Antony and Cleopatra (27 page)

To curb the rise of Octavian, Antony had made some public offers of compromise with Brutus and Cassius, but this alienated many of his supporters who were staunch Caesareans and loathed the assassins. It was a difficult, probably impossible balancing act. In August Calpurnius Piso criticised Antony in the Senate. Cicero, who had planned to go abroad, was sufficiently encouraged to return to Rome, but failed to attend a meeting on 1 September, pleading fatigue from his journey. In his absence Antony attacked him and then proposed fresh honours for Caesar. The next day Antony was not in the Senate, but Cicero did go and delivered a speech that would later form the basis for his
First Philippic.
The original
Philippics
had been delivered by the famous Athenian orator Demosthenes, warning his fellow citizens of the danger posed by King Philip II of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great. Cicero's first speech was fairly moderate, but still represented a concerted attack on Antony's position and actions.

The consul responded angrily, although it was not until 19 September that he lambasted the orator in a speech. Antony blamed him as the real instigator of the Ides of March, criticising him for his ‘ingratitude' to a man who had treated him generously in 48
BC
and, in true Roman fashion, freely damning his character and politics. Cicero retired to the country and wrote his
Second Philippic.
This was never delivered as a speech, but took the form of a pamphlet, and copies were sent out to a few associates, although opinion is divided on how widely it was circulated. The text replied in kind, liberally slinging invective at Antony's whole life and career.
¹

About this time, Antony had a statue of Caesar erected on the Rostra in the Forum, which referred to him as ‘father and benefactor'. Such a statement made it harder to agree any compromise with the conspirators. Then he accused Octavian of sending an assassin to murder him. Cicero was deeply suspicious of the ‘young Caesar', but was cheered by this news and slowly began to wonder if the boy might be useful. It was probably no more than a rumour. Octavian had little to gain by killing Antony and could not yet risk an open confrontation. A few weeks later, his hand became stronger.
²

Three legions of the Macedonian army arrived at Brundisium, and a fourth was soon to follow. By the vote of the people, these soldiers were placed under Antony's command and their officers had obeyed the summons to come to Italy. They were well trained, and it is reasonable to think that they were strong in numbers and perhaps even close to their full strength. Antony had no prior connection with these units, which had been training in Macedonia since they were formed in 48
BC.
Their officers had all been appointed by Caesar and both they and the men were loyal to his memory. They did not know Antony and he did not know them. When he went to meet them in October 44
BC
there were angry complaints that he had done nothing to avenge Caesar's murder.

Antony promised the soldiers a special bounty of 100 denarii apiece, less than half of a legionary's annual pay of 225 denarii. Octavian's agents had already visited the camps and promised the men 500 denarii, and ten times as much on the eventual discharge, and so the legions were unimpressed, jeering the consul. It is always worth remembering that officers received far larger sums, so that the centurions and tribunes stood to become very wealthy indeed. Caesar had broken the spirit of the mutinous
Tenth
Legion with supreme self-confidence and a single word, backed by limited punishment. They were his ‘comrades', men he had led to victory after victory for twelve years, with whom he had shared hardships and on whom he had lavished rewards, decorations and praise. The bond between soldier and commander was deep and not to be shattered by one disagreement.

Antony and these legions were strangers to each other. On top of that he had no great victories of his own to show and there were no stories of his rewards to his own soldiers. He lacked Caesar's experience and his gifts, as well as his charisma, and when the soldiers jeered, he lost his temper and tried to bully them into submission. Demanding the names of malcontents from the officers, he ordered executions, although he may have stopped short of a full decimation. Cicero claimed that the victims of this purge included centurions as well as ordinary soldiers, and he seems unlikely to have invented such a detail. It is a lot less likely that the men were killed in front of Antony and his wife, so that their blood spattered onto Fulvia, who was egging her husband on. She may well have been with Antony and possibly urged him to take strong action, but the rest will have come readily to Cicero's imagination and such invective was rarely expected to restrict itself to the actual truth.

The punishment made the troops angry and resentful, and that was a mistake when Octavian's agents were still promising far more attractive service under Caesar's son. The discontent and Antony's wrath had fallen mainly on the
Fourth
Legion and the
Martia
Legion, whose number has not been preserved and seems to have preferred being known as the war god Mars' own. As these troops marched north from Brundisium both of these units deserted Antony and marched under discipline to join Octavian. They brought with them some supplies, including a number of war elephants.
³

The young Caesar had already gathered some 3,000 volunteers from amongst the veterans and had led these to Rome earlier in November. Few of them had proper weapons and equipment, and they showed a reluctance to back him against Antony. They were also disappointed that he was taking no immediate action to punish the conspirators. Caesar's heir had yet to prove himself and his strength and connections were still modest, so he left Rome and began recruiting again. When the fully equipped and trained
Fourth
and
Martia
legions joined him, he at last had the basis for a proper army. Alongside them he formed new versions of Caesar's old
Seventh
and
Eighth,
as well as a praetorian cohort of picked troops to act as bodyguard and an elite reserve. The young Caesar now had more than ‘just a name. He had an army.
⁴

One legion remained faithful to Antony and another soon arrived at Brundisium and joined him. These were the
Second
and
Thirty-Fifth.
Their loyalty was helped at the end of November when he gave them a bounty of 500 denarii, matching Octavian's promise. He also had a substantial force of auxiliaries, including light infantry and Moorish light horsemen. At some point, he reformed Caesar's old
V Alaudae,
the ‘Larks', originally recruited from Gauls and then given citizenship. There was little to be gained by fighting Octavian at the moment, nor was there any pretext. Instead, Antony decided to march to Cisalpine Gaul and occupy the province allotted to him by the Popular Assembly. Before he went, he made those senators who gathered to see him take an oath of loyalty to him. His soldiers did the same and could probably be relied on more readily to keep it. Given time, Antony had the knack of getting troops, and especially officers, to like him. He now had a force of perhaps 10,000–15,000 men. It would be his first campaign as overall commander.
⁵

Decimus Brutus refused to give up Cisalpine Gaul. Earlier in the year he had led the provincial garrison on an expedition against the Alpine tribes. He won some small victories, sharing the rigours of a campaign with his men and rewarding them with plunder to ‘make them firm for the defence of our concerns'. He told Cicero that he thought he had ‘succeeded; for they have practical experience of my liberality and spirit'. There were two legions already in Cisalpine Gaul and soon after his arrival Decimus Brutus began raising another two. Antony also continued to recruit, forming three new legions by the beginning of 43
BC.
These new units were inexperienced and needed intensive training before they would become effective. All seem to have been quite small in size, far below their theoretical strength. The normal practice was to establish a cadre, appointing officers and setting up the structure for the entire legion, and then allocate recruits as these became available. This made practical sense, but there was also a propaganda element. An army of four or six legions sounded impressive, even if in reality most of these units were mere shadows of their normal size.
⁶

Decimus was determined to retain the province and the army, although it is probable that his command was supposed to expire at the end of 44
BC
. He was unwilling to face Antony in the open and perhaps still hoped that fighting could be avoided. Slaughtering his baggage oxen and smoking the meat to bolster his store of food, he took his army into the town of Mutina and prepared to defend it. Antony established a blockade, but does not seem to have attempted a direct assault. He, too, was reluctant to begin an open war, and anyway it was winter, with poor weather and difficult conditions for foraging. Brutus' men were doubtless happier to be billeted in a town rather than camping in siege lines outside.
⁷

From late in 44
BC
Cicero lobbied hard to have the Senate name Antony as a public enemy and formally declare hostilities against him. Most senators were reluctant to take this step, and Fulvia and Antony's mother Julia were very visible expressing their dismay that a consul of Rome should be condemned in his absence and without trial. Some senators had connections to Antony, although his two uncles, Caius Antonius and Lucius Julius Caesar, were never more than lukewarm in their support and at times hostile. Many had no particular sympathy for Decimus Brutus or the other conspirators; almost all feared the return of civil war and felt that any compromise would be preferable. To Cicero's disgust, the Senate sent a delegation of three former consuls – Caesar's father-in-law Calpurnius Piso, Octavian's stepfather Philippus and Sergius Sulpicius Rufus – to negotiate with Antony.

The fear of civil war was the most powerful emotion, made worse because it remained so uncertain what the sides would be and who was likely to win. Lepidus was now proconsul of Transalpine Gaul and Nearer Spain, and Asinius Pollio governed Further Spain. Both were Caesareans, but that did not mean they would automatically ally themselves with Antony, and the latter was in any case busy enough trying to contain the resurgent Sextus Pompey. On 1 January 43
BC
, the new consuls Hirtius and Pansa took office. They were also Caesareans, although they had not been especially close to Antony in recent months.
⁸

Antony's brother Caius had gone out to Macedonia, but the legion left there had been subverted by Brutus. Caius was placed under arrest and Brutus took his place as governor and was soon recruiting more soldiers. More violent confrontations had already erupted in the eastern provinces. On his way to Syria, Dolabella had visited Asia, the province allocated by Caesar to Trebonius. Feigning friendship, Dolabella had taken the proconsul by surprise and had him killed. Cicero claimed that Trebonius was tortured first and there were grisly stories of his severed head being thrown about like a ball until the face was unrecognisable. While Dolabella enthusiastically plundered Asia, Cassius went to Syria and brought the army there under his control. He and Brutus now led armies and governed provinces without any authority to do so. At Rome, Cicero struggled and eventually succeeded in getting this recognition for them.
⁹

Sulpicius died on the way back from meeting Antony. The other two delegates returned in February and reported that the latter was willing to give up Cisalpine Gaul, as long as he kept the other Gaul and retained command of his six legions for five years. Antony was insistent that before this period lapsed, Brutus and Cassius must have given up their own commands, tacitly accepting that they held them. He also demanded formal recognition of all his acts as consul and, in due course, discharge bonuses for his soldiers equal to those promised by Octavian.
¹⁰

Since the beginning of the year, the consuls had led the Senate in making preparations for war. Both gathered armies and Octavian was awarded propraetorian
Imperium,
although he was still a private citizen. A man with his own fiercely loyal army simply could not be ignored. Decimus Brutus was also confirmed in his command. The Senate rejected Antony's terms, but only after a fierce debate. Lucius Caesar blocked the move to name Antony as a public enemy. The
senatus consultum ultimum
was passed, but rather than a formal declaration of war, the crisis was termed a
tumultus –
something closer in sense to a state of emergency. In many ways the situation was similar to the build-up to war in 49
BC
. Both sides were reluctant to commit themselves irrevocably and still hoped that the other would make concessions. There was another attempt to form a delegation to go to Antony, but this came to nothing. Lepidus sent letters urging compromise. Yet while all this went on, Decimus Brutus' army was steadily consuming its stocks of food and would starve or surrender if not relieved within a few months.