Complete Works (152 page)

L
ACHES
: By heaven, you talk well, Socrates. Give us an honest answer to this, Nicias—whether you say that these wild beasts, whom we all admit to be courageous, are wiser than we in these respects, or whether you dare to oppose the general view and say that they are not courageous.

N
ICIAS
: By no means, Laches, do I call courageous wild beasts or anything else that, for lack of understanding, does not fear what should be feared. Rather, I would call them rash and mad. Or do you really suppose I call [b] all children courageous, who fear nothing because they have no sense? On the contrary, I think that rashness and courage are not the same thing. My view is that very few have a share of courage and foresight, but that a great many, men and women and children and wild animals, partake in boldness and audacity and rashness and lack of foresight. These cases, [c] which you and the man in the street call courageous, I call rash, whereas the courageous ones are the sensible people I was talking about.

L
ACHES
: You see, Socrates, how the man decks himself out in words and does it well in his own opinion. Those whom everyone agrees to be courageous he attempts to deprive of that distinction.

N
ICIAS
: I’m not depriving you of it, Laches, so cheer up. I declare that you are wise, and Lamachus
⁶
too, so long as you are courageous, and I say the same of a great many other Athenians.

L
ACHES
: I shan’t say anything about that—though I could—in case you should call me a typical Aexonian.
⁷

[d] S
OCRATES
: Never mind him, Laches, I don’t think you realize that he has procured this wisdom from our friend Damon, and Damon spends most of his time with Prodicus, who has the reputation of being best among the sophists at making such verbal distinctions.

L
ACHES
: Well, Socrates, it is certainly more fitting for a sophist to make such clever distinctions than for a man the city thinks worthy to be its leader.

[e] S
OCRATES
: Well, I suppose it would be fitting, my good friend, for the man in charge of the greatest affairs to have the greatest share of wisdom. But I think it worthwhile to ask Nicias what he has in mind when he defines courage in this way.

L
ACHES
: Well then, you ask him, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: This is just what I intend to do, my good friend. But don’t therefore suppose that I shall let you out of your share of the argument. Pay attention and join me in examining what is being said.

L
ACHES
: Very well, if that seems necessary.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, it does. And you, Nicias, tell me again from the
[198]
beginning—you know that when we were investigating courage at the beginning of the argument, we were investigating it as a part of virtue?

N
ICIAS
: Yes, we were.

S
OCRATES
: And didn’t you give your answer supposing that it was a part, and, as such, one among a number of other parts, all of which taken together were called virtue?

N
ICIAS
: Yes, why not?

S
OCRATES
: And do you also speak of the same parts that I do? In addition to courage, I call temperance and justice and everything else of this kind parts of virtue. Don’t you?

N
ICIAS
: Yes, indeed. [b]

S
OCRATES
: Stop there. We are in agreement on these points, but let us investigate the grounds of fear and confidence to make sure that you don’t regard them in one way and we in another. We will tell you what we think about them, and if you do not agree, you shall instruct us. We regard as fearful things those that produce fear, and as hopeful things those that do not produce fear; and fear is produced not by evils which have happened or are happening but by those which are anticipated. Because fear is the expectation of a future evil—or isn’t this your opinion too, Laches?

L
ACHES
: Very much so, Socrates. [c]

S
OCRATES
: You hear what we have to say, Nicias: that fearful things are future evils, and the ones inspiring hope are either future non-evils or future goods. Do you agree with this or have you some other view on the subject?

N
ICIAS
: I agree with this one.

S
OCRATES
: And you declare that knowledge of just these things is courage?

N
ICIAS
: Exactly so.

S
OCRATES
: Let us find out if we all agree on still a third point.

N
ICIAS
: What one is that?

S
OCRATES
: I will explain. It seems to me and my friend here that of the [d] various things with which knowledge is concerned, there is not one kind of knowledge by which we know how things have happened in the past, and another by which we know how they are happening at the present time, and still another by which we know how what has not yet happened might best come to be in the future, but that the knowledge is the same in each case. For instance, in the case of health, there is no other art related to the past, the present, and the future except that of medicine, which, although it is a single art, surveys what is, what was, and what is likely to be in the future. Again, in the case of the fruits of the earth, the art of [e] farming conforms to the same pattern. And I suppose that both of you could bear witness that, in the case of the affairs of war, the art of generalship is that which best foresees the future and the other times—nor does this art consider it necessary to be ruled by the art of the seer, but to rule
it
, as
[199]
being better acquainted with both present and future in the affairs of war. In fact, the law decrees, not that the seer should command the general, but that the general should command the seer. Is this what we shall say, Laches?

L
ACHES
: Yes, it is.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

N
ICIAS
: Yes, that is how it seems to me, Socrates.

[b] S
OCRATES
: Now, my good friend, you say that courage is the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful, isn’t that so?

N
ICIAS
: Yes, it is.

S
OCRATES
: And it was agreed that fearful and hopeful things were future goods and future evils.

N
ICIAS
: Yes, it was.

S
OCRATES
: And that the same knowledge is of the same things—future ones and all other kinds.

N
ICIAS
: Yes, that is the case.

S
OCRATES
: Then courage is not knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful [c] only, because it understands not simply future goods and evils, but those of the present and the past and all times, just as is the case with the other kinds of knowledge.

N
ICIAS
: So it seems, at any rate.

S
OCRATES
: Then you have told us about what amounts to a third part of courage, Nicias, whereas we asked you what the whole of courage was. And now it appears, according to your view, that courage is the knowledge not just of the fearful and the hopeful, but in your own opinion, it would [d] be the knowledge of practically all goods and evils put together. Do you agree to this new change, Nicias, or what do you say?

N
ICIAS
: That seems right to me, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Then does a man with this kind of knowledge seem to depart from virtue in any respect if he really knows, in the case of all goods whatsoever, what they are and will be and have been, and similarly in the case of evils? And do you regard that man as lacking in temperance or justice and holiness to whom alone belongs the ability to deal circumspectly [e] with both gods and men with respect to both the fearful and its opposite, and to provide himself with good things through his knowledge of how to associate with them correctly?

N
ICIAS
: I think you have a point, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Then the thing you are now talking about, Nicias, would not be a part of virtue but rather virtue entire.

N
ICIAS
: So it seems.

S
OCRATES
: And we have certainly stated that courage is one of the parts of virtue.

N
ICIAS
: Yes, we have.

S
OCRATES
: Then what we are saying now does not appear to hold good.

N
ICIAS
: Apparently not.

S
OCRATES
: Then we have not discovered, Nicias, what courage is.

N
ICIAS
: We don’t appear to.

L
ACHES
: But I, my dear Nicias, felt sure you would make the discovery
[200]
after you were so scornful of me while I was answering Socrates. In fact, I had great hopes that with the help of Damon’s wisdom you would solve the whole problem.

N
ICIAS
: That’s a fine attitude of yours, Laches, to think it no longer to be of any importance that you yourself were just now shown to be a person who knows nothing about courage. What interests you is whether I will turn out to be a person of the same kind. Apparently it will make no difference to you to be ignorant of those things which a man of any pretensions ought to know, so long as you include me in your ignorance. [b] Well, you seem to me to be acting in a thoroughly human fashion by noticing everybody except yourself. As far as I am concerned I think enough has been said on the topic for the present, and if any point has not been covered sufficiently, then later on I think we can correct it both with the help of Damon—whom you think it right to laugh at, though you have never seen the man—and with that of others. And when I feel secure on these points, I will instruct you too and won’t begrudge the [c] effort—because you seem to me to be sadly in need of learning.

L
ACHES
: You are a clever man, Nicias, I know. All the same, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to say good-bye to you and me as teachers of the young men and to retain the services of this man Socrates, as I said in the beginning. If my boys were the same age, this is what I would do.

N
ICIAS
: And I agree: if Socrates is really willing to undertake the supervision of the boys, then don’t look for anyone else. In fact I would gladly [d] entrust Niceratus to him, if he is willing. But whenever I bring up the subject in any way, he always recommends other people to me but is unwilling to take on the job himself. But see if Socrates might be more willing to listen to you, Lysimachus.

L
YSIMACHUS
: Well, he should, Nicias, since I myself would be willing to do a great many things for him which I would not be willing to do for practically anyone else. What do you say, Socrates? Will you comply with our request and take an active part with us in helping the young men to become as good as possible?

S
OCRATES
: Well, it would be a terrible thing, Lysimachus, to be unwilling [e] to join in assisting any man to become as good as possible. If in the conversations we have just had I had seemed to be knowing and the other two had not, then it would be right to issue a special invitation to me to perform this task; but as the matter stands, we were all in the same difficulty. Why then should anybody choose one of us in preference to another?
[201]
What I think is that he ought to choose none of us. But as things are, see whether the suggestion I am about to make may not be a good one: what I say we ought to do, my friends—since this is just between ourselves—is to join in searching for the best possible teacher, first for ourselves—we really need one—and then for the young men, sparing neither money nor anything else. What I don’t advise is that we remain as we are. And if
[201b]
anyone laughs at us because we think it worthwhile to spend our time in school at our age, then I think we should confront him with the saying of Homer, “Modesty is not a good mate for a needy man.”
⁸
And, not paying any attention to what anyone may say, let us join together in looking after both our own interests and those of the boys.

L
YSIMACHUS
: I like what you say, Socrates, and the fact that I am the oldest makes me the most eager to go to school along with the boys. Just [c] do this for me: come to my house early tomorrow—don’t refuse—so that we may make plans about these matters, but let us make an end of our present conversation.

S
OCRATES
: I shall do what you say, Lysimachus, and come to you tomorrow, God willing.

1
. On the boys’ future see
Theaetetus
150e ff., where we are told that Aristides became an associate of Socrates but left his company too soon. Both Aristides and the young Thucydides are mentioned in
Theages
130a ff.

2
. The Athenians were defeated by the Boeotians at Delium in November of 424, the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades refers to the conduct of Socrates in the retreat (to the detriment of Laches) at
Symposium
220e ff.

3
. The same proverb appears at
Gorgias
514e. A wine jar is the largest pot; one ought to learn pottery on something smaller.

4
. Here (see also
Republic
536d) Plato refers to a verse of Solon (Athenian poet and lawgiver of the early sixth century): “I grow old ever learning many things” (frg. 18 Bergk).

5
. The famous sow of Crommyon (near Corinth) was killed by Theseus. See Plutarch
Theseus
9.

6
. Lamachus shared the command of the Sicilian expedition with Nicias and Alcibiades; he died at Syracuse.