The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945 (92 page)

The reason for Weizsäcker’s suggestion is unclear. Did he wish to avoid receiving an “official” message that could indeed have led to retaliation against church interests in the Reich? His next step (the letter from Hudal, which we shall refer to) would be a nonofficial warning and thus probably exclude any violent reaction. But if the pope were to protest, all such precautions would have been in vain. Weizsäcker probably hoped that the threat of papal protest would suffice to stop the roundup; a protest would thus not be necessary. Either Maglione was informed of Weizsäcker’s next step and understood his reasoning, or else the cardinal’s acceptance of Weizsäcker’s suggestion not to report the conversation could only be interpreted as a rather strange signal that the possibility of a papal protest should not be taken too seriously.

Be that as it may, on that same day Weizsäcker and fellow German diplomats in the know approached the rector of the German church in Rome, Bishop Aloïs Hudal, a prelate notorious for his pro-Nazi leanings, and convinced him to write a letter to Stahel in which the strong possibility of the pope’s public protest would be mentioned.
⁸²
Hudal accepted.

A few hours later Weizsäcker cabled Hudal’s message to Berlin and added his personal comments for Ribbentrop’s benefit: “With regard to Bishop Hudal’s letter,” Weizsäcker informed the minister, “I can confirm that this represents the Vatican’s reaction to the deportation of the Jews of Rome. The Curia is especially upset considering that the action took place, so to say, under the Pope’s own windows. The reaction could perhaps be dampened if the Jews were to be employed in labor service here in Italy. Hostile circles in Rome are using this event as a means of pressuring the Vatican to drop its reserve. It is being said that when similar incidents took place in French cities, the bishops there took a clear stand. Thus the Pope, as the supreme leader of the Church and as Bishop of Rome, cannot do less. The Pope is also being compared with his predecessor, Pius XI, a man of a greatly more spontaneous temperament. Enemy propaganda abroad will certainly also use this event, in order to disturb the friendly relations between the Curia and ourselves.”
⁸³

The pope kept silent. On October 25, after the deportees’ train had left Italy on its way to Auschwitz, an article in the Vatican’s official newspaper,
L’Osservatore Romano
, sang the praises of the Holy Father’s compassion: “The August Pontiff, as is well known…had not desisted for one moment in employing all the means in his powers to alleviate the suffering, which, whatever form it may take, is the consequence of this cruel conflagration. With the intensification of so much evil, the universal and paternal charity of the Pontiff has become, it could be said, ever more active; it knows neither boundaries nor nationality, neither religion nor race. This manifold and ceaseless activity on the part of Pius XII has intensified even more in recent times in regard for the increased suffering of so many unfortunate people.”
⁸⁴

Weizsäcker sent a translation of the article to the Wilhelmstrasse, with a notorious cover letter: “The Pope, although under intense pressure from various sides, has not allowed himself to be pushed into a demonstrative comment against the deportation of the Jews of Rome. Although he must know that such an attitude will be used against him by our adversaries…he has nonetheless done everything possible in this delicate matter in order not to burden relations with the German government and the German authorities in Rome. As there apparently will be no further German action taken on the Jewish question here, it may be expected that this matter, so unpleasant in regard to German-Vatican relations, is liquidated.” Referring then to the article in
L’Osservatore Romano
, Weizsäcker added: “No objections need be raised against this statement, insofar as its text…will be understood by very few people only as a special allusion to the Jewish question.”
⁸⁵

In August 1941 Hitler had been sufficiently worried about the impact of Bishop Galen’s sermon against euthanasia to alter the course of the operation. Why didn’t the Nazi leader make the faintest move to forestall a threat of much greater magnitude—a public declaration by the pope against the deportation and extermination of the Jews? Why, in fact, did Hitler insist on deporting the Jews of Rome, notwithstanding warnings about dire potential consequences? Even if he assumed that German Catholics would not take a stand regarding the Jews as they could have done regarding their own people (the mentally ill), a public condemnation by the pope would have constituted a worldwide propaganda disaster. Only one answer is plausible:
Hitler and his acolytes must have been convinced that the Pope would not protest
. This belief probably derived from the multiple and quasi-identical reports reaching Berlin about the pontiff ’s political stand.

As early as the beginning of 1943, in a conversation with the German ambassador to the Vatican, Diego von Bergen, Pius XII had expressed his desire to postpone dealing with all outstanding contentions between the Reich and the Holy See (regarding the situation of the church in Germany) until the end of the war. According to Bergen the pope added that such was his intention except if the Germans took measures that would compel him to speak out “to fulfill the obligations of his office.” Given the context the remark referred to the situation of the church in Germany.
⁸⁶
The pope’s readiness to accept, temporarily, the everyday difficulties that party and state created for German Catholics, and to postpone the discussion until after the war, derived, of course, from the ever-increasing worry of the Holy See in the face of gathering “Bolshevik” strength.

A short comment in Goebbels’s diary entry of February 8, 1943, confirmed that Hitler was well aware of the Vatican’s fears. The propaganda minister was listing the main points of Hitler’s address to the
Reichsleiter
and
Gauleiter
at Rastenburg headquarters, on February 7. In the course of his survey of Germany’s strategic and international situation after Stalingrad, the Nazi leader came to speak of the Vatican: “Also the Curia has become somewhat more active as it sees that now it has only one choice left: National Socialism or Bolshevism.”
⁸⁷

Two further Goebbels diary entries of the same weeks have to be viewed with caution, as the minister may have added some wishful thinking to information that was reaching him. Thus on March 3 he noted: “I hear from the most diverse sides, that it could be possible to do something with the present Pope. He is supposed to share, in part, some very reasonable views and not to be as hostile to National Socialism as one could surmise from the declarations of some of his bishops.”
⁸⁸
Two weeks later Goebbels noted the “very sharp declaration against the twisting, in the U.S., of a speech by [New York Cardinal Francis] Spellman [who had just met with the pope]…. The Vatican declares that it has nothing to do with the war aims of the enemy. One can see from this, that the Pope is possibly closer to us than is generally assumed.”
⁸⁹

On July 5, on presenting his credentials as new German ambassador to the Holy See, Weizsäcker had a conversation with the pontiff that seemed to tally entirely with prior German assessments: Pius first mentioned his “gratitude for the years he had spent as Nuncio in Germany and his affection for Germany and the German people.” After alluding to the ongoing problems between church and state in Germany, the pope expressed the hope that these issues would later be solved. The conversation then turned to Bolshevism. Weizsäcker emphasized Germany’s role in the fight against the Bolshevik threat. According to the ambassador, “the Pope spoke of his own Munich experience with the communists in 1919. He condemned the mindless formula of our enemies that refers to ‘unconditional surrender.’” After mentioning Pius’s lack of expectations regarding any peace initiatives “at the present time,” Weizsäcker indicated in conclusion that although in general the conversation took place without apparent passion, it was “suffused with hidden spiritual ardor which turned into an acknowledgement of common interests with the Reich only when the fight against Bolshevism was evoked.” (“
Das Gespräch…wurde vom Papst ohne sichtbare Leidenschaft, aber mit einem Unterton von geistlichen Eifer geführt, der nur bei der Behandlung der Bolschewisten-Bekämpfung in eine Annerkenung gemeinsamer Interessen mit dem Reich überging.
”)
⁹⁰

The Vatican’s fear of the communist menace grew after Mussolini’s fall and, a few weeks later, in the wake of Italy’s surrender. On September 23 Weizsäcker informed Berlin that “by chance” he had had a look at three Vatican documents all dated July 25 (the day of Mussolini’s fall). The third—and the most important—of these documents was, so Weizsäcker reported, “an exposition by Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione to the Italian Government of the dangers threatening the world. Maglione says that the fate of Europe depends on the victorious resistance by Germany on the Russian front. The German Army is the only possible bulwark—‘
baluardo
’—against Bolshevism. Should this bulwark break, European culture would be finished.”
⁹¹

On September 3 Weizsäcker sent an even more explicit report to Berlin regarding the pope’s political attitude: “I continually receive proof how very much annoyed Vatican people are over Anglo-American policy, the spokesmen of which are regarded as clearing the path for Bolshevism. Concern in the Vatican about the fate of Italy and of Germany, too, is growing. A diplomat who enjoys special connections with the Vatican assured me yesterday the Pope sternly condemns all plans aimed at weakening the Reich. A bishop working in the Curia told me today that in the Pope’s view a powerful German Reich is quite indispensable for the future of the Catholic Church. From confidential transcript of conversation between an Italian political publicist and the Pope, I gather that the Pope, in reply to question as to what he thought of the German people, replied: “They are a great nation who, in their fight against Bolshevism, are bleeding not only for their friends but also for the sake of their present enemies.”
⁹²

Three weeks later Orsenigo paid a visit to the new state secretary at the Wilhelmstrasse, Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, and, without any prodding, started expostulating about the threat represented by world communism. Only Germany and the Vatican could counter the threat: Germany, in material terms, and the Vatican, spiritually.
⁹³
In all probability Weizsäcker in his reports and Orsenigo in his communications were trying to please Ribbentrop and, beyond him, Hitler himself, in order to alleviate the constant pressure put by the regime on the church in Germany. Nonetheless the authenticity of the constantly repeated political message could not be doubted.

All this must have been known to both Hitler and Goebbels when, on August 7, they discussed the situation in Italy following Mussolini’s fall. At some point Goebbels broached the subject of the pope: “Undoubtedly, as the Führer also agreed, the Pope is a Roman and an Italian. His efforts are concentrated upon holding back Bolshevism in Europe, under any circumstances. Also, he can certainly be considered as a friend of the Germans; after all he did spend fourteen years in Germany. Naturally he is no friend of National Socialism; but, all the same, he likes it more than Bolshevism. In any case, during the entire Italian crisis he did not express any hostility against fascism or against Mussolini. The Italian clergy in its majority is favorable to fascism. Admittedly though, the Pope is advised by a wide circle of enemies of National Socialism. His Secretary of State in particular, Maglioni [
sic
], is thoroughly hostile to Germany and National Socialism. I believe however that one can do something with the Pope and that is also Ribbentrop’s opinion. The Führer wants to keep him for a favorable occasion. Here too we have a piece on the chessboard. When to move it remains open.”
⁹⁴

On October 14, as the first anti-Jewish measures had already been taken in the Italian capital, Goebbels noted: “The Cardinal Archbishop of Paris has expressed himself regarding the present situation in a conversation with one of our informants: According to him, the Vatican is absolutely hostile to Bolshevism. It would wish to reach firm agreements with the Reich. The Pope watches with greatest worry the increasingly bolshevist mood in all European countries. There is no doubt that the Catholic Church knows that if Bolshevism were to stand at Germany’s borders, it would mean mortal danger for her [the Church].”
⁹⁵
Closer to home, Mussolini’s fall energized the partisans active in the northern and central parts of Italy and, among them, communist units, which particularly worried the Vatican.
⁹⁶

The Nazi leader could assume therefore that Pius XII would abstain from any step that would harm Germany and increase the communist danger from outside “Europe,” or from inside. The only way that seemed open to the Vatican in order to avoid what it deemed an oncoming catastrophe was to broker a peace agreement between the Western powers and Germany that would establish a common “bulwark” against the advancing Soviets and defend the heart of the Continent. Hence Pius’s criticism of the unconditional surrender formula, if indeed he expressed himself in the way Weizsäcker reported on July 5. Both sides were aware of the papal plan and knew it to be the Vatican’s first priority. Within such a grand scheme there could be no place, the pontiff probably thought, for a public stand regarding the fate of the Jews, either in general or in relation to the events in Rome and in Italy.

It has been argued that in order to bring about the diplomatic compromise that he considered his mission, the pope had decided, from the very beginning of the war, not to speak up for any group of victims of the Nazi regime—either the Poles, the victims of euthanasia, or the Jews. This, however, was not the case. As we saw, the pope publicly expressed his sympathy for the Poles in his encyclical
Summi Pontificatus
of December 1939. Over the following years Polish bishops and the Polish population felt that Pius did not protest frequently and forcefully enough. This may have been the case until May 31, 1943, when the pontiff expressed a ringing recognition of “the tragic fate of the Polish people,” adding warm praise about the “faithful Polish people, heroically silent about their sufferings down the centuries, [who] have contributed to the development and preservation of Christian Europe.”
⁹⁷
Pius spoke again about Polish sufferings in his June 2, 1943, address to the College of Cardinals. Regarding euthanasia the pope most energetically condemned it in letters to the German bishops. Mainly the Holy See addressed numerous protests, demands, and inquiries
via diplomatic channels
both regarding the situation of Catholics in Poland and about the killing of the mentally ill.
⁹⁸
Not one such diplomatic intervention dealt with the overall fate of the Jews.