A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (79 page)

Solutions proposed for this particular problem include inviting working-age immigrants from more ‘youthful’ countries, typically developing countries, which is in practice already happening to some extent. There are also hopes that advanced technology can help out. And, most realistically of all, there are calls for the retirement age (officially still 60, but in practice often 65 or beyond) to be lifted sooner rather than later. Some people even want a fundamental redefinition of ‘elderly’ to start at 75 rather than 65, though this is surely not quite so realistic. A significant number of aged nations are indeed proposing to raise their retirement age by two or three years, and this will very likely happen shortly in Japan’s case too. Plans are already in place for a modest rise.

Other problems associated with an aged society include increased pension and other benefit costs, increased health expenditure, increased insurance costs, increased need for special care institutions, reduced tax income for the government (both from the elderly themselves and from those family members – typically women – who stay at home to look after elderly relatives rather than going into the workforce), and so forth. To address these complications in an aged society, the government started building more homes for the elderly, and introduced a nursing care insurance scheme in the late 1990s. This was considered a better and more politically correct option than the Silver Columbia Plan (‘silver’ being a frequently used reference to the elderly), which had been backed in the mid 1980s by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and aimed to ‘export’ the elderly – with their consent of course – to retirement villages in places such as north-western Australia.
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The plan occasioned widespread – but not universal – opposition and was presently replaced in 1989 by the Golden Plan produced by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which promised to increase welfare facilities for the aged.

In 2011 Japan faced a very difficult time with regard to its economy – but of course not just its economy – as a result of the catastrophic magnitude 9.0 earthquake of 11 March off its north-eastern coast, near
Sendai (now known as the T
hoku Earthquake, named after the region). As the world knows, this triggered a massive tsunami causing even more severe damage. Around a million homes were affected, many of them destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of people were displaced. Fatalities were around 20,000, and precise numbers will likely never be known. As if the earthquake and tsunami were not in themselves enough, a further anxiety was radioactive leakage from damaged nuclear facilities that threatened a Chernobyl-type scenario. It was the biggest earthquake ever recorded in Japan, and one of the biggest recorded anywhere in the world. Significant shocks were felt as far south as T
ky
and beyond. It is also the world’s most expensive natural disaster, with early estimates as high as US$300 billion. The disaster was broadcast immediately around the globe, and few will be able to forget powerful images such as the tsunami carrying a burning house further inland, in a deadly combination of fire and flood.

From an economics perspective, the prognosis is that the economy for 2011 and probably also 2012 will suffer badly – for example, the Nikkei dropped 6 per cent within hours after the earthquake – but should recover relatively quickly once rebuilding can start in earnest, hopefully within a year or so.

7.2   A Political Merry-Go-Round

Internationally, the bursting of Japan’s Bubble quickly lessened tensions with the west, and to a lesser extent also with some Asian nations. One major reason for this reduction in tensions was that it also deflated much – but not all – of the hard-line nationalism that had arisen during the Bubble years. Most western economists had felt the bursting of the Bubble was inevitable, though it had lasted longer than expected and was starting to cast doubt on their predictions. Its bursting gave reassurance to the world that economic laws did work after all, and could not be flouted by a Japanese ‘economic miracle’. It also meant the end of fears of Japan buying up the entire world. Perhaps even more importantly, in a broader sense it deflated Japanese arrogance. The Pacific War had deflated their sense of superiority in military terms, and the burst Bubble and its ensuing recession now did the same in economic terms. It was not exactly a loss for Japan, for it still remained a very mighty economic superpower, but it did show that it was not invincible.

The Japanese public, however, were less reassured. They were angry enough already about Japan’s wealth not being used to improve the quality of life for ordinary Japanese. The collapse of the economy now seemed to indicate that real improvements would be postponed yet again. Even more importantly, it threatened to undo much of the hard work and sacrifice they had offered in the cause of the nation.

To make matters worse, yet more scandals involving politicians were coming to light. In 1992 another major one broke, the Sagawa Ky
bin Scandal. Once again large numbers of politicians and officials were seen to have received large sums of money in return for favours, this time to the Sagawa Company (a parcel delivery service). Once again leading figures such as Takeshita and Nakasone were involved. The involvement of the underworld was also apparent.

Public anger was so great over the combination of economic collapse, continuing poor quality of life, and continuing corruption in the government that in October that year a major in the Self-Defence Forces, Yanai Shinsaku, even publicly mooted the idea of a military coup.
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There was great public sympathy for his claim that politicians were feathering their nests while the nation suffered, and that corruption had to be stopped. There was less sympathy, however, for his idea of letting the military take things into their own hands. Most Japanese very much wanted to avoid that, for Japan had been down that road before and paid the price for it. Yanai was dismissed.

Yanai was not the only one to be dismissed. So too was the LDP, in July the following year. In June 1993 a vote of no confidence was moved against Miyazawa Kiichi, the prime minister since November 1991. As finance minister in 1989 Miyazawa had resigned over the Recruit Scandal. On his return to politics he had tried to placate the public by promising to make Japan a ‘lifestyle superpower’. This was clearly not happening. The vote against him led to a snap election the following month. In the election the LDP failed to gain a majority in the important Lower House (also known as the House of Representatives), winning only 223 of the then 511 seats.
²¹

The public had had enough, and the 38–year unbroken regime of the LDP was brought to an end. The change of emperor had not brought about any great improvement. Perhaps a change of government would.

The change of government, however, was not in fact so very great. Conservatives still ruled. Miyazawa’s successor as prime minister, Hosokawa Morihiro, was a former LDP man and grandson of the immediate prewar
prime minister Prince Konoe. Hosokawa headed an alliance of some seven parties, many of which had been formed in haste just prior to the election. He did manage to initiate legislation that brought significant changes to the electoral system,
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but he too was soon forced to resign through involvement in scandal.

From the public’s perspective, it was all a case of déj`a vu. Conservatives ruled, scandals continued. Japan Incorporated was conducting business as normal. Already further angered by the economic recession and serious weakening of the ‘lifetime employment’ ideal, the Japanese public severely criticised the government at the start of 1995, on the occasion of the K
be Earthquake that killed over 5,000 people. The public felt that the government’s response was too ineffective, with some observing that the yakuza – Japan’s organised underworld – did a better job than the government in providing emergency food and shelter. Moreover, the government, along with its ‘partner’ big business, was seriously criticised for what were evidently corrupt building practices that had weakened structures in the first place.
²³
In fact, in what might be seen as a political mock heroic gesture, in local elections in 1995 two former comedians – Aoshima ‘Nasty Gran’ Yukio and Yokoyama ‘Knock’ Isamu – were chosen to be governors of T
ky
and
saka respectively.