A Secret Life (41 page)
Authors: Benjamin Weiser
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Germany, #World, #True Crime, #Espionage
Daniel and other CIA officials were prepared to exfiltrate Ostaszewicz, but they were concerned about the implications for the Gull operation. Once Ostaszewicz’s defection became known, the SB would investigate and clamp down tighter on security. “We are all in agreement that the recent flurry of activity is dangerous,” the Soviet Division cabled Warsaw on September 21. “We also all know that Gull is aware of this danger but apparently has resolved his concerns for his security, and has no intention of suggesting a cutback in contact with us.”
Daniel’s cable advised that Warsaw Station vary the timing of contacts and exchanges with Kuklinski. On October 5, the Soviet Division cabled a message to Warsaw, to be delivered in the next car pass.
We have carefully considered your recommendations for increased Iskra exchanges and the addition of sites where you can securely leave packages. As we have told you in the past, there is no adequate way to express our gratitude for the timely and invaluable information you provide, and we are aware of the urgency you feel to give us information on a timely basis in this period of crisis. However, the very fact of the crisis makes it imperative that you exercise great caution in your contacts with us.
On October 7, Daniel and his colleagues decided Kuklinski should be informed of the Ostaszewicz matter and given the opportunity to suspend contact. If he concurred, he would be asked to destroy his supplies. The CIA wrote to Kuklinski to reveal the news about Ostaszewicz.
We want to alert you to the fact that your neighbor traveled to the West in September and requested asylum for himself and his wife. His son also has decided to remain in the West. We have carefully considered this matter and, in our judgment, and with the proper precautions, we do not believe this matter will adversely affect your security. You, your neighbors and many of your colleagues will undoubtedly be interviewed concerning [Col. Ostaszewicz]. But at this time, there is no reason to believe you yourself would be the subject of any heightened interest.In your office, you should exercise extreme caution. It is possible that the random inspection of briefcases and parcels you told us about previously will be increased. If that is the case, you should immediately stop removing documents from your office to photograph at home. We would prefer you not photograph any documents until you are positive the situation has returned to normal. We do not wish to unduly alarm you, and hope that this alert will enable you to put the expected security investigation in proper perspective. That is, it is a result of [your neighbor’s] decision and not a result of your activity. However, we believe you should be prepared to witness a very active investigation by the WSW [military counterintelligence] who will follow through the slightest suspicion.[Your neighbor] is, as a matter of course, being debriefed concerning colleagues, neighbors, etc. He speaks highly of you, characterizing you as a colonel with a very good future who “knows more about his business than most generals.”
Daniel sent Kuklinski his first personal letter since returning from Vienna.
With our officer who delivers this to you, I shake your hand with esteem and affection. The ever-present need for vigilance and alertness and the resulting tension that you wrote of are burdens in your life I wish I could share. Unfortunately, they are the penalties a great man must bear. How fortunate, however, that you have the love and honor of your family. This must be a great comfort to you, and your devotion to them surely must be evident to them.P.V., your invaluable information is carefully studied at the highest levels of our government and I can assure you it is an important factor in the planning of our government’s policy to stem Soviet aggression.Dear friend, do not despair of the work that is ahead. You indeed are one of the few who can accomplish much in our mutual struggle. We stand ready to help you, but our role is insignificant in comparison to your role. We thank you.
Both letters were cabled to Warsaw Station for delivery at the first opportunity.
On his way to work on Friday, October 9, Kuklinski spotted a chalk mark calling for a car pass that night. He was still unaware that Warsaw Station had not found the message he had left at Kaftan three weeks earlier. At 3:00 P.M., Siwicki called, asking Kuklinski to begin working immediately on a speech Siwicki would deliver at a party meeting the next week. He wanted to take a hard-line stance attacking Kania and defending Jaruzelski. Siwicki said he was ready to criticize party officials for failing to move faster against the “internal opponent.”
That evening, Kuklinski began a letter to the CIA. He said he now had more evidence of the divergence in views between Kania and Jaruzelski. “Today I have proof that their paths have parted completely.” Kania had rejected the idea of imposing martial law as a way of eliminating Solidarity, but Jaruzelski had accepted Moscow’s arguments and ordered the Defense and Interior Ministries to begin making final contingency plans. For days, there had been intensive deliberations concerning the possibility of leadership changes. Kuklinski described Siwicki’s planned speech and its central message that it was time for “radical measures―martial law.” Kuklinski said he had been told to “stand by” for new orders on the use of force. He also learned that handbills and posters announcing the crackdown, which had been printed in Moscow to avoid leaks from Polish printers, had been delivered to Warsaw.
Soviet leadership maintains contact with Jaruzelski. Brezhnev had many telephone talks with Jaruzelski. These talks were reportedly very unpleasant. Kania is left out completely. The new military attaché of the U.S.S.R. armed forces in the Polish People’s Republic stated during a confidential talk in which Gen. [Wladyslaw] Hermaszewski was present that before he started his mission he had a talk with Ustinov. Ustinov stated that U.S.S.R. has decided under certain situations to intervene militarily.
Kuklinski asked the CIA to leave a signal confirming that it had retrieved his package at Kaftan. He noted that he had not seen the car at Dublet with its wheels turned inward. At 10:32 P.M., at a site code-named Skok (jump), Kuklinski smiled broadly as he handed over a package containing four rolls of film. His message was summarized and included in the “President’s Daily Brief” of October 14.
Kuklinski received an Iskra in return, with new batteries and instructions, twelve rolls of film, an updated list of exchange and dead-drop locations, a new set of signals to use to indicate he was safe in the event communications had to be suspended, and the letters from the agency and Daniel. “We have called you to this exchange tonight,” the CIA’s letter began, “to give you this message discussing our communications agreements, to return the Iskra to you, and to inform you of a recent event which has bearing upon your security,” a reference to Ostaszewicz’s defection.
Kuklinski was surprised to read of the news about Ostaszewicz, but was thunderstruck by what he read next: “We observed what we thought was your signal at Zaspa on 16 September and our officer went to Przelot that night but was unable to find any message from you. Our cars were parked at Dublet the following day to advise you that we did not find any message.”
Kuklinski suddenly realized that he had left the glove containing the film at the wrong dead-drop site. A whole month had passed. He considered the possibilities. His biggest concern was that someone had found the glove, inspected it, and taken it to the police or the SB. Kuklinski knew that the “Jack Strong” signature would not give him away. But the contents of the letter would reveal that its writer had knowledge of the September 15 session, which so few had attended.
At that moment, Hanka entered the study and saw Kuklinski’s stricken look. “I did something wrong,” he murmured. It was far too risky for him to return to the lot himself, but he had to find out whether the glove was still there. After considering his options, he felt he had only one choice.
The next morning, Saturday, October 10, he called in Bogdan, then twenty-six years old. Kuklinski could not disguise the sense of urgency in his voice. Without elaborating, he asked Bogdan to drive to the lot, park nearby, and take a walk. Bogdan should establish that he was not being followed and casually look around to see if the glove was still there. Kuklinski warned Bogdan not to pick up the glove. If it was there, Kuklinski would ask him to return at night to get it. Kuklinski knew the plan was risky, but he felt Bogdan would be safe because his son knew nothing of his activities, and if he was questioned, he would have no answers.
Kuklinski paced in his living room for more than an hour after Bogdan left. Hanka sat in silence. Suddenly, the door opened, and Bogdan entered with a smile on his face and the glove in his hand. He pulled out the wrapped film canister and drop-kicked it to the ceiling. Bogdan did not ask for an explanation, but assured his father that he had not been seen or followed home. Kuklinski practically fell into his son’s arms.
That night, Kuklinski typed a message into his newest Iskra, describing the mix-up in the sites. “It was my fault, because I left it at Kaftan instead of at Przelot. The absence of cars at Dublet . . . reassured me that all is well. Today I recovered my package, which was undisturbed.”
As for Ostaszewicz, he was still undecided about whether to suspend contact. Warsaw Station received the message and cabled it on to Langley.
At 11:30 A.M., on October 18, just before a meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee, Kuklinski transmitted another Iskra message. “The military are on alert status in case matters at the plenum take an unfavorable turn,” he wrote. “In the event a liberal leadership is appointed, the military will not support it.”
Kuklinski said he had still heard nothing in the General Staff about his neighbor’s defection. “Did the West reveal this fact? Is the current leadership covering it up because this defection is too embarrassing to the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs?”
Warsaw Station cabled headquarters the same day, including Kuklinski’s message and the news that Kania had been ousted at the plenum and replaced by Jaruzelski. The result “would seem to indicate a victory for hardliners,” the station told Langley.
At 11:15 A.M. on Sunday, October 25, Kuklinski used the Iskra to send another message that the military was taking steps to “penetrate all fields of life in the country. . . . At the same time, orders were issued for preparation of activities under conditions of martial law.” The biographies of several hard-line generals had been sent to Moscow for consideration. Kuklinski observed that the Iskra was finally functioning properly. “No garbles. Thank you,” he added.
As he transmitted, he received the CIA’s latest Iskra message back, which said the West had not yet revealed his neighbor’s defection. Kuklinski was also reminded to be sparing in use of the Iskra, transmitting “only when necessary.”
At about 1:00 P.M. on Monday, November 2, Kuklinski was summoned to an office of one of his superiors. He arrived and walked in to find Skalski sitting at a large T-shaped table, looking pale and grim. Seated around the table were General Szklarski and two colonels working on martial law, Franciszek Puchala and Czeslaw Witt.
Skalski barely nodded and directed Kuklinski to take a seat across from him. There was an awkward silence. Skalski looked straight at Kuklinski and then at the others. There had been a disastrous leak, he said, an act of treason.
10
“EVERYTHING IS POINTING TO THE END OF MY MISSION”
KUKLINSKI SAT IN ASTONISHED SILENCE as Skalski continued. The Polish leadership had learned that the CIA―Skalski said “Langley”― had obtained the latest version of the martial-law plans. The information came to them from “Rome sources.” Skalski said he was confident that Polish counterintelligence would be able to trace the source of the leak. It was only a matter of time.
Kuklinski’s colleagues around the table were aghast and angry. General Szklarski spoke first, saying he was willing to offer himself up for questioning and suggesting that any leak must have come from the Interior Ministry. Colonel Puchala went next and protested his innocence. Colonel Witt said it was clear that Solidarity had an ally in the center of power, but he declared he was not it and that he, too, would submit to interrogation if necessary.
Kuklinski listened, his mouth dry. His name was on the classified control forms for the most sensitive martial-law documents, including perhaps the one most closely held. Referred to as the “final version,” it was the most complete set of plans and included the latest revisions ordered by Jaruzelski. There were only two copies, and only several officers had access. Kuklinski had prepared the original in his office and kept it in his safe. Puchala had the other copy in his safe.
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