The Wizards of Langley (13 page)

The two components transferred to the new directorate were the Automatic Data Processing Staff from the administration directorate, which became DS&T’s Office of Computer Services, and the Office of Scientific Intelligence.
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Once again the Technical Services Division remained under Richard Helms and the clandestine service. It was not an issue Wheelon wished to contest. He understood that Helms did not want “outsiders” involved in the audio operations, fabrication of identity documents, and secret writing techniques that were an essential part of espionage operations. Nor did he believe that dramatically improving the
quality of TSD would lead to significant improvement in the value of U.S. espionage operations. In addition, TSD was often involved in activities that were somewhat less than scientific—such as commissioning a madam to produce a
Handbook for Courtesans
instructing women on how to excite men (presumably more detailed than a comedian’s advice to “show up”) or rolling a Russian courier in the expectation of obtaining plans for Soviet subversion (and instead winding up with a briefcase containing $250,000).
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OSI was a quite different matter. Wheelon believed Cline to be a political opportunist who did not understand and would not nurture scientific intelligence but would tear it apart. That view was echoed by longtime OSI official Karl Weber—“Cline didn’t know diddly-squat” about scientific matters, he stated in 1999. He also recalled telling Wheelon at one point, “Watch out for him [Cline]. He’s a street fighter with a Harvard accent.”
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Weber need not have worried. According to one history of the CIA, Cline “was furious with the shift of OSI” but was “consistently outmaneuvered by Wheelon.” One CIA official recalled that “Ray had an uncontrollable ability to make enemies. . . . He and Bud Wheelon were at daggers drawn. When you take on Bud Wheelon, you’re taking on a bureaucratic master, and Bud Wheelon ripped Ray to shreds.” Wheelon attributed his victory less to bureaucratic skill than to the fact that he and McCone had concluded, prior to the discovery the previous October, that the Soviets had placed offensive missiles in Cuba, whereas Cline’s intelligence directorate argued that the Soviets would not take such an action. As a result, Wheelon’s stock rose while Cline’s fell.
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Cline’s pique at the transfer of OSI was still evident in his memoirs, published twenty-five years later. He noted that “the one major change in CIA’s structure that McCone made was one I disapproved of . . . he took the scientific intelligence analytical staff from the DDI and turned it over to . . . Albert (Bud) Wheelon, who stayed only a short time before going back to industry.” As a result, “CIA advocacy of its own scientific collection techniques became mixed up with its objective analysis of all scientific and technical developments.” Permitting the same unit to collect and evaluate intelligence “violated a cardinal rule of sound intelligence organization.”
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During Wheelon’s tenure as deputy director for science and technology, OSI focused on a variety of topics—foreign scientific resources; the research, development,
and testing of air defense systems; cruise missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels; scientific space activities; unconventional warfare; the physical, engineering, and life sciences; and nuclear energy.
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Heading OSI was Donald Chamberlain, a Ph.D. in chemical engineering who had left his professor’s position at Washington University in St. Louis to join the agency. Chamberlain was someone Wheelon “had extraordinary confidence” in and would keep “the military guys from going off half-cocked on Russia.”
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As in the past, a crucial element of the office’s work concerned foreign nuclear weapons programs. The division’s products included November 1964 studies on the Japanese and Indian nuclear energy programs. The former study covered the number and type of research reactors in Japan, its exploration for and production of uranium, research into the production of heavy water, and a variety of applications—from the study of the use of plutonium for advanced reactors to the application of nuclear energy research, medicine, and industry. A few months earlier, OSI had examined the status of Soviet nuclear research reactors and their contribution to the Soviet atomic energy program.
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In 1964 and 1965, OSI helped draft the national intelligence estimates on the Soviet atomic energy program. Topics explored included the Soviet Union’s production of fissionable materials, its nuclear-powered submarine program, nuclear weapons developments, and the command and control of nuclear weapons. The 1964 estimate noted that “the Soviets significantly improved their fission and thermonuclear weapon capabilities as a result of the 1961–62 test series.”
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In addition to Japan’s activities, the nuclear programs of two other Asian countries were of concern to OSI. In October 1965, Chamberlain responded to a request from a National Security Council staff member for information on the Indian nuclear weapons capabilities. His memo focused on the possibility of India developing nuclear weapons and on its nuclear facilities, plutonium research, and nuclear power development. Chamberlain noted, “India probably already has on hand enough plutonium for a nuclear device.” But he concluded, “We have no firm indication that the Indian Government has decided to develop nuclear weapons.”
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Of far greater concern was the Chinese program. China was, according to Karl Weber, “a real mystery . . . big, really foreign, hard to get a handle on.”
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Just a year earlier, on October 16, 1964, China had detonated its first atomic bomb at Lop Nur, in northwestern China. The test,
in addition to unequivocally demonstrating China’s nuclear capability, also highlighted the shortcoming of OSI’s analysis of the Chinese program.

Between August 1963 and China’s detonation, OSI’s work had been conducted against the backdrop of growing concerns by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and their advisers about the implications of China’s joining the nuclear club. They had already considered a number of options—including assisting India in building a bomb (to ensure that the first Asian bomb would not be a Communist one), as well as enlisting the Soviet Union in a joint preventive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. The first alternative was rejected by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the second by Nikita Khrushchev.
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A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), published less than two weeks before OSI’s transfer to the science and technology directorate and largely the work of OSI, summarized what OSI knew, or believed it knew, about the Chinese program. The estimate, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,” reported that since the estimate of the previous year, “we have received a considerable amount of information, mainly from photography”—the results of U-2 and CORONA overflights. But the estimate also noted that “the gaps in our information remain substantial and we are therefore not able to judge the present state or to project the future development of the Chinese program as a whole with any high degree of confidence.”
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The estimate fully reflected the belief of OSI and Chamberlain that China would seek to join the nuclear club via the same route taken by other emerging nuclear powers—a plutonium bomb. The process of enriching uranium to a level suitable for use in weapons is laborious, and considerably less plutonium than uranium is needed to make a simple atomic weapon. The Chinese might indeed have taken the plutonium route had the Soviets not withdrawn technical assistance in 1960, forcing the Chinese to concentrate their scare resources on the more advanced program—which happened to be uranium enrichment.
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The SNIE reported the discovery of what was mistakenly judged to be a plutonium production reactor at Baotou with “elaborate security arrangements.” The estimate also said it was unclear whether the reactor had gone critical, and it probably could not have gone critical before early 1962—in which case the earliest a first device could be tested, relying on plutonium from that reactor alone, would be early 1964. If the Chinese ran into a normal number of difficulties, late 1964 or 1965 would be the
earliest they could test. If the reactor went critical after early 1962, the detonation would be delayed even further. Although the accumulated overhead photography yielded no signs of the other plutonium reactors that OSI analysts believed China needed, they noted that “the possible existence of another reactor cannot be ignored.”
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March and June 1963 photographs of the Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant, which had first been identified in 1959 aerial photography, showed progress being made on a nearby hydroelectric plant believed to have been designed to supply Lanzhou, as well as transmission lines between Lanzhou and a thermal electric plant. The analysts believed Lanzhou was unlikely to produce weapons-grade uranium-235 before 1966, even under the most advantageous conditions, and more likely to do so during 1968 and 1969. What the analysts did not know was that in late 1962, China’s Second Ministry of Machine Building, which ran the nuclear program, had directed Lanzhou to produce enough uranium for a bomb by the beginning of 1964.
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Based on the faulty identification of Baotou as a plutonium production facility, and the erroneous assumption that plutonium would fuel China’s first atomic explosion, the analysts’ best guess was late 1964 or 1965. But they added that the possible existence of another, undiscovered plutonium reactor might mean that “the Chinese could achieve a first detonation at any time.”
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As OSI continued to try to determine the truth about the Chinese program, U.S. policymakers continued to explore their options. In November 1963, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman Maxwell Taylor presented his colleagues with a paper on “how we can prevent or delay the Chinese from succeeding in their nuclear development program.” The wording of the title on the agenda—“Unconventional Warfare Program BRAVO”—indicated the paramilitary nature of the contemplated action.
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A few months later, Walt Rostow, the chief of Policy Planning, asked staff expert Robert Johnson to study the feasibility of disrupting the Chinese nuclear effort by force. Johnson concluded that “preemptive military action is undesirable,” in part because the United States had not identified all of the relevant targets.
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During the first eight months of 1964, China made steady progress toward building its first atomic bomb. In January, the Lanzhou facility produced its first highly enriched uranium and began regular operations. In April, the Jiuquan complex made the first nuclear components for the bomb. In June, the Ninth Academy conducted a successful full-scale sim
ulation. And on August 19, workers at Jiuquan assembled the first nuclear test explosive, including the nuclear core.
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A special national intelligence estimate published on August 26 reflected both the extensive reconnaissance operations directed at China’s nuclear facilities and the continued assumption that plutonium would be China’s path to its first atomic bomb. Titled “Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” the NIE reported that recent CORONA photography of the Lop Nur test facility (first identified as a result of a December 1961 CORONA mission) led analysts to conclude that “the previously suspect facility at Lop Nur . . . is a nuclear test site which could be ready for use in two months.”
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However, the estimate, reflecting OSI’s views, stated “that [the detonation] will not occur until sometime after the end of 1964.” That conclusion was driven by the view that China “will not have sufficient fissionable material for a test of a nuclear device in the next few months”—a conclusion based on the continuing belief that China’s first bomb would be fueled by plutonium, not uranium, and that the Lanzhou plant, which had already produced sufficient uranium-235 for a bomb, was “behind schedule.” Analysts believed that the plutonium reactor assumed to be at Baotou would not produce enough plutonium for a bomb until 1965 at the earliest.
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Such conclusions were disputed both within and outside the CIA. Two prominent nuclear advisers, Albert and Richard Latter, told Wheelon that OSI was “screwing up” by assuming that a first bomb would rely on plutonium. Chamberlain had misjudged the Chinese program and “got stubborn about it,” Wheelon later recalled. He took the Latters to see Mc- Cone.
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Allen Whiting of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) doubted that the Chinese would have erected the test tower at Lop Nur evident in CORONA imagery unless a test were imminent. That evidence, along with public and private statements by Chinese leaders, led him to recommend to INR director Thomas Hughes that the United States invoke a long-standing contingency plan by announcing the upcoming test before the Chinese did—in an effort to lessen the impact and “reassure neighboring countries that the United States was watching and aware.” NPIC director Arthur Lundahl independently recommended a preemptive announcement.
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On September 29, after further consideration of more violent options, which may have included another attempt to recruit the Soviet Union to
participate in a preemptive strike, a State Department spokesman announced that a Chinese test “might occur in the near future.”
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On October 15, a memo from Chamberlain to Deputy DCI Carter noted that the most recent information had confirmed that Lop Nur was probably ready to host an atomic test. The memo included descriptions of specific items revealed in overhead photography—including a 340-foot tower surrounded by a double fence, two small towers, and various bunkers and platforms—then stated that the “high priority given to the completion of site construction suggests that a test is scheduled in the fairly near future.” It also noted that the high level of flight activity to and from the area halted in September 1963, when the site was essentially complete, but had resumed in September 1964, possibly reflecting final preparations.
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