Complete Works (185 page)

C
ALLICLES
: Let’s take it that way.

S
OCRATES
: So if a house gets to be organized and orderly it would be a good one, and if it gets to be disorganized it would be a terrible one?

C
ALLICLES
: I agree.

S
OCRATES
: This holds true for a boat, too?

[b] C
ALLICLES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And we surely take it to hold true for our bodies, too?

C
ALLICLES
: Yes, we do.

S
OCRATES
: What about the soul? Will it be a good one if it gets to be disorganized, or if it gets to have a certain organization and order?

C
ALLICLES
: Given what we said before, we must agree that this is so, too.

S
OCRATES
: What name do we give to what comes into being in the body as a result of organization and order?

C
ALLICLES
: You mean health and strength, presumably.

[c] S
OCRATES
: Yes, I do. And which one do we give to what comes into being in the soul as a result of organization and order? Try to find and tell me its name, as in the case of the body.

C
ALLICLES
: Why don’t you say it yourself, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: All right, if that pleases you more, I’ll do so. And if you think I’m right, give your assent. If not, refute me and don’t give way. I think that the name for the states of organization of the body is “healthy,” as a result of which health and the rest of bodily excellence comes into being in it. Is this so or isn’t it?

C
ALLICLES
: It is.

S
OCRATES
: And the name for the states of organization and order of the [d] soul is “lawful” and “law,” which lead people to become law-abiding and orderly, and these are justice and self-control. Do you assent to this or not?

C
ALLICLES
: Let it be so.

S
OCRATES
: So this is what that skilled and good orator will look to when he applies to people’s souls whatever speeches he makes as well as all of his actions, and any gift he makes or any confiscation he carries out. He will always give his attention to how justice may come to exist in the souls [e] of his fellow citizens and injustice be gotten rid of, how self-control may come to exist there and lack of discipline be gotten rid of, and how the rest of excellence may come into being there and badness may depart. Do you agree or not?

C
ALLICLES
: I do.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, for what benefit is there, Callicles, in giving a body that’s sick and in wretched shape lots of very pleasant food or drink or anything else when it won’t do the man a bit more good, or, quite to the contrary, when by a fair reckoning it’ll do him less good? Is that so?

C
ALLICLES
: Let it be so.
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S
OCRATES
: Yes, for I don’t suppose that it profits a man to be alive with his body in a terrible condition, for this way his life, too, would be necessarily a wretched one. Or wouldn’t it be?

C
ALLICLES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Now, isn’t it also true that doctors generally allow a person to fill up his appetites, to eat when he’s hungry, for example, or drink when he’s thirsty as much as he wants to when he’s in good health, but when he’s sick they practically never allow him to fill himself with what he has an appetite for? Do you also go along with this point, at least?

C
ALLICLES
: Yes, I do.

S
OCRATES
: And isn’t it just the same way with the soul, my excellent [b] friend? As long as it’s corrupt, in that it’s foolish, undisciplined, unjust and impious, it should be kept away from its appetites and not be permitted to do anything other than what will make it better. Do you agree or not?

C
ALLICLES
: I agree.

S
OCRATES
: For this is no doubt better for the soul itself?

C
ALLICLES
: Yes, it is.

S
OCRATES
: Now isn’t keeping it away from what it has an appetite for, disciplining it?

C
ALLICLES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So to be disciplined is better for the soul than lack of discipline, which is what you yourself were thinking just now.

C
ALLICLES
: I don’t know what in the world you mean, Socrates. Ask [c] somebody else.

S
OCRATES
: This fellow won’t put up with being benefited and with his undergoing the very thing the discussion’s about, with being disciplined.

C
ALLICLES
: And I couldn’t care less about anything you say, either. I gave you these answers just for Gorgias’ sake.

S
OCRATES
: Very well. What’ll we do now? Are we breaking off in the midst of the discussion?

C
ALLICLES
: That’s for you to decide.

S
OCRATES
: They say that it isn’t permitted to give up in the middle of [d] telling stories, either. A head must be put on it, so that it won’t go about headless. Please answer the remaining questions, too, so that our discussion may get its head.

C
ALLICLES
: How unrelenting you are, Socrates! If you’ll listen to me, you’ll drop this discussion or carry it through with someone else.

S
OCRATES
: Who else is willing? Surely we mustn’t leave the discussion incomplete.

C
ALLICLES
: Couldn’t you go through the discussion by yourself, either by speaking in your own person or by answering your own questions?

[e] S
OCRATES
: In that case Epicharmus’ saying applies to me: I prove to be sufficient, being “one man, for what two men were saying before.”
¹⁹
But it looks as though I have no choice at all. Let’s by all means do it that way then. I suppose that all of us ought to be contentiously eager to know what’s true and what’s false about the things we’re talking about. That it should become clear is a good common to all. I’ll go through the discussion,
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then, and say how I think it is, and if any of you thinks that what I agree to with myself isn’t so, you must object and refute me. For the things I say I certainly don’t say with any knowledge at all; no, I’m searching together with you so that if my opponent clearly has a point, I’ll be the first to concede it. I’m saying this, however, in case you think the discussion ought to be carried through to the end. If you don’t want it to be, then let’s drop it now and leave.

[b] G
ORGIAS
: No, Socrates, I don’t think we should leave yet. You must finish the discussion. It seems to me that the others think so, too. I myself certainly want to hear you go through the rest of it by yourself.

S
OCRATES
: All right, Gorgias. I myself would have been glad to continue my discussion with Callicles here, until I returned him Amphion’s speech for that of Zethus. Well, Callicles, since you’re not willing to join me in carrying the discussion through to the end, please do listen to me and [c]interrupt if you think I’m saying anything wrong. And if you refute me, I shan’t be upset with you as you were with me; instead you’ll go on record as my greatest benefactor.

C
ALLICLES
: Speak on, my good friend, and finish it up by yourself.

S
OCRATES
: Listen, then, as I pick up the discussion from the beginning. Is the pleasant the same as the good?—It isn’t, as Callicles and I have agreed.—Is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant?—The pleasant for the sake of the good.—And
pleasant
is that by which, when it’s come to be present in us, we feel [d] pleasure, and
good
that by which, when it’s present in us, we are good?—That’s right.—But surely we are good, both we and everything else that’s good, when some excellence has come to be present in us?—Yes, I do think that that’s necessarily so, Callicles.—But the best way in which the excellence of each thing comes to be present in it, whether it’s that of an artifact or of a body or a soul as well, or of any animal, is not just any old way, but is due to whatever organization, correctness, and craftsmanship is bestowed on each of them. Is that right?—Yes, I agree.—So it’s due to [e] organization that the excellence of each thing is something which is organized and has order?—Yes, I’d say so.—So it’s when a certain order, the proper one for each thing, comes to be present in it that it makes each of the things there are, good?—Yes, I think so.—So also a soul which has its own order is better than a disordered one?—Necessarily so.—But surely one that has order is an orderly one?—Of course it is.—And an orderly soul is a self-controlled one?—Absolutely.—So a self-controlled soul is a
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good one. I for one can’t say anything else beyond that, Callicles my friend; if you can, please teach me.

C
ALLICLES
: Say on, my good man.

S
OCRATES
: I say that if the self-controlled soul is a good one, then a soul that’s been affected the opposite way of the self-controlled one is a bad one. And this, it’s turned out, is the foolish and undisciplined one.—That’s right.—And surely a self-controlled person would do what’s appropriate with respect to both gods and human beings. For if he does what’s inappropriate, he wouldn’t be self-controlled.—That’s necessarily how it is.—And [b] of course if he did what’s appropriate with respect to human beings, he would be doing what’s just, and with respect to gods he would be doing what’s pious, and one who does what’s just and pious must necessarily be just and pious.—That’s so.—Yes, and he would also necessarily be brave, for it’s not like a self-controlled man to either pursue or avoid what isn’t appropriate, but to avoid and pursue what he should, whether these are things to do, or people, or pleasures and pains, and to stand fast and endure them where he should. So, it’s necessarily very much the case, [c] Callicles, that the self-controlled man, because he’s just and brave and pious, as we’ve recounted, is a completely good man, that the good man does well and admirably whatever he does, and that the man who does well is blessed and happy, while the corrupt man, the one who does badly, is miserable. And this would be the one who’s in the condition opposite to that of the self-controlled one, the undisciplined one whom you were praising.

So this is how I set down the matter, and I say that this is true. And if it is true, then a person who wants to be happy must evidently pursue and practice self-control. Each of us must flee away from lack of discipline [d] as quickly as his feet will carry him, and must above all make sure that he has no need of being disciplined, but if he does have that need, either he himself or anyone in his house, either a private citizen or a whole city, he must pay his due and must be disciplined, if he’s to be happy. This is the target which I think one should look to in living, and in his actions he should direct all of his own affairs and those of his city to the end that [e] justice and self-control will be present in one who is to be blessed. He should not allow his appetites to be undisciplined or undertake to fill them up—that’s interminably bad—and live the life of a marauder. Such a man could not be dear to another man or to a god, for he cannot be a partner, and where there’s no partnership there’s no friendship. Yes, Callicles, wise
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men claim that partnership and friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men, and that is why they call this universe a
world order
, my friend, and not an undisciplined world-disorder. I believe that you don’t pay attention to these facts, even though you’re a wise man in these matters. You’ve failed to notice that proportionate equality has great power among both gods and men, and you suppose that you ought to practice getting the greater share. That’s because you neglect geometry.

[b] Very well. We must either refute this argument and show that it’s not the possession of justice and self-control that makes happy people happy and the possession of badness that makes miserable people miserable, or else, if this is true, we must consider what the consequences are. These consequences are all those previous things, Callicles, the ones about which you asked me whether I was speaking in earnest when I said that a man should be his own accuser, or his son’s or his friend’s, if he’s done anything unjust, and should use oratory for that purpose. Also what you thought Polus was ashamed to concede is true after all, that doing what’s unjust [c] who is to be an orator the right way should be just and be knowledgeable in what is just, the point Polus in his turn claimed Gorgias to have agreed to out of shame.

That being so, let’s examine what it is you’re taking me to task for, and whether it’s right or not. You say that I’m unable to protect either myself or any of my friends or relatives or rescue them from the gravest dangers, and that I’m at the mercy of the first comer, just as people without rights are, [d] whether he wants to knock me on the jaw, to use that forceful expression of yours, or confiscate my property, or exile me from the city, or ultimately put me to death. To be in that position is, by your reasoning, the most shameful thing of all. As for what my own reasoning is, that’s been told many times by now, but there’s nothing to stop its being told once again. I deny, Callicles, that being knocked on the jaw unjustly is the most shameful [e] thing, or that having my body or my purse cut is, and I affirm that to knock or cut me or my possessions unjustly is both more shameful and worse, and at the same time that to rob or enslave me or to break into my house or, to sum up, to commit any unjust act at all against me and my possessions is both worse and more shameful for the one who does these unjust acts than it is for me, the one who suffers them. These conclusions, at which we arrived earlier in our previous discussions are, I’d say, held down and bound by arguments of iron and adamant, even if it’s rather rude to say so. So it would seem, anyhow. And if you or someone more
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forceful than you won’t undo them, then anyone who says anything other than what I’m now saying cannot be speaking well. And yet for my part, my account is ever the same: I don’t know how these things are, but no one I’ve ever met, as in this case, can say anything else without being ridiculous. So once more I set it down that these things are so. And if they [b] are—if injustice is the worst thing there is for the person committing it and if that person’s failure to pay what’s due is something even worse, if possible, than this one that’s the greatest—what is the protection which would make a man who’s unable to provide it for himself truly ridiculous? Isn’t it the one that will turn away what harms us most? Yes, it’s necessarily very much the case that this is the most shameful kind of protection not to be able to provide, either for oneself or for one’s friends or relatives. And the second kind’s the one that turns away the second worst thing, [c] the third kind the one against the third worst, and so on. The greater by its nature each bad thing is, the more admirable it is to be able to provide protection against it, too, and the more shameful not to be able to. Is this the way it is, Callicles, or is it some other way?