Complete Works (35 page)
H
ERMOGENES
: The pace of investigating seems to be quickening, Socrates! [d]
S
OCRATES
: That’s because I’m coming to the finishing post! But I still want to investigate ‘
anank
ē
’ (‘compulsion’) and ‘
hekousion
’ (‘voluntary’), since they’re next. The name ‘
hekousion
’ expresses the fact that it signifies yielding and not resisting, but yielding, as I said before, to the motion (
eikon t
ō
i ionti
)—the one that comes into being in accord with our wish. ‘
Anankaion
’ (‘compulsory’) and ‘
antitupnon
’ (‘resistant’), on the other hand, since they signify motion contrary to our wish, are associated with ‘error’ and ‘ignorance’. Indeed, saying ‘
anankaion
’ is like trying to get through a ravine (
ank
ē
), for ravines restrain motion, since they are rough-going, filled with bushes, and hard to get through. It’s probably for this reason that [e] we use ‘
anankaion
’ in the way we do—because saying it is like trying to get through a ravine. Nonetheless, while my strength lasts, let’s not stop using it. Don’t you stop, either, but keep asking your questions.
[421]
H
ERMOGENES
: Well, then, let me ask about the finest and most important names, ‘
al
ē
theia
’ (‘truth’), ‘
pseudos
’ (‘falsehood’), ‘
on
’ (‘being’), and—the subject of our present conversation—‘
onoma
’ (‘name’), and why it is so named.
S
OCRATES
: Do you know what ‘
maiesthai
’ means?
H
ERMOGENES
: Yes, it means ‘to search’ (‘
z
ē
tein
’).
S
OCRATES
: Well, ‘
onoma
’ (‘name’) seems to be a compressed statement which says: “this is a being for which there is a search.” You can see this more easily in ‘
onomaston
’ (‘thing named’), since it clearly says: “this is a being for which there is a search (
on hou masma estin
).” ‘
Al
ē
theia
’ (‘truth’) [b] is like these others in being compressed, for the divine motion of being is called ‘
al
ē
theia
’ because ‘
al
ē
theia
’ is a compressed form of the phrase “a wandering that is divine (
al
ē
theia
).” ‘
Pseudos
’ (‘falsehood’) is the opposite of this motion, so that, once again, what is restrained or compelled to be inactive is reviled by the name-giver, and likened to people asleep (
katheudousi
)—but the meaning of the name is concealed by the addition of ‘
ps
’. ‘
On
’ (‘being’) or ‘
ousia
’ (‘being’) says the same as ‘
al
ē
theia
’ once an ‘
i
’ is added, since it signifies going (
ion
). ‘
Ouk on
’ (‘not being’), in turn, is [c] ‘
ouk ion
’ (‘not going’), and indeed some people actually use that name for it.
H
ERMOGENES
: I think you’ve hammered these into shape manfully, Socrates. But suppose someone were to ask you about the correctness of the names ‘
ion
’ (‘going’), ‘
rheon
’ (‘flowing’), and ‘
doun
’ (‘shackling’) …
S
OCRATES
: “How should we answer him?” Is that what you were going to say?
H
ERMOGENES
: Yes, exactly.
S
OCRATES
: One way of giving the semblance of an answer has been suggested already.
48
H
ERMOGENES
: What way is that?
S
OCRATES
: To say that a name has a foreign origin when we don’t know what it signifies. Now, it may well be true that some of these names are [d] foreign, but it is also possible that the basic or ‘first’ names are Greek, but not recoverable because they are so old. Names have been twisted in so many ways, indeed, that it wouldn’t be surprising if the ancient Greek word was the same as the modern foreign one.
H
ERMOGENES
: At any rate, it wouldn’t be at all inappropriate for you to respond that way.
S
OCRATES
: No, it probably wouldn’t. Nevertheless, it seems to me that “once we’re in the competition, we’re allowed no excuses,”
49
but must investigate these names vigorously. We should remember this, however: if someone asks about the terms from which a name is formed, and then [e] about the ones from which those terms are formed, and keeps on doing this indefinitely, the answerer must finally give up. Mustn’t he?
H
ERMOGENES
: That’s my view, at any rate.
S
OCRATES
: At what point would he be right to stop? Wouldn’t it be when
[422]
he reaches the names that are as it were the elements of all the other statements and names? For, if these are indeed elements, it cannot be right to suppose that
they
are composed out of other names. Consider ‘
agathos
’ (‘good’), for example; we said it is composed out of ‘
agaston
’ (‘admirable’) and ‘
thoon
’ (‘fast’).
50
And probably ‘
thoon
’ is composed out of other names, and those out of still other ones. But if we ever get hold of a name that isn’t composed out of other names, we’ll be right to say that at last we’ve [b] reached an element, which cannot any longer be carried back to other names.
H
ERMOGENES
: That seems right to me, at least.
S
OCRATES
: And if the names you’re asking about now turn out to be elements, won’t we have to investigate their correctness in a different manner from the one we’ve been using so far?
H
ERMOGENES
: Probably so.
S
OCRATES
: It is certainly probable, Hermogenes. At any rate, it’s obvious that all the earlier ones were resolved into these. So, if they are indeed elements, as they seem to me to be, join me again in investigating them, [c] to ensure that I don’t talk nonsense about the correctness of the first names.
H
ERMOGENES
: You have only to speak, and I will join in the investigation so far as I’m able.
S
OCRATES
: I think you agree with me that there is only one kind of correctness in all names, primary as well as derivative, and that considered simply as names there is no difference between them.
H
ERMOGENES
: Certainly.
S
OCRATES
: Now, the correctness of every name we analyzed was intended [d] to consist in its expressing the nature of one of the things that are.
H
ERMOGENES
: Of course.
S
OCRATES
: And this is no less true of primary names than derivative ones, if indeed they are names.
H
ERMOGENES
: Certainly.
S
OCRATES
: But it seems that the derivative ones were able to accomplish this by means of the primary ones.
H
ERMOGENES
: Apparently.
S
OCRATES
: And if the primary names are indeed names, they must make the things that are as clear as possible to us. But how can they do this when they aren’t based on other names? Answer me this: If we hadn’t a [e] voice or a tongue, and wanted to express things to one another, wouldn’t we try to make signs by moving our hands, head, and the rest of our body, just as dumb people do at present?
H
ERMOGENES
: What other choice would we have, Socrates?
S
OCRATES
: So, if we wanted to express something light in weight or above us, I think we’d raise our hand towards the sky in imitation of the very
[423]
nature of the thing. And if we wanted to express something heavy or below us, we’d move our hand towards the earth. And if we wanted to express a horse (or any other animal) galloping, you know that we’d make our bodies and our gestures as much like theirs as possible.
H
ERMOGENES
: I think we’d have to.
S
OCRATES
: Because the only way to express anything by means of our [b] body is to have our body imitate whatever we want to express.
H
ERMOGENES
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: So, if we want to express a particular fact by using our voice, tongue, and mouth, we will succeed in doing so, if we succeed in imitating it by means of them?
H
ERMOGENES
: That must be right, I think.
S
OCRATES
: It seems to follow that a name is a vocal imitation of what it imitates, and that someone who imitates something with his voice names what he imitates.
H
ERMOGENES
: I think so.
[c] S
OCRATES
: Well,
I
don’t. I don’t think this is a fine thing to say at all.
H
ERMOGENES
: Why not?
S
OCRATES
: Because then we’d have to agree that those who imitate sheep, cocks, or other animals are naming the things they imitate.
H
ERMOGENES
: That’s true, we would.
S
OCRATES
: And do you think that’s a fine conclusion?
H
ERMOGENES
: No, I don’t. But then what sort of imitation is a name, Socrates?
S
OCRATES
: In the first place, if we imitate things the way we imitate them [d] in music, we won’t be naming them, not even if the imitation in question is vocal. And the same holds if we imitate the things music imitates. What I mean is this: each thing has a sound and a shape, and many of them have a color. Don’t they?
H
ERMOGENES
: Certainly.
S
OCRATES
: It doesn’t seem to be the craft of naming that’s concerned with imitating these qualities, however, but rather the crafts of music and painting. Isn’t that so?
H
ERMOGENES
: Yes.
[e] S
OCRATES
: And what about this? Don’t you think that just as each thing has a color or some of those other qualities we mentioned, it also has a being or essence? Indeed, don’t color and sound each have a being or essence, just like every other thing that we say “is”?
H
ERMOGENES
: Yes, I think they do.
S
OCRATES
: So if someone were able to imitate in letters and syllables this being or essence that each thing has, wouldn’t he express what each thing itself is?
[424]
H
ERMOGENES
: He certainly would.
S
OCRATES
: And if you were to identify the person who is able to do this, in just the way that you said the first was a musician and the second a painter, what would you say he is?
H
ERMOGENES
: I think he’s the namer, Socrates, the one we’ve been looking for from the beginning.
S
OCRATES
: If that’s true, doesn’t it seem that we are now in a position to investigate each of the names you were asking about—‘
rho
ē
’ (‘flowing’), ‘
ienai
’ (‘going’), and ‘
schesis
’ (‘restraining’)—to see whether or not he has grasped the being or essence of each of the things they signify by imitating its being or essence in the letters and syllables of its name. Isn’t that so? [b]
H
ERMOGENES
: Certainly.
S
OCRATES
: Come, then, let’s see if these are the only primary names or if there are many others.
H
ERMOGENES
: For my part, I think there are others.
S
OCRATES
: Yes, there probably are. But how are we to divide off the ones with which the imitator begins his imitation? Since an imitation of a thing’s being or essence is made out of letters and syllables, wouldn’t it be most correct for us to divide off the letters or elements first, just as those who set to work on speech rhythms first divide off the forces or powers of [c] the letters or elements, then those of syllables, and only then investigate rhythms themselves?
H
ERMOGENES
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: So mustn’t we first divide off the vowels and then the others in accordance with their differences in kind, that is to say, the “consonants” and “mutes” (as I take it they’re called by specialists in these matters) and the semivowels, which are neither vowels nor mutes? And, as to the vowels themselves, mustn’t we also divide off those that differ in kind from one another? Then when we’ve also well divided off the things that are—the things to which we have to give names—if there are some things to which [d] they can all be carried back, as names are to the letters, and from which we can see that they derive, and if different kinds of being are found among them, in just the way that there are among the letters—once we’ve done all this well, we’ll know how to apply each letter to what it resembles, whether one letter or a combination of many is to be applied to one thing. It’s just the same as it is with painters. When they want to produce a resemblance, they sometimes use only purple, sometimes another color, [e] and sometimes—for example, when they want to paint human flesh or something of that sort—they mix many colors, employing the particular color, I suppose, that their particular subject demands. Similarly, we’ll apply letters to things, using one letter for one thing, when that’s what seems to be required, or many letters together, to form what’s called a syllable, or many syllables combined to form names and verbs. From
[425]
names and verbs, in turn, we shall finally construct something important, beautiful, and whole. And just as the painter painted an animal, so—by means of the craft of naming or rhetoric or whatever it is—we shall construct sentences. Of course, I don’t really mean
we ourselves
—I was carried away by the discussion. It was
the ancients
who combined things in this way. Our job—if indeed we are to examine all these things with scientific knowledge—is to divide where they put together, so as to see whether or [b] not both the primary and derivative names are given in accord with nature. For, any other way of connecting names to things, Hermogenes, is inferior and unsystematic.