultation process was the most valuable part of their investigations. With that we left Atlanta.

My pen was flying across my yellow legal-size pad on the airplane flight home. Our one-hour presentation of the Atlanta Child Killer’s profile and discussion about staking out the bridges left me with a very shallow feeling; I felt as though the consultation process was very superficial. I was concerned about what I saw and heard during the presentations and felt that I had to make written
recommendations to the task force, so I composed a letter to Commissioner Lee Brown. First of all, I didn’t get the impression that there were any homicide detectives in the room from the Atlanta task force, except for Sergeant Bolton, who was very quiet the entire session. I knew that police administrators were highly effective at summative evaluation—Monday-morning quarterbacking—and less effective at formative evaluation. I just felt that experienced investigators needed to be involved in the planning process of in-progress investigations. Murder cases cannot be run from above.

Another concern of mine was the reclassification of deaths that were originally declared accidents or suicides to homicides after the series became known. I didn’t get the feeling that investigators drained all the information about those deaths from the various medical examiners on the cases. One reason this might have happened was that some of the investigators had perhaps not been properly schooled in all aspects of death recognition and investigation. I felt strange recommending homicide investigation training for investigators in the middle of an intense investigation, but the probability that more bodies would be discovered was high. And the correct interpretation of each death scene was crucial. For those deaths that were incorrectly classified during their series, valuable evidence that might have been directly linked to the killer was not gathered.

I believe that death scenes tell stories. It’s the only way victims can relate to the investigator what happened to them, and, more important, who assaulted them. It somewhat disturbed me to hear Chief Redding comment about finding only dump sites and no crime scenes, therefore leaving the impression that crime scene processing was not as thorough as if they had discovered the real murder scene. I believe the dump site is a crime scene. It must be processed with equal thoroughness. I was concerned that his apparent attitude could quickly spread to the evidence searchers: it’s only a dump site; therefore, you’re not going to find anything—so why look?

There were two children, Eric Middlebrooks and Patrick Rogers, who died from head injuries. There was no mention of other trauma or defense wounds on them, wounds they might have received while trying to defend themselves against blows with blunt instruments or knives. The greatest chance to find other wounds existed in the Middlebrooks case because the Rogers corpse was discovered in a more advanced stage of decomposition. The presenters
didn’t give any information about the existence of other wounds. Had the medical examiner found any wounds or, in fact, even looked for them? Had the homicide investigator asked about them? I was worried about eliminating the possibility of child abuse in the Middlebrooks case because he was fresh when found and his body bore fibers similar to the ones found in other cases. I would hope those fibers were not generic to everyone’s surroundings. A complete investigation into the Middlebrooks murder was necessary to rule out fibers from his home.

The strangulation cases were intriguing me. Most of the quickly discovered victims had an evenly defined, unobstructed line of strangulation around their necks. Clearly, there were no interruptions of fingernail-type bruising on the neck from someone struggling to prevent the strangulation. The strangulation mark was a straight line and not in the pattern of the inverted V mark that would be indicative of a hanging motion.

The victims must have been taken totally by surprise or in a state in which they were almost ignorant that their murder was about to occur. The presenters offered no information about a blood scan for drugs or alcohol in each victim’s system that might have affected their alertness. I would reinquire about the presence of drugs in their systems.

In addition, the presenters did not tell us whether the strangulation caused a fracture of the hyoid cartilage. The presence of the fracture would indicate a more forceful application of pressure than if the assailant only cut off the blood flow to the brain. The clean appearance of the line of strangulation meant that the killer used a cord or rope. Therefore, the width of the line needed to be compared from one case to another. There was a good chance that the killer might still have the strangulation device in his possession. When the killer was finally apprehended, this might be the single piece of evidence the police would need to begin the long process of getting him to confess.

My report to Commissioner Brown ended with a recommendation that, when all else failed, they use their computer in much the same way that we did in the Ted Bundy cases. They could create lists of names from the investigations of each victim by dividing the names of persons mentioned in their files into categories such as family members, persons interviewed, suspects investigated, employees of businesses frequented by victims, vendors, volunteers
and teachers at schools, suspects with driver’s licenses, those people who were field-interviewed at crime scenes and disappearance sites, and so forth. Then they could see if one name appeared on more than one list.