Complete Works (151 page)

L
ACHES
: You are right.

S
OCRATES
: Then, according to your view, it would be wise endurance which would be courage.

L
ACHES
: So it seems.

S
OCRATES
: Let us see then in what respect it is wise—is it so with respect [e] to everything both great and small? For instance, if a man were to show endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending it he would get more, would you call this man courageous?

L
ACHES
: Heavens no, not I.

S
OCRATES
: Well, suppose a man is a doctor, and his son or some other patient is ill with inflammation of the lungs and begs him for something to eat or drink, and the man doesn’t give in but perseveres in refusing?
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L
ACHES
: No, this would certainly not be courage either, not at all.

S
OCRATES
: Well, suppose a man endures in battle, and his willingness to fight is based on wise calculation because he knows that others are coming to his aid and that he will be fighting men who are fewer than those on his side, and inferior to them, and in addition his position is stronger: would you say that this man, with his kind of wisdom and preparation, endures more courageously or a man in the opposite camp who is willing to remain and hold out?

[b] L
ACHES
: The one in the opposite camp, Socrates, I should say.

S
OCRATES
: But surely the endurance of this man is more foolish than that of the other.

L
ACHES
: You are right.

S
OCRATES
: And you would say that the man who shows endurance in a cavalry attack and has knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than the man who lacks this knowledge.

L
ACHES
: Yes, I would.

S
OCRATES
: And the one who endures with knowledge of slinging or archery or some other art is the less courageous.

[c] L
ACHES
: Yes indeed.

S
OCRATES
: And as many as would be willing to endure in diving down into wells without being skilled, or to endure in any other similar situation, you say are braver than those who are skilled in these things.

L
ACHES
: Why, what else would anyone say, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: Nothing, if that is what he thought.

L
ACHES
: Well, this is what I think at any rate.

S
OCRATES
: And certainly, Laches, such people run risks and endure more foolishly than those who do a thing with art.

L
ACHES
: They clearly do.

[d] S
OCRATES
: Now foolish daring and endurance was found by us to be not only disgraceful but harmful, in what we said earlier.

L
ACHES
: Quite so.

S
OCRATES
: But courage was agreed to be a noble thing.

L
ACHES
: Yes, it was.

S
OCRATES
: But now, on the contrary, we are saying that a disgraceful thing, foolish endurance, is courage.

L
ACHES
: Yes, we seem to be.

S
OCRATES
: And do you think we are talking sense?

L
ACHES
: Heavens no, Socrates, I certainly don’t.

[e] S
OCRATES
: Then I don’t suppose, Laches, that according to your statement you and I are tuned to the Dorian mode, because our deeds are not harmonizing with our words. In deeds I think anyone would say that we partook of courage, but in words I don’t suppose he would, if he were to listen to our present discussion.

L
ACHES
: You are absolutely right.

S
OCRATES
: Well then: is it good for us to be in such a state?

L
ACHES
: Certainly not, in no way whatsoever.

S
OCRATES
: But are you willing that we should agree with our statement to a certain extent?

L
ACHES
: To what extent and with what statement?

S
OCRATES
: With the one that commands us to endure. If you are willing,
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let us hold our ground in the search and let us endure, so that courage itself won’t make fun of us for not searching for it courageously—if endurance should perhaps be courage after all.

L
ACHES
: I am ready not to give up, Socrates, although I am not really accustomed to arguments of this kind. But an absolute desire for victory has seized me with respect to our conversation, and I am really getting [b] annoyed at being unable to express what I think in this fashion. I still think I know what courage is, but I can’t understand how it has escaped me just now so that I can’t pin it down in words and say what it is.

S
OCRATES
: Well, my friend, a good hunter ought to pursue the trail and not give up.

L
ACHES
: Absolutely.

S
OCRATES
: Then, if you agree, let’s also summon Nicias here to the hunt—he might get on much better.

L
ACHES
: I am willing—why not? [c]

S
OCRATES
: Come along then, Nicias, and, if you can, rescue your friends who are storm-tossed by the argument and find themselves in trouble. You see, of course, that our affairs are in a bad way, so state what you think courage is and get us out of our difficulties as well as confirming your own view by putting it into words.

N
ICIAS
: I have been thinking for some time that you are not defining courage in the right way, Socrates. And you are not employing the excellent observation I have heard you make before now.

S
OCRATES
: What one was that, Nicias?

N
ICIAS
: I have often heard you say that every one of us is good with [d] respect to that in which he is wise and bad in respect to that in which he is ignorant.

S
OCRATES
: By heaven, you are right, Nicias.

N
ICIAS
: Therefore, if a man is really courageous, it is clear that he is wise.

S
OCRATES
: You hear that, Laches?

L
ACHES
: I do, but I don’t understand exactly what he means.

S
OCRATES
: Well, I think I understand him, and the man seems to me to be saying that courage is some kind of wisdom.

L
ACHES
: Why, what sort of wisdom is he talking about, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: Why don’t you ask him? [e]

L
ACHES
: All right.

S
OCRATES
: Come, Nicias, tell him what sort of wisdom courage would be according to your view. I don’t suppose it is skill in flute playing.

N
ICIAS
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: And not in lyre playing either.

N
ICIAS
: Far from it.

S
OCRATES
: But what is this knowledge and of what?

L
ACHES
: You are questioning him in just the right way.

S
OCRATES
: Let him state what kind of knowledge it is.

[195]
N
ICIAS
: What I say, Laches, is that it is the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful in war and in every other situation.

L
ACHES
: How strangely he talks, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: What do you have in mind when you say this, Laches?

L
ACHES
: What do I have in mind? Why, I take wisdom to be quite a different thing from courage.

S
OCRATES
: Well, Nicias, at any rate, says it isn’t.

L
ACHES
: He certainly does—that’s the nonsense he talks.

S
OCRATES
: Well, let’s instruct him instead of making fun of him.

N
ICIAS
: Very well, but it strikes me, Socrates, that Laches wants to prove [b] that I am talking nonsense simply because he was shown to be that sort of person himself a moment ago.

L
ACHES
: Quite so, Nicias, and I shall try to demonstrate that very thing, because you
are
talking nonsense. Take an immediate example: in cases of illness, aren’t the doctors the ones who know what is to be feared? Or do you think the courageous are the people who know? Perhaps you call the doctors the courageous?

N
ICIAS
: No, of course not.

L
ACHES
: And I don’t imagine you mean the farmers either, even though I do suppose they are the ones who know what is to be feared in farming. And all the other craftsmen know what is to be feared and hoped for in [c] their particular arts. But these people are in no way courageous all the same.

S
OCRATES
: What does Laches mean, Nicias? Because he does seem to be saying something.

N
ICIAS
: Yes, he is saying something, but what he says is not true.

S
OCRATES
: How so?

N
ICIAS
: He thinks a doctor’s knowledge of the sick amounts to something more than being able to describe health and disease whereas I think their knowledge is restricted to just this. Do you suppose, Laches, that when a man’s recovery is more to be feared than his illness, the doctors know this? Or don’t you think there are many cases in which it would be better [d] not to get up from an illness? Tell me this: do you maintain that in all cases to live is preferable? In many cases, is it not better to die?

L
ACHES
: Well, I agree with you on this point at least.

N
ICIAS
: And do you suppose that the same things are to be feared by those for whom it is an advantage to die as by those for whom it is an advantage to live?

L
ACHES
: No, I don’t.

N
ICIAS
: But do you grant this knowledge to the doctors or to any other craftsmen except the one who knows what is and what is not to be feared, who is the one I call courageous?

S
OCRATES
: Do you understand what he is saying, Laches?

[e] L
ACHES
: Yes I do—he is calling the seers the courageous. Because who else will know for whom it is better to live than to die? What about you, Nicias—do you admit to being a seer, or, if you are not a seer, to not being courageous?

N
ICIAS
: Well, what of it? Don’t you, for your part, think it is appropriate for a seer to know what is to be feared and what is to be hoped?

L
ACHES
: Yes, I do, because I don’t see for what other person it would be.

N
ICIAS
: Much more for the man I am talking about, my friend, because the seer needs to know only the signs of what is to be, whether a man will experience death or illness or loss of property, or will experience
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victory or defeat, in battle or in any other sort of contest. But why is it more suitable for the seer than for anyone else to judge for whom it is better to suffer or not to suffer these things?

L
ACHES
: It isn’t clear to me from this, Socrates, what he is trying to say. Because he doesn’t select either the seer or the doctor or anyone else as the man he calls courageous, unless some god is the person he means. Nicias appears to me unwilling to make a gentlemanly admission that he [b] is talking nonsense, but he twists this way and that in an attempt to cover up his difficulty. Even you and I could have executed a similar twist just now if we had wanted to avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. If we were making speeches in a court of law, there might be some point in doing this, but as things are, why should anyone adorn himself senselessly with empty words in a gathering like this?

S
OCRATES
: I see no reason why he should, Laches. But let us see if Nicias [c] thinks he is saying something and is not just talking for the sake of talking. Let us find out from him more clearly what it is he means, and if he is really saying something, we will agree with him, but if not, we will instruct him.

L
ACHES
: You go ahead and question him, Socrates, if you want to find out. I think perhaps I have asked enough.

S
OCRATES
: I have no objection, since the inquiry will be a joint effort on behalf of us both.

L
ACHES
: Very well.

S
OCRATES
: Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, because Laches and I [d] are sharing the argument: you say that courage is knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope?

N
ICIAS
: Yes, I do.

S
OCRATES
: Then this knowledge is something possessed by very few indeed if, as you say, neither the doctor nor the seer will have it and won’t be courageous without acquiring this particular knowledge. Isn’t that what you’re saying?

N
ICIAS
: Just so.

S
OCRATES
: Then, as the proverb says, it is true that this is not something “every sow would know,” and she would not be courageous?

N
ICIAS
: I don’t think so.

S
OCRATES
: Then it is obvious, Nicias, that you do not regard the Crommyon [e] sow
⁵
as having been courageous. I say this not as a joke, but because I think that anyone taking this position must necessarily deny courage to any wild beast or else admit that some wild beast, a lion or a leopard or some sort of wild boar, is wise enough to know what is so difficult that very few men understand it. And the man who defines courage as you define it would have to assert that a lion and a stag, a bull and a monkey are all equally courageous by nature.
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