A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (87 page)

A rational consideration of Japan’s whaling shows the activity is not in the nation’s [Japan’s] interest. Whaling forces Japan to lie on the international stage – claiming the slaughter is for scientific purposes, when all the evidence shows it is for commercial gain and to soothe those nationalists who regard whale meat as a defining item of Japan’s culinary culture. That subterfuge is demeaning for a country that is a key to international trade and proud of its role as a respected world citizen.
⁶⁰

To gain some ‘quantifiable’ idea of Japan’s standing in the world at this present time, it is worthwhile to examine a number of international indexes – presented here in no particular order. No detailed analysis will be attempted, but for the purpose of comparison three other nations are given, namely Korea, the UK, and the USA. All rankings are aggregated across various criteria. In annual indexes, only the years 2009 and 2010 are given. Readers may wish to check out for themselves more details for their own nations and for earlier years for the four countries given below.

The
Prosperity Index
(by the Legatum Institute) involves scrutiny of 110 nations based on nine factors, namely economic infrastructure, democratic institutions, health, governance, social capital, entrepreneurship/innovation, education, safety/security, and personal freedom.
⁶¹
In 2009 Japan was ranked 16th, and 18th in 2010. By way of comparison, in 2009 Korea was 26th, and 27th in 2010; in 2009 the UK was 12th, and in 2010 it was 13th; and the USA in 2009 was 9th, and 10th in 2010.

Next there is the
Human Development Index
, involving 169 countries based on income, life expectancy, and education.
⁶²
In 2009 Japan was 10th, and in 2010 it was 11th; in 2009 Korea was 26th, but in 2010 it had leaped to 12th; in 2009 the UK was 21st, and in 2010 it had slid to Korea’s former spot, 26th; in 2009 the USA was 13th, but in 2010 it had advanced to 4th.

The
Ease of Doing Business Index
, conducted by the World Bank and covering 183 nations, shows that in 2009 Japan was 13th, and 15th in 2010; Korea was 23rd in 2009, and 19th in 2010; the UK was 6th in 2009 and 5th in 2010; and the USA was 4th in 2009 and retained that position in 2010.

The next is the somewhat controversial
Transparency Index
, also known as the
Corruption Perception Index
, involving 180 nations.
⁶³
In 2009 Japan was 17th, and retained that position in 2010; in 2009 Korea was 39th, and also retained that position in 2010; in 2009 the UK was 17th (equal with Japan), but in 2010 had slipped to 20th; in 2009 the USA was 19th, but in 2010 similarly slipped to 22nd.

Another index is an apparently one-off
Happiness Index
, also known as the
Satisfaction with Life Index
, devised by Adrian White and presented in 2006. It is based on direct questions put to participants in 178 countries. Japan was 90th, that is to say just in the lower half; Korea was 102nd; the UK was 41st; and the USA 23rd.

There are several organisations that conduct a
Quality of Life Index
. The most established is that by the magazine
International Living
. There are nine criteria for evaluation: cost of living, culture and leisure, economy, environment, freedom, health, infrastructure, safety and risk, and climate. According to their results for 194 countries, in 2009 Japan was 23rd, but in 2010 had slipped to 36th; Korea was 32nd in 2009 but slipped to 42nd in 2010; the UK was 20th in 2009 but slipped to 25th in 2010; and the USA was 3rd in 2009 but was down to 7th in 2010. Clearly, perceptions of the quality of life in all these four nations slipped quite significantly.
⁶⁴

As another separate example of a
Quality of Life Index
, one can refer to that produced in 2005 (seemingly a one-off snapshot) by the
The Economist
Intelligence Unit, surveying 111 nations based on health, family life, community life, material well-being, political stability, climate, job security, political freedom, and gender equality.
⁶⁵
Japan was 17th; Korea 30th; the UK 29th; and the USA 13th.

Finally there is the
Global Gender Gap Report
, run annually by the World Economic Forum in Geneva. It involves 134 countries, and is based on four criteria: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, political empowerment, and health and survival. In 2009 Japan was 101st, and in 2010 moved up to 94th; Korea was 115th in 2009 and moved up to 104th in 2010; the UK was 15th in 2009 and retained that position in 2010; the USA was 31st in 2009 and moved up to 19th in 2010.

There is one conclusion regarding the
Gender Gap Report
for Japan that should be noted. Notwithstanding ‘the lost 230,000 centenarians’ (as discussed above), Japanese women are still very likely the longest lived – or
at least among the longest-lived – in the world, and so Japan scores highly on that matter. Similarly, educational attainment for women is good, with 54 per cent of women going on to tertiary education in 2008, compared with 56 per cent for males, though postgraduate figures strongly favour males. Where it falls down is in the matter of empowerment, not just politically – with typically only two women in a cabinet of around 19 politicians – but also in the business world, with only about 10 per cent of managerial positions occupied by women. It would seem that Japan has some way yet to go to achieve real gender equality.

Japan’s population peaked in 2004 at 127,878,000, and by 2010 it had reduced to 127,177,000. Females totalled 65,309,000, and males were 61,868,000. Thus women had a slight numerical advantage over males, but this was only in the 50 years-old or more range, with women living around five years longer. This pattern is not unique to Japan.

In a global age, as an indication of internationalisation one can also consider the interface between Japan and the rest of the world in terms of Japanese living overseas and foreigners living in Japan.

For official figures regarding foreign residents it is necessary to go back a few years to 2008, at which point the total population of Japan was 127,692,000, and for comparison, in order to establish trends, we can also consider 1985, when Japan’s population was 121,049,000.

In 1985 there were 850,000 foreigners resident in Japan (0.7 per cent of the total population), and by 2008 there were 2,217,000 (1.7 per cent). This represents an increase between a doubling and a trebling of foreigner presence, though the figures and percentages are still quite low by international standards. The largest group in 1985 were Koreans, who numbered 683,000 – that is, 80 per cent of the then foreign population. By 2008 this had dropped to 589,000 (27 per cent). Conversely, Chinese numbered only 75,000 in 1985 (9 per cent of the foreign presence), whereas in 2008 they had increased to 655,000 (30 per cent), thereby becoming the largest foreigner group. Increasing numbers of Brazilians came to Japan during the Bubble years (and beyond), as part of a policy by the Japanese government to reduce labour costs, and they continue to increase their presence. Many of them are of ethnic Japanese descent, as a result of significant migration from Japan to South America (especially Brazil) a century or so ago. In 1985 there were just 1,995 Brazilians in Japan (0.02 per cent of the foreign presence), whereas in 2008 there were 312,582 (14 per cent). Regarding other source areas, there are not really any others of major statistical significance. For example, in 1985 there were 32,339 North Americans (3.8 per cent of the foreign presence), whereas in 2008 the number had increased to 67,729 but the percentage had dropped a little (3.1 per cent), and Europeans rose from 19,473 in 1985 (2.3 per cent of the foreign presence) to 61,875 in 2008 (2.8 per cent).
⁶⁶

As for Japanese living overseas for three months or longer, including those with permanent residence and dual nationality, figures for 1985 are not available but those for 1990 are.
⁶⁷
In 1990 there were 620,000 Japanese living abroad, and this increased in 2008 to 1,116,000. The United States was the main country for Japanese living overseas, with 236,000 in 1990 and 386,000 in 2008; China had 22,000 in 1990 and 126,000 in 2008;
⁶⁸
Australia had 15,000 in 1990 and 66,000 in 2008; the UK had 44,000 in 1990 and 63,000 in 2008; Brazil had 105,000 in 1990 dropping to 61,000 in 2008.
⁶⁹
Perhaps surprisingly, Korea comes quite far down, with just 6,000 in 1990 and 27,000 in 2008.

Thus, from the indexes we can see that Japan is generally held in quite high regard, its worst ranking being in the
Global Gender Gap Report
, and that is something that the government should perhaps pay more attention to – sooner rather than later.

From the ‘foreign presence’ statistics it can be seen that Japan is playing a relatively active part in the global community, with considerable increases both in foreigners living in Japan and Japanese living in foreign countries, though the absolute figures are still low by international standards.

Nonetheless, Japan in recent decades has had a great impact on the world community, not just in economic terms but also in technological and cultural terms. Its economic impact has already been demonstrated. With regard to technological developments, Japan has shown itself to be a world leader, and indeed an innovator, largely casting off the former image of mere borrower and adaptor. In cultural terms, Japan had already had an impact on the world as early as the popular artistic
orientalisme
in late nineteenth century France and elsewhere. Some of its supposedly traditional cultural practices and items, such as the tea ceremony and
ikebana
, actually had their origins in China but over the centuries became modified Japanese-style, and are known as Japanese around the world. And in the last two decades we are seeing a cultural impact on the world in the form of
manga
and
animé
and video games – a development aided by technology, and characterised by a certain youthfulness and playfulness, quite fitting for a (post-)postmodern global age.

Japan is not simply an economic superpower, it is also a technological and cultural superpower. It is to be hoped that the disaster of 11 March
2011 does not diminish its status. There is a possibility that, resilient as the Japanese may be, the disaster is of such catastrophic proportions that there may be a resurfacing of the anxiety felt during the late 1990s in particular, indeed even worse than that time.

Review of Part Seven

Upon Hirohito’s death and the accession of Akihito to the imperial throne early in 1989, the Japanese public hoped for a new beginning. They hoped that issues related to Japan’s prewar and wartime behaviour could finally be put to bed. They hoped that their labours in building Japan the Economic Superpower would be rewarded by a better distribution of wealth and a better infrastructure. They hoped for greater transparency in the political world and an end to scandals. Some were also wary of the growth in some quarters of an arrogant nationalism based on Japan’s economic success, and how this might be perceived overseas.

The public were to be disappointed. In politics, it was the same old tune being played, with leading LDP figures being involved in the Recruit Scandal just a few months later. The same year, Ishihara Shintar
published a highly controversial book demonstrating a deeply entrenched ultranationalistic stance and irritating many westerners with his extraordinary comments. Most significantly, with regard to the economy, the Bubble burst at the end of that year, threatening to undo all the hard work that the public had put in.

Inevitably a recession followed, but it was longer than many expected, going well into the next millennium. Soon there were layoffs. Even managers and senior staff at major companies, who thought they had the protection of ‘lifetime employment’ were dismissed in droves, proving that at best lifetime employment was an ideal and not a guarantee. Loyalty and the work ethic declined seriously, and people became disillusioned and felt cheated. One consequence has been the growth of casual workers known as freeters, and of those completely averse to work, known as NEETs, along with another group who have withdrawn from society entirely, known as
hikikomori
. The LDP was toppled initially, for the first time in decades, in 1993, but after a flurry of activity in forming alliances they were soon back in power by the mid 1990s. This brought on a period of enduring political apathy. To add to their woes there were two major anxiety-generating events in 1995, the devastating K
be Earthquake of January and the sarin gas attacks in March on the T
ky
subway system by the AUM Shinriky
religious cult. Commentators talked of widespread anxiety and a loss of direction.