Complete Works (29 page)

H
ERMOGENES
: I believe you’re right.

S
OCRATES
: Doesn’t the same argument apply to ‘king’? For a king will
[394]
probably be the son of a king, a good man the son of a good man, a fine man the son of a fine one, and so on. So, unless a monster is born, the offspring of a kind will be of the same kind and should be called by the same name. But because of variation in their syllables, names that are really the same seem different to the uninitiated. Similarly, a doctor’s medicines, which have different colors and perfumes added to them, appear different to us, although they are really the same and appear the same to a doctor, who looks only to their power to cure and isn’t disconcerted by [b] the additives. Similarly, someone who knows about names looks to their force or power and isn’t disconcerted if a letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even if the force a name possesses is embodied in different letters altogether. So, for example, in the names ‘Hector’ and ‘Astyanax’, which we were discussing just now, none of the letters is the same, except ‘
t
’, but they signify the same anyway. And what letters does ‘Archepolis’—[c] ‘Ruler-of-a-city’—have in common with them? Yet, it expresses the same thing. Many other names signify simply king; others signify general, for example, ‘Agis’ (‘Leader’), ‘Polemarchus’ (‘War-lord’), ‘Eupolemus’ (‘Good-warrior’); and still others signify doctor, for example, ‘Iatrocles’ (‘Famous-healer’) and ‘Acesimbrotus’ (‘Healer-of-mortals’). And we might perhaps find many others, which differ in their letters and syllables, but which have the same force or power when spoken. Is that plain to you or not?

H
ERMOGENES
: Certainly. [d]

S
OCRATES
: Then those that are born according to nature should be given the same names as their fathers.

H
ERMOGENES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: What about the ones that are born contrary to nature, those that are some form of monster? For instance, when a good and pious man has an impious son, the latter shouldn’t have his father’s name but that of the kind to which he belongs, just as in our earlier example of a horse having a calf as offspring?

H
ERMOGENES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Therefore the impious son of a pious father should be given [e] the name of the kind to which he belongs.

H
ERMOGENES
: That’s right.

S
OCRATES
: Then he shouldn’t be called ‘Theophilus’ (‘God-beloved’) or ‘Mnesitheus’ (‘Mindful-of-god’), or anything of that sort, but something that signifies the opposite, if indeed names are to be actually correct.

H
ERMOGENES
: That’s absolutely right, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Thus the name ‘Orestes’ (‘Mountain-man’) is surely correct, Hermogenes, whether it was given to him by chance or by some poet, who displayed in his name the brutality, savagery, and ruggedness of his nature.

H
ERMOGENES
: It seems so, Socrates.
[395]

S
OCRATES
: And his father’s name also seems to accord with nature.

H
ERMOGENES
: It does.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, for Agamemnon is someone who worked hard and persevered, bringing his plans to completion because of his virtue or excellence. The stay of his army in Troy and his perseverance there is a sign of this. And thus the name ‘Agamemnon’ signifies that this man is admirable (
agastos
) for holding his ground (
epimon
ē
). The name ‘Atreus’ also seems to be correct; for both his murder of Chrysippus and his cruelty to Thyestes [b] were damaging and destructive (
at
ē
ra
) to his virtue. However, the meaning of his name is somewhat distorted and obscure, so that it doesn’t express his nature to everyone. But to those who understand about names it adequately expresses what ‘Atreus’ means. For whether the name accords with his stubbornness (
ateires
), or his boldness (
atrestos
), or his destructiveness (
at
ē
ros
), [c] it is correctly given to him. I think Pelops also has a fitting name; for ‘Pelops’ signifies he who sees only what is near at hand (
pelas, opsis
).

H
ERMOGENES
: How is that?

S
OCRATES
: Because, according to legend, he didn’t think about or foresee what the long-term consequences of murdering Myrtilus would be for his entire family, or all the misery that would overwhelm them. In his eagerness to win Hippodameia by any available means, he saw only what was ready [d] to hand and on the spot—that is to say, what was nearby (
pelas
). Everyone would agree, too, that ‘Tantalus’ was given correctly and according to nature, if what’s said about its bearer is true.

H
ERMOGENES
: What’s that?

S
OCRATES
: They say that many terrible misfortunes happened to him in his life—the last of which was the total overthrow of his country—and that, in Hades, after his death, he had a stone suspended (
talanteia
) over [e] his head, in wondrous harmony with his name. It’s exactly as if someone had wished to name him ‘
Talantatos
’ (‘Most-weighed-upon’) but had disguised the name and said ‘Tantalus’ instead. In some such way, in any case, the chance of legend supplied him with this name. His father, who is said to have been Zeus, also seems to have had an altogether fine name
[396]
given to him—but it isn’t easy to figure out. That’s because the name ‘Zeus’ is exactly like a phrase that we divide into two parts, ‘
Z
ē
na
’ and ‘
Dia
’, some of us using one of them and some the other.
¹⁵
But these two names, reunited into one, express the nature of the god—which is just what we said a name should do. Certainly, no one is more the cause of life (
z
ē
n
), whether for us or for anything else, than the ruler and king of all things. Thus ‘
Z
ē
na
’ and ‘
Dia
’ together correctly name the god that is [b] always the cause of life (
di’ hon z
ē
n
) for all creatures. But, as I say, his name, which is really one, is divided in two, ‘
Dia
’ and ‘
Z
ē
na
’. When one hears that Zeus is the son of Cronus, one might find that offensive at first, and it might seem more reasonable to say that he is the offspring of a great intellect. But in fact Cronus’ name signifies not a child (
koros
), but the purity and clarity of his intellect or understanding.
¹⁶
According to legend, he was the son of Uranus (Heaven), whose name is also correctly given, for the sight of what is above is well called by the name ‘
ourania
’ (‘heavenly’)—looking at the things above (
hor
ō
sa ta an
ō
)—and astronomers say, Hermogenes, that that results in purity of intellect. If I could remember [c] Hesiod’s genealogy, and the even earlier ancestors of the gods he mentions, I wouldn’t have stopped explaining the correctness of the names he gives them, until I had tested this wisdom which has suddenly come upon me—I do not know from where—to see whether or not it holds up till the end. [d]

H
ERMOGENES
: Indeed, Socrates, you do seem to me to be exactly like a prophet who has suddenly been inspired to deliver oracles.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, Hermogenes, and I, for my part, mostly blame Euthyphro, of the deme of Prospalta,
¹⁷
for its coming upon me. I was with him at dawn, lending an ear to his lengthy discussion. He must have been inspired, because it looks as though he has not only filled my ears with his superhuman wisdom but taken possession of my soul as well. So it seems to me that this is what we ought to do: Today, we’ll use this wisdom and finish [e] our examination of names, but tomorrow, if the rest of you agree, we’ll exorcise it and purify ourselves, as soon as we’ve found someone—whether priest or wise man—who is clever at that kind of purification.
[397]

H
ERMOGENES
: That’s fine with me. I’d be very glad to hear what remains to be said about names.

S
OCRATES
: Then that’s what we must do. Since we now have some sort of outline to follow, which names do you want us to begin with, in order to find out whether names themselves will testify to us that they are not given by chance, but have some sort of correctness? The names that heroes and men are said to have might perhaps deceive us. After all, as we saw [b] at the beginning, they are often given because they are the names of ancestors, and some of them are wholly inappropriate. Many, too, are given in the hope that they will prove appropriate, such as ‘Eutychides’ (‘Son-of-good-fortune’), ‘Sosias’ (‘Saviour’), ‘Theophilus’ (‘God-beloved’), and many others. In my view, we must leave such names aside. We are most likely to find correctly given names among those concerned with the things that by nature always are, since it is proper for their names to be given with the greatest care, and some may even be the work of a more [c] than human power.

H
ERMOGENES
: I think that’s sensible, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: So isn’t it right to begin by seeing why the name ‘
theoi
’ (‘gods’) is itself one that the gods are correctly called?

H
ERMOGENES
: It probably is.

S
OCRATES
: I suspect something like this. It seems to me that the first inhabitants of Greece believed only in those gods in which many foreigners [d] still believe today—the sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky. And, seeing that these were always moving or running, they gave them the name ‘
theoi
’ because it was their nature to run (
thein
). Later, when they learned about the other gods, they called them all by that name. Does that seem likely—or am I talking nonsense?

H
ERMOGENES
: It’s very likely.

S
OCRATES
: What shall we investigate next? Clearly, it’s daemons,
¹⁸
then heroes, then humans, isn’t it?
¹⁹

[e] H
ERMOGENES
: Yes, daemons are next.
²⁰

S
OCRATES
: And what is the correct meaning of the name ‘daemons’, Hermogenes? See if you think there’s anything in what I’m about to say.

H
ERMOGENES
: Say it, and I will.

S
OCRATES
: Do you know what Hesiod says daemons are?

H
ERMOGENES
: No, I don’t remember.

S
OCRATES
: Do you remember that he speaks of a golden race, which was the first race of human beings to be born?

H
ERMOGENES
: Yes, I remember that.

S
OCRATES
: He says this about it:

Since this race has been eclipsed by fate,
[398]
They are called sacred daemons;
They live on earth and are good,
Warding off evil and guarding mortal men.
²¹

H
ERMOGENES
: So what?

S
OCRATES
: Well, I don’t think he’s saying that the golden race is by nature made of gold, but that it is good and fine. I consider it a proof of this that he calls us a race of iron.

H
ERMOGENES
: That’s true.

S
OCRATES
: So don’t you think that if someone who presently exists were [b] good, Hesiod would say that he too belonged to the golden race?

H
ERMOGENES
: He probably would.

S
OCRATES
: Are good people any different from wise ones?

H
ERMOGENES
: No, they aren’t.

S
OCRATES
: It is principally because daemons are wise and knowing (
da
ē
mones
), I think, that Hesiod says they are named ‘daemons’ (‘
daimones
’). In our older Attic dialect, we actually find the word ‘
da
ē
mones
’. So, Hesiod and many other poets speak well when they say that when a good man dies, he has a great destiny and a great honor and becomes a ‘daemon’, [c] which is a name given to him because it accords with wisdom. And I myself assert, indeed, that every good man, whether alive or dead, is daemonic, and is correctly called a ‘daemon’.

H
ERMOGENES
: And I think that I completely agree with you, Socrates. But what about the name ‘hero’ (‘
h
ē
r
ō
s’
)? What is it?

S
OCRATES
: That one isn’t so hard to understand because the name has been little altered. It expresses the fact that heroes were born out of love (
er
ō
s
).

H
ERMOGENES
: How do you mean?

S
OCRATES
: Don’t you know that the heroes are demigods?

H
ERMOGENES
: So what?

S
OCRATES
: So all of them sprang from the love of a god for a mortal woman or of a mortal man for a goddess. And if, as before, you investigate [d] the matter by relying on old Attic, you will get a better understanding, since it will show you that the name ‘hero’ (‘
h
ē
r
ō
s
’) is only a slightly altered form of the word ‘love’ (‘
er
ō
s
’)—the very thing from which the heroes sprang. And either this is the reason they were called ‘heroes’ or else because they were sophists, clever speech-makers (
rh
ē
tores
) and dialecticians, skilled questioners (
er
ō
tan
)—for ‘
eirein
’ is the same as ‘
legein
’ (‘to speak’). And therefore, as we were saying just now, in the Attic dialect, the heroes turn out to be speech-makers and questioners. Hence the noble [e] breed of heroes turns out be a race of speech-makers and sophists. That isn’t hard to understand. But can you tell me why members of the human race are called ‘humans’ (‘
anthr
ō
poi
’)? That’s much harder to understand.