The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (18 page)

4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding

CIA Headquarters approved requests to use water dousing, nudity, the abdominal slap, and dietary manipulation, despite the fact that the techniques had not been reviewed by the Department of Justice.
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Interrogators used the water dousing technique in various ways. At DETENTION SITE COBALT, detainees were often held down, naked, on a tarp on the floor, with the tarp pulled up around them to form a makeshift tub, while cold or refrigerated water was poured on them.
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Others were hosed down repeatedly while they were shackled naked, in the standing sleep deprivation position. These same detainees were subsequently placed in rooms with temperatures ranging from 59 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.
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Other accounts suggest detainees were water doused while placed on a waterboard.
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Although CIA Headquarters approved the use of the “water dousing” interrogation technique on several detainees, interrogators used it extensively on a number of detainees without seeking or obtaining prior authorization from CIA Headquarters.
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In interrogation sessions on April 5, 2003, and April 6, 2003, senior CIA interrogator
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and another interrogator used the water dousing technique on detainee Mustafa al-Hawsawi at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Hawsawi later described the session to a different CIA interrogator,
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, who wrote that al-Hawsawi might have been waterboarded or subjected to treatment that “could be indistinguishable from the waterboard.”
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An email from the interrogator stated that:

“We did not prompt al-Hawsawi - he described the process and the table on his own. As you know, I have serious reservations about watering them in a prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board.

“I have real problems with putting one of them on the water board for ‘dousing.’ Putting him in a head down attitude and pouring water around his chest and face is just too close to the water board, and if it is continued may lead to problems for us.”
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Several months later, the incident was referred to the CIA inspector general for investigation. A December 6, 2006, inspector general report summarized the findings of this investigation, indicating that water was poured on al-Hawsawi while he was lying on the floor in a prone position, which, in the opinion of at least one CIA interrogator quoted in the report, “can easily approximate waterboarding.”
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The OIG could not corroborate whether al-Hawsawi was strapped to the waterboard when he was interrogated at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Both of the interrogators who subjected al-Hawsawi to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on April 6, 2003, said that al-Hawsawi cried out for God while the water was being poured on him and one of the interrogators asserted that this was because of the cold temperature of the water. Both of the interrogators also stated that al-Hawsawi saw the waterboard and that its purpose was made clear to him. The inspector general report also indicates that al-Hawsawi’s experience reflected “the way water dousing was done at [DETENTION SITE COBALT],” and that this method was developed with guidance from CIA CTC attorneys and the CIA’s Office of Medical Services.
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During the same time that al-Hawsawi claimed he was placed on the waterboard in April 2003, a CIA linguist claimed that CIA detainee Abu Hazim had also been water doused in a way that approximated waterboarding.
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███████████, a linguist in Country ████████ from ██████, 2003, until ██████, 2003, told the OIG that:

“when water dousing was used on Abu Hazim, a cloth covered Abu Hazim’s face, and [████████ [CIA OFFICER 1]] poured cold water directly on Abu Hazim’s face to disrupt his breathing. [The linguist] said that when Abu Hazim turned blue, Physician’s Assistant [████████] removed the cloth so that Abu Hazim could breathe.”
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This allegation was reported to the CIA inspector general on August 18, 2004. The CIA reported this incident as a possible criminal violation on September 10, 2004, to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of Virginia.
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The inspector general report concluded that there was no corroboration of the linguist’s allegation, stating, “[t]here is no evidence that a cloth was placed over Abu Hazim’s face during water dousing or that his breathing was impaired.”
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5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

In the summer of 2003, the CIA captured three Southeast Asian operatives: Zubair,
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Lillie,
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and Hambali. (These captures are discussed later in this summary in the section entitled, “The Capture of Hambali.”)
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In August 2003, Hambali was captured and transferred to CIA custody.
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Despite assessments that Hambali was cooperative in the interview process without “the use of more intrusive standard interrogation procedures much less the enhanced measures,” CIA interrogators requested and obtained approval to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Hambali approximately a month after his transfer to CIA custody.
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In late 2003, Hambali recanted most of the significant information he had provided to interrogators during the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, recantations CIA officers assessed to be credible.
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According to a CIA cable:

“he had provided the false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself . . . and to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed the questioners wanted to hear.”
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CIA officers later suggested that the misleading answers and resistance to interrogation that CIA interrogators cited in their requests to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, Lillie, may not have been resistance to interrogation, but rather the result of issues related to culture and their poor English language skills.
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6. After the Use of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Detention of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and Held for An Additional Four Years

In October 2003, the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan national in his mid-fifties who was believed to have assisted Usama bin Laden in his escape through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001.
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After 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being “visibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family.” According to CIA cables, Arsala Khan “stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding them to the dogs.”
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Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep.
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Two days later, however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to 21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques “[d]ue to lack of information from [Arsala Khan] pinning him directly to a recent activity.
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Three days after the reporting about Khan’s hallucinations, and after the interrogators had already subjected Khan to the additional 21 hours of standing sleep deprivation (beyond the initial 56 hours), CIA Headquarters sent a cable stating that RDG and the Office of Medical Services believed that Arsala Khan should not be subjected to additional standing sleep deprivation beyond the 56 hours because of his hallucinations.
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After approximately a month of detention and the extensive use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Arsala Khan, the CIA concluded that the “detainee Arsala Khan does not appear to be the subject involved in . . . current plans or activities against U.S. personnel or facilities,” and recommended that he be released to his village with a cash payment.
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CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT instead transferred him to U.S. military custody, where he was held for an additional four years despite the development of significant intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan had aided Usama bin Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan’s family.
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7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports “Unsettling Discovery That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little”

In the fall of 2003, CIA officers began to take a closer look at the CIA detainees being held in Country ██, raising concerns about both the number and types of detainees being held by the CIA. CIA officers in Country ██ provided a list of CIA detainees to CIA Headquarters, resulting in the observation by CIA Headquarters that they had not previously had the names of all 44 CIA detainees being held in that country. At the direction of CIA Headquarters, the Station in Country ██ “completed an exhaustive search of all available records in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of the [CIA] detainees.” A December 2003 cable from the Station in Country
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to CIA Headquarters stated that:

In the process of this research, we have made the unsettling discovery that we are holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. The majority of [CIA] detainees in [Country ██] have not been debriefed for months and, in some cases, for over a year. Many of them appear to us to have no further intelligence value for [the CIAl and should more properly be turned over to the [U.S. military], to [Country ██] authorities or to third countries for further investigation and possibly prosecution. In a few cases, there does not appear to be enough evidence to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact the case, the detainees should be released.”
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Records indicate that all of these CIA detainees had been kept in solitary confinement. The vast majority of these detainees were later released, with some receiving CIA payments for having been held in detention.
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8. CIA Detention Sites in Country ██ Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the Interrogations of Detainees

Throughout 2003, the CIA lacked sufficient personnel and adequate translators to conduct debriefings and interrogations in Country ██. Because of this personnel shortage, a number of detainees who were transferred to CIA custody were not interrogated or debriefed by anyone for days or weeks after their arrival at CIA detention facilities in Country ██.
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As noted in a cable from the CIA Station in Country ██, in April 2003:

“Station is supporting the debriefing and/or interrogation of a large number of individuals . . . and is constrained by a lack of personnel which would allow us to fully process them in a timely manner.”
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I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues

1. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care

While CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice in July 2002 “that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah’s] injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these [enhanced interrogation] methods,”
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CIA Headquarters informed CIA interrogators that the interrogation process would take “precedence” over Abu Zubaydah’s medical care.
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Beginning on August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, fed a “bare bones” liquid diet, and subjected to the non-stop use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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On August 15, 2002, medical personnel described how Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation resulted in the “steady deterioration” of his surgical wound from April 2002.
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On August 20, 2002, medical officers wrote that Abu Zubaydah’s wound had undergone “significant” deterioration.
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Later, after one of Abu Zubaydah’s eyes began to deteriorate,
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CIA officers requested a test of Abu Zubaydah’s other eye, stating that the request was “driven by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ.” The cable relayed, “[w]e have a lot riding upon his ability to see, read and write.”
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In April 2003, CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in casts.
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CIA cables requesting the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on the two detainees stated that the interrogators would “forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical shackling (due to [the detainees’] injury).”
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Notwithstanding medical concerns related to the injuries, both of these detainees were subjected to one or more of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to obtaining CIA Headquarters approval.
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In the case of Abu Hazim, on May 4, 2003, the CIA regional medical officer examined Abu Hazim and recommended that he avoid all weight bearing activities for an additional five weeks due to his broken foot.
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In the case of Abd al-Karim, on April 18, 2003, a CIA physician assistant recommended that al-Karim avoid extended standing for “a couple of weeks.”
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Six days later, on April 24, 2003, CIA Headquarters reviewed x-rays of al-Karim’s foot, diagnosing him with a broken foot, and recommending no weight bearing and the use of crutches for a total of three months.
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Despite these recommendations, on May 10, 2003, CIA interrogators believed that both Hazim and al-Karim were “strong mentally and physically due to [their] ability to sleep in the sitting position.”
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On May 12, 2003, a different CIA physician assistant, who had not been involved in the previous examinations determining the need for the detainees to avoid weight bearing, stated that it was his “opinion” that Abu Hazim’s and Abd al-Karim’s injuries were “sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the standing sleep deprivation position.”
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He further reported that he had “consulted with [CIA’s Office of Medical Services] via secure phone and OMS medical officer concurred in this assessment.”
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CIA Headquarters approved the use of standing sleep deprivation against both detainees shortly thereafter.
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As a result, both detainees were placed in standing sleep deprivation. Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep deprivation from June 3-5, 2003,
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and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation on May 15, 2003.
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