A Doctor in The House: A Memoir of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (28 page)

When the Malay Congress was held in 1946, representatives of Malay organisations from Singapore also attended. Following the founding of UMNO, Singapore Malays decided to set up an UMNO branch in Singapore. This proved a deft move because its links with the politically dominant UMNO in the peninsula earned Singapore’s UMNO leaders recognition from the Chinese-based political parties, including the PAP. Lee’s early plans for Singapore made it clear that he assumed there would be a merger with Malaya. When the Tunku proposed the inclusion of Singapore in a bigger Malayan Federation, Lee eagerly welcomed it. He even aspired to become its Prime Minister, something he knew was entirely possible because the Chinese would make up the biggest racial group in the Federation.

Yet although Singapore was part of Malaya historically and geographically, the Malays of the peninsula did not want the island included in the Federation. By right, Singapore should have been returned to Johor, or at least to Malaya, since it was originally part of 
Tanah Melayu
. But the peninsular Malays had their future to think about. They did not object to the exclusion of Singapore from the Malayan Union proposal, nor did they voice any desire to include Singapore in the Federation before or after Independence. They were fully aware that Singapore’s large and aggressive Chinese community would adversely tilt the delicate racial balance in the peninsula.

At the time of Independence in 1957 the Malays made up only slightly more than half the population of the Malay Peninsula. The Chinese made up more than 30 per cent of the population, the Indians about 10 per cent and the rest comprised a number of other racial groups. Feeding Singapore’s population into this mix would increase both the percentage and absolute numbers of Chinese, making them the biggest community in the new Federation proposed by the Tunku. Inclusion of the natives of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo might have reduced the overall proportion of Chinese, but it would not increase the number and demographic weight of the Malays. It would not affect the standing of the Chinese as the largest ethnic component in the proposed new Federation’s population.

The Malay hold on Malaya was tenuous. Demographically, they had almost been outnumbered in the peninsula before World War II. Politically, their standing was weakened by the post-war MacMichael Treaties, which paved the way for the Malayan Union. When the Sultans signed over practically everything to the British, their Malay subjects banded together in protest. With their numbers and astute political tactics, the Malay people rescued the Rulers and restored the primacy of the Malays in the 
Tanah Melayu
. Grouped and organised together, the Malays succeeded in forcing a change in direction. The Malayan Union and the MacMichael Treaties were revoked and a new Federation was formed instead, and on that basis, Independence was achieved. Throughout all these crucial stages, the Malays of the peninsula were keenly aware of the importance of numbers, of political demography. Being indigenous to the country and its definitive people was symbolically significant; but it counted for less in hard facts than making up the majority of the country. Consequently, they were hesitant about the Tunku’s idea of a bigger Federation that would include Singapore, fearing that they would not remain the majority race.

They had already made a huge cultural concession by giving up the name of their beloved land, now officially called the Federation of Malaya. But the Malay people still referred to it by its emblematic Malay name, 
Persekutuan Tanah Melayu
 or Federation of Malay Lands. Earlier, the Malays had suggested a name for the new country, including the new component states. But 
Melayu Raya
 or Greater Malay Land was rejected collectively by the peoples of Sarawak, Brunei, British North Borneo and Singapore. Reluctant as ever to insist, the Malays acquiesced. The new Federation would be known as Malaysia.

But the risks faced by the Malays did not end there. The Tunku had not considered that the population of Singapore at that time was bigger than the combined population of Sarawak and North Borneo. The indigenous peoples made up about 75 per cent of the population in these two states and the Chinese were also about 75 per cent of the population of Singapore. But since its population was bigger, the Singapore Chinese easily outnumbered the indigenous peoples in Sarawak and North Borneo. Even if the majority populations in both states voted together with the peninsular Malays in solidarity against all others, the Chinese in Singapore would still be dominant. So the Tunku had miscalculated. He had assumed that overall, by including Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei, the indigenous population would outweigh the Chinese population, thus preserving Malay primacy in the 
Tanah Melayu
.

As far as it can be ascertained, the Tunku had not fully consulted anyone in UMNO about his proposal to expand the Federation. Certainly no proper study was done first—had UMNO done a feasibility study, things might have been different. There should have been full, open party discussions before any steps were taken. My own firm belief was that the British put the Tunku up to it, planting in his mind a pleasing but hardly workable idea, because they did not think their North Borneo colonies could survive as independent states. They feared Indonesia had further ambitions after it had demanded Dutch Western New Guinea and got what it wanted. Would Sabah and Sarawak, which they claimed as integral parts of their island province of Kalimantan, be their next target? The British looked to Malaya and the Tunku to block any such move. Britain was fearful then, as were many others, of Sukarno,
[3]
 who was the bogeyman of the region.
 

The Tunku eventually realised that his assumption was wrong. He tried to get the PAP to agree not to be involved in politics outside of Singapore, but this solution was highly untenable. In effect, he was asking for an understanding with the most powerful political party in Singapore at the time to limit its political ambitions to its own corner of the country. His request had no legal basis and would not be binding upon any other party that might come to power in Singapore. Not even the PAP felt bound to honour the understanding.

In 1964, the year after Malaysia was inaugurated, the PAP reached into the peninsula, appealing to racist sentiments in order to gain power over the new nation. The Tunku’s negotiations with the PAP to confine itself to Singapore politics were not made known to UMNO members and mid-level leaders in the party divisions. The Malays in general were apprehensive about their ability to promote their interests and to gain real benefit from the enlarged Federation. They had given up their 
Tanah Melayu
 for Malaysia—what more would they be asked to give up to make Malaysia acceptable to the peoples of the other four territories?

Once Indonesia and the Philippines objected to the formation of Malaysia, it was too late for UMNO or the Malays to protest. We in Malaya could not object without appearing to support Indonesia and the Philippines. To prevent being accused of being disloyal, the Malays of the peninsula were forced to accept the risk of the Singapore Chinese tilting the balance of the races in the proposed Malaysia. Between risking charges of treachery and the potential threat of Chinese numbers, the Malays chose the latter. Yet the Chinese in Singapore, being mostly wealthy, were not used to the ways of the Malays. They knew them only as servants and as members of the poor labouring class of Singapore. By looking down on the Malays, they may also have underestimated the community’s strength.

Brilliant lawyer that he was, Lee could not claim to have not understood the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, which was to be the basis of the Constitution of Malaysia. It included clear provisions for the special position of the Malays, which would surely be extended to the natives or indigenous peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo, and also the Singapore Malays. He would have noticed that the delineation of the Federation’s electoral constituencies favoured the rural areas where Malays and other indigenous people lived. The urban areas may have had larger population concentrations but, partly for that reason, the number of urban constituencies was smaller. Mainly Chinese, these urban areas would have a proportionally smaller number of representatives to Parliament compared to the rural constituencies. So long as this fact was accepted, it would balance out the higher number of Chinese voters.

Not the kind of person to be content with a secondary role, Lee saw Malaysia as his chance to dominate a substantial nation and become its Prime Minister. The Singapore of the early 1960s was too small for him and his ambitions. Malaysia was a real country, not a city-state and to become Prime Minister of Malaysia would satisfy his ambitions, especially for power and a more than municipal role. The disparities between the Malays and the non-Malays did not concern him. He was counting on the Chinese in Singapore and throughout Malaysia to support his party and thus shoulder aside the MCA and UMNO. He denounced what he called Malay racism, but in expecting the Chinese to support him as a Chinese who would uphold Chinese interests, he revealed himself as a racist.

Apparently unaware of these undercurrents, the Tunku was satisfied with the support he got from Singapore and the Borneo territories for the creation of Malaysia. The refusal of Brunei to join was for him a small matter. He did not think that it would change the equation in terms of the mix of races. He expected the PAP and Lee to respect their informal understanding with him, which was not to meddle in the politics of the other states of Malaysia. The Tunku continued to believe that the Alliance would win huge majorities in those states and so rule the country as a whole, while the PAP would do no more than rule Singapore and represent it with a limited number of seats in the Federal Parliament. In the Tunku’s mind, the PAP would never have enough seats in the Malaysian Parliament to form the government.

But Lee had no intention of accepting Tunku’s views of what was good for Malaysia and of Singapore’s limited place within it. The PAP was overtly a multiracial party but the Indians and the small number of Malays were just window-dressing. Effectively, it was a Chinese party. Moreover, as a Singapore Chinese, Lee appeared not to appreciate that there was a difference between the Singapore Chinese and the Chinese of peninsular Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak. The latter lived among ordinary Malays, had known Malay dignitaries—even royals—and had in some measure accepted, accommodated themselves to, and even practised elements of Malay culture. Living in peace with the Malays, they did not care to rock the boat. Initially, they had not been happy with the Malay opposition to the Malayan Union that denied them equal citizenship with the Malays. But when the communist insurgency was launched, the less extreme Chinese—who made up the majority—identified with neither the ambitions nor the violence of the communists. Instead, in 1949, they founded the MCA, to fight for better access to citizenship in the Federation of Malaya. On their behalf the MCA leader Tun Tan Cheng Lock championed the principle of 
jus soli
 or the common right to citizenship for all who were born in the country, regardless of origins and descent, to citizenship.

UMNO and the Malays had preferred 
jus sanguinis
 or citizenship by descent, through birth to at least one parent who was already a Malayan citizen. This criterion would have reduced considerably the number of Chinese Malayan citizens. But for the municipal elections in Kuala Lumpur in 1952, when UMNO and MCA made the momentous decision to cooperate, Sino-Malay political ties through the Alliance would not have been possible. By the time the Tunku proposed Malaysia, the Chinese of the MCA were quite comfortable working with the Malays of UMNO. And while non-Malay access to citizenship remained restricted until 1957, it was enlarged considerably in the following years. The Chinese of the peninsular states were not as receptive to the PAP’s appeals, or to Lee’s own views of Chinese political identity and action.

Shortly after Malaysia was inaugurated, Lee rolled out his plan for achieving power in Malaysia. He believed the PAP could oust the MCA from the Alliance and take its place. In his book 
Looking Back
, the Tunku quoted from several of Lee’s speeches and statements, all obviously anti-Malay. “None of the three major racial groups—Chinese, Malays and Indians—can claim to be more native to Malaysia than the others,” he declared, “because all their ancestors came to Malaysia not more than 1,000 years ago.” The Tunku countered by pointing to the history of the United States. The English people were the first people to settle there. When in 1776 the American colonies became independent, it was considered to be an “English” country. Thereafter, immigrants from Europe poured in and settled into the American Anglo-Saxon way of life. They accepted English as their national language and mother tongue and for a long time they did not question that only WASPs—white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants—could become President. Catholics were unacceptable until the swearing-in of John F. Kennedy.

In a limited, technical sense, Malays may be immigrants. Some anthropologists believe that they originated from South China long before recorded history. But that does not put them on the same level as the white Americans, Australians, New Zealanders, the Spanish and Portuguese of Latin America and others of recent overseas colonial settlement, as some would argue. No one thinks of the Malays as migrants in this sense. Those migrants who settled earlier in the peninsula saw the Malays as the definitive people, and without protest, adapted to the Malay culture and language. They accommodated themselves to what they found among the local Malays, and much of Malay culture was adopted by the Baba and Nyonya, or Straits Chinese, and incorporated into their own local Chinese way of life.

While in many countries immigrants with citizenship are officially regarded as formally equal to original citizens, they are often denied significant public posts unless they convert to the religion of the majority, who are considered the definitive people. Such discrimination is not grounded in law, but it is subtly practised. While everyday acts of prejudice may be nothing more than the turning of a blind eye or a deaf ear, their occurrence demonstrates the absence of honest equality even in those countries that boast of having achieved it. Malaysia has been no worse than many of the countries of the West that criticise its Malay-centric multiculturalism, and is decidedly better than many of them in providing and assuring a place under its sun for those of immigrant origins. Like many of Malaysia’s Western critics, Lee failed to recognise that Malaya’s accommodation of its non-Malay immigrant communities greatly reduced the force of Chinese grievances which he could exploit in Malaysia.