The Telegraph Book of Readers' Letters from the Great War (39 page)

In his despatch covering the Allied Note of 10 January 1917, Mr Balfour mentions as one of the three conditions essential to a durable peace the condition that:

Behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction might be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor.

Such sanction would probably take the form of coercion applied in one of two modes. The ‘aggressor' would be disciplined either by the pressure of superior naval and military strength, or by the denial of commercial access and facilities.

The proceedings of the Paris Conference show that we should not shrink from such a denial, if we were compelled to use the weapon for purposes of self-defence. But while a commercial ‘boycott' would be justifiable as a war measure, and while the threat of a ‘boycott', in case Germany should show herself utterly unreasonable, would be a legitimate threat, no reasonable man would, surely, desire to destroy the trade of the Central Powers, if they will, so to speak, enter into recognisances to keep the peace, and do not force us into conflict by a hostile combination. Commercial war is less ghastly in its immediate results than the war of armed forces, but it would be deplorable if after three or four years of sanguinary conflict in the field, a conflict which has destroyed a great part of the wealth of the world, and
permanently crippled its resources, the Powers were to embark upon commercial hostilities certain to retard the economic recovery of all the nations involved.

That we shall have to secure ourselves against the fiscal hostility of others, that we shall have to prevent the recurrence of the conditions under which, when war broke out, we found ourselves short of essential commodities, because we had allowed certain industries, and certain sources of supply, to pass entirely under the control of our enemies, no one will doubt, subject however to this reservation, that it will surely be for our interest that the stream of trade should, so far as our own fiscal interests permit, be allowed to flow strong and interrupted to its natural channels.

There remains the question of territorial claims. The most authoritative statement of these is to be found in the Allies' Note of 10 January 1917. This statement must obviously be regarded as broad outline of the desiderata of the Allies, but is anyone prepared to argue that the sketch is complete, or that it may not become necessary to re-examine it?

Mr Asquith, speaking at Liverpool in October last, used the following language:

No one pretends that it would be right or opportune for either side to formulate an ultimatum, detailed, exhaustive, precise, with clauses and sub-clauses, which is to be accepted
verbatim et literatim
, chapter and verse, as the indispensable preliminary and condition of peace.

‘There are many things,' he added, ‘in a worldwide conflict such as this, which must of necessity be left over for discussion and negotiation, for accommodation and adjustment, at a later stage.'

It is surely most important that this wise counsel should be kept in mind. Some of our original desiderata have probably become unattainable. Others would probably now be given a less prominent place than when they were first put forward. Others, again, notably the reparation due to Belgium, remain, and must always remain, in the front rank, but when it comes to the wholesale rearrangement of the map of south-eastern Europe we may well ask for a suspension of judgment and for the elucidation which a frank exchange of views between the Allied Powers can alone afford.

For all these questions concern our Allies as well as ourselves, and if we are to have an Allied Council for the purpose of adapting our strategy in the field to the ever-shifting developments of the war, it is fair to assume that, in the matter of peace terms also, the Allies will make it their business to examine, and if necessary to revise, the territorial requirements.

Let me end by explaining why I attach so much importance to these considerations. We are not going to lose this war, but its prolongation will spell ruin for the civilised world, and an infinite addition to the load of human suffering which already weighs upon it. Security will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it, but what will be the value of the blessings of peace to nations so exhausted that
they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them?

On my belief, if the war is to be brought to a close in time to avert a worldwide catastrophe, it will be brought to a close because on both sides the peoples of the countries involved realise that it has already lasted too long.

There can be no question that this feeling prevails extensively in Germany, Austria and Turkey. We know beyond doubt that the economic pressure in those countries far exceeds any to which we are subject here. Ministers inform us in their speeches of ‘constant efforts' on the part of the Central Powers ‘to initiate peace talk'. (Sir E. Geddes at the Mansion House, 9 November.)

If the peace talk is not more articulate, and has not been so precise as to enable His Majesty's Government to treat it seriously, the explanation is probably to be found in the fact that first, that German despotism does not tolerate independent expressions of opinion, and second, that the German Government has contrived, probably with success, to misrepresent the aims of the Allies, which are supposed to include the destruction of Germany, the imposition upon her of a form of government decided by her enemies, her destruction as a great commercial community, and her exclusion from the free use of the seas.

An immense stimulus would probably be given to the peace party in Germany if it were understood:

1. That we do not desire the annihilation of Germany as a Great Power;

2. That we do not seek to impose upon her people any form of government other than that of their own choice;

3. That, except as a legitimate war measure, we have no desire to deny to Germany her place among the great commercial communities of the world;

4. That we are prepared, when the war is over, to examine in concert with other Powers the group of international problems, some of them of recent origin, which are connected with the question of ‘the freedom of the seas';

5. That we are prepared to enter into an international pact under which ample opportunities would be afforded for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

I am under the impression that authority could be found for most of these propositions in Ministerial speeches. Since the above lines were written, 1, 2 and 3 have been dealt with by our own Foreign Minister at the public meeting held in honour of M. Venizelos at the Mansion House.

The question of the ‘freedom of the seas' was amongst those raised at the outset by our American Allies. The formula is an ambiguous one, capable of many inconsistent interpretations, and I doubt whether it will be seriously contended that there is no room for profitable discussion.

That an attempt should be made to bring about the kind of pact suggested in 5 is, I believe, common ground to all the belligerents, and probably to all the neutral Powers.

If it be once established that there are no insurmountable difficulties in the way of agreement upon these points, the political horizon might perhaps be scanned with better hope by those who pray, but can at this moment hardly venture to expect, that a new year may bring us a lasting and honourable peace.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Lansdowne

Lansdowne House

In one place only is Lord Lansdowne's letter likely to damp the fighting spirit. It will doubtless do so in Germany and Austria, if the enemy Governments allow it to circulate there, but I fear that is not likely. What the enemy Governments want their subjects to believe is the exact opposite of Lord Lansdowne's five points: that we do wish to destroy Germany and impose upon her an English-appointed Government; that we do mean, unconditionally, to strangle German trade, and to make of the League of Nations a vast anti-German alliance, which shall reduce the peoples of central Europe to a state resembling serfdom, such as the worst pan-Germans proposed for France; and, lastly, that we absolutely refuse to discuss any international problems, whether relating to sea power or otherwise. Put forward that programme, and I do not know if it will make anyone in England fight the better, but it will certainly rally the Germans round the Kaiser and earn the gratitude of the Berlin Press Bureau.

Yours obediently,

Gilbert Murray
Oxford

SIR – To reply to Lord Lansdowne's letter in detail would occupy too much of your space, but one matter must be emphasised in the nation's interest for the sake of all those thousands of men who have gallantly laid down their lives in our own and the Allied cause. Lord Lansdowne is absolutely right when he says that we are fighting for one thing above all – security. Security against the repetition of such a horror as this war, which has deluged the whole world with blood. But what security does he suggest? Germany's word – Germany's solemn pact. As M. Clemenceau has lately remarked, the Belgians, looking at their desolated country, can tell us what Germany's pledges are worth.

The decisive defeat of Germany is essential, for since it is impossible to trust her promises, the only possible safeguard for Europe is to be found in her powerlessness. The other word must be added. Lord Lansdowne says that we do not wish to force upon the German people a form of government which is objectionable to them. That is true. Such an attempt would be futile in any case, seeing the permanent conquest of Germany is and never has been any part of the Allied programme. But the fact remains and should not be ignored that so long as the despotic hate of the Hohenzollerns continues, so long will the whole of Europe need to stand on guard against Germany's aggressiveness. Whether a democratic Germany is possible, and whether, if a democratic Germany did come into existence, it would prove less aggressive than the autocracy which the German nation has hitherto so whole-heartedly supported in all its crimes, the future only can show. I am not myself sanguine, but if as some hopeful people think, the Germans are capable of
reform, the best and undoubtedly the only proof they can offer would be the overthrow, complete and final, of their present rulers.

Yours faithfully,

E. Bowden-Smith, Hon. Sec.

British Empire Union, 346 Strand, W.C.2