A Secret Life (37 page)
Authors: Benjamin Weiser
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Germany, #World, #True Crime, #Espionage
On March 5 headquarters cabled Warsaw to say of Kuklinski’s most recent documents on martial law: “They are of outstanding importance to our understanding of the current situation and interpretation of future events. [In] view of extreme sensitivity of these documents as they relate to [Gull’s] security, dissemination will be limited to the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.”
That day, the Reagan administration issued a public statement of concern about Soyuz 81. “Outside intervention, in whatever form, would have the gravest consequences,” a State Department spokesman said.
On March 11, five days before Soyuz 81 was to begin, Kuklinski tried to use the Iskra to report that Marshal Kulikov was to lead the exercise from Wunsdorf, East Germany, and that 44,000 Polish troops would be involved. But he again had trouble getting the device to work. So he left a chalk mark signaling for a car pass in two days.
On the night of the exchange, he wrote a letter providing an update on Soyuz 81. Jaruzelski had ordered troops to “bypass large cities” to avoid confrontations. Moscow was also keeping key details from the Poles. In a briefing in Moscow, “everybody participated except the Poles. For us there was a separate briefing.”
Kuklinski included films of the war-game summary that had been the basis for Jaruzelski’s briefings when he had gone to Moscow, and he enclosed the defective Iskra. The CIA officer who went to meet him almost missed the exchange after becoming stalled about a half mile away by a religious festival. The officer drove through a throng of celebrants and arrived just in time to find Kuklinski.
On March 19, three days after the beginning of Soyuz 81, 200 riot police brutally beat more than twenty activists in Solidarity and an affiliated organization, Rural Solidarity, which represented more than 3 million farmers, who had occupied a local government hall in Bydgoszcz. Three people were seriously injured. The incident prompted Solidarity to consider calling a nationwide strike. Meanwhile, Marshal Kulikov told the General Staff that the Soyuz 81 exercises would continue indefinitely. Polish ground, air, and naval forces were placed under Polish General Eugeniusz Molczyk, a strong ally of Moscow, for the duration of Soyuz 81. The decision infuriated Kuklinski. He received frantic calls from officers at front headquarters in Bialobrzegi, southeast of Warsaw, asking, “Don’t the people at the top understand what is going on?”
In an exchange March 27 on a rainy night, Kuklinski wrote that he had become convinced the Soviets were creating the conditions for an invasion and for establishing an independent command center that would not keep the Polish General Staff informed. In the exchange, the CIA delivered a new Iskra to him.
On April 1, Kuklinski was able to use the new Iskra to send a message about Moscow’s reaction to Jaruzelski’s martial-law plans. Moscow had deemed the plans unsatisfactory and presented its own strategy. Kuklinski said that four days earlier, thirty Soviet defense and KGB “functionaries,” led by Kulikov and a first deputy to Soviet KGB chief Yuri Andropov, had flown to Warsaw to act as “consultants” on martial law. “After familiarizing themselves with our plans,” he wrote, “the Soviets deemed them unsatisfactory and presented their own proposals.” He explained the Russian assessment:
Introduction of the state of martial law is dictated by the necessity to defend socialism. Its introduction should also be accompanied by suspension of the Constitution, with the total power being put into the hands of the military command. In the provinces the authority should be in the hands of garrison commanders and in areas where there are no garrisons, the authority should be in the hands of appointed commanders of the Polish Armed Forces.
Kuklinski described proposed activities during preparations for martial law:
We should concentrate our effort on unmasking counterrevolution in Solidarity [and the] identification of leaders and elements who are extremist, determination of where they live, introduction of agent networks into hostile organizations and the location of underground radios and printing presses. Fourteen hours before the state of martial law is introduced, we should complete detentions and start investigation and emergency courts. In order to stifle counterrevolution and strikes, we should use the security forces together with the armed forces. Soviet advisers should be brought into the Polish Armed Forces General Staff, to the military district commands, and branches of the armed forces.
Kuklinski wrote that the Polish military leadership had generally rejected the Soviet suggestions. “Our leaders―Jaruzelski, Kania, and in the Polish Armed Forces, Siwicki―have no intention of introducing this state. During the visit the Soviets in a provoking manner appealed to the generals in the General Staff to revolt,” he added.
Over the next few days, Soviet combat helicopters buzzed repeatedly over Polish air space, ignoring the Polish air-traffic controllers and frightening the population. When General Siwicki demanded an explanation, he was told that the flights were carrying food and were part of a normal troop rotation. Kuklinski also learned that on the evening of April 3, Jaruzelski and party chief Kania were flown secretly on a Russian military aircraft to the U.S.S.R. for talks with the Soviet leadership; they returned the next morning. A few days later, Marshal Kulikov and his chief of staff, Anatoly Gribkov, flew into Warsaw, asking if Polish officials had incorporated their “corrections and additions” into the martial-law plans. After a briefing, Gribkov demanded that twenty key documents be translated into Russian and sent to Moscow.
The Soyuz 81 exercise ended in the first week of April, but the threat of outside intervention or martial law remained. On Saturday, April 11, Jaruzelski visited the General Staff to meet the small group of officers, including Kuklinski, working on “Operation Spring,” the code name for the martial-law plan. Jaruzelski seemed depressed as he studied the documents. He stated, “I am not acquainted with matters on which you have worked for the past several months, but I must finally learn them.”
Jaruzelski was by turns reluctant and impatient. “In the darkest corners of my mind,” Jaruzelski added, “I could not find the thought that we could do such a thing. I do not want to be the Prime Minister if I must sign these documents so that they may be implemented.”
As Kuklinski listened, Jaruzelski blamed the crisis on provocations by Solidarity activists, and he lamented that “the bloodying of three noses” in Bydgoszcz had put Poland on the edge of disaster. He was still searching for an intermediate solution before ordering the mass internment of Solidarity activists. On Sunday, April 13, he met with Kulikov and “categorically refused” Kulikov’s demand to set a date for introducing martial law.
On three occasions―April 10, 12, and 16―Kuklinski tried without success to alert the CIA with the Iskra. On April 26 he wrote to the CIA that the Iskra’s malfunctions were “regrettable, since this communications system appears to me to be indispensable in the present situation which approaches a confrontation.”
He said he awaited that night’s exchange impatiently, “so I can give you a timely alert about the danger of military intervention in Poland.” He went on to describe Moscow’s continued “air war of nerves against Poland.” In a single night, April 25, he said, the Soviets had conducted 280 flights into and within Poland.
Under Moscow’s pressure and supervision, the basic planning for martial law had been concluded. He enclosed sensitive General Staff documents, including one pertaining to the use of army troops against the workers. “The General Staff, chiefly Skalski and Siwicki, could not entertain the possibility,” Kuklinski wrote. “On the other hand, the Russians and General Molczyk saw the armed forces as the main force which should deal with the ‘counterrevolution.’” The process was being conducted under “the greatest secrecy.”
Kuklinski expressed increasing concern about security: “There is a new list of persons who know the plans in the parts pertaining to them,” he wrote, “and also those who have access to the whole. This list is kept together with the only copy of the planning documents by the chief of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff [Siwicki] in his own safe. My name is one of three who had seen the complete plans. I beg that you continue to handle reporting on these matters with care.”
Kuklinski said that if the Poles realized what was happening, they could formulate strategy and tactics in the struggle for “their inalienable rights.” But he saw little evidence of preparations for armed resistance by the Polish military if Moscow invaded. “In conclusion,” he wrote, “I greet you with the hope that just as during the entire course of the crisis in Poland, my country will not be left to itself.”
In a letter to Daniel, Kuklinski described a meeting in which a Polish general had criticized the United States for not doing more to oppose Moscow. The general claimed America had sold out the Poles, allowing Moscow a free hand. Kuklinski had remained silent, confident the materials he was providing the CIA “would be properly utilized” for the Polish cause.
“We Poles are deeply aware that for freedom, we ourselves must fight, even if we had to pay the ultimate price,” he wrote. “I continue to believe that the assistance which your country gives to all who are fighting for this freedom may speed up the attainment of such a goal.”
The Soviet presence in Poland remained an issue. One day, Kuklinski heard from the commander of the Polish Third Division in Lublin that Soviet soldiers with communications equipment had landed at a nearby airfield, and that a Soviet major had approached the Polish officer, looking for food. The Soviet major said that his contingent was waiting for a Soviet Army air echelon to arrive in three days. The Soviets had also informed Siwicki that during Soyuz 81, eighteen communications sites were secretly deployed in Poland, with eight Russian soldiers stationed at each. Kuklinski made a list of the sites and their locations.
Tom Ryan, Warsaw Station Chief, was worried. He had been engaged in continuing discussions with the Soviet Division at Langley about what would happen to their communications with Gull if the Poles imposed a crackdown or if the Soviets invaded. In one cable to Ryan, the Soviet Division said it shared his concerns. But, the cable noted, “We must face stark reality that a HUMINT [human intelligence] source such as Gull is a key contributor to our evaluation and reactions to a crisis such as this. [Station’s] and Gull’s security are uppermost in our considerations, but Gull remains a unique source of critical and perishable information as he has clearly demonstrated.”
Ryan responded that Gull still had “the best view” of his situation and had so far correctly assessed his status, but he insisted that the agency had “a moral obligation” to instigate “changes in operational M.O. or frequency of contact if at any time we determine that the value of the information Gull can provide does not match the risks to his personal safety.”
Ryan said Gull would have more freedom “under a Polish-declared, Polish-enforced state,” even with curfews, than he would if the Soviet Union invaded.
Under Soviet intervention, believe Gull’s usefulness and security will be in question. . . . Gull has reported to us he has an anti-Soviet reputation, and on at least one occasion, a Soviet general made pointed note of this attitude in a meeting. If the Soviets come, there could be a purge of the Polish military, especially those with anti-Soviet sentiments. It is quite possible that Gull could be among those purged. If not, he certainly could be shunted off to some unimportant duty. Sustained contact with Gull under such circumstances would be unrealistic and dangerous for his personal security.
On June 17, Kuklinski was ordered to prepare a speech for Siwicki to deliver to the KOK, the highest-ranking Polish defense body. Kuklinski worked into the night and gave copies of the speech the next morning to Siwicki and his three top deputies―Generals Skalski, Hupalowski, and Antoni Jasinski, who oversaw organization and mobilization. Siwicki offered his suggestions for revisions and said he needed the speech by 6:00 P.M. The final version, which was eight pages, was classified “Secret, of Special Importance.” Kuklinski made four copies but could find only Siwicki and Skalski. He gave each a copy. He placed the third copy inside his private safe and the fourth copy in his briefcase.
At home, Kuklinski photographed the speech. But he was so tired that he overslept the next morning and did not reach the General Staff until 7:45. Rushing upstairs, he was stunned to see General Waclaw Szklarski, his direct superior, and three aides standing in his office. His safe was open and in disarray, and one of the aides was reaching into it, rifling through the papers in search of the missing document.
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