Another view of Stalin (45 page)

To attack the tremendous prestige of Stalin, undoubtedly the greatest military leader of the anti-fascist war, his enemies like to refer to the `incredible mistake' that he made by not predicting the exact date of the aggression.

Khrushchev,  in his Secret Report, stated:

`Documents ... show that by April 3, 1941 Churchill  ...\ personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union ....

`However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings.'

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Khrushchev,  Secret Report, op. cit. , pp. S36--S37.

Khrushchev  continued by stating that Soviet military attachйs in Berlin had reported rumors according to which the attack against the Soviet Union would take place on May 14 or June 15.

`Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for defense ....

`When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operations began, Moscow issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned ....

`(A) certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies had received orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union on the night of June 22 at 3 o'clock. Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.'

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Ibid. , pp. 37--39.

This version is found throughout bourgeois and revisionist litterature. Elleinstein,  for example, wrote that under `the dictatorial and personal system that Stalin had set up ... no-one dared to say that he had erred.'

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Jean Elleinstein,  Staline (Paris: Fayard, 1984), p. 262.

What can be said about the first day of the war?

Stalin knew perfectly well that the war would be of extreme cruelty, that the fascists would exterminate without mercy the Soviet Communists, and would, using unprecedented terror, reduce the Soviet peoples to slavery.

Hitlerian  Germany was reinforced by Europe's economic potential. Each month, each week of peace meant a significant reinforcement of the Soviet Union's defence. Marshal Vasilevsky  wrote:

`The political and state leaders in the country saw war coming and exerted maximum efforts to delay the Soviet Union's entry into it. This was a sensible and realistic policy. Its implementation required above all a skillful conduct of diplomatic relations with the capitalist countries, especially with the aggressors.' The army had received strict orders to avoid `any action that the Nazi leaders could use to exarcerbate the situation or to make a military provocation.'

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Vasilevsky,  op. cit. , p. 84.

The situation on the borders had been very tense since May 1941. It was important to keep one's cool and to not get entangled in German provocations. Vasilevsky  wrote about this subject:

`The state of alert in a border area is in itself an extreme development ....

`(T)he premature alert of the troops may be just as dangerous as the delay in giving it. Quite often there is still a long distance from hostile policies of a neighbour-country to a real war.'

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Ibid. , p. 83.

Hitler  had not succeeded in invading Britain, not in shaking it. But the British Empire was still the world's leading power. Stalin knew that Hitler  would do anything to avoid a war on two fronts. There were good reasons to believe that Hitler  would do everything it could to beat Britain before engaging the Soviet Union.

For several months, Stalin had been receiving information from Soviet intelligence services announcing that the German aggression would begin in one or two weeks. Much of this information was rumor spread by Britain or the U.S., who wanted to turn the fascist wolves against the socialist country. Each defence measure of the Soviet borders was manipulated by the Right in the U.S. to announce an imminent attack by the Soviet Union against Germany.

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Dйborine,  op. cit. , pp. 73--74.

Zhukov  wrote:

`The spring of 1941 was marked by a new wave of false rumours in the Western countries about large-scale Soviet war preparations against Germany.

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Zhukov,  op. cit. , p. 224.

The Anglo-American Right was pushing the fascists to fight the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, Stalin had no guarantees as to the British or U.S. reaction to a Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union. In May 1941, Rudolf Hess,  number two in the Nazi Party, had landed in Scotland. Sefton Demler,  who ran a British radio station specialized in propaganda broadcasts destined for Germany, noted in his book:

`Hess  ... stated that the object of his flight to Scotland had been to make peace with Britain ``on any terms'', providing that Britain would then join Germany in attacking Russia.

` ``A victory for England as the ally of the Russians,'' said Hess,  ``will be a victory for the Bolsheviks. And a Bolshevik victory will sooner or later mean Russian occupation of Germany and the rest of Europe.'' '

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Sefton Demler,  Black Boomerang (London: Secker & Warburg, 1962), pp. 59--60.

In Britain, the current to make a deal with the USSR had deep roots. A recent event shows this once again. In early 1993, a controversy took place in Britain with John Charmley's  bibliography of Churchill,  The End of Glory. Alan Clarc,  former Minister of Defense under Thatcher,  intervened to state that it would have been better if Churchill  had made peace with Germany in Spring 1941. Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia would have mutually destroyed each other and Britain would have maintained its Empire!

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De Morgen, 23 January 1993, p. 21.

Let us return to early 1941. Stalin was receiving at the time varied information, from all over the world, announcing an imminent German attack against Britain. When Stalin saw simultaneous reports coming from Britain, announcing an imminent Nazi attack against the Soviet Union, he had to ask himself: to what extent are these British lies, whose aim is to prevent a Hitlerian  attack against Britain?

After the war, it was learned that German Marshall Keitel,  applying instructions from Hitler  given on February 3, 1941, had followed a `Directive for Misinforming the Enemy'. Zhukov  wrote:

`Maps of England were printed in vast quantities, English interpreters were attached to units, preparations were made for ``sealing off'' some areas along the coast of the English Channel, the Strait of Dover and Norway. Information was spread about an imaginary ``airborne corps'', make-believe ``rocket batteries'' were installed along the shore ... the flood of propaganda was turned against England and the usual diatribes against the Soviet union stopped'.

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Zhukov,  op. cit. , p. 223.

All this explains Stalin's extreme caution. He was hardly the blind dictator that Elleinstein  depicts, but well a very lucid Communist leader who weighed all possibilities. Zhukov  testified:

`(Stalin) did say to me one day:

` ``A man is sending me very important information about the intentions of the Hitler  Government but we have some doubts.''

`Perhaps he was speaking of Richard Sorge  (famous Soviet spy)'.

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Ibid. , p. 228.

According to Zhukov,  the Soviet intelligence services bear their responsability in the erroneous prediction of the attack date. On March 20, 1941, their leader, General Golikov,  submitted to Stalin a report containing information of vital importance: the attack would take place between May 15 and June 15. But in his conclusions, Golikov  noted that this was probably `misinformation coming from the English or perhaps even the German intelligence service.' Golikov  estimated that the attack would probably take place `after (German) victory over England'.

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Ibid. , pp. 228--229.

On June 13, Marshal Timoshenko  phoned Stalin to place the troops on alert. `We will think it over,' Stalin replied. The next day, Timoshenko  and Zhukov  came back. Stalin told them.

`You propose carrying out mobilization, alerting the troops and moving them to the Western borders? That means war! Do you two understand that or not?!'

Zhukov  replied that, according to their intelligence services, the mobilization of the German divisions was complete. Stalin replied:

`You can't believe everything in intelligence reports.'

At that very moment, Stalin received a phone call from Khrushchev.  Zhukov  relates:

`From his replies we gathered that they talked about agriculture.

` ``That's good,'' Stalin said after listening for a while.

`N. S. Khrushchev  must have painted the prospects for a good harvest in rosy colours.'

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Ibid. , p. 230.

From Zhukov,  this remark is incredible! We know that Khrushchev  attacked Stalin's `lack of vigilance' and `irresponsibility'. But at the time that Zhukov,  Timoshenko  and Stalin were evaluating the chances of an imminent aggression, the vigilant Khrushchev  was discussing grain and vegetables.

The evening of June 21, a German deserter reported that the attack would take place the next night. Timoshenko,  Zhukov  and Vatutin  were called to Stalin's place:

`But perhaps the German generals sent this deserter to provoke a conflict?', Stalin asked.

Timoshenko:  `We think the deserter is telling the truth'.

Stalin: `What are we to do?'

Timoshenko:  `A directive must immediately be given to alert all the troops of border Districts'.

After a brief discussion, the military men drew up a text, which was slightly modified by Stalin. Here is the essence:

`I order:

`a) During the night of 21.6.41 the firing posts in the fortified areas on the state border are to be secretly occupied;

`b) Before dawn on 22.6.41 all aircraft including army aviation are to be dispersed among the field aerodromes, and carefully camouflaged;

`c) All units are to be alerted. Forces are to be kept dispersed and camouflaged;'

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Ibid. , pp. 232--233.

Signed Timoshenko  and Zhukov.  The transmission to the various regions was finished soon after midnight. It was already June 22, 1941.

Khrushchev  wrote about the first months of the war:

`(A)fter the first severe disaster and defeat at the front, Stalin thought that this was the end ....

`Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him'.

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Khrushchev,  Secret Report, op. cit. , p. S40.

`(T)here was an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in October 1941, when Central Committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow .... Stalin did not even want to meet and talk to the Central Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war'.

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Ibid. , pp. S19--S20.

Elleinstein  adds to this:

`Drinking strong vodka, he remained drunk for almost eleven days.'

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Elleinstein,  op. cit. , p. 269.

Let us return to Stalin, dead drunk for the last eleven days and demoralized for another four months.

When Zhukov  announced to Stalin on June 22, 1941, at 3:40 in the morning, that German planes had bombed border cities, Stalin told him to convoke the Politburo. Its members met at 4:30. Vatutin  told them that the German land forces had begun their offensive. Soon after came the German declaration of war.

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Zhukov,  op. cit. , pp 235--236.

Stalin understood better than anyone the savagery that the country would have to endure. He kept a long silence. Zhukov  recalled this dramatic moment.

`Stalin himself was strong-willed and no coward. It was only once I saw him somewhat depressed. That was at the dawn of June 22, 1941, when his belief that the war could be avoided, was shattered.'

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Ibid. , p. 268.

Zhukov  proposed that the enemy units should be attacked immediately. Stalin told him to write up the directive, which was sent at 7:15. But `considering the balance of forces and the situation obtaining it proved plainly unrealistic --- and was therefore never carried out.'

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Ibid. , p. 236.

Khrushchev's  affirmation that Stalin had `issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned' is clearly false.

 .

Khrushchev,  Secret Report, op. cit. , p. S39.

If Stalin was affected when he heard that the war broke out, `After June 22, 1941, and throughout the war Stalin firmly governed the country, led the armed struggle and international affairs together with the Central Committee and the Soviet Government.'