A Doctor in The House: A Memoir of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (24 page)

BOOK: A Doctor in The House: A Memoir of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad
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Gent was regarded as weak and incapable of tackling the insurgency. He also bore the stigma of responsibility for the demise of the Malayan Union. When the communists surfaced with ferocious violence, the British planters and miners campaigned through the British-owned 
Straits Times
 for Gent’s removal and the appointment of a “Supremo”—a supreme commander responsible for both the civil administration and the conduct of the war against the terrorists. The way to meeting their demands was opened by fate: Gent was killed in an air crash and in 1949, was replaced by Sir Henry Gurney. Gurney had served in Palestine—where the Jews had adopted terror tactics against the British—and so had some experience with guerrilla warfare. He brought in 500 British police sergeants who were serving in Palestine to combat the problem, but this raised the matter of status. In the Malayan Police the British sergeants would have had to serve under Malay officers. This was not acceptable to the British Government and so to close the gap, the sergeants were given the rank of Police Lieutenants, a rank that had not previously existed. Naturally, they were not able to integrate smoothly into the force. Later, many of them were promoted to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, which enabled them to outrank Malayan Police Inspectors and Assistant Superintendents. Nor were the police and the army able to work together either—Colonel W. N. Gray, the Commissioner of Police who was also from Palestine, was particular about his authority over the police force and did not cooperate with the officers of the military forces.

Things were not going well at all for the Government. The MCP had announced the setting up of the Malayan Peoples’ Liberation Army (MPLA) and actively tried to recruit Malays and Indians. But they had little success and, in the end, the MPLA remained an almost exclusively Chinese force. One of the very few Malays who joined was Shamsiah Fakeh. She ended up living for many years in China but during the 1990s, our Government allowed her to return to Malaysia in her old age. She passed away in 2008.

Despite measures to eradicate the communist threat, including the establishment of New Villages to cut off their food supply, the number of guerrilla attacks remained high. The members of the “War Councils” at federal, state and district levels were kept busy with briefings on the progress of the war, the number and the location of the guerrilla attacks and the campaign to get the people, especially the Chinese, to back the war effort. The hearts and minds of the people had to be won if the guerrillas were to be defeated.

The Colonial Government’s pressing problems were not simply military but also broadly political. They had to manage the political activities and seek to reconcile the demands of the different communities. After leading the AMCJA, Tun Tan launched the Malayan Chinese Association in 1949. Now called the Malaysian Chinese Association, the MCA is today a major component party of the ruling Barisan Nasional alliance. At the time I didn’t think much of its chances. I thought it would be difficult for the Chinese, who were divided between the communists and the pro-Kuomintang Nationalists, to work together politically. Tun Tan was a very prominent Chinese and it was natural for him to lead the movement. He had considerable influence over the Chinese, even though, as a Straits Chinese, he could speak only Malay and English.

Irked by all this political strife, the British had appointed Malcolm MacDonald Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia in May 1948. He was able to bring a few of the community leaders together through the Communities Liaison Committee.

After Dato’ Onn Jaafar left UMNO in 1951 to set up his Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), Tunku Abdul Rahman assumed leadership in August that year. The Tunku’s reputation preceded him and most people who were politically active knew of him. He and his brother Tunku Yaacob were known in Kedah for trying to promote Malay small businesses and for their concern for the well-being of poor Malays generally. Besides being my brother’s friend, I also came to know him when I had earlier invited him to watch a stage play by the Kesatuan Pemuda Melayu Kedah (Kedah Malay Youth Association).

During the protest against the Malayan Union the Tunku had voiced his objection to the proposal. He helped draft the petition by the Kedah Malay Association to the Colonial Secretary, registering the people’s’ protest. His heart was obviously in the right place with regard to Malay interests and aspirations and, accordingly, his assumption of the leadership of UMNO was generally well accepted.

The Tunku began to talk about independence for Malaya almost as soon as he took over. The British were displeased, to say the least. Their candidate to win over Malay support was now encouraging freedom from their rule. They had also wanted him to get UMNO to relax its view with regard to Chinese and Indian citizenship but instead, the party, with the Tunku at its head, rejected this intended policy outright.

One month after the Tunku became leader of UMNO, Gurney was killed in a guerrilla ambush on his way for a holiday in Fraser’s Hill. A new High Commissioner had to be appointed, not just to deal with the new leadership of the Malays but also to implement the strategies worked out by Gurney and Director of Operations Sir Harold Briggs against the insurgents. The state of emergency had been extended and the plan to relocate the squatters to New Villages approved. But without a decisive High Commissioner, there was little chance of a victorious war, despite all the careful attention and planning.

In 1951, 531 civilians and 504 soldiers and policemen were killed. The British planters and miners again demanded the appointment of a “Supremo” to deal with the political and military situation. In February 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer arrived with comprehensive powers over the civil and military administration. He had a tough job—the political problems alone were highly complex and required an accurate combination of diplomacy and firmness. He also had to carry out and extend Gurney’s plans for social and economic development. To win the support of the Malays and other races, Templer promised to hold elections for towns and municipalities, the states and finally, for the Federal Legislative Council. The last could result in self-government.

The British Government had at last realised the seriousness of the situation in the Federation. It promised powerful and continuing help in defeating the guerrillas and attaining the objective of a united Malayan nation. Templer had a productive, two-year tenure as High Commissioner. His term marked the turning point in the war against the insurgents as well as progress towards representative government for the Federation of Malaya. Templer’s term of office ended in June 1954. Elections to municipal and town councils had already begun during his time, but the British were not yet ready for an elected Federal Legislative Council.

In 1952, elections were held for the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council. This election saw UMNO working with the MCA for the first time, and the branch-level alliance of the two parties won a majority of the seats. But more significantly, none of the multiracial parties—including Dato’ Onn’s IMP—won any seats, which meant the formula for Malay/non-Malay political cooperation seemed to be the most acceptable course to the different races. One of the most positive features was that in the coalition, parties did not lose their distinct ethno-communal or separate racial identities while working for the common good.

The Tunku was quick to appreciate its political usefulness. After the 1952 Municipal Election he worked hard towards broadening it on a nationwide basis. When subsequent town council elections were held, the new coalition, called the Alliance Party, did admirably and won most of the seats. The Tunku began to press for early elections for the Federal Legislative Council. The British Government was reluctant to let the locals control the council as this would effectively mean self-rule, so they refused to set a date for elections. Templer, however, had promised that there would be a democratic government in Malaya.

The Tunku went to the United Kingdom with T. H. Tan of the MCA, who was also Secretary-General of the Alliance. The Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton, refused to see them at first. But the Tunku knew a lawyer and soldier, David R. Rees-Williams, who had long served in Malaya but returned to England and had been elected a Labour Member of Parliament. Through the Rees-Williams’ intervention, the Tunku saw the Colonial Secretary. But Lyttleton thought that it was too early for elections to be held in Malaya.

The Tunku came back disappointed but not defeated. He continued to pressure Templer’s successor, Sir Donald MacGillivray, for elections to be held as soon as possible. Finally, the High Commissioner agreed and decided that elections would be held in 1955 for just 52 of the 98 seats in the Federal Legislative Council (the remaining members would be named by the High Commissioner). Misreading the local situation yet again, the British thought that it would be impossible for any of the Malayan parties to gain an absolute majority.

The Tunku protested and demanded a bigger number of elected members, if not an entirely elected body. He was finally persuaded to accept the 52 elected members but, in exchange, he managed to obtain one condition: that the party with the largest number of elected members would be consulted over the appointment of the nominated members.

At that time, the number of Chinese who were eligible to vote was very small. Moreover, the number of constituencies where they made up the majority was insufficient for the MCA to play a meaningful role in the election. In a bold step, the Tunku persuaded UMNO to give up Malay-majority constituencies to the MCA and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).
[3]
 That UMNO agreed to it was remarkable. What was even more remarkable was that Malay voters supported the Chinese MCA and Indian MIC candidates, frequently against Malay candidates from the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP).
 

Dato’ Onn had dissolved his multiracial IMP and instead set up Party Negara, a virulently anti-Chinese party. Together with the PMIP, Party Negara was expected to draw Malay votes away from the Alliance. Instead, and despite everyone’s scepticism, the Alliance won an astounding 51 of the 52 seats that were contested and PAS won one seat. Left with no choice after this enormous triumph (making up more than half of the 98-member Consultative Council), the Colonial Government had to allow the Alliance under Tunku Abdul Rahman to form a government in Malaya.

Prior to this, the British had introduced a member system of government in which a few selected members of the nominated Legislative Council were given the responsibility of overseeing certain government departments and answering for these departments in the Council. The High Commissioner nominated to these positions prominent figures in the Malay, Chinese, Tamil and Ceylon Tamil communities who enjoyed some official confidence.

The Tunku, Dato’ Onn, Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman and Tun H.S. Lee had been among the members so appointed. Upon the Alliance’s victory, these nominees were replaced by nominations made by the Tunku in the Federal Executive Council, of which the Tunku was Chief Minister.

The first phase of the Federation of Malaya had been initiated upon the end of the Malayan Union in February 1948. Now began the second phase, during which we would become a self-governing people. The British High Commissioner effectively remained the head of state; however, as Chief Minister, the Tunku was the head of government and he lost no time in showing his independence. One of his first announcements was to say that he was willing to meet Chin Peng, head of the MCP, to negotiate a ceasefire. In a radical move away from British policy, he also offered amnesty to the insurgents.

This rattled the British badly. They were completely against recognising the MCP, let alone seeing them play a role in Malayan politics. But the Tunku was adamant.

Together with Tun Tan and David Marshall,
[4]
 the Singapore Chief Minister, the Tunku met Chin Peng and his right-hand man Rashid Maidin in Baling, in rural Kedah. Chin Peng wanted recognition for the MCP and the right to retain the arms they possessed. But the Tunku demanded the disbanding of the MCP and the surrender of all arms possessed by the guerrillas. Chin Peng refused and returned to the jungle to carry on the fight.
 

This meeting was a great victory for the Tunku. With one deft stroke, he proved to all that he was no British puppet. Henceforth Chin Peng and the MCP would be fighting against Malayans, not as freedom fighters of the country and its people. In effect, Chin Peng made the case as to why the British might still need to stay: to counter armed resistance and insurrection. For all his anti-colonial rhetoric, Chin Peng and his stubborn followers showed that it was the MCP that was now prolonging British colonialism. That put paid to MCP’s charges that the Tunku and the new national political forces that he was leading were nothing but British puppets. It was Chin Peng who was now placed on the defensive. There was no place, the Tunku affirmed, for a party that used force and terror in the politics of Malaya. The Tunku’s credibility as a leader of Malayans of all races was sealed and from that time on, the British had to take him and his quest for independence seriously.

But the Rulers were apprehensive about independence for the Federation of Malaya. They had regained their positions and had obtained the right to choose the 
Menteri Besar
 or Chief Minister of their respective states. Democracy as promoted by the British and espoused by the 
rakyat
 would put an abrupt end to feudal autocracy. The nine Malay rulers—who all had equal status—had been prepared to accept the British High Commissioner as the head of state as he represented the British monarch. But an independent Malaya could accept neither the High Commissioner nor even the British monarch herself in that office.

India had had a similar problem soon after it became independent in 1947. It, however, resolved the problem of hereditary rulers by taking away their titles and reducing them to ordinary citizens. Dr Rajendra Prasad, a commoner, was chosen to be president. A commoner president breached no royal protocol after that. In Indonesia—especially in many parts of Sumatra whose traditional political systems were Muslim Malay sultanates rather than Javanese Hindu-Buddhist sacred states—this problem of protocol was solved by more drastic measures: murder. Royal families were assassinated, and the use of royal titles forbidden.

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