A Doctor in The House: A Memoir of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (32 page)

During those six weeks, the communal campaigning was vicious. Tempers frayed and inter-communal tensions mounted. All parties played on racial issues and the emotions they engendered. Each tried to outdo the other with increasingly racist statements at every successive campaign meeting. One Opposition worker and one Alliance party worker from Penang UMNO were killed during that period. The exhausting six-week campaign provided plenty of scope for relations to sour between the races and parties in the Alliance. Invectives were venomously hurled as each side tried to demonise the other. I felt the pressure in my own constituency, but since it was a Malay-majority constituency and I had retained my popularity with the Malays over the past five years, I believed I could still win even if I lost Chinese votes.

I thought my chances against my PAS opponent were good, because the strong antagonism between the Chinese and PAS would work to my and the Alliance’s advantage. Non-Malays dreaded the Islamism of PAS, while PAS showed open hatred for the Chinese and Indians. The party talked of imposing Islamic laws on everyone irrespective of religion. UMNO, on the other hand, had guaranteed the rights of the non-Muslims, assuring them that they would not be subjected to Islamic laws.

But such reasoning did not take into account the powerful anti-Alliance and anti-Malay feelings that surged among non-Malays, especially the Chinese, as the protracted campaign continued. It seemed inconceivable that they would snub UMNO and the Alliance and register their disapproval of Malay political claims by casting their votes for PAS. I had won by more than 4,000 votes in 1964. Even if the Chinese voters, because of their suspicions of me as a so-called “Malay ultra”, refused to vote for me this time, I thought I would still retain my seat. I believed that they would either abstain or spoil their votes if they wished to register their protest, but I did not anticipate that they might actually vote for an Opposition party they disliked so intensely.

If they did so, I would have had to double the number of additional Malay votes cast for me in order to win: 3,500 to replace Chinese votes withdrawn from me, and 3,500 more to make up for the Chinese votes which went towards PAS. That was an impossible gap to close. As it turned out, in the polling stations where the Chinese voters were in the majority, nearly all their votes went to PAS. I lost the election by just under 1,000 votes.

The same swing and pattern was seen elsewhere in Kedah. On his rounds during polling day, the Tunku was shocked to see Chinese voters in his constituency going to the booths belonging to PAS. Normally they would have given these booths a wide berth. Even though the Tunku won, it was with a reduced majority (3,504 in 1969 as against 11,647 in 1964). Other UMNO candidates including stalwarts like Khir, Tun Fatimah Hashim
[7]
 and Tun Zahir Ismail
[8]
 all won with much reduced majorities as well. Senu, then the Secretary-General of UMNO, actually lost his seat. A similar quake was also reflected in the national results. While the Alliance won the General Election, it was with a much-reduced majority. UMNO members were, to say the least, shaken.
 

Losing my Parliamentary seat hurt terribly and on the ride home with Hasmah, I could not help shedding tears. The taste of defeat was unfamiliar and it was painful. I was also angry at the Chinese, in particular the MCA, who I felt were responsible for my defeat and with it the undermining of my political future. I felt betrayed. I realised however, that the Chinese did not really want PAS to govern the country. They knew it could not win enough seats to form the Federal Government, but they wanted to serve notice on the Alliance Party that they should not be taken for granted. They had played a crucial role in all the Alliance’s electoral victories so their demands should be given serious consideration. They wished to be heard, and were so angry that they were prepared to hurt to make this happen. I swore that I would never again cooperate with them.

As I returned home that night, I had no idea of either the coming violent aftermath of the election or the long-term political lessons that would be drawn from it and given form in the New Economic Policy. When it was eventually implemented, Malaysia would have a plan for redressing the problems of the Malays and a way to create social peace and equitable economic development. This would assure the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, that their own stake in the country and their prospects for economic advancement would not be diminished just so that Malays might enjoy support and progress. But much would have to take place first before this could happen.

ENDNOTES

[
1
] Established in 1956, the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) is a government agency that manages the resettlement of the rural poor onto farms in newly developed areas.
 

[
2
] The (lower) House of Representatives in Parliament.
 

[
3
] Bank Negara Malaysia is the country’s Central Bank, and was established on 26 January 1959.
 

[
4
] Tan Sri Mohd Khir Johari served in the Cabinet of three Prime Ministers. His last Cabinet portfolio was as Trade and Industry Minister in 1972.
 

[
5
] From the 1960s, Assistant Ministers were called Deputy Ministers.
 

[
6
] Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, or the Institute of Language and Literature, is a Government agency that oversees the use of the Malay language in the country.
 

[
7
] Tun Fatimah Hashim was head of Kaum Ibu Malaya, later known as Wanita UMNO, for 16 years. She was the country’s first woman Minister, and held the post of Welfare Minister from 1969 to 1973.
 

[
8
] Tun Zahir Ismail was the country’s longest-serving Speaker in the Lower House of Parliament, holding the post for six terms over 22 years.
 

The Alliance won the 1969 General Election, but its members were shocked by its reduced number of seats, both at federal and state levels.

It also lost Penang to Gerakan, a party formed just before the polls by Tun Dr Lim Chong Eu’s
[1]
 faction of the MCA and an assortment of academics and politicians dissatisfied with the Government.
[2]
 In Perak, the PPP increased its share of state seats considerably while the DAP and Gerakan defeated many MCA candidates in Selangor. In the end, the Alliance could not form the Government in these two states.
 

Had all the Opposition parties, including PAS, been able to come to a consensus, they could have formed a state government in Perak. In all the peninsular states except Johor—traditionally an UMNO stronghold—support for both UMNO and MCA had eroded badly. In Parliament, the Alliance won 74 out of 140 seats compared to 89 out of 100 seats in 1964. The majority was enough to form a government, but a weak one.

The Opposition parties were jubilant and did not hide it. They behaved as if they had won the General Election. The Chinese-based DAP and Gerakan, in particular, were elated by their success and wanted to celebrate on the streets of Kuala Lumpur. The police gave them permission to hold a procession in certain areas but they ignored the designated routes and deliberately headed towards the old Malay settlement of Kampung Baru.

Given the unusual level of tension during the long election campaign, the decision to allow this celebration was, in my opinion, unwise. Many non-Malays who predominated in the crowd made rude remarks and gestures. They taunted the Kampung Baru Malays with such cries as 
Melayu balik kampung
 (Malays, go back to your kampongs), and “This is our country now”. What had started as a celebration was turning into something very different.

The next day, May 13, the Kampung Baru Malays, joined by Malays from areas around Kuala Lumpur, mounted a counter-celebration. When the large crowd went out of control, Kuala Lumpur’s fateful racial riots ensued.

Trouble had long been brewing and some of us had seen it coming. I had tried to alert the Tunku to the signs but he did not give me a hearing. In the two years leading to the 1969 General Election, antagonism between Malays and Chinese had risen sharply. The constitutional provision of certain privileges for the Malays and other indigenous people had been openly questioned by many Chinese as well as the PPP’s Seenivasagam brothers. In their largely Chinese constituencies near Ipoh, they had strong local support against the MCA and the Alliance.

Around this time, 11 Chinese men were found guilty of treason and sentenced to death for their crime. Malay suspicion of the Chinese was further aggravated by the Tunku’s decision to have these men’s sentences commuted to life imprisonment after the case attracted condemnation and appeals for clemency from all over the world. The Tunku said that he had even received an appeal from the Pope. Many countries were abolishing the death sentence at the time, and they saw imposing the sentence for treason, rather than murder, as political and therefore unacceptable. Yet his decision, his readiness as ever to be unduly conciliatory and give way to Chinese demands, angered the Malay community and contributed to his growing unpopularity. I could identify with that sense of Malay disappointment myself.

Many Chinese also refused to serve in the armed forces or the police as they disliked spending time doing something that earned them little in return. The general feeling on the ground was that while the Chinese wanted the privileges of citizenship, they were unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities.

The PAP of Singapore also did its bit to increase Chinese dissatisfaction with the status quo, in which the Malays apparently wielded more political power than the other races. In the 1964 General Election, the PAP had used the slogan “Malaysian Malaysia”, creating the subtext that the status quo meant a 
Malay 
Malaysia. The PAP clearly did not see the Malaysia they joined as a country for all Malaysians. The party lost the 1964 elections but continued to talk about a Malaysian Malaysia—even after Singapore was expelled. The PAP mantle was now draped over the DAP, a party formed by Malaysian Chinese members of the PAP. By persisting with the Malaysian Malaysia campaign, the DAP incited Chinese chauvinism and so helped stoke the fires of Malay racialism.

On their part, the Malays became emotional and argued their case poorly. Officials at the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka were always promoting the Malay language and urging everybody to speak it. They failed to point out that while Malay was designated the national and official language, other languages could be used freely, including for instruction in schools. Nowhere else in Southeast Asia was this permitted, let alone guaranteed by law.
[3]
 

But the Chinese did not seem to appreciate these finer points and the fairness of the Constitution of Malaysia. Dr Tan, as well as the DAP leaders, harped upon Malay rights and privileges as if in Malaysia only Malays had rights and others had none.

Although the Malays are masters of political nuance, ironically, in argument, they often lack subtlety and emphasise the wrong things. They also take pride in themselves for all the wrong reasons. They like to emphasise their 
ketuanan
, that is, their being masters of the country, even though they are not. The PAP never talked of the Chinese being masters of Singapore because they did not need to. Everyone knew this was the case.

The PAP wanted a “Malaysian Malaysia” because they knew that, without positive discrimination in favour of the Malays, the Chinese would dominate every field, including the Government. Even in Malaysia today, despite all the so-called privileges and opportunities enjoyed by Malays and other indigenous people, there are proportionately more educated and professional Chinese and Indians than Malays. In business, the Malays still lag very far behind. Thirty-six years after the NEP, they have managed to achieve only a 20 per cent ownership of economic equity when 30 per cent was the original goal. Yet as I have often argued, blaming others is not the solution; the Malays themselves must accept a good part of the blame for the community’s under-performance.

When the May 13 riots broke out in Kuala Lumpur, I was on my way to the city by road. I was hoping to see UMNO colleagues and leaders to discuss why I had lost my Kota Star Selatan parliamentary seat. At Tanjung Malim, about an hour from the capital, I was stopped by the police who asked me to turn back.

I had expected something to happen, but nothing of the scale and violence of the riots. I feared that violence might spill over and the Chinese living in Malay-dominated states would be in danger. As it turned out, those living in rural areas among the Malays were not touched and the situation outside of Kuala Lumpur remained calm. There was no outward animosity and no confrontation from either side.

Tan Sri Abdullah Ahmad, who was then the political secretary to Tun Razak, said he had been horrified to witness a Malay man chasing a Chinese man and stabbing him. Malays outside of the city did not condemn the riots even though there was general anger in the community. But they were mindful of the Government’s order not to take any action independently.

When I finally made it to Kuala Lumpur a few days later, the city looked like a war zone. I was shocked to see the extent of the damage. Many buildings had been blackened by fire and the skeletons of numerous burnt-out cars blocked the streets. Here and there, black smoke still rose as another building was torched. Officially, more than 100 people, mainly Chinese, were killed. The atmosphere was very quiet and strained. Other than the strong police and military presence, few people were to be seen and all the shops were closed. I thought it was the end of Malaysia as we knew it. Malays and Chinese, I thought, would never be able to work together after this. I even wondered whether I would ever dare go into a Chinese shop again.