Antony and Cleopatra (31 page)

The loyalty of the legions could be inspired by a cause, as long as this was backed by the soldiers' trust that they would be rewarded. This faith was not in a side, but a personal bond, almost a contract, with their commander. Soldiers followed a general and they might leave him to serve another if they felt it was in their own interest. When Antony, Octavian or Lepidus offered rewards to their legionaries it was in their own name. The same was true of Brutus and Cassius. Brutus, not the Senate or the Republic, gave generous bounties to his legionaries and he personally guaranteed all future rewards. The soldiers were reluctant to trust that a commander allied to their own general would fulfil his promises. This meant that each side in the coming conflict consisted of more than one army. Octavian's and Antony's legions were distinct groups, as were those of Brutus and Cassius. This would have a major impact on the course of the war.
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Once again, the decisive campaign would be fought in Macedonia, just like the contest between Caesar and Pompey. Then, Caesar had fielded eight legions to Pompey's eleven. In 42
BC
Brutus and Cassius probably had seventeen legions, while Antony and Octavian brought no fewer than nineteen to the main battles. Both sides had several other units in supporting roles. If these were at full strength then the triumvirs ought to have had 95,000 legionaries to the conspirators' 85,000. Appian says that the conspirators' legions were under strength, but claims that Octavian's – and perhaps by extension Antony's – legions were full. Both sides are also credited with substantial numbers of cavalry, and this time the conspirators had the advantage, fielding 20,000 horsemen to the triumvirs' 13,00?.
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These are staggering figures. The Philippi campaign may have involved exceptionally large armies, although as an aside Dio actually claims that it was not the largest-scale encounter of Rome's civil wars. It would be striking if Brutus and Cassius had been able to muster double the number of infantry and almost treble the total of cavalry gathered by Pompey in 49-48
BC
. Neither Alexander the Great nor Hannibal had ever led so many horsemen. Logistically, feeding so many soldiers, mounts and baggage animals would have been a mammoth task, especially since the campaign was protracted and lasted well into the autumn months. Commanding such large forces – especially for relatively inexperienced generals and senior officers – would have been almost as difficult. Early in the next century, the future emperor Tiberius would find it too difficult to control an army of ten legions and so divided them into several smaller forces.
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As noted already, it added greatly to a commander's prestige if he led a large number of legions. Having lots of units also created plenty of posts as officers, providing opportunities to reward followers. When ordinary soldiers received the equivalent of a decade or more of pay as a single bounty, a centurion stood to receive some five times as much, and a tribune double that total. Grants of land would also be on a similar scale. Many aristocratic young Romans who had been studying in Athens, including Cicero's and Cato's sons, as well as the poet Horace, were drawn to Brutus' prestige and needed to be rewarded with suitable commissions.
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It is probable that the legions on both sides were well below strength. At Pharsalus, Pompey's units had been at about 80 per cent strength and Caesar's less than half the proper size for a legion, and yet both functioned effectively. Octavian's and Antony's legions may have been larger than the enemy formations as Appian claims, but an average size of 5,000 is very unlikely. Even if the total forces for both sides were halved, that would still mean that some 90,000-100,000 legionaries – the bulk of them Roman citizens, although the conspirators are known to have recruited some provincials as well – fought at Philippi, supported by substantial numbers of cavalry. This would still make it a significantly larger encounter than any of the battles in the civil war of 49-45
BC
, and the armies far bigger than was typical for Roman field forces. None of the commanders, including Antony, had any experience of leading such substantial numbers, and very many of the officers and soldiers they led were inexperienced. This too would shape the campaign.

In 42
BC
the triumvirs decided to leave Lepidus to watch over Italy, while Antony and Octavian went east to deal with the conspirators. It may have been for this reason that he was given the consulship. He loaned several of his legions to each of his colleagues and in the course of the campaign these would be integrated into their own armies, coming to see their new leaders as the source of rewards. Antony was the dominant figure in the triumvirate and Octavian could not be denied the opportunity to avenge his father and win glory, so Lepidus was the logical choice to leave behind.
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Like Caesar in 49
BC
, the triumvirate faced an enemy who was much stronger at sea. Brutus and Cassius resolved upon essentially the same strategy adopted by Pompey, waiting to meet their opponents in the east. This gave them the chance to harass and intercept the enemy at sea. In late summer the triumvirs sent an advance force of some eight legions to Greece. These crossed without misadventure, but the conspirators' fleet made it difficult for any convoy carrying supplies or reinforcements to reach them. Antony was effectively blockaded at Brundisium for several weeks. Octavian had begun building up a force of warships to deal with Sextus Pompey and it was only when these had sailed round southern Italy that the blockade was broken. Antony and Octavian with their main armies were able to cross to Macedonia.
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The Via Egnatia, built by the Romans in the second century
BC
, crossed the top of the Greek Peninsula from the Adriatic to the Aegean coast and was the natural path for an army to follow. The advance guard had pushed almost to the Aegean and occupied the most commonly used pass through the mountains. Brutus and Cassius ferried their combined army over the Dardanelles and, with the assistance of a local Thracian chieftain, found another pass that allowed them to outflank the position. The triumvirate's advance guard withdrew to Amphipolis on the coast. Brutus and Cassius followed them as far as Philippi. Then their advance stopped and they took up a strong position outside the town, blocking the line of the Via Egnatia.
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Antony arrived at Apollonia some time in September 42
BC
. Octavian's army was lagging behind, for he had fallen seriously ill. In spite of this, Antony took his own legions and the advance guard forward and camped in front of Philippi. It was a gesture of confidence, which unnerved the conspirators. Although they had a temporary advantage in numbers, they do not appear to have made any effort to provoke a battle and Octavian was able to join Antony ten days later. The conspirators planned to wear the enemy down. Brutus and Cassius camped separately, but constructed a ditch and wall joining the two camps. They were well supplied, with ready communications to the coast and plentiful sources of water from the local springs. Brutus was in the north and Cassius in the south. Antony and Octavian constructed a single camp down on the plain and had to dig for wells, although these soon provided an adequate water supply. It was harder to draw enough food and fodder from the surrounding countryside. The Philippi campaign would more closely resemble Dyrrachium than Pharsalus or any of the other pitched battles of Caesar's civil war.
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Antony and Octavian repeatedly formed their armies up in front of their camp. Brutus and Cassius did the same – and were indeed encouraged when the enemy held a lustration, a ceremony that ritually purified the army behind their own rampart, seeing this as a sign of caution. However, they were unwilling to advance any great distance in front of their own fortifications. This meant that their armies kept the advantage of the slightly higher ground, while the wall and towers behind could support them with missiles and offered a ready haven for retreating troops if things went badly. Antony and Octavian were unwilling to attack in these conditions, for that would risk failure and certainly involve heavy casualties. They continued to deploy and challenge the enemy, but apart from some skirmishing there was no serious fighting. Octavian's army formed on the left of the line, facing Brutus, while Antony's legions were on the right, opposite Cassius' men.

Unable to provoke a battle, Antony decided to threaten the enemy flank, building a new line of fortifications reaching past Cassius' camp and then at right angles to the conspirator's position. If completed this would allow the triumvirs to cut the enemy's lines of communication, forcing them either to withdraw or risk a battle. Work began in secret, with men detached from each unit while their colleagues formed line of battle as usual facing towards the enemy. The deception was helped because the work started in an area of marshland, where the tall reeds obscured what was happening. For ten days the fortified causeway progressed and it was only then that it became visible as soldiers openly garrisoned the new line. Yet it was far from complete and Cassius' response to the threat was to set his own men working on a line extending south from his camp. His intention was to cut across Antony's fortifications, preventing their extension and isolating any of the redoubts left behind his own line.

On 3 October Antony realised what was happening. It was about noon and the rival armies had deployed for battle as usual. It is possible that Brutus and Cassius had already decided to launch a demonstration or perhaps even a major attack to cover the construction work. Octavian was still seriously ill and was not with his army. He does not seem to have appointed anyone else to supreme authority, but even if he had done so, it would have been hard for that individual to inspire the same enthusiasm and obedience from his men, given the very personal bonds of loyalty and reward in these years.

Antony took the troops on the extreme right of his line and led them diagonally uphill, evading Cassius' main line and striking at the new wall. Soon afterwards the main armies on both sides engaged and heavy fighting developed. In the meantime, Antony and his men stormed through the new line of fortification, which was not yet complete, and brushed aside a counter-attack by another part of the enemy work party. He then turned and assaulted Cassius' camp itself. This was strongly fortified, but contained few defenders, since the bulk of the legions were either in the main line or had been working on the new wall. Antony, keeping the momentum of his attack going by personal example, broke into the camp. When news of this spread to the main fighting line, Cassius' legions collapsed into rout. Roman troops were often made nervous by the fear of losing their possessions and that was no doubt a particular concern to legionaries so generously paid by their commanders.
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While this was going on, what was effectively a separate action was being fought to the north, where Brutus had launched an attack. His legions advanced in some confusion, several units moving off before they received the orders. It all suggests an inexperienced general with equally inexperienced staff officers trying to control an unusually large and not very well-disciplined army. (All of this would still be true even if, as suggested, the numbers involved were substantially less than is usually believed.)

In the event, it worked well, for Octavian's men lacked the clear authority of a commander altogether and were not ready. It may have made things worse that for so many days they had deployed in battle order and yet nothing had happened. Brutus' line was longer than that formed by Octavian's troops, who were quickly outflanked. Octavian's line collapsed, with three legions being badly cut up –one of them the
Fourth.
Brutus' men swept on and broke into the triumvirs' camp, which they proceeded to loot. Octavian was not there – he later claimed that his physician had had a dream warning him to leave the camp. Critics said that he spent three days hiding in a marsh, completely out of touch with his army.
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Each side had overwhelmed the enemy on one flank. Brutus does not seem to have made any real effort to keep in communication with Cassius and did not know of his defeat until too late. He is said to have noticed that the general's tent had been struck in his ally's camp. Antony had led the attack on the wall and camp in person, energising the men he was with, but as a result losing touch with the wider picture. It would probably have been difficult for him to regain control over Octavian's leaderless men anyway. Both sides simply withdrew to their own positions. Casualties may have been heavier amongst the triumvirs' men, but the conspirators suffered a very serious blow when Cassius lost heart. Unaware of Brutus'success, he mistook a party of friendly cavalry for the enemy – he was short-sighted and took their greeting to one of his officers as a cry of triumph – and ordered a slave to kill him. By coincidence, it was his birthday.
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