The Whale Has Wings Vol 2 - Taranto to Singapore (41 page)

We understand that there has been political opposition to this as it might cause Germany to respond in kind, but the Luftwaffe is in any case targeting our ports and coastal waters, and we make far les use of inland waterways than does Germany.

This operation can be conducted by the Wellington (indeed, by any heavy bomber) over the coast and estuaries; river attacks can also be a productive use of light and medium bombers since they do not need to drop the large sea mines needed to damage ocean-going ships.

(b) Pinpoint attacks on specific installations

The FAA have shown that precision attacks on targets, while often costly in planes, can drastically damage the target. While the losses are higher as a percentage than area raids, the damage done is such that there is no need to revisit the target, and so the actually losses (for a specific amount of damage) are actually lower. Since this type of attack can concentrate on small targets that cause severe damage to the German war economy, by attacking targets which cannot be easily replaced, the effects can be much larger than just the immediate damage indicates. We recommend that we build up a capability to do this type of attack on a regular basis.

The aircraft used by the FAA are not suitable except for some of the coastal/port targets. We need a fast, medium bomber capable of delivering some 1-2 tons of bombs precisely. In addition, the navigation of the crews needs to be improved significantly. Ideally, such raids should take place in daytime to make sure the maximum damage is done, but defences may make this impossible. If we decide on daylight raids, we will need a long range fighter capable of escorting the bombers. The only suitable long range fighter currently is the Whirlwind, and we need to use some of the current production to see if it capable of the task against the Luftwaffe's first-line fighters. Another possibility is the US-produced Mustang, currently undergoing testing with a Merlin engine. It would also be possible to use Spitfires or Goshawks (with overload tanks) for some closer targets.

A list of suitable targets by type should be drawn up, paying careful attention to the effects that destroying these targets would have on the German economy, assuming a bomber force of some 200 planes available carrying 200-400 tons of bombs. The Navy has asked specifically if some initial operations can target German naval facilities (particularly submarine construction and support), and we suggest this is not only a useful target, but will allow the force to build up experience on easier to locate coastal targets without having to also fight through Germany to get to their target.

(c) Area attacks on installations, transport & Communications, and the oil industry.

While we feel that the pinpoint raid is the most effective in terms of results for resources used, there are a considerable number of targets for which this type of raid is not suitable - they are either too large, too dispersed, or too heavily defended. For these the option of a large raid by heavy bombers is the most suitable choice. In order to be able to attack these successfully, we need to build up the requisite bomber force. We have had estimates from the Air Ministry of up to 4,000 bombers needed to achieve success with an area bombing campaign. We reject this scale of build-up for a number of reasons. First, the amount of fuel needed to prosecute such a campaign (and it would be a campaign, not limited to a few raids) exceeds our capability to import. Second, such an effort would virtually exclude the other services from investment in equipment. Third, the existing evidence suggests that the current accuracy of bomber command is so poor as to make this scale of attack extremely inefficient. We should also examine carefully the nature of the raids made on us by the Luftwaffe, to see why some raids have caused more damage than others, with a view to learning how to cause more damage to Germany.

Bearing in mind the need to do sufficient damage to neutralise (at least for a time) a large target, we consider that we should build up a heavy bomber force capable of operating 500 planes on a regular series of missions (plus allowance for maintenance and training). This will allow either a number of smaller raids or one large raid with the available force. This force will need support by Pathfinders to find and mark the targets, as we are seeing that the current training of ordinary crews does not allow them to find targets at night, especially in poor weather.

Studies are being prepared as to the best composition of this force. First indications are that a mix of high and medium altitude planes will be the best initial solution, using a mix of bombs to disrupt the ability of the target to protect itself, cause direct damage, and allow the use of a large quantity of incendiaries. Since we will not have the planes available in numbers for a year, these studies should be concluded in time to make sure we are building the correct mixture.

It is expected that initially the force will be comprised of the Halifax, supplemented by the four-engine Manchester once this passes evaluation trials.

(d) Raids or sweeps over Northern France and other areas covered by the range of our fighters

We view these and being an inefficient and costly way to use our fighters and light bombers. The number of targets in range is relatively small, and many of these have political issues (too close to the occupied countries civil population). We would meet a strong defence on any worthwhile target, and would suffer crew losses in the same way as the Luftwaffe did in its attacks on us - lost crew will not be recovered, while German crews will. It is an obvious aim to weaken the Luftwaffe fighter arm, but we consider a more efficient way will be to use our surplus of fighters against them in other theatres. It does not matter where we shoot them down, and playing them on their own ground puts us at an unnecessary disadvantage.

While the above covers the operational use of our bombers, it is realised that in addition we need to be seen to be hurting and damaging the enemy. Mine laying does not show this. Pinpoint raids may, as long as they are large and do a significant amount of damage (the FAA raid on Wilhelmshaven is an example of this), or hit a notable target, but otherwise they are not likely to be seen as causing major damage; the significance of their success will often not be obvious to the uninformed. The area attacks, although the last effective in terms or aircraft usage, do have the political advantage of being easy to use in propaganda terms. However we feel that effectiveness should be a higher priority than propaganda, as otherwise we risk diluting and damaging our bomber force for small results.

Summary of Recommendations for the next year.

The Spitfire and the associated Merlin engine should continue to be developed as our primary air defence fighter, especially for high altitude work.

The Sparrowhawk (initially the Hurricane) is seen as the best option for army support as well as air defence of the theatre, as it can deliver a useful bomb-load yet act as a first-rate fighter when unloaded. We have considered a dedicated dive bomber, but the vulnerability of these planes to AA fire and to fighter opposition leads us to think that the fighter-bomber is the more efficient option (we realise the Navy has specific and specialised roles for dive bombers, and note that this means suitable planes are available in small number if specialised raids are contemplated, although training will need to be given to RAF pilots in this case.)

The Beaufighter, while only a marginal first-rate fighter, is longer ranged and can also carry a significant bomb-load, or a torpedo for naval use. Production should be continued as planned, to replace part of the Beaufort force. We should also look into the suggestion of a very heavily gun-armed version (4x20mm cannon and 4x0.5" mg) for air support and interdiction of light shipping. The initial priority should be to coastal command, but a certain number should be retained to develop the concept of the heavy attack fighter properly.

Hurricane production should be reduced and replaced by Sparrowhawk as resources permit. The Hurricane will be supplied to overseas theatres where the fighter threat is less than over Germany.

Goshawk production will continue until the new fighters are available for the FAA. It will then either be discontinued or retained at a lowe level for second-line carrier operations.

Development of the Tornado should cease; development of the Typhoon should continue subject to ongoing monitoring of the situation of the Sabre engine.

The development of the new aircraft for the Navy is seen as acceptable by the Navy, now that the three new planes have entered production. Once these are available, the existing production will be reviewed to see if any of it should be made available for other usage. Although it is technically obsolete, the Navy has asked that production of the Fairy Swordfish be continued due to the characteristics that make it particularly suitable for the AS role on small carriers. This will be reviewed in one year when more experience with hew new escort carriers is available.

There is a problem with the performance and availability of the current light bomber force. The Blenheim is obsolescent, and not suitable for the fighter role against serious opposition. We recommend that production be reduced and phased out in favour of more useful aircraft. In the meantime it should be used in theatres such as North Africa where is performance is not such a drawback.

We have a lack of good new light bombers in development. Some of the roles currently tasked to them can and will be performed more usefully by the new fighter-bomber concept, but light bombers will still be needed. The Mosquito concept shows promise, but is untested, and until it has proven itself we cannot rely on it as the only plane to fill this role. In addition, while its construction has the useful benefit of not using many scarce resources, it also means that unlike a conventional aircraft there are limits on the number that can be produced. We therefore recommend we look for one or two aircraft from the USA to fill the light bomber requirement.

The medium bomber role is currently filled adequately by the Wellington. Production should be given priority, especially as it is also required by coastal command. The other planes being used in this role are seen as obsolescent.

The heavy bombers currently coming out of development and into service have a number of significant problems (please see detailed appendix on these). As a result, we cannot justify the huge investment in these demanded by Bomber Command, although development of the planes and techniques for using them should of course continue. We do not feel that any significant campaign against Germany using these planes is possible before 1942 at the earliest. In particular we are deficient in the means to find and mark the targets with suitable accuracy - until we do this, we are just wasting any heavy bomber force.

A marking or Pathfinder force should be established as soon as possible, and trained up to locate and mark targets of various kinds so that when the heavy bomber is mature we can use it effectively. This can be usefully tied in with the development of precision raids, as similar levels or marking/delivery accuracy is needed in both. The question of using a different aircraft for marking than bombing needs to be addressed.

Following successful tests of the prototype, a requirement has been put out for a twin engined jet-powered aircraft. Both Westland and deHaviland have presented suitable ideas, and prototypes from each company will be developed. While we see this advance as having great potential, after talks we have determined that the engines are currently the main limiting factor (they are currently unreliable with a short working life), and we recommend additional resources in this area to parallel to development of the planes.

AA - Anti Aircraft (guns).

AI - Airborne Intercept (radar). A small light radar set capable of being carried on a plane to allow it to intercept another aircraft at night.

ASDIC - what later became known as SONAR, a high-frequency sound system designed to detect a submerged submarine. At this time, rarely usable above 1,500 - 2000 metres.

A/S - Antisubmarine

ASV - Air to Surface radar, a small airborne set designed to spot ships and, later, smaller objects such as submarines.

Avgas - Aviation Gasoline (fuel), very volatile and very dangerous.

CAP - Combat Air Patrol, the act of keeping a number of fighters in the air above the carrier or fleet ready to intercept enemy aircraft.

DB - Dive Bomber, an aircraft designed to deliver a single bomb in a very steep (normally over 70°) dive.

FAA - Fleet Air Arm, the aeroplanes flown and controlled by the Royal Navy

HA - also known as HA(AA), the guns capable of attacking a high-altitude enemy plane. Normally used against high altitude level bombing. While not terribly accurate at this time, the aim was to disrupt the formation of the attackers, making them miss, rather than to shoot them down. Level bombers depended on the 'shotgun' principle of bombing during this period.

Hammer-and-Anvil attack - a type of attack by torpedo planes. Two groups of planes will attack 90° apart, one the 'hammer', the other the 'anvil'. Dodging the torpedoes of one group will put the ship broadside on to the other group. The ideal torpedo attack against a moving ship.

HMS - His Majesties Ship (British); also HMAS - His Majesties Australian Ship, HMCS - His Majesties Canadian Ship, HMNZS - His Majesties New Zealand Ship.

HIMJS - His Imperial Japanese Majesties Ship (Japan)

Kriegsmarine - the German Navy

LA - Low angle guns, normally those unable to elevate above about 40 degrees, so unable to fire on a plane over the ship. In fact, these guns can be used as antiaircraft guns, but only on aircraft some distance away (the angle of the aircraft increases as it closes the ship). Usually even less accurate than HA fire, as this type of gun was not usually matched with the control system designed to engage aircraft.