Complete Works (327 page)

[c] C
LINIAS
: No sir, nobody could be so mad.

A
THENIAN
: Now then, Megillus and Clinias, let’s delimit the courses of action open to anyone who has so far refused to believe in gods, and get rid of him.

C
LINIAS
: You mean…

A
THENIAN
: …
either
he should demonstrate to us that we’re wrong to posit soul as the first cause to which everything owes its birth, and that our subsequent deductions were equally mistaken,
or
, if he can’t put a better case than ours, he should let himself be persuaded by us and live the rest of his life a believer in gods. So let’s review the thesis we argued [d] for the existence of gods against the non-believers: was it cogent or feeble?

C
LINIAS
: Feeble, sir? Not in the least.

A
THENIAN
: Very well. So far as atheists are concerned, we may regard our case as complete. Next we have to use some gentle persuasion on the man who believes in gods but thinks they are unconcerned about human affairs. ‘My splendid fellow,’ we’ll say, ‘your belief in the existence of gods probably springs from a kind of family tie between you and the gods that draws you to your natural kin and makes you honor them and recognize their existence. What drives you to impiety is the good fortune of scoundrels [e] and criminals in private and public life—which in reality is not good fortune at all, although it is highly admired as such by popular opinion and its misplaced enthusiasms: poetry and literature of every kind invest it with a pernicious glamour. Or perhaps you observe men reaching the
[900]
end of their lives, full of years and honor, leaving behind them their children’s children, and your present disquiet is because you’ve discovered (either from hearsay or personal observation) a few of the many ghastly acts of impiety which (you notice) are the very means by which some of these people have risen from humble beginnings to supreme power and dictatorships. The result is that although by virtue of your kinship with the gods you’d clearly be reluctant to lay such things at their door, your mental confusion and your inability to find fault with them has brought [b] you to your present predicament where you believe they exist, but despise and neglect human affairs. Now, we want to prevent your thoughts from becoming more impious than they are already: let’s see if argument will ward off the disease while it is still in its early stages. We must also try to make use of the original thesis we argued so exhaustively against the absolute atheist, by linking the next step in the exposition on to it.’ So you, Clinias and Megillus, must do what you did before: take the young man’s [c] place and answer on his behalf. If any difficulty crops up in the argument, I’ll take over from you two as I did just now, and conduct you across the river.

C
LINIAS
: Good idea. You play your part, and we’ll carry out your suggestions to the best of our ability.

A
THENIAN
: Still, perhaps it won’t be too difficult to show our friend that gods are just as attentive to details as to important matters—more so, in fact. You see, he was here a moment ago and heard that their special job—[d] an expression of their perfect virtue—is to watch over the universe.

C
LINIAS
: Yes, he certainly did hear that said.

A
THENIAN
: The next thing is for our opponents to join us in asking this question: what particular virtue have we in mind when we agree that the gods are good? Now then: don’t we regard moderation and the possession of reason as a mark of virtue, and their opposites as marks of vice?

C
LINIAS
: We do.

A
THENIAN
: What about courage and cowardice? Are we agreed they [e] come under virtue and vice respectively?

C
LINIAS
: Certainly.

A
THENIAN
: And we’ll label the one set of qualities ‘disgraceful’ and the other ‘admirable’?

C
LINIAS
: Yes, we must.

A
THENIAN
: And if the base qualities are characteristic of anyone, they are characteristic of us; the gods, we shall say, are
not
affected by them, either radically or slightly.

C
LINIAS
: No one would disagree with that either.

A
THENIAN
: Well, then, shall we regard neglect and idleness and riotous living as part of the soul’s virtue? Or what’s your view?

C
LINIAS
: Really!

A
THENIAN
: As part of vice, then?

C
LINIAS
: Yes.

A
THENIAN
: So it’s the opposite qualities that will be ascribed to virtue?
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C
LINIAS
: Right.

A
THENIAN
: Very well then. In our view all idle and thoughtless bons vivants will be just the kind of people the poet said were ‘like nothing so much as stingless drones’.
⁵

C
LINIAS
: Very apt, that.

A
THENIAN
: So we mustn’t say that God has precisely the sort of character he himself detests, and we mustn’t allow any attempt to maintain such a view.

C
LINIAS
: Of course not; it would be intolerable.

[b] A
THENIAN
: Take someone who has the special job of looking after some particular sphere of action, and who is preoccupied with his major duties to the neglect of the small. Could we possibly commend him, except for reasons that would ring quite hollow? Let’s consider the point in this light: doesn’t this sort of conduct—divine or human—fall into two categories?

C
LINIAS
: Two categories, do we say?

A
THENIAN
:
Either
a man thinks it makes no difference to his job as a whole if he neglects the details,
or
important though they are, he nevertheless lives [c] in idleness and self-indulgence and neglects them. Or is there some other possible reason for his neglecting them? (Of course, if it is simply
impossible
to look after everything, and a god or some poor mortal fails to take care of something when he has not the strength and therefore the ability, no question of positive neglect of either major or minor duties will arise.)

C
LINIAS
: No, of course not.

A
THENIAN
: Now let our two opponents answer the questions of the three [d] of us. They both admit gods exist, but one thinks they can be bought off, the other that they are careless about details. ‘First of all, do you both admit that the gods know and see and hear everything, and that nothing within the range of our senses or intellect can escape them? Is this your position, or what?

C
LINIAS
: ‘It is.’

A
THENIAN
: ‘And also, that they can do anything which is within the power of mortals and immortals?’

C
LINIAS
: Yes, of course they’ll agree to that too.

[e] A
THENIAN
: Further, the five of us have already agreed that the gods are good—supremely so, in fact.

C
LINIAS
: Emphatically.

A
THENIAN
: So surely, given they’re the sort of beings we’ve admitted, it’s absolutely impossible to agree that they do anything out of sloth and self-indulgence. Among us mortals, you see, laziness springs from cowardice, and sloth from laziness and self-indulgence.

C
LINIAS
: That’s very true.

A
THENIAN
: Then no god neglects anything because of sloth and laziness, because no god, presumably, suffers from cowardice.

C
LINIAS
: You’re quite right.

A
THENIAN
: Now if in fact they do neglect the tiny details of the universe,
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the remaining possibilities are surely these:
either
they neglect them because they know that no such detail needs their attention,
or
—well, what other explanation could there be, except a lack of knowledge?

C
LINIAS
: None.

A
THENIAN
: So, my dearest sir, are we to interpret you as saying that the gods are ignorant, and display negligence where it is necessary to be solicitous, because they don’t
know
? Or alternatively that they realize the necessity, but do what the most wretched of men are said to do, namely fail in their duty because they are somehow overcome by temptation or pain, even though they know that there are better options than the one [b] they’ve in fact chosen?

C
LINIAS
: Indeed not.

A
THENIAN
: Now surely human life has something to do with the world of the soul, and man himself is the most god-fearing of all living creatures, isn’t he?

C
LINIAS
: I dare say.

A
THENIAN
: And we regard all mortal creatures as possessions of gods, like the universe as a whole.

C
LINIAS
: Of course.

A
THENIAN
: So whether you argue these possessions count for little or much in the sight of the gods, in neither case would it be proper for our [c] owners to neglect us, seeing how very solicitous and good they are. You see, there’s another point we ought to consider here.

C
LINIAS
: What?

A
THENIAN
: It’s a point about perception and physical strength. Aren’t they essentially at opposite poles, so far as ease and difficulty are concerned?

C
LINIAS
: What do you mean?

A
THENIAN
: Although little things are more difficult to see or hear than big, they are much easier, when there are only a few of them, to carry or control or look after.

C
LINIAS
: Yes, much easier. [d]

A
THENIAN
: Take a doctor who has been given the entire body to treat. Will he ever get good results if he neglects the individual limbs and tiny parts, in spite of being willing and able to look after the major organs?

C
LINIAS
: No, never.

A
THENIAN
: Nor yet will helmsmen or generals or householders, nor ‘statesmen’ or anybody of that ilk, succeed in major day-to-day matters if they neglect occasional details. You know how even masons say the big [e] stones don’t lie well without the small ones.

C
LINIAS
: Of course.

A
THENIAN
: So let’s not treat God as less skilled than a mortal craftsman, who applies the same expertise to all the jobs in his own line whether they’re big or small, and gets more finished and perfect results the better he is at his work. We must not suppose that God, who is supremely wise,
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and willing and able to superintend the world, looks to major matters but—like a faint-hearted lazybones who throws up his hands at hard work—neglects the minor, which we established were in fact
easier
to look after.

C
LINIAS
: No sir, we should never entertain such notions about gods. It’s a point of view that would be absolutely impious and untrue.

A
THENIAN
: Well, it looks to me as if we’ve given a pretty complete answer to this fellow who’s always going on about the negligence of heaven.

C
LINIAS
: Yes, we have.

[b] A
THENIAN
: At any rate, our thesis has forced him to admit he was wrong. But I still think we need to find a form of words to
charm
him into agreement.

C
LINIAS
: Well, my friend, what do you suggest?

A
THENIAN
: What we say to the young man should serve to convince him of this thesis: ‘The supervisor of the universe has arranged everything with an eye to its preservation and excellence, and its individual parts play appropriate active or passive roles according to their various capacities. These parts, down to the smallest details of their active and passive functions, have each been put under the control of ruling powers that have [c] perfected the minutest constituents of the universe. Now then, you perverse fellow, one such part—a mere speck that nevertheless constantly contributes to the good of the whole—is you, you who have forgotten that nothing is created except to provide the entire universe with a life of prosperity. You forget that creation is not for your benefit:
you
exist for the sake of the universe. Every doctor, you see, and every skilled craftsman always works for the sake of some end-product as a whole; he handles his materials so that they will give the best results in general, and makes [d] the parts contribute to the good of the whole, not vice versa. But you’re grumbling because you don’t appreciate that your position is best not only for the universe but for you too, thanks to your common origin. And since a soul is allied with different bodies at different times, and perpetually undergoes all sorts of changes, either self-imposed or produced by some other soul, the divine checkers-player has nothing else to do except promote a soul with a promising character to a better situation, and relegate one that is deteriorating to an inferior, as is appropriate in each case, so that [e] they all meet the fate they deserve.’

C
LINIAS
: How do you mean?

A
THENIAN
: I fancy I could explain how easy it could be for gods to control the universe. Suppose that in one’s constant efforts to serve its interests one were to mold all that is in it by
transforming
everything (by turning fire into water permeated by soul, for instance), instead of producing variety from a basic unity or unity from variety, then after the first or
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second or third stage of creation everything would be arranged in an infinite number of perpetually changing patterns.
⁶
But in fact the supervisor of the universe finds his task remarkably easy.