Complete Works (326 page)

C
LINIAS
: You’ve put it admirably, and your point must be allowed.

A
THENIAN
: Now let’s put the point in a different way, and once again answer our own questions: ‘Suppose the whole universe were somehow to coalesce and come to a standstill—the theory which most of our philosopher-fellows are actually bold enough to maintain—which of the motions we have enumerated would inevitably be the first to arise in it?’ ‘Self-generating [b] motion, surely, because no antecedent impulse can ever be transmitted from something else in a situation where no antecedent impulse exists. Self-generating motion, then, is the source of all motions, and the primary force in both stationary and moving objects, and we shan’t be able to avoid the conclusion that it is the most ancient and the most potent of all changes, whereas the change which is produced by something else and is in turn transmitted to other objects, comes second.’

C
LINIAS
: You’re absolutely right.

[c] A
THENIAN
: So now we’ve reached this point in our discussion, here’s another question we should answer.

C
LINIAS
: What?

A
THENIAN
: If we ever saw this phenomenon—self-generating motion—arise in an object made of earth, water or fire (alone or in combination) how should we describe that object’s condition?

C
LINIAS
: Of course, what you’re really asking me is this: when an object moves itself, are we to say that it is ‘alive’?

A
THENIAN
: That’s right.

C
LINIAS
: It emphatically is alive.

A
THENIAN
: Well then, when we see that a thing has a soul, the situation is exactly the same, isn’t it? We have to admit that it is alive.

C
LINIAS
: Yes, exactly the same.

[d] A
THENIAN
: Now, for heaven’s sake, hold on a minute. I suppose you’d be prepared to recognize three elements in any given thing?

C
LINIAS
: What do you mean?

A
THENIAN
: The first point is what the object actually
is
, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name. And in addition there are two questions to be asked about every existing thing.

C
LINIAS
: Two?

A
THENIAN
: Sometimes we put forward the mere name and want to know the definition, and sometimes we put forward the definition and ask for the name.

C
LINIAS
: I take it the point we want to make at the moment is this.

A
THENIAN
: What?

[e] C
LINIAS
: In general, things can be divided into two, and this is true of some numbers as well. Such a number has the
name
‘even’ and its
definition
is ‘a number divisible into two equal parts’.

A
THENIAN
: Yes, that’s the sort of thing I mean. So surely, in either case—whether we provide the name and ask for the definition or give the definition and ask for the name—we’re referring to the same object? When we
call
it ‘even’ and
define
it as ‘a number divisible into two’, it’s the same thing we’re talking about.

C
LINIAS
: It certainly is.

[896]
A
THENIAN
: So what’s the definition of the thing we call the soul? Surely we can do nothing but use our formula of a moment ago: ‘motion capable of moving itself’.

C
LINIAS
: Do you mean that the entity which we all
call
‘soul’ is precisely that which is
defined
by the expression ‘self-generating motion’?

A
THENIAN
: I do. And if this is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t we got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul is identical with the original source of the generation and motion of all past, present and future things and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion in everything. [b]

C
LINIAS
: Dissatisfied? No! On the contrary, it has been proved up to the hilt that soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there is.

A
THENIAN
: But when one thing is put in motion by another, it is never thereby endowed with the power of independent self-movement. Such derived motion will therefore come second, or as far down the list as you fancy relegating it, being a mere change in matter that quite literally ‘has no soul’.

C
LINIAS
: Correctly argued.

A
THENIAN
: So it was an equally correct, final and complete statement of the truth, when we said that soul is prior to matter, and that matter [c] came later and takes second place. Soul is the master, and matter its natural subject.

C
LINIAS
: That is indeed absolutely true.

A
THENIAN
: The next step is to remember our earlier admission that if soul were shown to be older than matter, the spiritual order of things would be older than the material.

C
LINIAS
: Certainly.

A
THENIAN
: So habits, customs, will, calculation, right opinion, diligence [d] and memory will be prior creations to material length, breadth, depth and strength, if (as is true) soul is prior to matter.

C
LINIAS
: Unavoidably.

A
THENIAN
: And the next unavoidable admission, seeing that we are going to posit soul as the cause of
all
things, will be that it is the cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice and all the opposites.

C
LINIAS
: Of course.

A
THENIAN
: And surely it’s necessary to assert that as soul resides and [e] keeps control anywhere where anything is moved, it controls the heavens as well.

C
LINIAS
: Naturally.

A
THENIAN
: One soul, or more than one? I’ll answer for you both: more than one. At any rate, we must not assume fewer than two: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity.

C
LINIAS
: That’s absolutely right.

A
THENIAN
: Very well, then. So soul, by virtue of its own motions, stirs into movement everything in the heavens and on earth and in the sea. The names of the motions of soul are: wish, reflection, diligence, counsel,
[897]
opinion true and false, joy and grief, cheerfulness and fear, love and hate. Soul also uses all related or initiating motions which take over the secondary movements of matter and stimulate everything to increase or diminish, separate or combine, with the accompanying heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, roughness and smoothness, white and black, bitter and sweet. These are the instruments soul uses, whether it cleaves to divine reason [b] (soul itself being, if the truth were told, a divinity), and guides everything to an appropriate and successful conclusion, or allies itself with unreason and produces completely opposite results. Shall we agree this is the case, or do we still suspect that the truth may be different?

C
LINIAS
: By no means.

A
THENIAN
: Well then, what kind of soul may we say has gained control of the heavens and earth and their entire cycle of movement? Is it the rational and supremely virtuous kind, or that which has neither advantage? [c] Would you like our reply to run like this?

C
LINIAS
: How?

A
THENIAN
: ‘If, my fine fellow’ (we should say) ‘the whole course and movement of the heavens and all that is in them reflect the motion and revolution and calculation of reason, and operate in a corresponding fashion, then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path.’

C
LINIAS
: True.

A
THENIAN
: ‘If however these things move in an unbalanced and disorganized [d] way, we must say the evil kind of soul is in charge of them.’

C
LINIAS
: That too is true.

A
THENIAN
: ‘So what is the nature of rational motion?’ Now this, my friends, is a question to which it is difficult to give an answer that will make sense, so you’re justified here in calling me in to help with your reply.

C
LINIAS
: Good.

A
THENIAN
: Still, in answering this question we mustn’t assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately: let’s not produce darkness at noon, so to speak, by looking at [e] the sun direct. We can save our sight by looking at an
image
of the object we’re asking about.

C
LINIAS
: How do you mean?

A
THENIAN
: What about selecting from our list of ten motions the one which reason resembles, and taking that as our image? I’ll join you in recalling it, and then we’ll give a joint answer to the question.

C
LINIAS
: Yes, that’s probably your best method of explanation.

A
THENIAN
: Do we still remember at any rate this from the list of points we made earlier, that all things are either in motion or at rest?

C
LINIAS
: Yes, we do.

A
THENIAN
: And some of those in motion move in a single location, others
[898]
in a succession of locations?

C
LINIAS
: That is so.

A
THENIAN
: Of these two motions, that taking place in a single location necessarily implies continuous revolution round a central point, just like wheels being turned on a lathe; and this kind of motion bears the closest possible affinity and likeness to the cyclical movement of reason.

C
LINIAS
: What do you mean?

A
THENIAN
: Take reason on the one hand, and motion in a single location on the other. If we were to point out that in both cases the motion was determined by a single plan and procedure and that it was (a) regular, (b) [b] uniform, (c) always at the same point in space, (d) around a fixed center, (e) in the same position relative to other objects, and were to illustrate both by the example of a sphere being turned on a lathe, then no one could ever show us up for incompetent makers of verbal images.

C
LINIAS
: You’re quite right.

A
THENIAN
: Now consider the motion that is never uniform or regular or at the same point in space or round the same center or in the same relative position or in a single location, and is neither planned nor organized nor systematic. Won’t that motion be associated with every kind of unreason?

C
LINIAS
: Absolutely true, it will.

A
THENIAN
: So now there’s no difficulty in saying right out that since we [c] find that the entire cycle of events is to be attributed to soul, the heavens that we see revolving must necessarily be driven round—we have to say—because they are arranged and directed
either
by the best kind of soul
or
by the other sort.

C
LINIAS
: Well, sir, judging from what has been said, I think it would be rank blasphemy to deny that their revolution is produced by one or more souls blessed with perfect virtue.

A
THENIAN
: You’ve proved a most attentive listener, Clinias. Now attend to this further point. [d]

C
LINIAS
: What?

A
THENIAN
: If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon and the other heavenly bodies, does it not impel each individually?

C
LINIAS
: Of course.

A
THENIAN
: Let’s take a single example: our results will then obviously apply to all the other heavenly bodies.

C
LINIAS
: And your example is…?

A
THENIAN
: …the sun. Everyone can see its body, but no one can see its soul—not that you could see the soul of any other creature, living or dying. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that we are in fact held in the embrace of some such thing though it is totally below the level of our bodily senses, and is perceptible by reason alone. So by reason [e] and understanding let’s get hold of a new point about the soul.

C
LINIAS
: What?

A
THENIAN
: If soul drives the sun, we shan’t go far wrong if we say that it operates in one of three ways.

C
LINIAS
: And what are they?

A
THENIAN
: Either (a) the soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries it wherever it goes, just as
our
soul takes us around from one place to another, or (b) it acquires its own body of fire or air of some kind
[899]
(as certain people maintain), and impels the sun by the external contact of body with body, or (c) it is entirely immaterial, but guides the sun along its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful powers.

C
LINIAS
: Yes, it must necessarily be by one of these methods that the soul manages the universe.

A
THENIAN
: Now, just wait a minute. Whether we find that it is by stationing itself in the sun and driving it like a chariot, or by moving it from outside, or by some other means, that this soul provides us all with light, every single one of us is bound to regard it as a god. Isn’t that right?

[b] C
LINIAS
: Yes, one would be absolutely stupid not to.

A
THENIAN
: Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and the months and all the seasons: what can we do except repeat the same story? A soul or souls—and perfectly virtuous souls at that—have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we shall insist that these souls are gods. Can anybody admit all this and still put up with people who deny that ‘everything is full of gods’?
⁴