Belisarius: The Last Roman General (10 page)

Close-order infantrymen, and cavalry, could carry several of these weapons. They would be used immediately prior to contact, and modern reconstructions attest to their efficiency, especially at close range.

Lances

Used two-handed and underarm, the lance has often been seen as coming into its own only after the invention of the stirrup. Yet, as a note of caution to those who still maintain that the momentum of striking an enemy would dismount the rider unless stirrups are worn, Heliodorus and Plutarch describe the ability of such weapons to impale two opponents simultaneously. Unfortunately, the wooden shafts of these weapons have all rotted away, leaving only the metal heads behind. Without the shaft, the heads have probably been classified as either spear or javelin heads. It is likely that in order to work effectively, the shaft would need to be at least 8ft in length, otherwise it would be difficult to correctly balance the lance and have enough overlapping the head of the horse to make it a viable weapon frontally.

Swords

The style of sword used had also changed from earlier centuries. Three distinct new types are seen in the archaeological record. The first, the ‘Straubing/Nydam’ type was between 68 and 80cm long, and was less than 4.4cm in width. The second, the ‘Lauriacum/Hromowka’ type was only 55.5 to 65.5cm long, but had a width of up to 7.5cm. The final examples are of the double-edged ‘Avar’ type, and are much longer at 100 to 107cm. All had wood, bone and/or ivory hilts which have long since perished.

Much has been made of the difference in sword types, yet the diversity can easily be ascribed to fashion or simple regional variations. Furthermore, due to their wide difference in styles, the idea has arisen that they were produced to face different troop types. This is extremely unlikely.

Firstly, there would have been large logistical difficulties in ensuring that troops who may be faced by heavily armoured warriors, for example, had the correct style of sword. Secondly, the troops had to buy their own weapons: they would clearly not be willing to pay for two swords and carry both during a campaign, only deciding on the day of battle which they should use. This is clearly unrealistic. The most that needs to be said is that troops with the option would probably buy the one that they preferred – possibly with horsemen buying the longer Avar type to give them extra reach – but again it would come down to cost and personal preference.

Bows

Apart from the javelin, the main missile weapon was the bow. The Romans appear to have changed the bow in use at some point from around the second century onwards. Prior to this they had used the older ‘static-limb’ bows, usually deriving their power from the compression of the wooden fibres that formed the body of the bow. Later, they adopted the more powerful horn-composite reflex bows that had been developed on the steppes of Central Asia.

The advantage of the new composite reflex bows is that they were more powerful than the older types whilst still being smooth and easy to fire. After the adoption of the new bow, the Romans (and then Byzantines) copied the Hunnic practice of concentrating on power and accuracy when firing, rather than using the Sasanid tactic of relying more on sheer volume of arrows delivered.

The Byzantines also adopted the ‘up-to-date’ steppe and Central Asian fashions of an hour-glass or box-shaped quiver, allowing the cylindrical quiver to fade away. Again, this is where personal taste came in to which item of equipment should be bought; the same bow as the rest of the troops is likely to have been enforced for military reasons, the style of quiver was personal taste.

At this point it is important to mention the extensive use of mercenary Hun units by the Byzantine army. Although in theory their use was simply an extension of the Byzantine conversion to horse archery, they had a formidable reputation as warriors and archers. This is mainly due to their adoption of the asymmetrical composite bow. Perceived as an adaptation for use by mounted bowmen, in the asymmetrical bow the lower limb is shorter than the upper limb. This results in a bow that is easier to fire from horseback, since the lower limb tends to make less contact and be less interfered with by the horse.

Yet this does not take all of the known factors into account. Extensive research by modern bowyers and archers has established that, although the asymmetrical bow requires much more skill and is much harder to master than the symmetrical bow, the end result is an archer that is far superior to one using the symmetrical bow. The asymmetrical bow excels in really high poundages (the amount of power needed to draw back the string) which gives greater range and power, is faster to fire, and performs far better with a thumb ring. In tests a fair degree of accuracy and power can be achieved even with flightless arrows by an archer trained in the use of the thumb-ring.

Consequently, it would appear that archers trained in the use of the asymmetrical bow would far surpass even the best-trained users of the symmetrical bow. It is not surprising that Hunnic warriors, trained from infancy in the use of a more effective bow, managed to achieve such a fearsome reputation when using it.

Sling

The existence of a unit with
funditores
(slingers) as part of their title has resulted in the acceptance of the continuing use of the sling as a missile weapon, and indeed its use since at least the fourth millennium BC implies the same. However, the continuation of the unit title does not necessarily mean that the unit definitely retained the sling. It is possible that the unit conformed to the contemporary practice and was converted to archers. A theory based upon the fact that the sling was retained as being more effective against armoured targets than the bow has its merits, but the simplification of supply and the ease of use of the bow must make the concept questionable. Unfortunately, the use of the sling must remain in the realm of conjecture.

Siege Equipment

The art of siege warfare dates back to the Assyrians of the seventh century BC, if not before. It had been absorbed through the ages by different cultures, until finally the Romans had learned it from the Greeks. The Romans had made it a weapon of terror, using it to intimidate any city unwise enough to resist them. The epitome of their siegework is probably that employed against the Jewish fortress of Masada, where even today the ramp built to allow the siege towers to reach the walls still remains after nearly 2,000 years.

In their sieges the Romans made use of a large array of machines and techniques, ranging from tunnels to undermine the walls, to
scorpio
bolt-shooters,
onager
rock-throwers, battering rams and movable siege towers. In defence they would use the countermine,
scorpio, onager,
incendiary projectiles, boiling water and boiling or flaming oil. These techniques were both complex and sophisticated, and the Romans were past masters in the art: a city besieged by the Romans was in serious trouble.

Overall, the Byzantine military machine, despite recent innovations and evolution, remained a very capable opponent. Capable of beating any adversary in the field, it was also capable of reducing even the strongest fortification. That is why many of the enemies of Rome waited until a period of chaos or confusion within the empire before striking, hoping to profit from Byzantine weakness whilst the Byzantines were unable to defend themselves or launch a counterattack of their own.

Despite the changes, the Byzantine army retained a strong tradition of success, and was capable of defeating any of its enemies. When Belisarius was appointed as a general in the Persian campaign, he took control of a formidable fighting machine.

Chapter 4

The Persian War

The Romano-Persian Wars to 527

In previous centuries, the Romans and Sasanids had fought each other to a virtual stalemate. The Romans and Byzantines found it difficult to face either the earlier Parthian or the later Sasanian cavalry when the armies deployed on the open plains prevalent in the west of Persia. More than once they had suffered heavy defeats at the hands of the Persian aristocratic heavy cavalry and accompanying horse archers. For example, Rome lost at the Battles of Carrhae in 53 BC and at Urumia in 36 BC. However, the Romans could also win, as at the Battles of the Taurus in 39 BC and Gindarus in 38 BC, and at the Battle of the Tigris in AD 115. The invasion of Julian in AD 363 resulted in three battles during which the Romans won tactically but strategically were forced to retreat after the death of Julian.

Taking the experience of these battles into account, Roman and Byzantine attacks tended to divert to the north, generally going through Christian Armenia before coming down through the more hilly terrain prevalent there, which they could use to their advantage. Roman armies that forgot this lesson were usually heavily beaten, while those that remembered usually captured the capital city of Ctesiphon and so gained a victory. Thanks to its strategic importance, the kingdom of Armenia had by the time of Justinian been divided between the two great powers. The name Armenia was retained for the area governed by Rome, while the Persian-controlled remainder of the country was now labelled Persarmenia.

Recognising each other’s weaknesses, warfare in the region had gradually become one of limited gains, dominated by raids and sieges; open, large-scale warfare usually resulted in the weakening of both, leaving them open to attack by third parties. It is in this context that Belisarius was appointed to high command in the year 527.

The causes of the war lay in the earlier history of Romano-Persian relations. In the fifth century, there had been a tradition of peaceful cooperation. The Emperor Arcadius had even asked King Yazdigerd to adopt Theodosius, Arcadius’ son, to help ensure support for his accession to the throne. Yazdigerd had agreed and his support had proved of inestimable value to the young Theodosius.

Yet the overall impression gained is that relations were based upon the poor financial position of the Persian king and his ability to raid the Roman east to help his finances. Accordingly, whenever there was a drastic shortfall of money, the Persians would ask for a subsidy. If this was paid peace prevailed; if not, the Persians would attack, capturing as many cities, fortifications and prisoners as possible before the arrival of substantial Roman reinforcements made the Persians withdraw. The fact that the Romans and Byzantines often paid the subsidies shows the plain economic truth: it was usually cheaper to pay the Persians than it was to gather the troops, fight a war, and then pay for replacement equipment, train recruits and pay for the repairs to the eastern infrastructures that had been damaged by the conflict.

Yet not all emperors agreed to pay. In 502 the Persian King Kavadh requested subsidies from the Emperor Anastasius to pay the Hepthalites who had helped him to regain his kingdom during a civil war. When Anastasius refused to pay the tribute, Kavadh invaded Armenia, capturing Theodosiopolis, Martyropolis and Amida. The Byzantines were already at war with the Bulgar Huns, who were ravaging the Balkans, so Kavadh faced little opposition at the start of the war. However, the situation in the Balkans slowly stabilised, allowing reinforcements to be sent east. Then, in 505, the roles were reversed; the Hepthalites invaded eastern Persia. Faced with war on two fronts, in 506 Kavadh agreed to a truce lasting for seven years. In the end, it lasted for twenty.

Anastasius asked for advice from his generals, who recommended the building of a new, secure forward base for the army, who were otherwise at a disadvantage logistically. Whilst the Persians were still occupied on their eastern front, Anastasius quickly built a fortress and supply base at Dara (sometimes spelt Daras). By the time the Persians were in a position to interfere it was too late; although Anastasius paid compensation, Dara remained.