A Secret Life (26 page)
Authors: Benjamin Weiser
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Germany, #World, #True Crime, #Espionage
Although Gull seems to have eluded his surveillants, his evasive actions must have convinced the surveillants that their target had been guilty of something and his description made matter of record for future reference.In addition to these two incidents, there have been problems with casuals [bystanders] on several of the exchanges, one or more of whom may have been sufficiently suspicious to report the incident, i.e. an unidentified man in furtive contact with a momentarily stopped diplomatic vehicle, and furnished a physical description. It thus seems to me probable that [Polish counterintelligence] has on file a physical description of Gull as a person possibly in clandestine contact with [foreign intelligence].Fortunately, Gull is a rather slight individual of unprepossessing appearance and no singular or prominent physical characteristics. Moreover, in civilian clothes he would be unlikely to be taken for the senior military officer he is. His description, in itself, has not and probably will not lead to Gull. However, were suspicions to be directed at Gull for other reasons, a damaging comparison conceivably could be made.We have no way of knowing on what grounds the Poles and/or Soviets believe that there have been significant leaks of important information on Warsaw Pact matters, but there seems little doubt that there is serious concern about this, and that counterintelligence activity to identify the source of such leaks has intensified. On at least four occasions, known or suspected leaks have involved material which Gull’s office was in some way involved in preparing, although these documents apparently had fairly wide dissemination within the [General] Staff, and the suspected leakage would not necessarily be attributed to Gull’s office on that basis. . . .I consider it vital that we make every effort to determine exactly what is happening to Gull’s substantive reporting after it is disseminated, and to do whatever is possible to ensure that it does not go beyond those who have a genuine and compelling need for it. We should also, if possible, try to ascertain just how Gull’s reporting has been used in any negotiations with Warsaw Pact governments, and whether our possession of Gull’s material could have inadvertently been tipped off in this manner.This, I recognize, constitutes a difficult task and perhaps an impossible one, but I feel we owe it both to the U.S. national interest and to this truly remarkable and dedicated agent to do everything humanly possible to protect him. Until we have thoroughly looked into what has been and is being done with Gull’s reporting following formal dissemination, we will never have a full picture of his overall security situation.
After reviewing the Boggs memo, Kalaris alerted CIA director Turner to Gull’s security situation. Kalaris said the agency was prepared to exfiltrate him on short notice, although Gull “has always stated that he wishes to remain in Poland unless there are specific indications that he is about to be arrested.” On Sunday, August 6, 1978, an officer spotted Kuklinski in the phone booth near the fish shop―the visual recognition signal―and cabled Langley that he “appeared relaxed and healthy.”
Two days later, the CIA informed the FBI that classified documents provided by Gull may have been “mishandled, either deliberately or otherwise.”
In the half decade since Daniel had first met Kuklinski in Europe, he had risen from case officer to chief of operations for the Soviet Division. But his recent five-year stint at headquarters was relatively long for a field officer. In August 1978, at the age of forty-seven, he was asked whether he would be interested in going to Vienna as Chief of Station. Vienna, a lively, beautiful city, was a busy place for the CIA, which had more than thirty officers posted there. But the transfer would remove Daniel from the Gull case and would also raise family issues. His wife, Sally, had joined him on his four previous overseas postings, in Germany, Argentina, Poland, and Mexico. She was not excited about a fifth. They had a lovely house in Potomac, Maryland, and their children, Caty, Daniel, and Sara, who were then ten, twelve, and eighteen, had settled into school and the community. Sally also wanted to resume her career as a journalist. Daniel finally decided to go to Vienna alone.
In August 1978, Kuklinski and Hanka enjoyed their brief vacation in Bulgaria, but he returned to some uncertainty. Over a period of several nights, he found cars parked outside his home for hours, with people remaining inside them. Then one day at work, a military counterintelligence (WSW) officer visited Kuklinski’s office and said the WSW was conducting a broad investigation into intelligence leaks to the West. The officer had asked Kuklinski for a list of officers who were involved in weapons planning and development, command systems, and combat readiness. Kuklinski was relieved later when he learned that Chief of Staff Siwicki had requested the investigation. Since Siwicki regularly entrusted him with sensitive duties, Kuklinski concluded that he was unlikely to be under suspicion.
Upon his return from vacation in Bulgaria, Kuklinski was assigned to prepare materials for the continuing Vienna arms negotiations. The instructions from the Soviet Union were to conceal the true manpower of the Warsaw Pact ground forces.
In September, Kuklinski was enormously relieved when he found the missing roll of film in the pocket of a flannel workshirt that he had not worn in a while.
Feeling more confident, Kuklinski retrieved his sealed package from Leon Barszcz and began photographing documents again.
In late 1978, the CIA prepared to resume contact with Kuklinski. As requested, he had appeared at 4:00 P.M. on Sunday, October 1, in the phone booth near the fish store, to signal that he was safe. That month, a memo summarizing the operation said that Gull had been producing intelligence “at a prodigious rate,” and the exchanges were to begin again in two months. The memo repeated earlier assertions that he was “the best-placed source now available to the U.S. government in the Soviet bloc, in terms of collection of priority information.”
In late December or early January 1979, Kuklinski left a signal asking for an exchange that night. In it, he delivered twenty rolls of film, which contained around 500 pages of documents. “I will not attempt to hide the fact that I lived through some difficult days,” he wrote in a five-page letter, adding that he hoped the crisis was over. He described his relief at finding the missing film. “I considered the possibility of informing you about this important discovery, but a sober evaluation of the still-complex situation restrained me from taking this step. Any contact with me could have been dangerous for both sides.”
Kuklinski said he had begun to collect documents again in August. They included materials from the Warsaw Pact command in Moscow on weapons development, his notes on Project Albatross, and a draft directive from Kulikov concerning the new combat-readiness system. “This document carries the highest grade of classification,” Kuklinski wrote.
He also described the misleading figures being submitted in the Vienna arms talks. “It was a matter of the Poles (on instructions from Moscow) concealing the actual manpower of the ground forces,” he wrote. “While working on this problem, I gained normal access to documents which might once and for all dissolve your doubts concerning Soviet intentions and, under pressure from them, those of the other Warsaw Pact countries, to deceive and swindle the West regarding the numerical strength of the forces under negotiation.”
At Langley, Kuklinski’s materials―his first document delivery in six months―produced relief. Kuklinski, meanwhile, received a letter commenting on several documents he had delivered the previous summer.
“The Russian-language document you provided in your last delivery on the development of the Warsaw Pact forces from 1981-1985 was an outstanding acquisition,” the letter said. “However, the Russian-language document which provided the tactical and technical specifications of Soviet military material to be introduced into the Warsaw Pact forces during the period 1979-1985 is potentially the single most important document that you have provided us in our long and productive association, because it will not only impact on all branches of the U.S. military establishment but will also impact on NATO force structure in the forward area.”
The CIA reminded Kuklinski that in resuming his activities, his safety should remain paramount. “If there is ever any question in your mind as to whether you can securely manage an act, please make your decision in favor of safety, even if this means you are not able to photograph an important document or that you must abort a scheduled exchange,” the CIA said.
The agency warned of an investigative tactic sometimes used to track leaks. A test document, often genuine but also marked in some covert way, would be given to an official who was under suspicion, and a Soviet agent in the West would then be used to determine whether the document was passed to the CIA. “This is a technique which the KGB has used, for example.
“Therefore, we ask that you be particularly attentive to circumstances when documents to which you and your immediate working colleagues do not have normal access or which, for one reason or another, seem suspicious or unusual become available to you. If such a situation arises, please exercise special care in deciding whether or not these documents can be securely copied. Please also identify the specific document or documents to us.”
The CIA advised Kuklinski not to be overly concerned about surveillance on Rajcow Street, although he should exercise caution. “Remember that all of your neighbors are also military officials and the surveillance may have been directed against any one of them, or no one in particular.”
A letter from Daniel was also cabled to Warsaw for delivery to Kuklinski. Daniel said he felt recurring frustration over not being able to do more to ease Kuklinski’s lingering concerns about security. Over the past six months, he wrote, the CIA had conducted “an exhaustive study of what the Soviets might have learned, and in what way.”
We have also examined what they know and speculate we learned from the Romanians―Gen. Pacepa.
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Putting all this together, we find nothing that in their eyes points at you. Moreover, they have many more directions in which to look before they can begin to solve their problem of restricted information “leaking” to the West.Even so, I am satisfied that our mutually agreed suspension of contact was a wise decision. You needed a period of normal activity in which there would be no risk at all of attracting idle curiosity. We needed time for our investigation. It was deeply rewarding for us, however, to see you during that period at the recognition site. Your timing was perfect. . . .P.V.―you are seldom far from my thoughts. In a complicated and changing world, there is no one I know who has shown greater courage and dedication than you in the successful pursuit of our common goals. In the loneliness of your work, know that the bonds of friendship, respect and shared purpose bind us together―and will do so always.Sincerely,Daniel
Warsaw Station, after reviewing the draft, made only a minor alteration, and the letters were delivered to Kuklinski in early 1979. But there would soon be a significant change in how Daniel’s letters were prepared. With Daniel now stationed in Vienna, it would be impractical for him to continue the highly personal correspondence with Kuklinski. But because his letters were a critical part of the Gull operation, the CIA felt it was too risky to stop them, and the agency did not want even to suggest to Kuklinski that Daniel was no longer at Langley, for fear it would concern or distract him. The Soviet Division thus assigned a group of officers, including Stanley Patkowski, the translator who had adeptly handled Daniel’s correspondence with Kuklinski, to produce letters under Daniel’s name. They consulted with Daniel, studied his earlier letters, and became thoroughly familiar with his voice and style.
Daniel was not troubled by the idea. His friendship with Kuklinski was genuine, but so was his concern for Kuklinski’s security and morale. Daniel agreed that it was essential for the letters to continue, but they had to be germane and contemporaneous. Keeping him in the loop would be a strain on the operation and could lead to mistakes. For the several years Daniel expected to be away from Langley, he was confident his colleagues would find his voice and keep the conversation going.
7
TREMORS OF CHANGE
ONE NIGHT IN FEBRUARY 1979, Ruth Brerewood,
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who ran the CIA’s Polish desk at Langley, was in Warsaw dining with a CIA colleague and his wife at a fashionable restaurant called the Duck. Brerewood had never served in Poland, but she had agreed to fill a two-month vacancy in Warsaw Station until a new full-time officer arrived. In a way, it was appropriate for her to be there. She had done just about everything else in the Gull case.
10
who ran the CIA’s Polish desk at Langley, was in Warsaw dining with a CIA colleague and his wife at a fashionable restaurant called the Duck. Brerewood had never served in Poland, but she had agreed to fill a two-month vacancy in Warsaw Station until a new full-time officer arrived. In a way, it was appropriate for her to be there. She had done just about everything else in the Gull case.
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